

This is the book of a man who has suffered much and forgotten nothing. It shows up several prevalent notions about the nature of espionage and of communism as false. Though the author feels aggrieved, with good reason, he tries hard to tell the truth.

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THE LAST SIX MONTHS: RUSSIA'S FINAL BATTLES WITH HITLER'S ARMIES IN WORLD WAR II. By *S. M. Shtemenko, General of the Soviet Army*. Translated by *Guy Daniels*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977. xvi, 436 pp. Illus. \$10.00.

The considerable value of the first volume of General Shtemenko's memoirs, published in Moscow in 1968 under the title *General'nyi shtab v gody voyny*, was that it gave an insight into the actual working of the General Staff during World War II. It was marred by Shtemenko's many biases, not the least of them being an evident desire to restore as much luster to Stalin's wartime reputation as was possible under the negative considerations still prevailing in the wake of the twentieth and twenty-second party congresses.

The second volume, presented in a serviceable English translation by Guy Daniels, is of considerably less value. Not only has Shtemenko covered the major developments of the war in the first volume but in the second the propaganda content is substantially higher and the informational yield correspondingly lower.

This volume deals basically with the last few months of the war. Shtemenko utilizes his narrative to present almost every action taken by Russia's allies in that period in an unfavorable light, beginning with the Warsaw uprising and ending with the fall of Berlin and the signing of Germany's Unconditional Surrender.

One service Shtemenko provides is a rather detailed description of Stalin's Kuntsevo dacha, ordinarily called Blizhniaia. He had provided in his first memoir a description of New Year's Eve, December 31, 1944, at the dacha. In this book he gives a room-by-room description of the residence where Stalin conducted so much of his business and where he died on the evening of March 5, 1953.

Shtemenko makes clear the extraordinary control which Stalin's Stavka or General Headquarters maintained over every phase of operations in the later part of the war. The greater freedom of the front commanders in the earlier period, stemming in part from disorganization and lack of communication and in part from Stalin's slow recovery of confidence after his breakdown following the Nazi attack in June 1941, had vanished. The commanders sent their plans to Stavka where they were rigorously reviewed and often radically changed. Then a Stavka overseer was attached to the operating front to make certain that the operation was carried out as approved by Stavka (and countersigned by Stalin).

The paranoia which gripped Stalin and his associates in the later part of the war over almost every act of their Western allies was, Shtemenko reveals, profound. Whatever was proposed by the West was suspect. Suspicion of resistance forces in eastern Europe was equally deep, particularly if the anti-Nazi group had had any connection with the West.

Shtemenko makes clear (without perhaps wishing this) that Soviet distrust in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia almost invariably was so great that the Russian advance was slowed and the Nazis consequently managed to wipe out or badly damage native resistance movements. As might be expected, the story of the fall of Prague and the role of the Vlasov forces in fighting the Nazis is hopelessly distorted.

Shtemenko closes his book with a description of another meeting at Stalin's dacha, this one in the summer of 1949, in which he describes Stalin in tones which can only

be called those of adoration. On this occasion Stalin advanced the proposition that the main factor in Russia's defeat of Germany was that Hitler had been compelled to mobilize 16 percent of his population (including losses) in his armed forces. "Such a high percentage of mobilization," Shtemenko quotes Stalin as saying, "represents either adventurism or an ignorance of the objective laws of warfare."

Shtemenko fails to provide the equivalent Russian percentage, but if prewar Russia had a population of 194 million and if the Soviet maximum military strength was a bit more than 11 million (as he says) and if Soviet war casualties were only 20 million (as is officially claimed) the percentage would almost precisely match Germany's 16 percent. Perhaps that is why Shtemenko does not provide the arithmetic.

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THE POLITICS OF SOVIET POLICY FORMATION: KHRUSHCHEV'S INNOVATIVE POLICIES IN EDUCATION AND AGRICULTURE. By *James B. Bruce*. Monograph Series in World Affairs, vol. 13: CHANGE AND SURVIVAL: STUDIES IN SOCIAL DYNAMICS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION. ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOSEF KORBEL, Book 4. Denver: University of Denver, Graduate School of International Studies, 1976. xx, 138 pp. Paper.

This short monograph is a welcome and timely addition to the literature on Soviet policy making. It is an innovative attempt to place case studies of specific decisions within a larger framework informed by decision-making theory. The two cases chosen for reinterpretation in these terms are the Virgin Lands decision of 1953-54, and the Production Education reforms of 1958. Mr. Bruce does not reinvestigate these decisions through personal research into primary sources; rather, he relies upon case studies already published (by Mills, Ploss, Little, Stewart, Schwartz and Keech) to inform him as to the sequence of events and the positions of the actors involved, or to guide him to the relevant sources. His main concern is to determine the scope and nature of political participation at different stages of the policy-making process. He finds that the top political elites dominate the initial stages of "policy proposal" and "decision in principle," thereby defining the basic direction of change. However, the subsequent stages of "policy controversy," "formal decision," and "implementation directives" are largely shaped by the interests and political activity of lesser-ranking elites, which Bruce dubs "affected participants." In addition, Mr. Bruce raises and explores vitally important questions about the political behavior of participants: are their positions on these issues dictated by their backgrounds, their political connections, or their bureaucratic roles? Predictably, he finds major differences on this score between Presidium members and lower-ranking elites.

On the whole, Bruce's effort strikes me as successful. It is suggestive and well executed, and fulfills the author's intention to provide a framework for "multiple case studies similarly conceptualized" (p. 3). Although a short review cannot do justice to the nuances, and cannot explore the shortcomings in depth, let me nonetheless indicate a few caveats. First, the reliance upon existing Kremlinological literature for identification of the positions of actors may be hazardous. Some of that literature is very good indeed; some is sloppy. So the theory builder should beware of compounding errors. Second, I have misgivings about the utility of exploring only the short-term processes of consensus building at the initial points of decision. These processes are often manipulable in accord with personal political styles (for example, expanded plenary sessions). Less manipulable are the longer-term processes by which policies are deflected or reshaped in the course of implementation—by both bureaucratic inter-