

Soviet history, Avtorkhanov has to use scanty and not fully reliable evidence (such as Khrushchev's memoirs). He must search for hidden meaning in official pronouncements and publications and sift through rumors that were leaked to the West by various "well-informed" sources. Given all this he fares remarkably well. Though compellingly interesting and personal, his work is not one of gossip but one of serious political and historical analysis. We learn from his book why and how Khrushchev, Beria, Malenkov, and Bulganin conspired to have Stalin removed.

Avtorkhanov is a former Communist who lost his illusions and became a student of Stalinism. As such he belongs to a group of distinguished authors. He is rather atypical among them, however, in that he is a Russian citizen by birth and one who was formed and educated in the Soviet Union. By joining the Institute of Red Professors (*Institut Krasnoi Profesury* [IKP]), he automatically became one of the "leadership group" (*rukovodiashchii aktiv*) included in the *nomenklatura* of the Central Committee. The Institute, its professors and students, formed what was called the "theoretical headquarters" of the Central Committee, and indeed all who in later years were responsible for ideology and propaganda at the CC level studied in the twenties and thirties at the IKP. Not surprisingly, they were taught by prominent Marxists such as Varga, Bukharin, or Pokrovskii; non-Marxist professors such as Marr, Struve, or Tarle; and distinguished intellectuals-politicians like Togliatti, Bela Kun, or Wilhelm Pieck. Kalinin, Stalin, and other Soviet leaders used to come to the IKP to deliver an occasional lecture. Because of Avtorkhanov's close view of Stalin's ascent to power in the twenties and his consolidation of power in the early thirties, and knowing of Avtorkhanov's intimacy with the prominent figures of the Soviet regime, one may feel more at ease with his involved, subjective, and at times very personal style of narrative.

In an earlier book, *The Technology of Power* (Munich, 1959), Avtorkhanov has shown masterfully that no episode in the history of the Soviet Union which had some impact on the control and allocation of political power could be attributed merely to coincidence, unforeseen circumstances, or some similar fiat. Everything, and especially everything that concerned Stalin, had its assigned place in the general order established to generate and control power in Soviet society. Obviously Stalin's death was no trivial matter for the Soviet system and, if Avtorkhanov's analysis is fundamentally correct, it could not be left to the unpredictable forces of nature. *Zagadka smerti Stalina* proves the point and thus, in a way, completes Avtorkhanov's analysis undertaken in *The Technology of Power*. In the spectacle of the ultimate triumph of the system he has begotten, we see, as we have to, Stalin's death. Only then is it demonstrated that *no one* is immune to downfall. Only then does the system prove to be stronger than its leader; it shows that it can survive him because it can be taught to others.

And yet in some curious way it is he, Stalin, who accomplishes this last crowning endeavor of Stalinism—Stalin's death. By attempting to repeat the Great Purge on his associates, who were his accomplices in the thirties, he leaves them no choice but to "liquidate" him. Avtorkhanov's book tells us this story admirably.

JAN T. GROSS
Yale University

WARNING TO THE WEST. By *Alexander Solzhenitsyn*. Introduction by *George Meany*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976. viii, 146 pp. \$7.95, cloth. \$2.95, paper.

Solzhenitsyn's *Warning* contains references to many events little known in the West—a March 1918 meeting of Petrograd workers denouncing the Communists' deceit;

Alexander Shliapnikov's role in the Russian Party and his later execution; Soviet workers' strikes in 1930, 1961, and 1962. In this vein the book spells out what Solzhenitsyn sees as the implications of *The Gulag Archipelago*: that a system so corrupt and abusive to its own people cannot be trusted in its dealings with foreign partners, especially if the latter, spellbound by capitalist greed, pragmatism, and democratic procedures, manifest little stomach for long-term struggle.

Such is the message of five statements to United States and British audiences in 1975-76, collected here in one handy volume.

To tilt lances with one of the bravest, most knowledgeable, and most prolific intellects of our time makes the critic feel like a gnat attacking a mammoth. It strikes me, however, that Solzhenitsyn has overshot his real competence. What he knows in depth is the Soviet life that he has observed or heard about firsthand. When he talks about Western policies or even about Soviet actions abroad his broadsides often fall short of historical accuracy or, in my opinion, political wisdom. Thus, he asserts that Roosevelt "gave unlimited aid, and then unlimited concessions" to Stalin during World War II, charging that "seven or eight more countries were surrendered" to Moscow, even though "England, France, and the United States were the victors in World War II" and could have dictated the peace (p. 23). As for recent events, Solzhenitsyn says that "China and the Soviet Union . . . have quietly grabbed three countries of Indochina" (p. 29).

Solzhenitsyn's capacity for overstatement about matters close to the West raises questions about his reports on the less accessible USSR. Americans "eliminated" the *émigré*-staffed Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union, "the last genuine institute which could actually study this Soviet society" (p. 74). His predictive powers fail when we read that "very shortly Portugal will be considered a member of the Warsaw Pact" (p. 69). His descriptive faculties also collapse with his assertion that Soviet military power will soon exceed Western by a factor of 2 to 1 (p. 77). Even his borrowing of historical analogies seems crudely inept: Russia has "trodden the same path seventy or eighty years before the West" (p. 101).

But if we believe that Solzhenitsyn has exaggerated both the flaccidity of the West and the Soviet threat, we nonetheless put the book down uneasily. He asks whether we have a meaningful *détente* when Westerners can spend their time agreeably "while over there people are groaning and dying or confined in psychiatric hospitals" where doctors apply drugs to destroy the brain; when the regime with which we sign *détente* agreements is unbound by public opinion, a free press, or a freely elected parliament; and when ideological warfare persists.

WALTER C. CLEMENS, JR.

Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies

SOWJETISCHE ENTSPANNUNGSPOLITIK HEUTE. By *Borys Lewytskij*. Zeitpolitische Schriftenreihe, 14. Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1976. 286 pp. DM 24, paper.

SALT II: PROMISE OR PRECIPICE? By *Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.* and *Jacquelyn K. Davis*. Monographs in International Affairs. Coral Gables, Fla.: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, in association with the International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1976. x, 45 pp. Appendixes. \$5.95, cloth. \$3.95, paper.

A question that has occupied those in the West concerned with Soviet foreign policy is the extent to which it is based on Marxist-Leninist doctrines. In answering this question three schools of thought have emerged, broadly speaking: (1) those who maintain that power-political considerations are subsumable to doctrine, (2) those who