

(II p. 392), which Nietzsche was to take up. But, above all, Schopenhauer's work leaves us (as Nietzsche recognised) with immense problem on our hands. His central theory of the non-intellectual nature of the will (I pp. 20, 81) has since been powerfully elaborated. The genesis of

reason, it seems, does not take place within the bounds of rationality. Nor have the traditional defences proved adequate. As a result, the rational principle is in jeopardy. Here, as Schopenhauer would insist, we have to think (and act) for ourselves.

J.A. BRADLEY

**WITTGENSTEIN AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF**, by W. Donald Hudson, *Macmillan*, London, 1975, 206 pp. £6.95.

W. Donald Hudson has written before in this area but this volume is the most comprehensive of his studies. It is a clear and useful exposition of Wittgenstein's philosophical development, and particularly of the way his thought on religious belief is related to his general philosophical concern with language. There is, however, one fundamental problem which Hudson evades by too ready an acceptance of Wittgenstein's position.

Wittgenstein's account of language undergoes a radical change, but there remains a certain continuity in his account of religious belief. Just as there is no way of questioning that which in the *Tractatus* is referred to as "das Mystische" (6.45; 6.522), so in the *Philosophical Investigations* we are not able to resolve the problem of the respective worth of different language-games because there is no higher logical order to which we can take such questions as "Does it make sense to talk in this way?". In the *Investigations* we are left with "What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of life" (P.I. 226); "This is simply what I do" (P.I., 217). The comparable position in his *Lectures on Religious Belief* is found in his characterisation of the difference between the believer and unbeliever: "I have different pictures" (p. 55); "I can't contradict that person" (p. 55). This aspect of Wittgenstein's thought presents both the religious believer and the philosopher with a problem. Is religious belief an attempt to describe what the world is like, in some way, or does it in some sense "create" a world? If the religious believer is trying to say something in terms of how things are, what the world is like, then one must ask whether it is permissible to have statements which place themselves beyond criticism. One can accept Wittgenstein's claim for immunity from criticism but only because he presents religious belief as in some sense ethical. This ethical account

is not to be confused with that of R.B. Braithwaite's Eddington lecture. Wittgenstein has idealist tendencies, as Hudson points out: "Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is" (P.I. 373). Thus for Wittgenstein the ethical constitutes the kind of world we live in. But this is also to apply to theology, for after the above sentence from the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein adds in brackets: "Theology as grammar" (P.I. 373). For the Christian the dilemma is obvious. Hudson does not face up squarely to this problem. He does insist that language in any one language-game cannot be used in a completely isolated way, but with that proviso he finds no serious faults in Wittgenstein's approach.

This account of religious belief raises crucial questions for the religious believer, especially the Christian, but these questions are only part of a more general unease that arises directly from the way in which Wittgenstein "liberated" English philosophy. It is crucial to understand and accept that the meaning of a word is its use in a language. But without having recourse to some absolute logical order, it is also important to engage in some evaluation of different language-games. This can be done only if we reject the view that language-games are logically isolated, thus allowing scope for criticism whereby the worth of any particular language-game is constantly under scrutiny. Although this critical activity may never make conclusive claims, by it we are able to discriminate and put aside much that is of little value. Hudson takes Wittgenstein to be saying that criticism can only take place within an agreed language-game, and not between it and some other. Forms of life then become absolute and this could result in all sorts of nonsense which would have "to be accepted".

JOHN IBBETT