

## R E V I E W S

RELIGION UND SEELE IN DER PSYCHOLOGIE C. G. JUNG'S, von H. Schär  
(Zurich: Rascher; 12.00 S.Frs.)

Notwithstanding the immense implications of religion for his psychology, Professor Jung has devoted only one of his many books expressly and exclusively to the subject: the series of lectures entitled *Psychology and Religion* delivered at Yale in 1937, and later issued in book form. Dr Schär is not alone in finding that this book, presupposing as it does much that Dr Jung has written elsewhere, has given rise to much misunderstanding, and indeed disappointment and irritation, among readers who had hoped from it a complete and worthy survey of the whole matter. His own book is intended to fill this gap; and it is, we believe, the first serious attempt to do so.

Incidentally to his main task, Dr Schär has given us the best systematic summary of Jung's psychology that we have seen. It is brilliantly done, with scrupulous objectivity and understanding, and in large measure by way of quotation from Jung's own works. He succeeds in finding in them a pattern and coherence which is too often hidden from any but the most thorough and painstaking reader of those works themselves. Only the absence of an index prevents this book from being the invaluable work of reference it might otherwise have been. Perhaps his extremely vivid and picturesque account of the 'Copernican revolution' which Jung has brought to basic psychological postulates (pp. 28 ff.) goes rather further than Jung's own scientific caution would permit, and we may ask whether the subjective and objective levels of dream-interpretation are so mutually exclusive as might be implied on p. 50. But these are very minor over-simplifications in an otherwise masterly condensation.

Outside his last chapter, on 'Jung's Significance in the Contemporary Religious Situation', the author, who is a Protestant pastor with advanced 'liberal-modernist' leanings, hardly ever intrudes his own views. Any adequate criticism of his book would therefore be a critique of Jung's own interpretation of the religious significance of his psychology; a task which must necessarily exceed the scope of a review. Dr Schär deserves our gratitude for so clearly setting up the hitherto elusive target.

Dr Schär frankly recognises that 'for Jung, the ecclesiastical form of Christianity is undoubtedly best represented through the Catholic Church'; but most Catholic readers will smile wryly at the accompanying picture of Peter's barque as a luxury-cruise liner filled with irresponsible 'projectors'. For this, however, they have nobody to thank but some of their own propagandists. Protestant readers must be left to decide whom to thank for the still more surprising picture of their redemptionless selves, dying stripped of everything except the proud and perilous possession of their own loneliness and sin.

But, in the main, we are in full agreement with Dr Schär's appraisal of Jung's importance in the contemporary religious crisis; and we are beholden to him for bringing so much of it to light. We may however ask whether the restricted conception of *transcendence* (p. 131) allows an adequate discrimination of the distinctive character of the 'higher' from the 'nature' religions, and of Christianity from both. We do not ask the psychologists to affirm the validity of the psyche's own affirmations of transcendence or of the transcendental (whether in religion or elsewhere), but we must demand of them to take account of them as facts of paramount psychological importance, and without recognition of which the specific core of the higher religions is not touched. Is it some shortcoming here which, as Dr Schär remarks, prevents Jung from taking the last step to the Carus-Hartmann conception of the Unconscious as ultimately Absolute?

VICTOR WHITE, O.P.

LA THEORIE DES PREMIERS PRINCIPES SELON MAINE DE BIRAN. Par A. M. Monette, O.P. (Editions du Lévrier, Montreal; Vrin, Paris; n.p.)

Cartesianism is acknowledged to be his 'mother-doctrine' by Maine de Biran, the subject of Père Monette's workmanlike study. In opposition to the physiological fatalism of Hume and Condillac, Biran took his departure from the 'primitive fact' of reflection. This fact envelops a double awareness: of the thing known and of the I that knows. Not the subsistent thought, but the I that knows, is the centre of this primitive datum, and the Cartesian doubt that imagines the body annihilated though thinking remains plainly contradicts this primary datum. So that the questions that bristle round the *Cogito*—as to whether into 'thinking' Descartes does not really insinuate the reality of everything thinkable and into the subject of thinking the being that always contains it as well as the being it contains—apparently do not arise. The author points out that the expression 'primitive fact' is used polemically against Condillac who made great play with adherence to fact: and Biran invents *le sens intime*, a super-sense that feels its way to causes, again with one eye on the sensationalists.

The word 'effort' becomes a keyword here. It stresses the hard work of metaphysical disciplines as against the facile constructions of the 'geometrical mind'. In mathematics thinking is possible (as it is in Eddington physics) without continual reference to the external world, but elsewhere the act of knowing involves close attention to something external, an outward-turning of the self, the intellectual dynamism that makes intelligibility (which is not just the same as knowledge) possible. Another Biranian term is 'resistance' used of the object, which is envisaged as an obstacle—whether because of its material condition or because its substance is a 'force' does not clearly emerge. The doctrine of memory is also interesting and aimed apparently at the sensationalists: the representative memory, for