THE PERUVIAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT, LABOR MOBILIZATION, AND THE POLITICAL STRENGTH OF THE LEFT*

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The Peruvian military government of 1968–80 defied the expectations and categorizations derived from academic work on the character and performance of its counterparts, past and present, in other Latin American countries.[1] A key anomaly is the fact that labor and the left were not eclipsed, but instead emerged strengthened by the period of military rule in their mobilizing capacity and electoral presence.[2] The purpose of this article is to explain the legacy of the military government for labor and the left by elucidating the processes that led to their strengthening, with particular emphasis on the policies of the Velasco regime.

The literature on the military in politics is virtually unanimous in stressing the anti-popular mobilization bias of military regimes.[3] Depending on the socioeconomic context, military regimes are expected to assume one of two policy approaches to popular forces—either a preventive or a repressive approach. In the Latin American context, the former approach has often taken the form of what has been labeled as *inclusionary corporatism*, the latter *exclusionary corporatism* (Stepan 1978).[4] Peru under the government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado seemed to fit the former type. Popular mobilization was at a low-to-intermediate level, and the military government's "revolution from above" was seen as a defensive maneuver designed to remove the structural causes for potential popular insurgency by incorporating popular forces into state-sponsored and -controlled organizations while providing some benefits through redistributive reforms. Accordingly, the dominant categorization of the regime was corporatist (Chaplin 1976; Cotler 1975; Palmer 1973; Stepan 1978), and the expectation was that popular forces would be encapsulated and demobilized, although with sectorally differing rates of success according to the previously acquired capacity to resist the imposition of controls and restrictions. Yet, not only did the Velasco

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government's policies fail to weaken existing popular organizations, but popular forces also acquired greater autonomous mobilization capacity.

Under Francisco Morales Bermúdez (1975–80), the government seemed to be moving increasingly toward the exclusionary type of military regime. It has been argued that uncontrolled intermediate-to-high popular mobilization in the context of economic stagnation and austerity policies tends to be dealt with by military regimes in an exclusionary fashion through the dissolution of unions and leftist political organizations, persecution of their leaders, abolition of civil liberties, and ultimate closure of all channels for organized civilian political activity. In 1976 the Peruvian government declared its first state of emergency and began to resort to various repressive policies vis-à-vis popular mobilization, which suggested a possible growing affinity with the neighboring regimes of the Southern Cone (Cotler 1979). Yet, the military decided to hold elections and turn power back to a civilian government rather than impose a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime and smash popular organizations. In these elections, the left emerged as a stronger force than it had been before the 1968 coup, and President Fernando Belaúnde has had to face stronger popular organizations, particularly unions, since his inauguration on 28 July 1980 than he faced during his 1963–68 presidency. As academic commentators and involved political actors have all observed, the level of popular mobilization constitutes one of the key differences between Peru before 1968 and the present situation (Dancourt and Pásara interview 1980, p. 2).[5]

This article, which concentrates on the labor policies of the 1968–80 period and their effects, will attempt to explain why labor and the left grew stronger under military rule. It will conclude with some brief comments on the reasons why no attempt was made to install a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. The key policies to be examined are the introduction of the Comunidad Industrial (CI) and the policies toward unions. Although the mobilization process extended to urban marginals and the peasantry, the role of the CI and the unions in shaping the interrelationships among the government, labor, and the private sector were at the heart of the process of increasing mobilization. It will be argued that this mobilization process was not accidental, but a direct, albeit mostly unintended, effect of the military government's policies. Both the "corporatist" explanation and the explanation offered by some leftist critics are unsatisfactory. The corporatism literature sees increased mobilization as the result of an overall failure of the regime caused by general economic policies and conditions. Those leftist critics who regarded the military regime as "the loyal agents of the national industrial bourgeoisie" see increased mobilization as a result of the "expansion of capitalism with [which] the proletariat has grown in size and organization" as well as in capacity to resist the government's intensified attack against

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the proletariat and the peasantry in the face of the economic crisis (Dore and Weeks 1977, p. 16). This explanation is weak because although capitalist expansion usually does increase the size of the proletariat, it does not lead automatically to a growth in organization. The explanation for the growth in organization and mobilization in the Peruvian case has to be sought instead in the concrete policies pursued by the government and in the largely unintended reactions they elicited from various social classes, particularly workers and capitalists. These unintended reactions were partly produced by the inconsistency of the government's policies towards organized labor resulting from a lack of ideological unity within the government. Although the corporatist element was important, the government's policies did not fit a coherent design based on ideological consensus, but contained instead many inconsistent and even contradictory elements.

The explanation provided here will be supported by statistical analysis of a data set based on research on the Comunidad Industrial carried out in 1975–76, immediately after President Velasco was replaced by Morales Bermúdez. The data set contains information about the development of the CI, about unions, and about strike patterns. The data were collected from various offices in the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Industry and Tourism, and they are unique in that they were not public information, but were obtained through persistence and luck.[6]

THE GOALS OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

The "Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces" under President Velasco characterized itself as "humanist-socialist" and professed a commitment to fundamental structural changes in the pursuit of a noncommunist, noncapitalist way to economic development and social justice. Despite these proclamations and the outward appearance of unity, members of the Velasco government by no means agreed on a coherent political project. Ideological consensus was limited to the achievement of a stable social and political order or "integral security." The cornerstones of integral security were seen as national integration and permanent, self-sustained economic development (Mercado Jarrín 1974, pp. 145–63). National integration meant eliminating class struggle by breaking up the economic and political power bases of small groups and overcoming the marginalization of the masses. Serious disagreements and tensions between the left and right existed within the government, however, over the division of power and material resources among the state, private capital, and the middle and lower classes. A few members on the left wanted to guide a slow evolution toward a socialist society, whereas many members on the right only intended structural changes

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to eliminate excessive exploitation that could lead to insurgency. These disagreements gave rise to many inconsistent policies, particularly toward organized labor, that had many unintended results.

By the end of its second phase (which started in 1975 when Morales Bermúdez replaced Velasco), the "Peruvian Revolution" had not improved materially the situation of those who were officially proclaimed to be its major beneficiaries. The benefits to be derived by the popular forces—urban and rural workers, urban marginals, and small peasants—from the profound structural changes initiated during the first phase (1968 to mid-1975) were either initially limited or eroded during the second phase. The two most conspicuous structural changes that survived the second phase, the expanded role of the state in the economy and the land reform, have had limited effects from the popular point of view. The expanded state apparatus increasingly has been controlled and used by antipopular forces. The land reform, although significant because it destroyed a major power base of the old oligarchy, brought concrete benefits to only a small proportion of the rural lower classes (McClintock 1981) and failed to affect the urban masses at all. The structural and redistributive reforms in the urban sector did not even survive the second phase. The Communidades Industriales were "reformed" to virtual insignificance, the social-property sector lost all official support, and inflation, high unemployment, and the slashing of public expenditures cut deeply into the consumption levels of the urban masses. Nevertheless, the "Revolution" changed the social and political landscape of the country. Its key legacy consists of the popular forces' increased capacity to make their presence felt as social and political actors through direct militant action and representative institutions because of the stronger organizational presence of urban and rural unions and *barriada* organizations and the greater electoral strength of leftist political parties.

MANIFESTATIONS OF POPULAR MOBILIZATION

Popular mobilization is seen primarily in the proliferation of unions during the Velasco period and the escalation of strike activity during the Velasco and Morales Bermúdez periods. The total number of unions nearly doubled under the Velasco regime, and despite a significant slowdown of union recognition under Morales Bermúdez, unions continued to grow (table 1). Strike activity shows an increase from the last years of the first Belaúnde presidency and the first years of the Velasco regime both in frequency and in breadth. Although the increase in frequency was reversed in 1976, when the government started to implement various large-scale repressive measures such as declaring strikes illegal and imposing massive firings, the greater breadth of participation persisted.

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TABLE 1 Recognition of New Unions, 1931–1978

Year	*All Sectors*	*Industry Only*	*Cumulative Total*
1931–1960	693	234	693
1961	143	45	836
1962	240	99	1076
1963	268	98	1344
1964	307	87	1651
1965	184	69	1835
1966	171	79	2006
1967	146	65	2152
1968	145	49	2297
1969	117	31	2414
1970	198	94	2612
1971	384	212	2996
1972	409	203	3405
1973	357	165	3762
1974	303	133	4065
1975 (Jan.–Aug.)	107	44	4172
1975 (Sept.–Dec.)	127		4299
1976	126		4425
1977	28		4453
1978	51		4504
Before 1968	2152	776	
1968–August 1975	2020	931	
1968–1978	2352		

Sources: For figures up to August 1975, Register of Unions, Ministry of Labor; for figures during August 1975 to 1978, Sectoral Planning Office of the Ministry of Labor, and *Realidad* 5 (July 1979), published by SINAMOS, cited by Scurrah and Esteves (forthcoming).

Thus, whereas figures for overall strike incidence declined after 1975, several general strikes were called after 1977, beginning with the first one in Peruvian history in July 1977 (table 2). Other forms of direct action, such as demonstrations, also escalated after 1968. In addition, participation in various forms of direct action has changed in composition, now including not only organized labor in the Lima-Callao and mining areas, but also urban marginals, workers in provincial towns, and some sectors of the rural lower classes. Protest actions in the form of strikes and demonstrations have frequently been coordinated by *frentes* consisting of unions, barriada organizations, and political groups. They have been aimed at protecting popular consumption levels in a period of runaway inflation by pressuring for wage adjustments, state subsidies for food prices, and changes in the government's economic policies. Such broader coordinated action has allowed the Peruvian labor move-

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TABLE 2 *Total Number of Strikes, Man-Hours Lost, and Workers Involved in Peru, 1965–1979**

	Strikes	*Man-Hours Lost (thousands)*	*Workers Involved*
1965	397	6,421	135,586
1966	394	11,689	121,232
1967	414	8,373	142,282
1968	364	3,378	107,809
1969	372	3,889	91,531
1970	345	5,782	110,990
1971	377	10,882	161,415
1972	409	6,331	130,643
1973	788	15,688	416,251
1974	570	13,413	362,737
1975	779	20,269	617,120
1976	440	6,822	258,101
1977	234	6,543	406,461
1978	364	36,145	1,398,387
1979	637	7,900	516,900

Sources: *Las huelgas en el Perú 1957–1972* (Lima: Ministerio de Trabajo, 1973); *ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1980); 1979 figures from William Bollinger, "Peru Today—The Roots of Labour Militancy," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 14, 6 (Nov.–Dec.): 2–35.

*Including general strikes of 19–20 July 1977; 27–28 February 1978; 22–23 May 1978; and 9–11 January 1979.

ment to compensate partially for one of its crucial limitations, the relatively small size of the industrial working class. By lining up with barriada organizations, rural-cooperative organizations and various leftist political groups, organized labor has managed to reach out to the unemployed, the marginally self-employed, and the peasantry, and thus to enlarge the popular movement.

At the electoral level, these popular organizations have provided a base for mobilizing support for political parties of the left.[7] An initial clear manifestation of the left's stronger political presence occurred in the 1978 elections to the Constituent Assembly. The combined leftist groups obtained 33.8 percent of the popular vote, in contrast to the 3.5 percent obtained by leftist parties in the 1962 elections (see table 3). The question was whether this strong showing in 1978 was a one-time protest vote in the wake of a two-year economic austerity program and stark increases in the price of basic goods, or whether it indicated a more enduring shift to the left. In the May 1980 presidential and congressional elections, the various left candidates received 16.5 and 20.8 percent, respectively, which confirmed the contention that a more lasting shift

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TABLE 3 Election Results

	Percent of Vote			
			1980	
	1962	*1978*	*Presidential*	*Congressional*
Right				
PPC		23.8	9.6	9.4
UNO	28.4	2.1	0.4	0.6
MDP		1.9	0.2	0.4
MDRP		0.5		
Center-Right				
AP	31.1		45.0	40.9
APRA	33.0	35.3	27.4	27.6
Center-Left				
PDC	2.9	2.4		
Left				
MSP	0.5			
FLN	2.0			
FOCEP		12.3	1.4	1.7
PCP	1.0	5.9 } UI	2.8	3.5
PSR		6.6 } UI		
UDP		4.6	2.3	3.5
FNTC		3.8	1.9	2.2
OPRP			0.4	0.6
UNIR			3.3	4.6
PRT			3.9	3.9
PSP			0.2	0.3
APS		0.6	0.3	0.5
Blank	1.1			
Left Total	3.5	33.8	16.5	20.8

Sources: For 1962 figures, Neira (1973); for 1978 figures, Handelman (1980); for 1980 figures, Desco, *Resumen Semanal* (no. 77), cited in Woy-Hazleton (1980).

Key:

PPC-Partido Popular Cristiano
UNO-Unión Nacional Odriísta
MDP-Movimiento Democrático Peruano
MDRP-Movimiento Democrático Reformista Peruano
AP-Acción Popular
APRA-Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana
PDC-Partido Democrata Cristiano
MSP-Movimiento Social Progresista
FLN-Frente de Liberación Nacional
FOCEP-Frente Obrero Campesino Estudiantil del Perú
PCP-Partido Comunista Peruano
PSR-Partido Socialista Revolucionario
UDP-Unidad Democrática Popular
FNTC-Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos
OPRP-Organización Política de la Revolución Peruana
UNIR-Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria
PRT-Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores
PSP-Partido Socialista del Perú
APS-Acción Popular Socialista
UI-Unidad de Izquierda

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had occurred. These results were surprisingly strong because the left had not presented a credible alternative power-bloc due to its being extremely sectarian, factionalized, and lacking in resources. In the November 1980 municipal elections, the left received 27 percent of the vote, again confirming its growing electoral presence. The strength of the left reflects the larger process of increased popular mobilization, with heightened rates of direct action resulting from greater organizational penetration of the lower classes.

Although leftist political parties, barriada organizations, and rural organizations are all important participants in the process of popular mobilization, the key role continues to be played by unions. Other organizations depend on unions to varying degrees because unions are the most effective at mobilizing electoral support, carrying out large-scale, coordinated protest actions, and putting pressure on the authorities. The unions are also more effective than other popular organizations because unions are the most experienced and consolidated of these organizations and they wield the most powerful potential weapon—the strike. Thus, in seeking to explain the general increase in popular mobilization in Peru, the key is to analyze the increase in unionization and labor militancy in the context of the policies pursued by the Velasco and Morales Bermúdez governments.

REASONS FOR THE INCREASE IN UNIONIZATION

As mentioned in the introduction, a lack of consistency characterized the Velasco government's policies towards popular mobilization in general and organized labor in particular. High-level government officials disagreed about the distribution of material resources and power among the state, capital, and popular forces. They also differed over whether to repress, tolerate, or even promote autonomous popular mobilization and whether to promote strictly controlled mobilization for incorporation into government-sponsored organizations and eventual demobilization.

The government's official policy toward popular mobilization was one of encouragement under state tutelage. In July 1971, SINAMOS (Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social) was set up in charge of "organizing the national population to achieve the conscious and active participation in the tasks that economic and social development demand."[8] SINAMOS was active in organizing agrarian cooperatives, industrial communities, self-help barriada organizations, new unions, and intermediate structures designed to link these various base organizations to the government. A majority in the government clearly opposed autonomous labor organization and promoted policies designed to reduce the influence of existing trade unions and labor mili-

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tancy. But whereas one faction around Minister of Fishery Tantaleán Vanini was ready to resort to highly manipulative and legally questionable means, other factions advocated a more moderate approach to the goal of weakening organized labor. Among top-level public officials centered around the labor area of SINAMOS, one faction promoted outright mobilization with the hope that this approach would push the government to the left.[9]

As of 1968, organized labor did not constitute an immediate threat to socioeconomic stability in Peru. With an official unionization rate of 19 percent of the labor force, its strength could be regarded as intermediate in the Latin American context.[10] Yet, organized labor concerned the military government in two respects. First, in some sectors, labor's strength was considerably greater than the average figure might imply because unionization was concentrated in the two crucial export sectors—mining and sugar production—and in construction, as well as in some white-collar sectors such as banking. Second, the Peruvian labor movement, like its counterparts in other Latin American countries, had been highly politicized since its beginning. From the 1940s until the mid-1960s, the dominant force was the Confederación de Trabajadores Peruanos (CTP), which was controlled by the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA). Until 1968 APRA was Peru's only mass-based party. Founded by Haya de la Torre in exile in Mexico in 1924, APRA adopted a radical program at its first national convention in 1931. During this early period, APRA was frequently involved in violent confrontations with the military. In particular, the 1932 massacre of military officers during an uprising in Trujillo resulted in lasting hostility towards APRA among the military. In the 1940s and 1950s, APRA dominated the emerging labor movement through the CTP, but in 1956, APRA started to make deals with right-wing parties and to abandon the defense of popular interests in its search for participation in power. This approach caused APRA to lose legitimacy as a defender of workers' interests and opened the way for the establishment and growth of the Communist-controlled Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP). Nonetheless, because of the military's traditional enmity toward APRA, the further weakening of APRA's influence on the labor movement became a particular concern of the military government.[11]

The government's initial approach to these two concerns was to offer incentives to labor in well-organized sectors to collaborate with employers and the government, and to recognize officially both the Communist CGTP and the tiny, Christian-Democratic Central Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) in 1971 as counterweights to the CTP. When these policies failed to reduce the influence of existing trade unions and labor militancy, the government sponsored a new central union organization, the Central de Trabajadores de la Revolución Peruana (CTRP), to

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compete with and thus to weaken autonomous labor organizations. The CTRP also failed to realize the government's objectives. The CGTP and unions to its left continued to grow, and strike rates started to soar in 1973. Instead of solving existing conflicts, some of the government's incentive policies created new ones, and instead of weakening autonomous labor organization and militancy, SINAMOS and the CTRP contributed to their growth.

The key incentive policy was the introduction of the Comunidad Industrial (CI), announced in July 1970. The CI was intended to reconcile the interests of labor and capital by allowing workers to participate in profits, ownership, and management of their enterprise. Every individual enterprise with at least six employees or more than one million *soles* gross annual income (U.S. $250,000 at the time) was required to give 25 percent of annual before-tax net profits to its employees. The allocation took two forms: 10 percent to be distributed in cash to individual employees, and 15 percent to be given to the CI (i.e., to the collectivity of all employees of the enterprise) in the form of shares newly issued or purchased from existing shareholders. In addition, the CI was to be represented on the board of directors of the enterprise, initially through one representative and later in proportion to its share in enterprise ownership. CI-ownership was eventually to reach 50 percent, at which point representatives of labor and private capital would jointly direct the enterprise as equal partners. The officially expressed expectation was that workers would begin to identify as co-owners of the enterprise and consequently would refrain from militant action, which would render the presence of unions superfluous and cause them to "wither away." In 1971 the concept of the CI was introduced in the mining, fishing, and telecommunications sectors, under the generic name of Comunidad Laboral (CL).

In order to promote collaboration between the government and unions, Minister of Labor Sala Orosco pursued an open-door policy accompanied by favorable wage settlements. Yet, it soon became obvious that this approach would not ensure organized labor's unconditional compliance with the government's wishes for moderation in militancy and that the CL by no means weakened unions. Consequently, efforts were undertaken to build up the CTRP by giving favorable treatment to unions affiliated to the CTRP. By controlling the CTRP leadership, the government hoped to weaken the prestige of and the workers' loyalty to the other central union organizations, the Communist-affiliated CGTP, the APRA-controlled CTP, and the Christian-Democratic CNT, and non-affiliated unions.

To explain why these policies, far from achieving the government's objectives, contributed to increased unionization and labor mili-

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tancy, it is useful to start with the reasons behind the increase in unionization, which was a major cause of the rise in militancy. Whereas the total number of unions nearly doubled between 1968 and August 1975, the number of unions in the industrial-manufacturing sector more than doubled in this period. A closer look at the industrial-manufacturing sector shows that a large proportion of medium and smaller enterprises were unionized during this period. As indicated by table 4, which is based on a representative sample of enterprises in the industrial-manufacturing sector, a new union was formed in over half of the enterprises employing fifty to five hundred workers. Enterprises with less than one hundred employees were particularly likely to be unionized for the first time. In larger and previously unionized enterprises, many of the new unions were either white-collar or unions in other production centers of the same enterprise (Peruvian law restricts unionization to the establishment level rather than allowing it on a company-wide basis). By 1976, then, over three-fourths of medium and large enterprises (those with more than fifty employees), which together employed 85 percent of the work force in the industrial sector, were unionized. Between 1966 and 1976, the number of unions in Peru increased over 120 percent, a figure that compares favorably with the increase achieved in Chile during the 1966–73 period, which was marked by extremely intense and rapid mobilization (table 5).

Table 4 shows unionization before and after 1970, when the CI was introduced and the number of new unions recognized sharply increased. These two events appear closely related. The CI contributed to

TABLE 4 Unionization before and after 1970 by Size of Enterprise

Number of employees in enterprise	*Percentage of enterprises where a union was established*		*Percentage of enterprises in size category*	*Percentage of employees employed by enterprises in size category*
	Before 1970	*By 1976*		
Under 20	0	0	28.9	4
20–49	4	25	32.5	11
50–99	23	74	17.0	13
100–499	51	78	19.3	42
500+	93	98	2.2	30
All	17	38	100.0	100.0
N	(338)	(758)	(1993)	(190,762)

Sources: CI data (see note 6); and Evelyne Huber Stephens, *The Politics of Workers' Participation: The Peruvian Approach in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Academic Press, 1980), p. 108.

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TABLE 5 Total Number of Unions in Chile and Peru

	N		Index*	
Year	Chile	Peru	Chile	Peru
1966	2870	2006	100.0	100.0
1970	4519	2612	157.5	130.2
1972	6001	3405	209.1	169.7
1973		3762		187.5
1974		4065		202.6
1975		4299		214.3
1976		4425		220.6

Sources: Chile: Landsberger and McDaniel (1976, p. 518). Peru: Register of Unions, Ministry of Labor. Calculations by the author.

*1966 = 100.0

the formation of new unions both by making more visible the conflict of interests between labor and capital and by providing an organizational shelter for the formation of unions. Instead of overcoming existing antagonisms between workers and employers, the CI created a whole range of new conflicts.[12] Employers not only felt threatened by the long-range participation of workers in ownership, but even in the short run, they regarded the representation of workers on the board of directors as an intolerable infringement on their prerogatives. Consequently, they resorted to a variety of maneuvers to block the development of the CI, both with respect to its shifts in ownership and participation in enterprise direction. Numerous techniques were used to minimize the declaration of profits and consequently lower the amount of money to be given to the CI for reinvestment in the enterprise. In larger enterprises, profits were channeled to service and commercial enterprises of the same owners because these sectors were not required to establish a labor community. In smaller, particularly family-owned, enterprises, profits were decreased by raising costs for "public relations" (i.e., entertaining, trips abroad) and "consultants" (phantom employees or family members put on the payroll). Official board meetings were not called at all or were turned into pure formalities, or the CI representatives were not provided with necessary information prior to the meetings, and so on. In many smaller, nonunionized enterprises, entrepreneurs could get away with these evasion strategies because of the low level of information about the legislation and the low capacity for self-defense of the workforce. In larger enterprises, however, particularly where an experienced union leadership existed, workers became aware of these maneuvers and started complaining about violation of the legislation, asking the Ministry of Industry for support and enforcement.[13] Although unions were legally barred from participating in CI affairs, they played a

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major role by providing the impetus for collective action in defense of workers' interests as CI members as well as offering practical experience in dealing with employers and the state bureaucracy.[14] Thus, rather than being relegated to insignificance and eventually disappearing, existing unions became key actors in the struggle between CIs and employers over the distribution of material rewards and control. Moreover, where no union existed, workers' perception of the need to form one in order to increase their capacity for collective action in this struggle could easily be sharpened by organizers and by a demonstration effect from the experience of workers in other enterprises.

SINAMOS organizers in their official role as promoters of the CI made an indirect, albeit not always unintended, contribution to the expansion of unionization, contrary to the spirit of the CI legislation. Some SINAMOS organizers were committed to promoting a genuine process of mobilization and perceived their role as one of "bureaucratic guerrillas." Their official role was to provide administrative support in setting up the CIs in collaboration with CI organizers from the Ministerio de Industria y Turismo (MIT) and to inform workers about their rights and duties as CI members, including the necessity to separate strictly CI and union affairs. Informing workers about their rights, however, involved pointing out violations of these rights by the owners of the enterprises, and thus sharpened workers' perception of the basic conflict of interests.

In March of 1971, a small scandal broke out and two officials were fired because they had "preached class struggle" in a seminar for CI organizers in the Ministry of Industry. Organizers did not even need to use Marxist analysis to make workers recognize a conflict of interest, but only to suggest some explanations as to why they were not receiving their expected share of profits from an enterprise that before the introduction of the CI had shown healthy profits. From here it was a short step for workers to realize that forming a union would provide them with greater leverage for defending their interests vis-à-vis employers. The CI also helped expand unionization by providing a protective shelter for organizing efforts because its assemblies brought workers together in situations where social pressure and feelings of solidarity could overcome individual fear and reluctance to sign the union membership list needed to obtain official recognition.

A further contributing factor to the increase in unionization was the law on security of employment, decreed in November of 1970. This law exemplifies the government's somewhat impulsive, action-reaction approach to labor policies. It was passed to stop the massive firings that protesting entrepreneurs were resorting to in their efforts to create social unrest and force the government to rescind the CI. Under this law (which was changed after 1975), a worker could be fired only for serious

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misbehavior once a three-months' trial period ended. The unintended consequence of the law was to deprive Peruvian employers of their usual tactic to prevent unionization—the firing of union organizers and supporters and the use of corresponding threats. Thus, the legislation was clearly counterproductive to the government's goals of weakening organized labor.

Another major component of the Velasco government's labor policies, the sponsoring of the CTRP, was similarly counterproductive. In order to understand why this project was undertaken when the failure of the CI to weaken existing unions became visible, it must be viewed in the context of the government's larger policy of national integration and the concern over organized labor's political ties. National integration (that is, elimination of economic and political conflict among social groups) required weakening autonomous organizations, particularly class-based ones, and linking these groups directly to the state through newly created organizations. This pursuit required weakening unions and loosening their ties to political parties. Official recognition of the CGTP and the CNT as counterweights to the CTP, however, meant that officials of these central organizations could represent affiliated unions in dealings with the Ministry of Labor and was therefore an imperfect strategy for accomplishing the government's goals. Because the CGTP already had developed into the strongest central organization, this strategy of division left unresolved the question of how to deal with pressures from organized labor in general and politically motivated pressures in particular. The attempt to deal with them by offering incentives for collaboration, consisting of frequent direct interaction and negotiation between Minister of Labor Sala Orosco and important union leaders that often resulted in favorable wage settlements, did generate support among CGTP and CNT leaders and unions for the government's general reform and labor policies, but it by no means guaranteed acceptance of no-strike directives, nor did it turn union leaders into loyal brokers between the government and the rank-and-file. In fact, the CGTP frequently found itself in the difficult position of trying to moderate militancy and prevent long and costly strikes without losing its credibility as defender of rank-and-file interests. Although the CGTP correctly concluded that no viable more-leftist alternative to the military government existed and consequently attempted to avoid unnecessary provocation, the CGTP also was convinced that labor strength and pressure were crucial to strengthening the more progressive forces within the government. Such moderation in militancy as was practiced caused the CGTP to be challenged as sell-out and collaborationist; it also occasioned some defections from the CGTP and an increase in the number and militancy of independent unions. Among these independent unions, Maoist, Trotskyist, and other varieties of Marxist political tendencies

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were strong, which on the one hand made these unions staunch opponents of the military government, but on the other hand prevented them from achieving the unity necessary to complete successfully their attempt to form a new central organization called Comité de Coordinación y Unificación Sindical Clasista (CCUSC).

When the military's efforts to ensure loyalty, collaboration, and labor peace from existing unions through division and incentives failed, the decision was made to create a new central union organization, the CTRP, as a model for "responsible" unionism and a tool for expanding direct control over organized labor.

Again, disagreements emerged on strategy, in this instance whether to build this new central organization from the bottom up or to co-opt existing organizations and work from the top down. The former strategy was advocated by SINAMOS organizers, the latter by a group of officers around the Minister of Fishery, Tantaleán Vanini, who was using the fishermen's union as a base to build up the CTRP (and his personal following). Although SINAMOS was formally directing the organizing drive, the Tantaleán faction pursued its own strategy simultaneously and managed in December 1972 to organize the Constituent Congress of the CTRP, which consisted of hastily composed union federations that in turn were made up of many base unions whose leadership had been captured through the combined means of co-optation and intimidation. Consequently, while government-sponsored organizers were propagandizing widely the advantages for workers of forming unions, the legitimacy of the CTRP was being undermined by the manipulative tactics involved in its formation and official recognition. This situation provided an opportunity for competing organizers from the CGTP and independent unions to capitalize on the government-supported organizing drive.

In addition to its manipulative organizational procedures, the CTRP's explicit class-conciliation approach of rejecting all strike action in favor of "constructive dialogue" prevented it from acquiring solid support among workers in important sectors of the economy, where experience with conflict and the example set by other unions rendered the CTRP leadership's nonresponsiveness particularly obvious. Figures from the register of unions in the Ministry of Labor show that between 1973 and August 1975, the CGTP managed to affiliate as many new unions as the CTRP (table 6). Furthermore, these figures surely underestimate CGTP strength because of the large percentage of unions for which no affiliation was recorded.

It was well known that CTRP unions received preferential treatment in their requests for official recognition, while the formalities imposed on other unions could be time-consuming. Accordingly, all CTRP unions would be expected to indicate their affiliation, in contrast to

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TABLE 6 Number of Unions by Affiliation

Affiliation	Total recognized 1973–August 1975	Percentage of Unions Recognized 1973	1974	1975	Total Affiliated by 1977
CTP	15	1	3	1	226
CGTP	177	22	24	24	671
CNT	16	1	3	3	118
CTRP	188	23	22	36	918
Independent	69	3	16	9	
No information	301	49	32	27	2520
Total	766	100	100	100	4453

Sources: Data for 1973–75 taken from Register of Unions, Ministry of Labor; data for 1977 from *Realidad* 5 (July 1979), published by SINAMOS, cited by Scurrah and Esteves (forthcoming).

CGTP unions. In fact, unions often indicated a CTRP affiliation and then switched to the CGTP as soon as they obtained official recognition.[15] These unions nonetheless appear as CTRP unions in this table because affiliation was recorded at the time of recognition.

According to the figures given by SINAMOS, the CTRP had surpassed the CGTP numerically by 1977. These figures have to be taken with two grains of salt, however, given their origin and the fact that they account for less than half of the unions in existence at that time. The 2,520 unions not mentioned in the SINAMOS figures undoubtedly contribute to the underestimation of CGTP strength. But even if one were to grant numerical prominence to the CTRP, it failed to become the dominant force in the Peruvian labor movement because it failed to penetrate the crucial sectors of the economy. In the industrial-manufacturing sector, the CGTP accounted for 38 percent of the unions recognized in 1973–75, the CTRP for 23 percent; in mining, the CTRP managed to affiliate a total of five unions. Its greatest organizational success occurred in the commerce and service sectors, particularly among sales personnel and transport and communication workers. Nevertheless, the government's organizing drive did not produce the desired new, dominant central labor organization capable of delivering labor peace and compliance with governmental directives. On the contrary, the campaign further strengthened autonomous labor organization and, consequently, labor's capacity for collective action, thereby contributing to the escalation of strike rates that assumed alarming proportions from 1973 on.[16]

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REASONS FOR THE INCREASE IN LABOR MILITANCY

To elucidate the reasons for this increase in militancy, strike behavior must be seen in the context of the total economic and political situation of organized labor; and, the analysis has to go beyond simple aggregate figures for frequency of strikes to include changes in strike patterns.[17] A large part of the increase in militancy was due obviously to the increase in unionization. In fact, one could easily make the mistake of attributing all of the increase to the formation of new unions because the number of strikes per recognized union does not show any substantial increase over the last Belaúnde years (this number ranges from 0.19 to 0.22 in 1965–67, and from 0.14 to 0.21 in 1973–75). The propensity of new unions to strike can be explained as their attempt to gain respect from management and the state bureaucracy, and loyalty from the workers. For the Peruvian case, former Minister of Labor Sala Orosco offered an additional explanation when interviewed in 1976. He observed that because of the ministry's pivotal role in all labor relations, it was flooded with requests for intervention in collective bargaining processes, which led to delays that in turn frequently provoked short protest strikes by unions. A closer look at strike activity in industrial enterprises through a regression analysis shows that independent of all other determinants of strike activity, presence of a new union was indeed a strong predictor of the total number of man-hours lost (table 7).[18]

Yet there are reasons to suggest that the whole increase in militancy cannot be attributed to the new unions. First of all, about one-quarter of new unions were affiliated to the CTRP, and CTRP unions pursued a clear and consistent no-strike policy. Second, new unions were formed mostly in medium and smaller enterprises, whereas the size of strikes (i.e., the mean number of strikers per strike) increased.

TABLE 7 *Regression of Total Number of Man-Hours Lost Per Worker in 1973–1975, in All Enterprises with a Recognized CI and More Than Twenty Workers**

Independent variables	*Beta*	*Simple r*
Number of employees	0.27	0.37
Presence of a new union	0.21	0.25
Average blue-collar remuneration per year	0.12	0.26
Ten percent cash distribution of profits through CI	−0.11	0.02
Presence of an old union	0.08	0.19
Proportion of enterprise capital owned by the CI	0.06	0.04
Increase in average remuneration 1971 to 1973	0.06	0.15

Sources: CI data (see note 6); and Evelyn Huber Stephens, *The Politics of Workers' Participation: The Peruvian Approach in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Academic Press, 1980), p. 132.

*R^2 = 0.20; N = 1075.

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This trend suggests that older (and larger) unions also became more militant or that an increase in solidarity strikes took place or both. In order to substantiate this point, a closer look at changes in strike patterns and their causes is needed.

In order to understand strike patterns, strikes need to be seen as one weapon by which organized labor attempts to improve the working class's share in the distribution of material resources and power in society. Where labor has alternative means available (such as access to a pro-labor government), the use of the strike weapon, which obviously involves costs for labor as well as for employers, can be avoided. Thus, societies with strong and influential labor movements—that is, labor movements characterized by extensive organizational penetration, high centralization, political unity, and collaboration with a political party, such as the Scandinavian ones—have very low strike rates. In contrast, where labor is organizationally and politically weak and characterized by organization of only a small proportion of the labor force, low centralization, and political disunity, strikes and strike threats tend to be the potentially most effective means available.[19] Where labor is also economically weak due to factors such as high unemployment, and government plays an important role in labor relations (a situation typical of dependent capitalist societies), strike pressure is likely to be directed toward the government as much as or more than toward employers. Whether strike pressure directed at the government is effective depends on the seriousness of the threat of economic disruption, that is, on the capacity of the labor movement to mobilize large numbers of workers into solidaristic action. Thus, in such situations the expected pattern would be large strikes that are relatively frequent in order to keep the pressure on, but short in order not to inflict heavy material costs on the participating workers.

The changes in strike patterns in Peru (table 8) can be explained as follows. The size and length of strikes did not change in any consistent fashion between the last years of the Belaúnde government and the early years of the Velasco government. A clearly visible decline in frequency, however, can be seen as a result of the government's open-door policy. In its attempt to obtain compliance from organized labor through persuasion and incentives, the government appeared to be, and to a certain extent was, responsive to labor demands; consequently, union leaders availed themselves of the channels for access to the Ministry of Labor. When the government became dissatisfied with the results of this strategy, however, and decided to close these channels and set up the CTRP, labor's only way of regaining influence was to transform its gains in organization into mobilization for strike action. The closing of these channels in 1973 coincided with a slow-down in wage increases, thus adding an economic basis to the political motives for militancy, which of

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TABLE 8 Shape of Strikes in Peru, 1965–1975, All Sectors

Year	*Size*[1]	*Duration*[2]	*Frequency*[3]
1965	342	5.9	20.5
1966	308	12.0	19.5
1967	344	7.4	19.7
1968	296	3.9	16.6
1969	246	5.3	16.3
1970	322	6.5	14.7
1971	428	8.4	15.2
1972	319	6.1	15.7
1973	528	4.7	28.7
1974	636	4.6	19.6
1975	792	4.1	25.6
1976	587	3.3	14.1
1977	1,737	2.0	7.3
1978	3,842	3.2	11.0
1979	811	1.9	18.8

Sources: *Las huelgas en el Perú 1957–1972*, Ministerio de Trabajo, Lima, 1973; and calculations by the author based on the *ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics* for 1976 and 1980 and unpublished statistics from the Ministry of Labor.

[1]Mean number of strikers per strike
[2]Mean number of man-days lost per striker
[3]Number of strikes per 100,000 non-agricultural economically active population

course were strengthened by the onset of the economic crisis and the deterioration of real wages in 1974 and 1975. In 1973, then, strike frequency increased dramatically, and the shape of strikes changed as well, becoming generally much larger and shorter.

This changing shape of strikes indicates the increasing importance of protest strikes directed at the government and the growing capacity of labor for solidaristic mobilization by coordinating strike action among various unions. Many of these protest strikes in 1973 were manifestations of a solidaristic reaction on the part of labor organizations in defense of their autonomy against the government's promotion of the CTRP and its verbal attacks on "irresponsible politicized unionism," as well as against physical attacks on union leaders and headquarters by the Movimiento Laboral Revolucionario, a militant group inspired by the Tantaleán faction.

Also, in 1973 a number of long and bitter regional labor conflicts erupted based on political motives that involved solidarity strikes of departmental union federations. For instance, a conflict in the state-owned steel company, SIDERPERU, surfaced in Chimbote over illegal firings that had resulted from a general strike of the Federación Sindical Departamental de Ancash and led to further solidarity strikes and the

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declaration of a state of emergency. Similarly, protest actions against arrests of teachers' union members in Arequipa also escalated into regional solidarity strikes; consequently, a state of emergency was declared in Arequipa in May and again in November of 1973. The strike data show the importance of these regional conflicts: in 1973, 29 percent of all man-hours lost through strikes in the industrial-manufacturing sector were lost in the provinces, as compared to 7 percent in 1974 and 9 percent in 1975.

These regional conflicts were an early manifestation of a phenomenon that assumed considerable importance in the protest and strike actions during the Morales Bermúdez administration—the gains in organization and, consequently, in militancy made in the provinces. The most impressive examples are the nationwide strikes that succeeded in the provinces as well as in Lima. But in several instances, protest, rioting, and strike waves originated in the provinces in response to the government's economic policies or firings of workers, such as occurred in Chimbote in December 1977 and Arequipa in May 1978.

In 1974 and 1975, strike action remained heavily concentrated in the Lima-Callao area. Demands escalated for government intervention to protect the consumption levels of workers against the effects of the economic downturn and also for changes in the Ministry of Labor's treatment of non-CTRP unions. Although political protest strikes and solidarity strikes did not become the dominant form of strike activity in Peru, their growing importance and the underlying strengthening of labor's mobilization capacity became a major concern for the government. A closer look at reasons underlying strike activity in the industrial manufacturing sector in 1973–75 shows that one-half to two-thirds of all strikes were called over wages and working conditions (table 9). Solidarity strikes and strikes called for "other" reasons, which include political demands directed at the government, accounted for roughly a quarter to a third of all strikes. These strikes, however, involved large numbers of workers, 40–50 percent of all workers who went on strike, and they were costly in terms of man-hours lost, accounting for roughly 40 percent of all man-hours lost during that period.

This capacity for large-scale mobilization presented an obvious obstacle to the Morales Bermúdez government's efforts to implement stringent economic austerity measures in the second phase. A variety of factors, some of them beyond the control of the government and some of them inherent in the development model chosen, caused a severe balance-of-payments crisis that forced the government to negotiate emergency loans in exchange for economic stabilization policies, first with a consortium of private banks and then with the IMF.[20] The predictable effects of monetarist stabilization measures on the consumption levels of the urban lower classes required a weakening of labor's defense

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TABLE 9 Reasons for Strike Activity in Manufacturing Industry

	% of all strikes			*% of all workers involved*			*% of all manhours lost*		
Reasons	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*
Wages / working conditions	53.2	54.5	66.3	37.9	33.2	43.5	50.2	50.0	45.8
Firings / layoffs	16.8	10.6	9.1	13.7	11.6	5.3	11.8	7.7	9.9
Union affairs	2.3	1.6	1.9	9.0	1.8	1.3	2.1	0.5	1.7
Solidarity	14.2	6.1	9.1	29.9	33.4	34.0	28.4	32.7	20.9
Others	13.2	27.2	13.6	9.4	20.0	15.9	7.5	9.1	21.7
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	(423)	(312)	(427)						

Sources: CI data (see note 6); and Evelyne Huber Stephens, *The Politics of Workers' Participation: The Peruvian Approach in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Academic Press, 1980), p. 201.

capacity. Obviously, the government discouraged labor organization, as indicated by the small number of unions recognized in 1977 and 1978. Furthermore, previous mild attempts to enforce legal restrictions on strike activity were replaced early in 1976 by more effective measures such as the declaration of a state of emergency in crucial sectors of the economy threatened by strikes (for example, in mining and fishing) and the firing of large numbers of striking workers. By mid-1976, the state of emergency was extended to the whole country, and labor leaders were subject to arrest and deportation. These repressive measures, together with the increasingly stringent economic austerity policies that by 1979 reduced real wages to 62 percent of their 1973 level (*Latin America Political Report*, 28 March 1980), intensified labor's propensity to solidaristic defense reactions. In July 1977, the first general strike in Peruvian history was successfully carried out, to be followed by other large-scale confrontations with the government. As previously mentioned, many of these confrontations occurred in provincial towns such as Arequipa, Huancayo, Cuzco, Huánuco, and Huancavelica. They tended to involve not only unions but popular organizations, some of which were formed spontaneously to coordinate demonstrations and strikes, and others having a more permanent basis among the barriada population, students, or members of agrarian cooperatives. The military government countered popular protest activities with repression, although it employed a mild variety in comparison to Chile, Argentina, or Brazil. Rather than further consolidating its rule and intensifying controls, the military government decided to prepare for transition to civilian rule.

The civilian government under President Belaúnde must contend

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with the same problem of enforcing economic policies that restrict popular consumption in the face of a labor movement that experienced improving conditions a decade ago and has increased greatly its mobilization capacity. Still, the current strength of the Peruvian labor and popular movement should not be overestimated. The changes since 1968 are dramatic in the extent of organization, but two key weaknesses have persisted.

First and foremost, organized labor is still weakened as a political force by its organizational and political fragmentation. In fact, these divisions have assumed renewed importance due to the close ties between unions and political parties that at times have attempted to use their influence on labor for their own purposes in the newly-reopened competition for power. This situation clearly has occurred in the case of APRA, as CTP forces have stepped up their (sometimes violent) attempts to regain control over various unions.[21] Disagreements among the Communist party and various leftist parties with ties to independent unions have hampered coordinated action among these unions and the CGTP, and they are likely to continue doing so. Several attempts to call general strikes have failed because of the CGTP's (and the Communist party's) reluctance to engage in a full-blown confrontation with the military government for fear of interrupting the transition to civilian rule.[22] The more radical unions with ties to Maoist and Trotskyist groups, such as the teachers' union (Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Educación Peruana or SUTEP), the miners' federation (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros y Metalúrgicos del Perú or FNTMMP), and the miners of Centromín (the state-owned mining enterprise) are reluctant to collaborate with the CGTP because of its "accommodationist" posture and its subservience to "social imperialism" emanating from Moscow. The problem of political disunity is equally, if not more, severe for other popular organizations, such as the *frentes* based in the barriadas because many of them were formed by political activists with exclusive affiliations.

The second weakness of organized labor is seen in its struggle with employers. Its economically precarious position in a society with a high unemployment rate and a real-wage level that barely guarantees subsistence continues to be aggravated by the economic crisis.

Still, although labor and other popular organizations are far from mustering sufficient strength to force major structural changes in their favor at the expense of capital and the middle class, they nonetheless present a new factor in the balance of power in Peruvian society. The presence of this new factor manifests itself not only at the level of direct action but also at the level of representative political institutions. The growing organization of labor and popular groups clearly has contributed to the greater electoral strength of the left. The relationship

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between popular organization and leftist electoral strength needs to be discussed in the context of the other factors contributing to the new political role of the left. In the absence of survey or aggregate electoral data for statistical analysis, this discussion must be based on inferences from fluctuations and location of leftist electoral support as reported in journalistic accounts.

REASONS FOR THE INCREASE IN THE ELECTORAL STRENGTH OF THE LEFT

Developments at both the mass and leadership levels created the possibility of translating popular organization and militancy into leftist electoral strength. First, unions and other popular organizations constituted valuable channels for political communication and for increasing electoral turnout in the competition for electoral support. The existence of a large, previously unmobilized electorate also aided the left's success in generating electoral support. The fifteen-year interval between the 1963 presidential and congressional elections and the 1978 elections to the Constituent Assembly, together with the lowering of the voting age to eighteen, meant that over half of the potential electorate had never voted before.[23] Although the leftist political parties were faced with competition from the center and right, they did not have to break into previous political alignments on a large scale, but benefited instead from "equality of opportunity" in seeking support from newly mobilized voters.[24]

The parties competing in the 1978 elections that were successful in gaining seats in the Constituent Assembly were the following: on the right, the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC), the Unión Nacional Odriísta (UNO), the Movimiento Democrático Peruano (MDP); in the center, APRA, with its distant leftist and recent rightist history and a center-right position in 1978, and the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC); and on the left, the Frente Obrero Campesino Estudiantil del Perú (FOCEP), the Partido Comunista Peruano (PCP), the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR), the Unidad Democrática Popular (UDP), and the Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos (FNTC). Acción Popular (AP), Belaúnde's party, decided not to participate in the 1978 elections on the official grounds that a revision of the constitution should wait until after general presidential and congressional elections, which were to be held as soon as possible. Unofficially, the party was highly suspicious of the close working relationship between APRA and the military government, which President Morales Bermúdez had initiated in a clear break with the history of mutual antagonism in order to ensure a smooth transition.

The UNO represented the old right, which had lost its power base with the old oligarchy as well as its popular base when its paternalistic ties to the barriadas were broken. The PPC emerged as the domi-

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nant new party on the right, formed by businessmen and lawyers from the modern urban industrial, commercial, and financial sectors to defend a strong, but pragmatic, pro-private-sector line. The FOCEP and the UDP were formed as coalitions of several radical worker, student, barriada, and peasant organizations with different ideological leanings; the Trotskyists dominated the FOCEP and the Maoists the UDP. The PCP is the old Communist party (both in longevity of existence in Peru and in leadership age); it had taken a consistently pro-Moscow line, while giving strong support to the military government in the first phase and abstaining from harsh criticism in the second phase. The PSR is the party formed by the most radical high-level leaders of the Velasco regime, and the FNTC is a regionally based party from the Puno area.

The strong showing of APRA was no surprise because the party always had managed to maintain a strong grass-roots network, despite its shift to the right and the erosion of its influence on organized labor. The PPC was strong in Lima, which contributed nearly 60 percent of its vote (Handelman 1980, p. 12). In particular, the middle-class areas in Lima and the suburbs voted heavily for the PPC. The strong showing of the left surpassed even the hopes of its own leaders, many of whom had not expected more than a quarter of the vote for all leftist parties (Handelman 1980, p. 12). The left enjoyed high electoral support in the barriadas; its FOCEP was particularly strong in the barriada districts of Lima.

At the level of political leadership, the legacy of the Velasco regime for the left provided numerous popular leaders experienced in political organizing. Several pre-1968 leftist political leaders and many new university graduates also had assumed positions in the state apparatus that brought them into contact with labor, peasant, and barriada organizations. They tended to favor popular mobilization as a means of strengthening the more progressive forces within the government. Toward the end of the Velasco government and during the Morales Bermúdez era, these officials were either transferred to purely administrative positions or fired. They nevertheless constituted a reservoir of leadership with organizational skills, contacts, and some degree of political visibility. Also, their experience had sharpened their perception of the need and potential for working toward social change by strengthening popular political organization in order to gain control over a variety of social institutions. Thus, a considerable number of capable leaders contributed to the formation of political groups and parties and were able to generate popular electoral support. The most visible group formed by leaders from the Velasco period was the PSR, founded by Generals Leonidas Rodríguez (former head of SINAMOS), Arturo Valdez Palacio (former head of the Comité de Asesoramiento de la Presidencia, the presidential advisory council), and other high-ranking officers. In addi-

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tion to these top-level ex-officials who formed their own Velasquista party, there were many lower-level ex-officials active in a variety of popular organizations and political parties.[25]

The strong showing of the left was further aided by APRA's declining activity in popular mobilization and the erosion of the influence of the Confederación de Trabajadores Peruanos on the labor movement that had begun in the sixties and continued under the military government. The succession crisis caused by the illness and death of Haya de la Torre resulted in tensions within the organization and further hampered APRA's ability to compete successfully with the left for support from new voters outside of the traditional APRA strongholds in the north. By the time of the municipal elections in November 1980, APRA had been displaced not only by the AP, but also by the leftist coalition Izquierda Unida (IU), these two having the largest and second-largest political forces in the country, respectively. Also, the traditional right, represented by the UNO, had lost its appeal in the barriadas because it had been based on clientelistic and paternalistic relationships built up originally by General Odría during his presidency (1948–56) and maintained by his party until 1963.[26] The traditional right's appeal to or control over voters in rural areas already had begun to erode before 1968 and was eliminated by the land reform. Why, then, did the left not capture an even larger percentage of popular votes, and why its comparatively weak showing in the presidential elections?

Two major structural factors have prevented the left from acquiring greater political strength: ideological and organizational fragmentation, and a precarious financial base. Structurally, the left is splintered into many small groups or parties that form a variety of shifting coalitions according to ideological as well as personal compatibilities. First, the left is divided between Marxist and non-Marxist parties. The non-Marxist parties on the left are the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR) formed by prominent officers of the Velasco government, which split into a Marxist and non-Marxist faction after the elections to the Constituent Assembly, and the regionally based Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos (FNTC). Acción Popular Socialista is classified as center-left, like the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), by some (Handelman 1980), but as left by this analyst and others (Woy-Hazleton 1980); it certainly is a non-revolutionary group. The Marxist left is further split into the Moscow-oriented Partido Comunista Peruano (PCP), the independent Marxist Vanguardia Revolucionaria (VR), the Comité Obrero Revolucionario (COR), the two mixed groups known as the Frente Obrero Campesino Estudiantil del Perú (FOCEP), which has strong Trotskyist tendencies, and the Unidad Democrática Popular (UDP), with a predominant Maoist tendency, and various smaller, ideologically exclusivist groups, such as the Maoist Patria Roja (PR), the

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Trotskyist Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST), the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT), and the Partido Obrero Marxista Revolucionario (POMR), as well as several other groups.[27] The FOCEP had emerged from the 1978 elections as the strongest leftist group and thus was in a favorable position to play a leadership role in forging a leftist electoral alliance for 1980. Several attempts to form a broad coalition with other groups failed, however, because of ideological incompatibility. Instead, several small coalitions, such as the Unidad de Izquierda (UI), the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT), the Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria (UNIR), and the Unidad Democrática Popular (UDP) competed for popular support with one another and with parties sponsoring their own candidates, including the pseudo-leftist Organización Política de la Revolución Peruana (OPRP), headed by the manipulative Tantaleán Vanini.

Clearly, organizational fragmentation and a precarious financial base affect elections at different levels varyingly. They detract most in national campaigns where agreement on one or a few candidates and extensive publicity through mass media are prerequisites for success, and least in local elections, where more options for coalition-building and grass-roots campaigning are available. Thus, the left could be expected to make its weakest showing in the presidential elections. The particular electoral-political constellation surrounding the 1980 election further reduced the vote for the leftist presidential candidates. The rule adopted by the Constituent Assembly postulated that a candidate would be elected with 36 percent of the total vote. If no candidate won, the election would go to the newly elected Congress. Clearly, the left had no chance of winning the presidency; the two candidates with the best chances were APRA's Villanueva and AP's Belaúnde. Because of the deep-seated hostility between APRA and the left, which was rooted in past, and occasionally violent, competition for organized popular support, many leftist supporters voted for Belaúnde in order to keep APRA from winning the presidency. Furthermore, the already noted shifting coalitions in support of various potential presidential candidates undermined voters' confidence in the left's ability to challenge seriously the candidates of the major center and rightist parties. In the congressional elections that were based on proportional representation, however, leftist candidates' chances appeared better, not least because leftist votes were not cast for AP in an attempt to keep APRA out. Nevertheless, difficulty in presenting a unified front and achieving national visibility obviously hampered the left in both elections.

The results of the November 1980 municipal elections support the contention that organizational fragmentation and financial weakness present less significant obstacles at the local level. The left managed to form a loose coalition, the Izquierda Unida, to increase its share in the

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total popular vote to 27 percent, and to gain control over the municipal government in eight departmental capitals for the first time in Peruvian history. The IU was particularly strong in the south, where it won a surprise victory over the AP in Arequipa, won in Puno, Pisco, and Ilo, and lost in Tacna only because rival lists of leftist candidates had been posted. It also carried the day in Moquegua (with over half the vote), in Pucallpa, and in Huaraz. In Lima, the IU was strong in the barriadas, winning in Comas, El Agustino, Independencia, Carabayllo, and Villa María del Triunfo, and failing in other barriada districts only because of leftist disunity.[28]

Several explanations for the left's strong showing in these elections can be offered. First, it is easier to agree on a limited, concrete program for local political action in the near future than on the desirable future shape of a society and political strategies for national transformation. Therefore, ideological differences between leftist factions, which tend to assume paramount importance in a national campaign, may be overcome in local campaigns by more pragmatic considerations and common goals for change. Second, while in national elections leftists need to agree on one candidate to head the list, in the municipal elections, various leftist groups could negotiate common support for a few candidates. Third, it is much easier to reach directly through popular organizations an electorate of a few thousand concentrated in a medium-sized town or urban area than to reach a much larger electorate dispersed over urban and rural areas, a situation that reduces the handicap posed by limited media access and increases the importance of organizational capacity. Thus the gains made in labor and popular organization could be translated into votes more easily at the local than the national level. Fourth, the solidarity created by joint political action, the visibility of local leaders, and the greater chances for concessions from local as opposed to national authorities all can be assumed to have reinforced the loyalty of members to their local organizations and consequently to have yielded popular support for the leftist candidates.

Part of the difference between the 1978 and 1980 results in elections at the national level must be attributed to the role of Belaúnde's party. If we assume that in 1978 some AP supporters abstained, some voted for the right-wing Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC), and smaller numbers voted for other right, center, and left parties, then the AP's participation in the 1980 elections was bound to diminish the left's share, although to a lesser extent than that of the PPC. In the absence of survey data, however, this assumption remains no more than an inference based on the PPC's votes.[29]

The fluctuations in the results of the 1978 and 1980 elections indicate weak party attachments among the many newly mobilized voters. One of the most consistent findings in the literature on voting behavior

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is that party attachments solidify the longer an individual supports a given party. Thus, continuing fluctuations in electoral outcomes are to be expected. In order to arrive at a better-founded assessment of long-range prospects for leftist electoral strength, survey data showing the percentage of voters who voted consistently in all four elections would be needed. Of course, the prerequisite for consistent voting behavior is the presentation of the same party choice in all elections. Given the weak organizational consolidation of the left and the formation and re-formation of coalitions between newly established leftist parties, the possibility for such consistency has been reduced, placing the left at a long-range disadvantage vis-à-vis the older parties of the center and right. Moreover, the current political situation in Peru is in so much flux that the question arises as to whether there will be an electoral long term at all. The concluding section will speculate briefly about this point.

REFLECTIONS ON THE BUREAUCRATIC-AUTHORITARIAN ALTERNATIVE

Given the Velasco regime's legacy of a heightened level of popular mobilization, the economic crisis, and the resulting imposition of a harsh austerity program, expectations drawn from comparative analysis of the political behavior of the military in Latin America would point in the direction of an attempt to install a bureaucratic-authoritarian or exclusionary regime. In fact, the years 1975–80 did show some tendencies in that direction. The economic hardship imposed on the population and some of the methods used to enforce economic policies certainly resembled those of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, although repression remained at a much lower level. Indeed, Cotler argued in early 1978 that the contradiction between monetarist stabilization policies and the demands of organized popular forces was turning the odds in favor of the establishment of a new, more repressive military dictatorship (1979, pp. 280–81).

Why did the Peruvian military not conform to these expectations? O'Donnell's conceptualization of the alliance between military and civilian technocrats on the one hand and the internationalized sectors of the bourgeoisie and foreign capital on the other as the backbone of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime provides the most obvious answer (1973, 1978). In Peru, such an alliance has not been formed because the military government's nationalistic, interventionist, and redistributive policies between 1968 and 1975 had severely strained relationships between the military and foreign capital, and the military and the internationalized and national sectors of the bourgeoisie. The imposition of the monetarist stabilization policies after 1975 further alienated all but a few export-oriented sectors of the bourgeoisie. Stepan's (1978, pp. 73–113) and Collier's (1979, pp. 385–93) conceptualizations offer further possible

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explanations.[30] Despite the rapid increase in popular mobilization and dramatic decline in popular consumption levels, the degree of political polarization had not reached extreme proportions as in Chile before the 1973 coup. The very fact that the military held governmental power gave rise to a multipartite struggle. The political constellation that is very likely to produce an attempt to install a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime is one where the bourgeoisie, a great majority of the middle class, large sectors of the petty bourgeoisie, and the military all are united in opposing organized popular forces and a government seen as purposefully protecting popular interests or being too weak to resist popular demands and pressures.[31] In contrast, the Peruvian military was the government and was itself under attack from all sides. Not only had its reform policies alienated the bourgeoisie, but the IMF-inspired austerity policies after 1975 also aroused strong opposition from most sectors of the middle class, particularly public employees who were affected by large-scale lay-offs and drastically declining real salaries, as well as from the popular forces who were hit hard by growing unemployment and the skyrocketing cost of living.[32]

Furthermore, the recent formation and consequent low consolidation of labor and popular organizations, combined with their political fractionalization, made them appear less threatening to economic recovery and political stability in the view of the middle class, the bourgeoisie, and the technocratic elite. It is also assumable that the military, the bourgeoisie, and the middle class believed that APRA would be able to reinvigorate its popular movement and contain its militancy. APRA's failure in this regard and the left's surprising electoral strength may well have been perceived as a threat, but only after the transition to civilian rule had begun.

Finally, the Peruvian military government and military institution lacked the organizational and ideological unity required for the installation of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. Internal disunity in the military had been rampant under Velasco, and although its leading figures were purged under Morales Bermúdez, the remaining members of the military government were still divided and unwilling to use large-scale repression. Nor can the purges be assumed to have restored unity in the military as an institution because personal loyalties among the middle ranks to the "progressive" higher officers had been built up over a period of at least six years. The precedents established by severe strains in the military government and institutions in Brazil and Argentina may well have taught the Peruvian military government to guard against undertaking a similar political project.

Nevertheless, the possibility of renewed military intervention and a turn to a stronger exclusionary regime cannot be discounted. The key question is whether civilian government will be able to bring about

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economic recovery and to ensure a certain degree of social and political stability. Continued runaway inflation, stagnation, and unemployment might aggravate social polarization and the threat posed by popular forces to the interests of private capital, technocrats, and the middle class to such an extent that these forces would favor recalling the military to power and installing a more repressive regime. Such social developments also might take their toll in terms of shifting the balance of power within the military to the conservative forces. On the other hand, the experiences during the Peruvian Revolution certainly have shattered the military's confidence in its superior capacity for political leadership and social engineering and thus lowered its propensity to assume governmental responsibility.

In 1968 the Peruvian military perceived the civilian politicians as incapable of guaranteeing a stable social and political order. The military thus took power in the belief that it could provide better leadership in the pursuit of national integration and economic development. The goal pursued by the political mainstream in the military government was to restructure society and build an organic system of citizen participation that would be guided from above. Within this new system, all groups in the society were to collaborate harmoniously in the advancement of national economic and social development under the leadership of the state. As has been shown, the outcome of the military's pursuit of structural reforms did not conform to its design because of a combination of internal disunity, counterproductive effects of its incentive policies, and competing organizational efforts by other social actors. Whereas the mainstream political tendency worked toward class conciliation and popular mobilization under state tutelage, the presence of the leftist faction in the government represented a rallying point and a shelter for radical forces within the state bureaucracy who were promoting genuine popular mobilization. The government's incentive policies, particularly the creation of the Comunidad Industrial, caused more conflict than class collaboration, which in turn facilitated the efforts by competing organizers (particularly preexisting labor organizations) to promote autonomous mobilization instead of integration into state-sponsored organizations. Resistance from the local bourgeoisie and foreign capital against both the redistributive components (like the CI) and the nationalistic components of the government's reforms (such as nationalization of foreign-owned enterprises and the state's assumption of the leading role in the economy) helped sharpen class conflict, but at the same time prevented the emergence of a bureaucratic-authoritarian alliance. Thus, after nearly twelve years in power, the Peruvian military restored liberal parliamentary democracy, the same system of government it had replaced in 1968. The outcome of the Peruvian Revolution, then, was not a change in the political system according to plan, but a

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change in the balance of political forces in favor of labor and the left resulting from a complex interaction between state policy and the struggle of social forces to protect and promote their interests.

NOTES

1. Hobsbawm (1971) and Lowenthal (1975) were among the earliest authors to point out the uniqueness and ambiguity in the character of the government. Later research, benefiting from retrospective insight into the Velasco period obtained during the second phase, has attributed much of this ambiguity and vacillation to the presence of different political tendencies among the military officers participating in the government. For particularly elucidating treatments, see Cleaves and Scurrah (1980), McClintock (forthcoming), and Pease García (1977).
2. The greater strength of labor and the left is clearly visible in figures for unionization, strike militancy, and electoral support. The only way to challenge this argument is to claim that APRA represented the left before 1968 and that only party labels have changed. I strongly disagree with this claim. APRA and the Marxist left have been in competition with one another since the 1930s. In contrast to APRA, the Marxist left never managed to build up a mass base; by the mid-sixties, it still was not able to attract more than a few hundred people at mass rallies. APRA became a mass-based party, but by the 1960s, it clearly had moved to the right.
3. Nordlinger (1977) gives a good survey of the literature and stresses this point over and over.
4. *Corporatism* is a term used widely to describe the character of military or civilian authoritarian regimes in Latin America (see, for example, Pike and Stritch 1974, and Malloy 1977). Stepan (1978) distinguishes between the inclusionary and exclusionary variety, the latter resembling O'Donnell's excluding or bureaucratic-authoritarian regime (1973).
5. Other scholarly commentators who have noticed the regime's legacy of mobilization are Gorman (1978), Handelman (1980), and, although they emphasize other aspects of the government's legacy, Stepan (1978) and Lowenthal (1980). Stepan emphasizes a more equal land distribution, an expanded role of the state in the economy, and innovative aspects in the relationship to foreign capital (1978), while Lowenthal stresses a shift in the structure and distribution of power from traditional to new entrepreneurial, financial, and technocratic groups as major legacies.
6. A description of the data and the sample procedures is given in Stephens (1980, pp. 103–7 and Appendix 1). The data will be referred to as CI data in this article.
7. A discussion of the various parties, their orientations, and their relationships to one another and to popular organizations will be given further on.
8. An analysis of the structure and formal role of SINAMOS in its formative years is given by Palmer (1973).
9. SINAMOS became highly controversial because of its partial role in genuine mobilization and by 1974, its head, General Leonidas Rodríguez, had been replaced and many SINAMOS officials had been fired. This aspect has been consistently overlooked by critics who branded SINAMOS as an exclusively corporatist control apparatus. The numerically most successful organizing effort took place in the agrarian sector, with the set-up of the Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA). It turned into a harsh critic of the economic policies of the second phase, however, and became a significant participant in militant protest actions. In the industrial sector, the higher level organization of Industrial Communities, Confederación Nacional de Comunidades Industriales (CONACI), developed early into a pressure group promoting radicalization of the CI legislation towards workers' control and social property. For an insider's view of the mobilizing role of SINAMOS, see Béjar (1976); for an account of its role in the agrarian sector, see McClintock (1981) and Cleaves and Scurrah (1980); for the industrial sector, see Alberti et al. (1977) and Stephens (1980).
10. The data from the *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* for 1968 show unionization rates for Peru roughly similar to Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay—that is, much

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lower than the ones for Argentina, Cuba, and Venezuela, but clearly higher than the remainder of Latin American countries.

11. For sources and a discussion of the history of APRA and the relations between the military and APRA, see North's 1975 review essay; see also Klarén (1973). For a history of the Peruvian labor movement, see Sulmont (1975, 1977).
12. For a similar view of the CI and a discussion of attitudes and behavior of entrepreneurs, unions, and CIs themselves, see Alberti et al. (1977).
13. A detailed analysis of conflicts at the enterprise level, based primarily on the correspondence between CIs, enterprises, and the Ministry of Industry, is presented in Stephens (1980). Here the question can only be mentioned briefly in order to relate the CI to the increase in unionization.
14. The reason union leaders were experienced in dealing with the state bureaucracy is because of the crucial role played by the Ministry of Labor in all aspects of labor relations. Every union has to obtain official recognition from the Ministry of Labor in order to be able to sign legally binding documents, such as collective contracts. Moreover, the ministry is involved as a mediator and arbitrator in collective negotiations as well as in individual grievances brought against employers. In short, interactions between employers and unions take place predominantly through the Ministry of Labor rather than on a direct basis.
15. This practice was pointed out to me by several union leaders as well as an official in the Ministry of Labor.
16. The failure of the Velasco government's attempt to set up a dominant, government-sponsored, central labor organization contrasts sharply with the successful incorporation of the Mexican labor movement under Cárdenas. The key variable accounting for this difference is the degree of prior labor organization and the consequent competition and demonstration effect from autonomous unions. For a theoretical and comparative historical treatment of the chances for a successful installation of corporatist regimes, see Stepan (1978, pp. 46–113).
17. Shorter and Tilly (1974) and Korpi and Shalev (1980) made pioneering contributions to such an analysis of strikes. The discussion here is inspired by their approach. A more extensive discussion of the development of strike patterns in Peru is given in Stephens (1980, pp. 195–204).
18. The regression shows that size of the enterprise was the strongest predictor of militancy. This relationship showed up consistently and also for other forms of militancy such as complaints from the CI. It can be explained by a longer tradition of unionization and by the greater confidence in their strength that workers gained from larger numbers. For a discussion of the variables in the regression, see Stephens (1980, pp. 131–35).
19. Obviously, this generalization requires that labor possess a certain degree of organization and autonomy. One would clearly not expect militant strike action from a labor movement that is completely unorganized or heavily repressed.
20. For an analysis of the factors contributing to the economic crisis, see Fitzgerald (1976, pp. 61–77 and 93–107), Stepan (1978, pp. 282–301), Stephens (1980, pp. 219–28), and Thorp and Bertram (1978). For Peru's relationship with private foreign banks, see Stallings (1979, pp. 217–53).
21. Attacks by APRA "bufalos" (goon squads) on union headquarters and elsewhere were a widely noted phenomenon during the election campaigns.
22. Angell (1979) mentions several such instances. His analysis of the Peruvian labor movement provides good insights into the importance of the political differences between the various confederations, federations, and independent unions.
23. Accordingly, opinion polls cited by Handelman (1980, p. 5) showed that political information and party recognition among adults in Lima as of late 1977 was very low. Twenty-three percent had never heard of APRA and 43 percent had never heard of Acción Popular, Belaúnde's party; only 10 percent understood that the Constituent Assembly was formed to elaborate a new constitution.
24. Due to the expansion of the electorate, most parties managed to expand their support in terms of absolute numbers of votes. A comparison of the votes received by the various presidential candidates in 1962, 1963, and 1980 reveals that only the candi-

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dates of the right lost support in absolute terms. But although the number of votes cast for APRA doubled and those for AP tripled, the votes obtained by the combined left increased twelvefold.

Presidential Elections		*Absolute number of votes (1,000)*			
	1962–63 / 1980	*1962*	*1963*	*1980*	*Increase 1980*
Right	Odría/Bedoya Reyes	481	463	395	0.82
APRA	Haya/Villanueva	558	623	1130	2.03
AP	Belaúnde/Belaúnde	544	709	1871	3.44
Center-left Christian Democrats		49	–	–	–
Left		60	19	728	12.1
Total valid votes		1693	1815	4124	2.44

Sources: For 1962 and 1963, Roncagliolo (1980); for 1980, DESCO, cited in Woy-Hazleton (1980).

25. Obviously, most pre-1968 leftist political leaders did not follow this pattern nor did most of the present political leaders on the left come out of such a career. Nevertheless, the mobilization policies during the first phase resulted in the formation of an experienced pool of potential political leaders. Although most of the major candidates of the leftist parties had never worked for the Velasco government, many organizers and leaders of popular organizations who performed crucial functions in generating electoral support for these candidates had. Hugo Blanco exemplifies a leftist leader who was not associated with the Velasco government, but who drew support from leaders and activists who had emerged under the regime. Jailed for guerrilla activities and then released in 1970, Blanco refused to accept the position offered by the Velasco government. In 1978 he drew strong electoral support for FOCEP from Lima's barriadas, where SINAMOS had been very active under Velasco.
26. See Collier (1976) for a discussion of the UNO's relationship to the population in the barriadas.
27. The following discussion relies heavily on Woy-Hazleton (1980) for specific information and on personal conversations with Peruvian observers for general comments. See also *Latin America Regional Reports: Andean Group*, 12 December 1980, London.
28. Amat presents figures showing that the strength of the IU was greatest in Lima's poorest districts. It won in five of the six mentioned, obtaining between 40 and 49 percent of the vote. See Amat y León 1981.
29. Attempts to assess the effect of the AP's nonparticipation are complicated by the enfranchisement of illiterates for the 1980 elections. Figures for aggregate voter turnout do not reveal whether part of the increase from 3.5 to 4.1 million voters was due to the 1980 participation of AP supporters who had abstained in 1978 or to participation of newly enfranchised voters.

	Registered Electorate	*Actual Voters*	*% Voted*	*Registered Voters (early 1980)*
1978	5.0m	3.5m	84%	literate 5.5m
1980	6.5m	4.1m	82%	illiterate 0.8m

Source: DESCO, *Resumen Semanal*, no. 50, December 1970, and no. 77, June–July 1980, cited in Woy-Hazleton (1980).

30. Stepan suggests the following key variables as determinants of the likelihood of installation and initial consolidation of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime: organizational strength and ideological unity of the state elite, development of autonomous political parties and interest groups, degree of polarization, and resource/effective demand ratio. Collier suggests availability of diversified or special economic resources, severity of the demand-performance gap, political strength of the popular

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sector, and severity of the threat perceived by technocrats, private capital, and the middle class.

31. Such a pro-coup coalition was present in Brazil in 1964 (see, for example, Stepan 1971), in Argentina in 1966 and 1976 (see, for example, O'Donnell 1973 and 1978), and in Chile in 1973 (see, for example, Valenzuela 1978).
32. See Dietz (1980) for the impact of the IMF stabilization policies on the quality of life for popular forces.

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