

trade treaty of 1904, contributed not only to the ultimate alienation of the very quarry it was meant to attract, but also to Bülow's final loss of domestic support when the always uneasy partnership of temporary interests fell apart.

Vogel also effectively cautions the reader not to impose the German *Russlandbild* of the last decade before the war upon the earlier Bülow era. Racialist predictions of an inevitable war between German and Slav, or Social Democratic calls for a struggle against tsarism, while not wholly new, achieved a louder voice precisely because the fiascos of 1904–5 and Algeciras had proven the illusory nature of Bülow's policy of courtship and threat.

The critical reader can scarcely think of an important source which the author has neglected to consult. The judicious use of the archives in Bonn—particularly those pertaining to Germany's *Anleihepolitik*, the rich vein of material on commercial and industrial relationships at Potsdam, and the holdings at Merseburg on Russian-Prussian cooperation against revolutionary and terrorist activities, greatly helped in the fashioning of a work of substance and conviction.

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THE TIDE AT SUNRISE: A HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904–1905. By *Denis and Peggy Warner*. New York: Charterhouse Publishers, 1974. xi, 627 pp.

This book is an attempt to place an essentially military history of the Russo-Japanese war into a political context. The title of the first chapter, "The First Pearl Harbor," furnishes a major clue not only to the double military-political threads that run through the book but also to the use of questionable historical parallels. An exposition of how Japan, Korea, Russia, and China reached "The First Pearl Harbor" is then presented in the next hundred pages. Interspersed through what is predominantly a military narrative are a number of vignettes, such as the story of Colonel Akashi Motojiro and the Japanese intelligence effort in Europe. The book concludes with one chapter on the ending of the war at the Portsmouth Conference and another under the heading of "Aftermath," which hastily brings the "story" down to the energy crisis of 1973.

What, specifically, is the story the authors are telling? Is the volume an attempt to write a chapter in the history of warfare by comparing the strategic, tactical, and technical accomplishments of two antagonists? Is it instead a story, with military emphasis, of Japan's effort to seize a fleeting opportunity to win a place in the world? Or is it an attempt to make military history more readable by enfolding it in a political format? The answers are not obvious, and the authors hint at each of these purposes as they recount how the Japanese David went forth to do battle with the Russian Goliath. This lack of a clear, central theme also means a lack of integration of the material in the thirty-three chapters. Although a more consistent narrative would have been desirable, there are passages which are quite adequately brought into focus. One example is the reference to the concluding stages of the Portsmouth Conference when Japanese willingness to compromise on Sakhalin and indemnity demands was necessarily influenced by the improved military position of the Russians in Manchuria.

The military narrative, although episodic with too little attention paid to general strategy, makes a positive contribution in the treatment of individual

actions and leaders. For example, there is a great deal of detail presented about the siege and surrender of Port Arthur. While taking account of many positive aspects of Japanese intelligence, the authors assert that it was remiss in estimating the ability of the Russians to hold out at Port Arthur and that its evaluations may have been unduly influenced by the experience of the previous decade with the Chinese armies. In listing the Japanese military advantages the Warners properly include not only strategy and weapons but a good sense of opportunity and a strong will to fight. In reference to the battle of Liaoyang, General Kuropatkin's own reasons for falling back are cited—the superiority of the Japanese in numbers; the fact that they were younger, carried lighter loads and were more accustomed to hills and hot weather; and their greater patriotism and military spirit. Finally, the authors bring out the point that, quite apart from the renowned battle of Tsushima, the Russian naval war was carried on with less determination and effectiveness than the Japanese.

The authors succeed in the matter of observing fairness to both sides—if one allows for a tendency to see the winners in a fairer light. While there is sympathy for Admiral Makarov, because he was a sympathetic figure and because of his early death, there is no doubt that Admiral Togo comes out as a genuine hero, which, of course, he was and is to the Japanese people. At the same time, however, the heroic efforts of the officers and men of the Russian Baltic fleet do receive attention as they live out the difficult months on the coal-laden decks of their ships bound for the Pacific.

The book is well published from a technical point of view. The maps of the individual battles are helpful and the pictures are well selected.

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DIE OKTOBRISTEN (1905–1913): ZIELVORSTELLUNGEN UND STRUKTUR: EIN BEITRAG ZUR RUSSISCHEN PARTEIENGESCHICHTE.

By *Ernst BIRTH*. Kieler Historische Studien, vol. 19. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1974. 203 pp. DM 39.50, paper.

THE OCTOBRISTS IN THE THIRD DUMA, 1907–1912. By *Ben-Cion Pinchuk*. Publications on Russia and Eastern Europe of the Institute for Comparative and Foreign Area Studies, no. 4. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974. ix, 232 pp. \$10.50.

It is a pity these two authors did not get together to write one book on the Octobrists. There has long been a need for a monographic study of the party which supported the most serious attempt of the tsarist government to work with society in the interests of reform. Neither of these books on its own quite fits the bill. Both are based on doctoral dissertations which dealt with aspects of the Union of October 17, and neither has been broadened sufficiently to serve as a general study. The student anxious for a full account will thus be put to some expense but in fact the two books taken together complement each other well. Birth concentrates on the Union's aims, social structure, and its relationships with other political groups, while Pinchuk describes only its work in the Third Duma, but their conclusions are similar. The Octobrists were an alliance between haute bourgeoisie and landowners, who had a common interest in ensuring the restoration of law and order and also in the pursuance of reform that would prevent a repetition of