

POPULISM :
Authoritarian and Democratic

Robert H. Dix
Rice University

Populism is one of those terms (*democracy* is another) that is frequently employed in the study of politics and varies in meaning from context to context and from author to author. Thus the term has been invoked in studies of such agrarian-based movements as nineteenth-century agrarian unrest in the United States and the *narodniki* of prerevolutionary Russia as well as being applied to the largely urban-based populism of Latin America.¹ Moreover, most of those who have sought to characterize the populist parties in Latin America have done so in broad terms that encompass any party or political movement that has both a mass base and a cross-class composition. Torcuato DiTella's well-known definition characterized populism (in Latin America or elsewhere) as "a political movement which enjoys the support of the mass of the working class and/or the peasantry, but which does not result from the autonomous organizational power of either of these two sectors. It is also supported by non-working class sectors upholding an anti-*status quo* ideology."² Other Latin American students of populism such as Francisco Weffort and Ernesto Laclau, along with most others who have studied the phenomenon, have similarly broad conceptions of it.³ The intent is presumably to distinguish such movements from traditional "oligarchical" or strictly middle-class parties, on the one hand, and from so-called working-class parties, on the other. But for purposes of analysis, most existing parties of any real significance in Latin America or elsewhere unfortunately fall at least loosely under the rubric of populism. Given the universal suffrage that now widely prevails (in those societies where suffrage is relevant), few parties seeking power do not try in some sense to incorporate the masses, and few seek to appeal only to a single class. Even most Marxist parties and revolutionary movements, which are presumably attuned to the workers or "the people," are usually led by persons of middle-class derivation and habitually count many such persons in the ranks of their voters (such as Chile's Socialists) or fighters (such as Cuba's Fidelistas and Nicaragua's Sandinistas).⁴ DiTella himself included as examples of populism the Chinese Communists and the Fidelistas, as well as the Peronists of Ar-

gentina and such parties of Latin America's "democratic left" as Venezuela's Acción Democrática (AD) and Peru's branch of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA).⁵

If the populist category is indeed so broad, if virtually everyone is a populist, the category tends to become meaningless and in need of some distinctions. DiTella himself recognized such a necessity. He considered the principal basis for distinction among the types of populism to be the social composition of the non-working-class elements of the populist coalition, that is, whether that coalition includes elements from the bourgeoisie, the military, and the clergy, or instead only elements from the lower middle class and intelligentsia. A second, related criterion asks whether these groups are accepted or rejected within their own class.⁶ My purpose in part will be to examine cross-nationally DiTella's propositions concerning the differences among types of populism in an effort to confirm, modify, or reject these propositions on the basis of the extant evidence. I intend, however, to go beyond DiTella by examining not only leadership composition but the mass base of populism, its ideology and program, and its organization and leadership style in order to delineate more explicitly the main varieties of populism as they are found throughout Latin America. After testing and expanding DiTella's original conceptualization of at least the principal types of populism, I hope to draw out the significance of these divergent varieties of populism for the history and politics of Latin America. In the process, I will also seek to explore those factors that seem best to account for the emergence of one or another type of populism in different nations or within the same nation at different times or even simultaneously.

I have chosen to analyze examples from those types of populism that occur most frequently in Latin America and that are most clearly populist both by DiTella's criteria and by common acceptance in the literature. These types will here be termed *authoritarian populism* and *democratic populism*.⁷ Other varieties of potentially populist parties, such as the Fidelistas or the Radicals of Argentina, have been more equivocally or controversially populist or have had fewer imitators elsewhere in the hemisphere. Many would mark them as single-class (whether middle-class or working-class) parties, and DiTella himself tended to equivocate in calling them "populist." Three parties were chosen as examples of each type in order to base the analysis on a more representative sample than a case or two of each without having to examine in detail every populist movement in Latin America, a project more appropriate for a book than an article. The particular cases were selected to give a fairly broad range of countries by levels of development; the relative availability of material governed the choice as well. Each case is unique in certain senses and does not necessarily reflect the universe of

Latin American populisms. Nonetheless, in this exploratory attempt at the systematic comparative study of populism, the parties and movements analyzed here can be said to reflect populism's major varieties within Latin America.

The three examples of authoritarian populism that I have chosen to analyze at length are Peronismo in Argentina, Ibañismo in Chile, and Rojismo in Colombia. A brief description of each is provided as background for the discussion to follow.

Peronismo was the movement led in Argentina by Juan Domingo Perón, a member of the colonels' clique that carried out a coup in 1943. Elected President of Argentina in 1946 and reelected in 1951, Perón was overthrown in 1955. Loyalty to his person and to Peronismo survived him, particularly within the labor movement, and he returned to the presidency in 1973. Perón died in 1974, but Peronism, albeit at times badly fragmented, lives on.

Ibañismo in Chile was a multiparty coalition that included the Partido Agrario Laborista (PAL) and the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP). The movement formed around Carlos Ibáñez del Campo's campaign for the presidency in 1952. Ibáñez was a former career military officer who had ruled as a dictator during the years 1927–31. Ibañismo did not outlast the end of the second Ibáñez government in 1958.

The Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO) was the Colombian movement that formed around erstwhile dictator General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who had ruled from 1953 to 1957. Known also as Rojismo, the movement had some success in opposing the institutionalized bipartisan (Conservative-Liberal) coalition called the Frente Nacional during the 1960s. In 1970, with Rojas as its standard-bearer and nearly 40 percent of the vote, ANAPO came close to winning the presidency in a multicandidate race. Age and ill health subsequently caused Rojas to turn the leadership of ANAPO over to his daughter, María Eugenia, but the return to full competition between the liberals and the conservatives eroded its support and the remnants of the movement fragmented. Rojas died in 1975.

The movements I have chosen to represent democratic populism are Acción Democrática (AD) in Venezuela, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) in Peru, and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) in Bolivia.

Acción Democrática was the Venezuelan party long led by Rómulo Betancourt. Its remote origins trace back to a student protest in 1928 against dictator Juan Vicente Gómez, but it was not formally founded until 1941. AD attained a share of power in 1945 when it supported a coup by young military officers. Overthrown in 1948, AD returned to power via elections in 1958, when it shared cabinet and other posts with other parties. Over the last two decades, AD has alternated

regularly in controlling the presidency with the Comité Organizado por Elecciones Independientes (COPEI) in a genuinely competitive political system.

The Peruvian party APRA was founded by Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who was its principal *caudillo* until his death in 1979. An outgrowth of a student movement of the 1920s, APRA has competed for the presidency on several occasions but has never won it, always being denied by defeat or military prevention. On occasion APRA has supported governments in power. Elements of APRA have also sought from time to time to reach power through force, but again without success. Despite its setbacks, APRA has been the most important party in Peru over much of the last half-century.

The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) was the Bolivian party formed in the early 1940s and led by Víctor Paz Estenssoro and other professionals and intellectuals in protest against the incumbent elite-military alliance that had been restored to power after a brief "socialist" regime led by veterans of the lost Chaco War in the 1930s. Allying itself with the interests of young military officers, the MNR acquired a share of power in the governments during 1943–46. Having acquired stout allies among the tin miners, the MNR led a revolt in 1952 that subsequently acquired peasant support and effected profound (some would say revolutionary) changes in Bolivian society. The party was eventually overthrown by a coup in 1964, but several splinters of the original MNR linger on as part of the current political scene.

All of the parties or movements under consideration here arose in broadly similar social, historical, and political circumstances, and they share roughly similar characteristics, such as their cross-class composition and their extensive mass bases. My analysis of them will seek to demonstrate that to speak of populism as one generic phenomenon is to overlook some significant differences in the social composition and the nature of the parties or movements themselves. The distinct strands or varieties of populism have in turn arisen under varying circumstances or conditions and have had differing impacts on the politics of their respective countries. In the one type, they have arisen from democratic impulses and have tended to foster democratic rule; in the other, they have had much closer ties to the authoritarian strain that runs through Latin American political life.

LEADERSHIP

DiTella viewed populist parties as being led by "incongruent elites" who might well share elite status relative to that of the working class, but who were either of "marginal" status relative to incumbent elites or otherwise disaffected from the status quo. In examining the six

populist parties, most of the evidence concerning the social composition of their leadership follows closely the lines of distinction drawn between DiTella's "military reformers" and the "Apristas."

To begin with the top leaders, or caudillos, of these movements, the distinctions could hardly be sharper. Such individuals are particularly important to populism because populist movements tend to be led by strong or charismatic leaders who persist in their roles for many years. The leaders of the three cases of authoritarian populism (or "militaristic reform" parties) were all high-ranking career army officers. In contrast, the maximum leaders of the three examples of democratic populism were all lawyers, either actual or prospective: Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre of Peru's APRA, Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela's AD, and Víctor Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia's MNR.⁸

The larger leadership of these parties also shows some clear-cut distinctions, many along the lines of DiTella's characterization. It is true that the majority of the leadership of all these parties were university educated, most as lawyers or other professionals. Yet in other respects, the differences are striking. Active or retired military officers (like Colonel Domingo Mercante and Rear Admiral Alberto Teisaire) served as Perón's key aides or held prominent positions in his first administration.⁹ A scattering of military officers also represented Peronismo in Congress.¹⁰ The same was true of the Ibáñez administration, although its military members were somewhat less conspicuous. In the case of ANAPO, twenty-four of the seventy-nine members named by Rojas in 1961 to its first "national command" were retired military officers.¹¹ In contrast, there were virtually no men with military backgrounds among the leaders or legislative representatives of any of the democratic populist parties.¹²

Furthermore, landowners, businessmen, and "old line" politicians made up a significant proportion of the national leadership cadres of all three cases of authoritarian populism. For the Peronists, 12 percent of their legislators in 1946 and 20 percent in 1963 were landowners.¹³ Industrialists were also prominent among the confidants and advisers of the first Perón regime.¹⁴ In the case of Ibañismo, 29 percent of its adherents in the 1953 congress had landowning connections, while 40 percent had ties to business.¹⁵ Comparable quantitative data for ANAPO are unavailable; however, all that is known of Rojas Pinilla's closest associates and of the representatives of Rojismo in Congress (including the erstwhile allegiance of most of them to the Conservative party) points to the prominence of property owners among them.

The presence of persons of similar backgrounds among the democratic populists was minimal. In contrast to the leadership pattern of the authoritarian version of populism, most leaders of the democratic populists were, if not strictly professionals or career politicians, usually

intellectuals (professors, teachers, students, writers, or journalists). For example, APRA was formed (ostensibly as an international political party) in 1924 in Mexico, after Haya and other leaders of the student movement at the University of San Marcos in Lima had been forced into exile as a result of their agitation against the Peruvian government of the day.¹⁶ In fact, both APRA and AD grew directly or indirectly out of university student movements that opposed the reigning dictatorships of their times. Virtually all the top AD leaders, including the founders of the party, came from the ranks of lawyers, doctors, educators, or labor or peasant leaders, although many had spent most of their lives as professional politicians.¹⁷ The founders of Bolivia's MNR were all lawyer-politicians and journalists, with the exception of one engineer. Subsequently recruited leaders included members of the same occupations, several students and teachers, a couple of union leaders, and a pharmacist.¹⁸

Among the authoritarian populists, however, intellectuals were relatively few. Perón's first regime, in particular, was decidedly anti-intellectual, and he drastically purged the faculty of the University of Buenos Aires. The Peronista congressional delegation included only a few teachers (2 percent in 1946, none reported in 1963).¹⁹ There were proportionately fewer intellectuals in the Ibañista congressional delegation during the 1950s than in any other Chilean party of that era.²⁰ In fact, Ibáñez himself complained in a 1955 speech that he had failed to obtain the understanding and support of youth with technical and administrative talents.²¹ A survey of a Colombian elite sample carried out in 1966 found that among the category of "intellectuals" (a designation carrying high prestige in Colombia), not one claimed to be an adherent of ANAPO.²² An occasional intellectual—the Socialist Antonio García, for example—supported the Rojista movement, but their numbers were few.

Comparing the leaders of worker or peasant origin reveals a more ambiguous picture. The democratic populists appear over time to have consistently included labor leaders (and even peasant leaders in the case of AD) in the top ranks of the party's command, in their parliamentary delegations, or in both. Such representation also appears to have been more "authentic" than in the case of authoritarian populism. At the same time, Peronism has always been closely tied to labor (32 percent of its congressional delegation in 1946 had a labor background),²³ and following Perón's first administration, union leaders have played a prominent role in the movement. Pro-Ibáñez congressional delegates also included workers, but most of them were white-collar, rather than blue-collar, workers, and most represented the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP). This important, but short-lived, component of the Ibáñez coalition was not a core supporter of Ibañismo, as

was the Partido Agrario Laborista (PAL).²⁴ The third example of authoritarian populism, ANAPO, had virtually no workers or labor leaders among its leadership strata.

The data are hardly complete and not always comparable. But they are sufficient for the present purpose of giving DiTella's distinction an empirical base. They make clear the fact that all of the populist movements in question have relied essentially on middle-class professionals to staff their party organizations and congressional delegations, as do almost all political groups of whatever political stripe in recent and contemporary Latin America. Leaders can generally be characterized fairly as "incongruent elites." Beyond such commonalities, however, the authoritarian populists look toward the military and toward property owners of some substance for their leadership. The democratic populists rely more on intellectuals and professional politicians. Representatives of labor also tend to be represented more in the leadership strata of the democratic populist parties, although the differences are not so marked or consistent. The pattern revealed is of two distinct varieties of populist party, at least as distinguished by the differing backgrounds of their leadership.

SUPPORT

The base of support for all of these populist leaderships was to a substantial degree urban and to a significant extent lower or working class in social composition. An important segment of the lower middle class also typically adhered to the populist cause.²⁵ Yet beyond such similarities, the specific composition of DiTella's "disposable mass" differed notably among the various examples of Latin American populism. In fact, such support was not always predominantly urban. Also open to question, and subject to considerable variation among particular instances of populism, is the issue of just who among the urban masses supported the various populist movements and parties. Were they workers, or urban "marginals," or even the middle class? Finally, an array of groups apart from the "masses" attached themselves to the support coalition of each of these movements, often contributing to their somewhat contrasting orientations and impacts.

In most striking contradiction to the usual image of Latin American populism was the rural dimension of all six of the cases under consideration. But in the case of the three authoritarian populist movements, rural dimensions were clearly secondary to the urban. In the case of the democratic populist movements, *campesino* support was a critical, even a predominant, element of their mass support.

Fully a third of ANAPO's votes in the presidential elections of 1966 and 1970 derived from *municipios* defined as rural.²⁶ Moreover, of

the eight departments giving 40 percent or more of their vote to Rojas in 1970, three contained Colombia's three largest cities (Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali); yet the other five, including the only three departments to give Rojas more than 50 percent of their votes in 1970, were largely agricultural.²⁷

Ibáñez also showed significant strength in rural areas of Chile. Of twenty-five communes that were at least 90 percent agricultural in 1960, Ibáñez won at least a third of the vote in twelve; in six communes, he won a plurality over all other candidates.²⁸ Although the class basis of Ibáñez's rural support can only be inferred, it appears that the 1952 Chilean election was the first in which the campesinos showed any substantial sign of throwing off their electoral dependence on *patrones*, thanks largely to the Ibáñez candidacy. In Rojas's case, his highest level of support nationwide came from the high-tenancy departments of eastern Colombia.²⁹

The evidence from Colombia and Chile broadly parallels that from Argentina. Peronism, which drew strong support from high-density urban areas in 1946 and in elections held after the end of Perón's first regime, often made at least as strong a showing proportionately in rural areas. Thus in 1962, when the Peronist vote accounted for 32 percent of the national total, it exceeded that figure in two of the four highly urbanized electoral districts of the littoral (the Federal Capital and the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Santa Fe). In the nineteen other provinces, Peronism surpassed the national average in seven, some of which were the most rural in the country.³⁰

Although this interpretation does not in itself contradict the proposition that populism in Latin America is above all an urban phenomenon, it does suggest that the rural dimensions of even authoritarian populism can be considerable.

Yet the rural and nonmetropolitan ties of the democratic populists are still more pronounced. For much of their political lives, all three parties under discussion have been the predominant force among the organized peasantry. Organizers from Venezuela's AD were largely responsible for the organization of the Federación Campesina Venezolana (FCV) in the 1940s and 1950s, a group whose members constitute about half of the country's organized workers. Additionally, all indications (in the absence of the requisite survey data) suggest that the votes of Venezuela's campesinos have usually gone disproportionately to AD. In fact, the region of AD's greatest electoral weakness is the capital city of Caracas and the surrounding metropolitan area.³¹ This situation does not imply, however, that populism as a generic phenomenon is weak in metropolitan Caracas because AD's most successful competition there has often come from other, usually ephemeral political movements that also would readily fit into the category of populist.³² It nonetheless

demonstrates that some populist movements do not draw their principal strength from urban "disposable masses."

Similarly, APRA has seldom fared well electorally in metropolitan Lima. Its strength has been more concentrated regionally than is the case with most populist parties, with its particular roots in the coastal provinces of northern Peru where it originated. Among its bases of support in that region have been the workers on the former sugar plantations.³³

The MNR as well, which began as an almost exclusively urban (and middle-class) party, subsequently drew its firmest base of support from the newly organized Bolivian peasantry. During the MNR's years in power from 1952 to 1964, when the tin miners proved rebellious against the dictates of government as well as party and the middle class proved to be its usually fractious self, the organized peasantry often served as the government's surest ally and most solid base of electoral and general support.³⁴

But even when the analysis is confined to urban areas, something of a problem exists, and some important distinctions need to be drawn in delineating the nature of populism's "disposable mass." Particular populist movements tend to differ with respect to whether they draw their greatest support from the unemployed and underemployed urban "marginals," often residents of the cities' shantytowns, or from the ranks of organized labor, whose members tend to be more regularly and remuneratively employed. The former seems to have been the case with Colombia's ANAPO. Survey data from the 1970 election period show that union members tended to support candidates other than General Rojas. His strength tended to rest instead with petty tradesmen, domestic servants, and the unemployed.³⁵ Survey data are lacking in the case of Ibañismo, but one must infer that Ibáñez received support from both categories of the urban lower class. He certainly received disproportionate support in those electoral districts where union members were most numerous (including mining districts), undoubtedly because of the backing he had in 1952 from what was then the largest faction of Chile's divided socialists.³⁶ Chile had a larger number of unionized workers than did Colombia because of its higher levels of industrialization and its important mining sector.

The evidence concerning Peronism is more complete, but also more complex for interpretation. Some students of Argentine society and politics argue that especially in the early years, Perón's support came disproportionately from recently urbanized internal migrants rather than from the "other" industrial working class, many of whom were European in origin or parentage. Such migrants supposedly tended to be uneducated, ideologically unsophisticated, steeped in the traditionalism of rural Argentina, and especially attracted by Perón's

nativist appeal and charismatic style.³⁷ Others argue that it was in fact industrial workers, whether migrants or not, who gave their backing to Perón on economic or “instrumental” grounds.³⁸ Still others contend that any such dualist approach to the Argentine working class is meaningless, that while concerns for social justice and participation were paramount among urban workers, the latter were much closer in background and attitude to their rural counterparts than is commonly supposed.³⁹ I do not propose to resolve the matter, which is apparently still at sharp issue among specialists on Argentina, but rather to reemphasize the internal diversity of populism’s “disposable mass” and the cross-national variations in its composition.

Within the democratic populist movements, there also has been diversity in country and cross-national variation in the composition of their urban mass support. Yet overall, the support of unionized or skilled labor seems to loom as a larger factor than reliance on an amorphous urban mass. This emphasis emerges clearly in Steve Stein’s comparative study of Aprismo and Sánchezcerrismo in Peru in the early 1930s. APRA tended to appeal more to workers while another populist movement led by Luis Sánchez Cerro appealed more to urban “marginals.” So too was AD’s urban lower-class support to be found among the petroleum workers and other elements of the Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos (CTV), rather than among the Caracas unemployed and semiemployed. The support of the MNR by the tin miners and other units of the Confederación de Obreros Bolivianos (COB) is yet another case in point.⁴⁰ Altogether, while the picture is mixed with regard to the authoritarian variety of populism, the democratic version appears relatively much more reliant on the support of union and skilled labor than on the proverbial “disposable mass.”

At the same time, other groups adhering to the cause of one or another political movement have given the varieties of populism their particular casts. In the case of ANAPO, such influential support included an association of retired military officers and some lower clergy (although by no means a majority of these groups).⁴¹ In the early years of Peronism, a number of “new” industrialists, an array of nationalist organizations, and much of the military and church hierarchies played important roles.⁴² Within Ibañismo, Arab-Chileans played an indicative role. Because many were merchants, industrialists, and professionals, the attraction of the left was presumably not great; at the same time, their ethnic origin barred them from full acceptance in the social and political circles of highest prestige.⁴³ Precisely this kind of person among the property-owning classes—individuals having property, but uncertain status—seemed particularly attracted to the Ibáñez movement.

The democratic populist movements, on the other hand, seemed

especially attractive to teachers, students, and intellectuals, at least until these ideologically restless types became alienated from the main body of the movement after it had attained power or at least a share of it.⁴⁴

These observations suggest that the social status and composition of leadership are not the only significant factors that distinguish the two main varieties of populism. For neither the “disposable mass” nor the more general supporting coalition is everywhere the same. Most notably, although authoritarian populist movements may have rural dimensions that are often overlooked, they do not rely nearly as heavily on campesinos for electoral and organizational backing as do the democratic populists. At the same time, the core support for the democratic variety of populist party cannot be adequately described as an urban-based lower class or “disposable mass,” a point that is confirmed by the relative strength of such parties among unionized and skilled labor (as distinct from urban “marginals”). Finally, DiTella’s distinctions regarding the non-lower-class components of the two varieties of populism—the military and the property-owning bourgeoisie in the one case as contrasted to intellectuals and lower-middle-class professionals in the other—are confirmed by the movement’s adherents as well as by the ranks of its leadership.

IDEOLOGY AND PROGRAM

For DiTella, “an ideology or a widespread emotional state” was the link that bound together the “incongruent elites” and “disposable masses” and drove them to collective action. Again, this generalization proves to be the case with the half-dozen populist movements under examination here. Yet again there are significant differences of emphasis that when taken together correspond generally to the distinctive patterns of leadership and support thus far delineated.

The authoritarian populist ideology and any attendant elaborated program were essentially afterthoughts and tended in any case to be vague and amorphous. Ibáñez’s supporters liked to think that Ibañismo was a tendency and a spirit superior to any program.⁴⁵ In fact, given Ibáñez’s disparate multiparty support, there was no centrally accepted program or ideology, merely “a widespread emotional state.” Lacking a formulated ideology at the outset, the Peronists subsequently sought to construct one, which they called *justicialismo*. It represented an attempt to steer a middle course, to find the “golden mean” or “third position” between such conflicting forces as communism and capitalism, collectivism and individualism. It was a “doctrine whose objective is the happiness of man in human society achieved through the harmony of materialistic, idealistic, individualistic, and collectivistic

forces, each valued in a Christian way."⁴⁶ George Blanksten characterized such an ideology, one constructed only after the fact of attaining power, as a theory of political opportunism: "It is somewhat difficult to imagine that Perón believes in Justicialismo. Perón believes in Perón."⁴⁷

For all three versions of authoritarian populism, fulminations against "the oligarchy," "the corrupt traffickers," indeed "politics" itself (not to mention Marxists) tended to take precedence over specific proposals; and immediate gains (in wages or social benefits) were of much greater concern than any real structural change or proposals for development or "modernization." As one follower of Rojas Pinilla expressed his view of the candidate during the 1970 election campaign, "He will reduce the cost of everything to the point of giving it away, [also] he promised to provide scholarships for all children and I have seven.
...⁴⁸

Although ANAPO spoke of "socialismo a la colombiana" and occasionally referred to the possibility of nationalizing the banks or the oil industry, little emphasis was placed on such proposals.⁴⁹ Ibáñez did institute a minimum wage for blue-collar workers after he won power in 1952, and he took steps to liberalize access to credit. Perón proceeded to nationalize considerable foreign-owned property during his first years in office and generally enhanced the role of the state in the Argentine economy. But none of the three movements really addressed the all-important matter of agrarian reform except in token ways (other than Perón's granting a minimum wage to agricultural workers). These movements viewed private property as a right, although not one so absolute that abuses of it could not be corrected. With the partial exception of the first Peronist administration, little was proposed or accomplished by these parties or governments to fundamentally change social or economic structures.

It has often been said that nationalism is central to populism, and so it was for Peronism, particularly in its early years, with the nationalization of foreign (mainly British) utilities, railroads, and other enterprises as well as various attempts to assert Argentine influence over its South American neighbors.⁵⁰ Curiously, however, the anti-imperialist dimension of nationalism was distinctly muted in both the Colombian and Chilean cases, despite a certain amount of indulgent nationalist rhetoric from Rojismo and Ibañismo. For example, in an interview during the 1970 presidential campaign, Rojas affirmed that he saw foreign participation in the development of the oil industry as beneficial to Colombia, and he was forthright in praising the U.S. contribution to his country's development.⁵¹ Ibáñez, during his 1952 campaign, promised to end Chile's Military Assistance Pact with the United States, but once in office, he failed to do so. On the whole, his relations with the United States were good. Nationalism of any stripe was, in

short, a rather weak strand in Rojismo. Ibañismo stressed not an antiforeign tack but the Chileans' capacity as a race and a nation as well as the need to devote the energy of all citizens to constructing a "destiny for Chile" in the face of the "decomposition and defeatism that corrode our nationality," as one PAL document phrased it.⁵² The anti-imperialist strain in both these movements was at best modest.

Although populist movements are often referred to as "modernizing," one of the most interesting ideological features of the three authoritarian populist movements analyzed here is their self-proclaimed affinity with the traditional political cultures of their respective countries. Both ANAPO and the Peronists, as well as certain segments of Ibañismo, referred to their "Christian" roots and orientation, with Rojas at one point in 1970 referring to himself as "God's candidate."⁵³ Perón meanwhile invoked Argentina's Hispanic roots, while Ibáñez spoke of "blood and soil." Each of the three movements pointed to its candidates as the successors to leaders or regimes of strong authority and authentic national traditions from each country's past—Juan Manuel de Rosas from Argentine history, Diego Portales (and Ibáñez's own earlier period of dictatorial rule in the 1920s) from Chilean history, and Simón Bolívar and Rafael Núñez (as well as Rojas's own period of rule) from Colombian history. Military symbols were also employed, particularly by ANAPO. In all three movements, strong, even authoritarian rule was clearly the standard, with the role of the masses being essentially to acclaim rather than to participate.

Programs and ideologies of some degree of explicitness and sophistication have been notably more important to the political lives of the democratic variety of populism exemplified by AD, APRA, and the MNR. AD and APRA, in particular, early showed the influence of Marxist thought (much of which they later dropped). Haya de la Torre, APRA's leader, indulged in an elaborate intellectual exercise that he called historical space-time, in which he purported to adapt Marxism, by means of Einstein's theory of relativity, to the specific conditions of contemporary Latin America.⁵⁴ AD's programs over the years have been especially elaborate in setting forth the party's proposals for Venezuela,⁵⁵ while both Betancourt and Haya de la Torre were prolific writers and speakers on matters of program and policy during their lifetimes. The MNR, although influenced by both Marxism and fascism in the 1940s, has tended throughout its history to be less concerned with programs and ideology. Yet as its core of middle-class organizers acquired labor and peasant allies when the movement attained power in 1952, the MNR for a time moved sharply leftward while its proposals for change became distinctly more concrete (among them nationalization of the tin mines and agrarian reform).⁵⁶

By the same token, the programs and proposals of these move-

ments were markedly more “positive” than were those of the authoritarian populists, again with the notable exception of the MNR in its first years. Denunciations of “oligarchs” and “imperialists” were certainly not lacking. But the emphasis of the democratic populist movements was on a program and rationale for development—economic, social, and political. Moreover, structural reforms tended to predominate over promises of benefits or the immediate alleviation of mass distress.

Nationalism was a focal concern for these three parties, with anti-imperialism and attendant proposals to rid their countries of foreign economic domination at the forefront. Although AD, APRA, and the MNR all tempered their proposals in later years and when actual policy-making was at issue, the anti-imperialist thrust figured prominently in the formation and careers of each of these parties, animating their leadership and membership as well as their ability to transcend the particular socioeconomic concerns of their diverse array of support groups.⁵⁷ Among the concrete embodiments of this nationalist thrust were nationalization of the tin mines in Bolivia, more favorable terms from the oil companies in Venezuela, and internationalization of the Panama Canal as a result of APRA's efforts.

Finally, the democratic populist parties were generally less traditionalist than were the authoritarian populist parties. APRA, for example, had to go out of its way at times to eschew the anticlerical overtones imputed to it, not entirely without justification.⁵⁸ The AD, during its first *trienio* in power in the 1940s, incurred the enmity of the church because of the overweening secular emphasis of its education policies.⁵⁹ Likewise, the symbols and allusive attachments to the military and to strong authority figures from the past were largely lacking. This statement does not mean to imply that any of these parties altogether avoided ties to the military. Each (or elements of each) either sought out or acceded to approaches from military units when access to power appeared to be otherwise blocked (examples are the actions of the MNR in 1943, of AD in 1945, and of Aprista adherents on several occasions during the 1930s and 1940s). Yet these groups usually did so reluctantly, incurring in each case the deep enmity or suspicion of the military. In spirit and demeanor, these three parties were civil, “modernizing,” and democratizing entities that dispensed with the trappings of traditional authority as well as those of the military and the church. If one type of populist movement tended to prefer authoritarian solutions but felt impelled by the global circumstance of increasing mass mobilization to pretend to democracy, the other type tended to be more at home with democracy or at least with mass mobilization, viewing coups and uprisings as last resorts.⁶⁰

To sum up the differences between the two types of populism: if authoritarian populism tends to eschew elaborated ideologies and con-

crete programs, the parties embodying the democratic variety have tended to pay considerable attention to them, although remaining broadly pragmatic in expression and implementation. While the authoritarian populists have stressed the negative, the democratic populists have placed somewhat more emphasis on the positive. While the former have promised immediate gains for the masses, the latter have paid more attention to structural reforms. While nationalism has been a minor element in authoritarian populism (or the concern with "blood and soil"), democratic populism has been explicitly anti-imperialist, especially at the outset (as Peronism was also). While authoritarian populist movements have looked to traditional or authoritative symbols and institutions for at least some of their inspiration, the democratic populist movements have instead sought out secularizing and democratizing symbols and attachments. Despite occasional exceptions and changes over time (only a few of which have been suggested here), the ideological distinctions between the two subtypes of populism seem to hold, paralleling those already noted in leadership and support.

ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP STYLE

Both varieties of populism have featured the role of the strong leader or caudillo. Such figures almost always have been the founder (or one of the founders) of the movement who have remained in command for years, usually until their death or the political demise of the movement. AD's Betancourt alone yielded his leadership voluntarily, and then only after more than twenty years at the helm and retaining a residual role as powerbroker. It should be noted that the role of caudillo does not necessarily require charisma—both Ibáñez and Rojas Pinilla were closer to being paternalistic authority figures than electrifying platform personalities. For the leaders of democratic populist movements, force of intellect has also seemed significant, in marked contrast to the leaders of authoritarian populist movements.

The most salient organizational distinction between the two types of populism, and the one with the most impact both on the movements and their societies, is the degree and manner of their institutionalization, along with their ties to other organized groups (especially the labor movement). In the authoritarian populist movements, institutionalization has been modest. Rojas Pinilla's 1970 campaign demonstrated considerable organization at the barrio level in the large cities, as well as some dependence on traditional patron-client ties elsewhere. But both elements proved ephemeral and highly dependent on the momentary popularity of the maximum leader and his potential access to power. Nor did ANAPO ever develop many ties to the union movement.⁶¹ Chile's Ibáñez depended for his election on a disparate

multiparty coalition held together only by fleeting loyalty to the caudillo. The coalition fell apart within a year of his reaching the presidency, and most of the pro-Ibañez parties disintegrated by the end of his term. The departure of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) from the coalition in 1953 took with it most of Ibañismo's links with organized labor.

Peronism differed in its development of strong ties with Argentine workers. Many of the Argentine unions and their leaders as well had actually been fostered under the shelter of Peronist governments. Moreover, the Peronist union movement, although divided, has outlived Perón to become the principal institutional embodiment of Peronism in contemporary Argentina. Yet the Peronist party itself was never autonomous nor did it have the organizational infrastructure of a modern party. For most of the time since the end of Perón's first administration in 1955, the party has also been badly fragmented.

The parties of democratic populism, on the other hand, have generally been highly institutionalized, with a leadership structure not wholly dependent on the person of the caudillo (or his wife, in the case of Peronism), a structure that has outlasted the caudillo. Both AD and APRA have continued to flourish several years after the demise of their respective founding fathers. Both parties have elaborate networks of cells, branches, and headquarters, as well as the other infrastructure of a modern political party. Ties to organized groups, especially labor and peasants, have also been close throughout the histories of these parties. Both AD and APRA founded or sponsored unions and peasant organizations, and both parties have enjoyed a long-standing predominance in major labor confederations. Thus both the institutional structure of these parties and their ties to organized groups have been strong enough to outlast dependency on one leader or myth.⁶²

Bolivia's MNR is something of a special case. The MNR began as little more than a cabal of professionals and intellectuals seeking power. The group soon forged an alliance with an association of young military officers (the Razón de Patria, or RADEPA) and attained its first share of power in 1943. After the fall of that regime in 1946, the MNR expanded its incipient ties with Bolivia's labor movement (especially the tin miners) and later with the peasant unions that burgeoned in the wake of the 1952 revolution (some of which the MNR helped organize). By then the MNR had also established branches drawn from the middle class in most Bolivian towns and was sending organizers throughout the country.

Unlike the other democratic populist movements, however, the relationship between the MNR and its worker and peasant allies remained merely one of alliance rather than control or interpenetration. It is true that Juan Lechín, the leader of the tin miners' union, became a part of the MNR leadership and even vice president of the country. But

he was first a union leader, and only secondarily and questionably, a leader of the MNR. The MNR survived the overthrow of Paz Estenssoro in 1964, but only as a remnant of its former self, lacking substantial organizational ties to labor or peasants. As a result, although the MNR has become more effectively institutionalized than either ANAPO or Ibañismo and has forged stronger ties in its heyday to both urban and rural unions, the party cannot be compared in these respects to either AD or APRA. Its ability to survive over time has suffered accordingly.⁶³

CONCLUSION

Populism, as defined by DiTella and others, entails a cross-class coalition embracing elements of the middle (or even upper) class as well as a broad base of workers or peasants or both. Populism is clearly a product of an increasingly mass society. Likewise, a strong or personalistic leader combines with an ideology having some nationalistic component, elements that are at least loosely shared by the instances of Latin American populism under consideration here. Other shared characteristics are the tendency of populist leadership to be comprised of "incongruent elites"; the tendency to be reformist rather than revolutionary (although temporary circumstances pushed the MNR in the latter direction); a broad base of support in a sectoral as well as class sense; a significantly urban nature, even though they may also possess rural dimensions that are often overlooked; and finally, a tendency toward a manipulative relationship between leadership and mass.

The principal types originally put forward by DiTella hold up well under examination: the authoritarian populists tend to include and be led by persons with military, clerical, or property-owning backgrounds or orientations; the democratic populists characteristically incorporate as leaders and followers professionals and intellectuals of middle- to lower-middle-class origins.

The distinctions do not end there, however. One salient contrast between the two varieties of populism has been the nature and strength of their ties to peasants. Such ties have been far stronger both quantitatively and qualitatively for the democratic populists, whose parties have regularly depended far more on the campesino vote than have the authoritarian populists. Democratic populists' organizational links have consequently been much more elaborate. While tenant farmers dependent on traditional patron-client relationships to local caudillos have often supported parties like ANAPO and the Peronists, support for the democratic populists has tended to come instead from the ranks of highly unionized campesinos in Peru, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Finally, the democratic populists have characteristically paid more attention to

agrarian reform than have their authoritarian counterparts, despite the attenuated nature of some proposals (such as those of APRA in recent years).⁶⁴ This situation undoubtedly reflects the differences in ties to rural elites between the two varieties of populism and the democratic populists' view that modernization of the agrarian sector is essential to national progress.

The democratic populists have been more consistently anti-foreign, especially in their early stages and on economic issues. Their ideologies and programs have been relatively more deeply rooted and more concretely worked out (although not lacking in vagueness and evasions of their own). The democratic populist organizations have also been more articulated, more institutionalized, and less dependent on the political survival of one individual. In sum, the authoritarian populists are somewhat closer to the classical portrayal of populism that envisions a demagogic leader arousing and manipulating an amorphous urban lower class, a movement essentially unmediated by elaborate programs and party structures. The so-called democratic version of populism, on the other hand, more nearly resembles the modern mass party.⁶⁵

The foregoing summation neglects the obvious (and already noted) point that the two types of populism are not altogether internally consistent. The Peronists among the authoritarians and the MNR among the democratic populists deviate most often from the modal pattern of their respective types. This deviation is most evident in the strong union ties and the antiforeign aspect of the Peronists and in the relatively less developed ideology and less articulated party structure of the MNR (although it remained more developed programmatically and more articulated structurally than the authoritarian norm). This kind of deviation suggests that it may be preferable ultimately to speak of tendencies within the larger rubric of populism rather than of rigidly defined types. But if the basic duality of tendencies (if not types) originally adumbrated by DiTella, and examined and expanded upon here, do generally hold, what is the significance of such a finding?

Because the democratic populists' organization is generally more structured and more institutionalized, and its ideology is more explicit and central to its appeal, the democratic variety of populism tends to be more durable as a political movement, surviving beyond the political life span of its founders.⁶⁶ Although democratic populists may not eschew a military coup when the electoral route to power appears closed, they have demonstrated a predilection for democracy in both word and deed. Their emergence has generally furthered the cause of democratic rule in their respective countries. This generalization has been true even of Bolivia's MNR, at least when compared to the governments that preceded and succeeded it, despite the MNR's checkered record of

The Types of Populism

<i>Characteristics</i>	<i>Authoritarian</i>	<i>Democratic</i>
Leadership	Military, upper-middle class	Professionals, intellectuals
Support	"Disposable" mass	Organized labor, peasants
Ideology and Program	Diffuse, unimportant Only mildly anti-imperialist	More concrete, relatively important Economically nationalistic, especially in early stages
Organization and Leadership Style	Loose, poorly articulated party organization Dependent on leader or leader's myth	Well-articulated organizationally Tends to outlast lifetime of the leader

tolerance of political opposition while in power. The contrasting impression conveyed by the authoritarian populists is that they are temporary and reluctant democrats who are impelled by circumstances to employ the techniques of mass mobilization, but who retain a deep-seated preference for authoritarian styles and procedures.⁶⁷

When in power, the democratic populists have promoted reform and modernization more effectively than have their authoritarian counterparts. Whether addressing issues of education or agrarian reform or institution building (governmental as well as party), the democratic populists have been systematically oriented toward development while being less inclined to put forward merely short-run distributional policies in the absence of broader reformist objectives. Again, such an approach seems to be associated with the nature of the respective populist leaderships and their partially differing views of existing institutions and structures.

If the meaning and consequences of the two principal varieties (or tendencies) within Latin American populism are in some respects so different, how can one account for the emergence of these two distinct strains? DiTella developed two different typologies distinguished by the level of development of the countries in which they occurred. Thus, for example, Peronism is distinguished from Rojismo or Nasserism on the basis of its more solid working-class base rooted in Argentina's relatively advanced level of industrialization.⁶⁸ Such distinctions help to account for differences within types and would be important to include in developing a more elaborate typology than the one attempted here. But they do little to account for the differences between the authoritarian and democratic varieties of populism.

Yet other scholars—Guillermo O'Donnell and Octavio Ianni, for example—have argued that populism in Latin America has tended to

emerge along with import-substitution industrialization (ISI) and to outlive its political usefulness when that stage of economic development exhausts its possibilities for further growth.⁶⁹ The logic is that coalitions between the industrial bourgeoisie and the workers form to promote ISI, from which both groups hope to benefit, but such coalitions subsequently fall apart when the contradictions of the later stages of ISI become manifest. Such a proposition becomes dubious, however, when the populist experience of all Latin America, rather than primarily that of the Southern Cone countries, is taken into account. After all, Argentina and Bolivia represent virtually opposite extremes of economic development, yet significant populist movements have emerged in both. The pronounced reemergence of populism in Argentina following a period of bureaucratic-authoritarian rule also throws a negative light on any argument of "stages." As Ernesto Laclau has persuasively argued, populism may occur at any stage of development. Even industrialized countries are not immune, although the characteristics of populism in such a context may differ in some respects from the populism of less developed countries. Laclau views populism as resulting from a fracture in the "power blocs" that leads one faction to appeal to "the people" in opposition to the established ideology or system, a process that may occur at various "stages" of development.⁷⁰

Although a certain minimal level of mass mobilization is obviously necessary for the emergence of populism of whatever variety and although the developmental characteristics of particular countries may help to account for variations in particular populist movements, the sociology of the respective movements as well as political factors would instead seem to account better for the occurrence of the two varieties delineated here.

I would argue in the first place (in general accord with Peter Smith's suggestion regarding early Peronism) that every populist movement, of whatever type or tendency, is comprised of two strains: one strain is located largely in the cities or among those with a "modern" outlook, who feel themselves victims of modernization; the second strain is often, although not always, found in the countryside or in other "traditional" redoubts of the society, among those who feel abandoned or left behind in the pell-mell process of modernization. The former tend to want to increase their share or stake in the modernization process (including its leadership); the latter tend to react against some of the manifestations of change or, more realistically, to employ mass politics to preserve their often tenuous status in the social or political order.⁷¹ Because these are only tendencies, rather than rigid distinctions, such a formulation helps to explain why both elements can at times be found within one populist movement and helps to account for the complex, often ill-defined nature of many of those movements. This

formulation also helps to explain why occasionally movements representing the two major tendencies of populism can even be found in the same country during the same period.⁷² I am also hypothesizing that democratic populists generally draw more of their leadership and support from those who are left behind by change and who aspire to share in it; the authoritarian populists, on the other hand, are more likely to attract a predominant share of individuals who tend to feel threatened by change and who seek, by one means or another, to resist it or to control its consequences.

Politically, authoritarian populism seems to thrive where civilian regimes having at least a pseudodemocratic gloss have failed (because of fraud, corruption, fragmentation, or simple ineptness) to resolve deep-seated socioeconomic problems or failed to accord full access to participation to both the masses and certain aspiring or incongruent elites. The availability of a military strongman may further facilitate the emergence of an authoritarian populist movement. Under contrary circumstances, when a military or otherwise authoritarian regime has failed to address the nation's problems or to provide access for new social groups, the democratic populists tend to be the group who constitute the populist opposition. In either case, the nature of a given populist movement derives as much from political causes as from sociological causes. By nature oppositional and reformist, any populist movement necessarily takes on a coloration distinct from the ruling powers of its time and place.

NOTES

1. Works on populism embracing examples from various parts of the world include these titles: Margaret Canovan, *Populism* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981); *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Michael L. Conniff (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982); and Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, *Populism* (London: Macmillan, 1969).
2. Torcuato S. DiTella, "Populism and Reform in Latin America," in *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, edited by Claudio Veliz (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 47.
3. See, for example, Franciso Weffort and Aníbal Quijano, *Populismo, marginalización y dependencia* (San José, Costa Rica: EDUCA, 1973); and Ernesto Laclau, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory* (London: NLB, 1977).
4. See Thomas H. Greene, *Comparative Revolutionary Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), chaps. 2–3, for a summary analysis of the sociology of revolutionary leadership and followership.
5. DiTella, "Populism and Reform."
6. I am here telescoping DiTella's distinctions between populism in typically "underdeveloped" and "relatively developed" countries; DiTella in any case has considerable difficulty finding examples for the cells of his "developed" matrix (*ibid.*, 73). This procedure also allows one to leave open the question of the relationship between "stages of development" and the types of populism. For further elaboration of this point, see the conclusion to this article.
7. Again collapsing the "underdeveloped" and "relatively developed" distinction, authoritarian populism would include DiTella's "militaristic reform parties" and

- Peronism. Parties of the democratic populist variety would be dubbed *Aprista* by DiTella, although parties such as the Argentine and Chilean Radicals might be included here among democratic parties in “developed” countries (DiTella equivocates here). As will become clear, no set of terms—authoritarian or military, on the one hand, democratic, civilian, or *Aprista* on the other—are wholly ideal.
8. Both Betancourt and Haya de la Torre began law school but were diverted by political events from finishing their studies.
 9. George Blanksten, *Perón's Argentina* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 343–56; and José Luis de Imaz, *Los que mandan*, translated by Carlos A. Astiz (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1970), 13–18.
 10. Peter Snow, *Political Forces in Argentina*, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1979), 32.
 11. Daniel Premo, “Alianza Nacional Popular: Populism and the Politics of Social Class in Colombia, 1961–1970,” Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, 1972, 56.
 12. This situation did not preclude occasional alliance with the military for tactical purposes, as will be discussed.
 13. Snow, *Political Forces*, 32.
 14. Imaz, *Los que mandan*, 17.
 15. Data calculated by the author, principally from Cámara de Diputados, *150 años, El Congreso de Chile (1811–1961)*, and from the *Diccionario biográfico de Chile*, various editions (Santiago: Empresa Periodística de Chile, 1937–). It should be noted that some legislators were coded as having more than one occupation. For the Partido Agrario Laborista (PAL), the core of Ibáñez's support, the percentages were notably higher.
 16. See Peter F. Klarén, *Modernization, Dislocation, and Aprismo* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973), especially chaps. 5–6.
 17. John W. Martz, *Acción Democrática* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 195ff.
 18. Christopher Mitchell, *The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia* (New York: Praeger, 1977), 17–19 and 26–28.
 19. Snow, *Political Forces*, 32.
 20. See note 15 for sources.
 21. Ernesto Würth Rojas, *Ibáñez, caudillo enigmático* (Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1958), 371.
 22. Rodrigo Losada, *Perfil socio-político del congresista colombiano* (Bogotá: Departamento de Ciencia Política, Universidad de los Andes, 1972), 94–95.
 23. Snow, *Political Forces*, 32.
 24. For sources, see note 15.
 25. See, for example, Judith Talbot Campos and John F. McCamant, *Cleavage Shift in Colombia: Analysis of the 1970 Elections* (Beverly Hills: Sage Press, 1972), 60.
 26. See table 5 in Lars Schoultz, “Urbanization and Changing Voting Patterns: Colombia, 1946–1970,” *Political Science Quarterly* 87 (Mar. 1972):39. A municipio is roughly equivalent to a U.S. county.
 27. See the table in Campos and McCamant, *Cleavage Shift*, 53.
 28. Communal data are from Armand Mattelart, *Atlas social de las comunas de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1965); electoral data were supplied by the Dirección del Registro Electoral in Santiago, Chile.
 29. Campos and McCamant, *Cleavage Shift*, 53.
 30. James W. Rowe, *The Argentine Elections of 1963: An Analysis* (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1964).
 31. Martz, *Acción Democrática*, chap. 12.
 32. *Ibid.*
 33. See Klarén, *Modernization, Dislocation, and Aprismo* for a portrayal of APRA's roots among the sugar workers of northern Peru.
 34. See Mitchell, *Legacy of Populism*, passim, and Richard W. Patch, “Peasantry and National Revolution: Bolivia,” in *Expectant Peoples*, edited by K. H. Silvert (New York: Random House, 1963), 95–126, on the MNR's relationship to peasants.
 35. Rodrigo Losada and Miles Williams, “Análisis de la votación presidencial en Bogotá, 1970,” in Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), *Colombia Política* (Bogotá: DANE, 1972), 16–17 and 20–22.

36. For sources, see note 28.
37. See in particular the works of Gino Germani, including *La estructura de la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1955), and "El surgimiento del peronismo: el rol de los obreros y de los migrantes internos," *Desarrollo Económico* 13 (Oct.-Dec. 1973):435-85.
38. Eldon Kenworthy, "The Function of the Little-Known Case in Theory Formation, or What Peronism Wasn't," *Comparative Politics* 6 (Oct. 1973):17-45; and Peter Smith, "The Social Base of Peronism," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 52 (Feb. 1972): 55-73.
39. Walter Little, "The Popular Origins of Peronism," in *Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, edited by David Rock (London: Duckworth, 1975); for a summary analysis of the question, see Lars Schoultz, *The Populist Challenge* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983).
40. See respectively Steve Stein, *Populism in Peru* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980); Martz, *Acción Democrática*; and Mitchell, *Legacy of Populism*.
41. Robert H. Dix, "Political Oppositions under the National Front," in *Politics of Compromise*, edited by R. Albert Berry, Ronald G. Hellman, and Mauricio Solaún (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1980), 148.
42. See, for example, Eldon Kenworthy, "Did the 'New Industrialist' Play a Significant Role in the Formation of Perón's Coalition, 1943-46?," in Alberto Ciria et al., *New Perspectives on Modern Argentina* (Bloomington: Latin American Studies Program, Indiana University, 1972); see also Blanksten, *Perón's Argentina*.
43. *Arab-Chilean* is a loose designation for persons of generally Levantine extraction. See Donald W. Bray, "Chilean Politics during the Second Ibáñez Government, 1952-58," Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1961, chap. 7.
44. On students and intellectuals as a "permanent" revolutionary group in developing societies, see Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), chap. 5.
45. See René Montero Moreno, *Confesiones políticas* (Santiago: Zig-Zag, 1958), 13.
46. Blanksten, *Perón's Argentina*, 290.
47. *Ibid.*, 297.
48. Pedro Pablo Morcillo et al., "Estudio sobre abstención electoral en las elecciones de marzo de 1968 en Cali," in DANE, *Colombia Política*.
49. Dix, "Political Oppositions," 157.
50. Examples include an attempt to establish a hemispheric labor confederation and Perón's personal support of Ibáñez's election.
51. Interview published in *Revista Javeriana* 73 (Apr. 1970):292.
52. Partido Agrario Laborista, *Estatutos bases* (1954).
53. Dix, "Political Oppositions," 160.
54. *Aprismo, The Ideas and Doctrines of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre*, edited and translated by Robert J. Alexander (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1973); and Harry Kantor, *The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement* (New York: Octagon, 1966).
55. See, for example, Martz, *Acción Democrática*, chap. 8; and Robert J. Alexander, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), pt. 3.
56. See Herbert S. Klein, *Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 1880-1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
57. James Malloy notes the MNR's virulent attacks on all groups alleged to have an internationalist orientation, including imperialists, Masons, Jews, Communists, the tin barons, and others. The MNR stressed the need to draw together all elements of society against the oppression of the nation. See Malloy's "Revolutionary Politics" in *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952*, edited by Malloy and Richard S. Thorn (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 114-15.
58. Stein, *Populism*, 166-67; and Kantor, *Ideology and Program*, 93-97.
59. Daniel H. Levine, *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
60. This generalization must be qualified with regard to the MNR in its earlier years, although its conspiratorial efforts prior to attaining power in 1952 increasingly

- looked to civilian allies. See Klein, *Parties and Political Change*, 383 and passim.
61. Dix, "Political Opposition," 148.
 62. See especially Martz, *Acción Democrática*; and Grant Hilliker, *The Politics of Reform in Peru* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).
 63. Concerning the MNR, see Mitchell, *Legacy of Populism*; and James M. Malloy, *Bolivia: The Uncomplete Revolution* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1970).
 64. G. Hilliker, *Politics of Reform*, chap. 7.
 65. See Hilliker, *Politics of Reform*, chap. 8, concerning the "mass reform party" in modern Latin America.
 66. Qualifications concerning the MNR have already been noted. Another exception might be the movement created by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in Colombia in the 1940s, although it shared some of the characteristics of each type. See Robert H. Dix, "The Varieties of Populism: The Case of Colombia," *Western Political Quarterly* 31 (Sept. 1978):334–51.
 67. Daniel Premo points specifically to this circumstance in his *Alianza Nacional Popular*, 88n.
 68. DiTella, "Populism and Reform."
 69. Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973); and Octavio Ianni, "Populismo y relaciones de clase," in *Populismo y contradicciones de clase en Latinoamérica*, edited by Gino Germani, Torcuato DiTella, and Octavio Ianni (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1973), 83–150.
 70. Laclau, *Politics and Ideology*.
 71. Smith, "The Social Base of Peronism."
 72. This was the case, for example, with Aprismo and Sánchezcerrismo in Peru in the early 1930s; see Stein, *Populism*.