

conomic dependence on Berlin by 1937. Only a state-directed and consistent British policy of increasing trade with Yugoslavia could have provided a counterweight. However, imperial preferences and the principle of free enterprise, bolstered by the view of Eastern Europe as a natural sphere of German economic influence, prevented any significant British effort to stem German economic domination of Yugoslavia and other Balkan states.

Garlicka correctly views Polish and Yugoslav policies within the context of Western policy toward Germany and Italy. Western conciliation of Germany convinced both Warsaw and Belgrade to accept the Anschluss and to view German annexation of the Sudetenland as inevitable unless France and Britain made a stand. Earlier, French attempts to reach an understanding with Italy provided a political motive for Yugoslav efforts to seek good relations with Germany. It was also Western policy toward Germany which prompted the Polish foreign minister, Józef Beck, to attempt to form a "Third Europe," a bloc consisting of Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia backed by Italy. However, Italian weakness, Hungary's reluctance to limit her revisionist aims, and thus Rumanian and Yugoslav fears of Budapest all doomed this concept to failure. Similarly, the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente failed to protect Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia because of the lack of Western support. British attempts to check forceful German expansion by guarantees to East European states in 1939 came too late and were not buttressed by any plans to attack from the west if Germany attacked in the east.

In sum, Garlicka confirms the view that the policies of East European states depended on those of the Western powers. She has made excellent use of Polish archives in her documentation of both Polish and Yugoslav attempts to find security when there was very little room for maneuver. In the end, both fell victim to invasion and occupation, Poland in 1939 and Yugoslavia in 1941. Garlicka's study contributes significantly to our understanding of how they tried to avoid this fate and why they failed.

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THE UNITED STATES IN PRAGUE, 1945–1948. By *Walter Ullmann*. East European Monographs, 36. Boulder, Colo.: *East European Quarterly*, 1978. x, 205 pp. \$13.00. Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.

Eurocommunism is not entirely a new phenomenon: it was attempted in Czechoslovakia during the period covered by this book. And in spite of the analysis of Eurocommunism by a number of authors, there are still many areas of uncertainty. The present volume throws light on a few of these areas by viewing the events through the eyes of the United States embassy in Prague. This is both the book's merit and its limitation, for it is based primarily on State Department archives, since Czech sources are not available.

One of the crucial, unresolved problems is why Eisenhower first ordered American troops to advance all the way to Prague, only to rescind his order. Ullmann describes the two ranking experts at the State Department's Central European desk—Riddleberger and Williamson—as "literally crawling on hands and knees to try to persuade the powers to send American armies to Prague." Eden also pushed for military involvement, but without success. The decision may have been one of the most fateful of the Truman administration.

In essence, the Ullmann book deals with the Prague ambassadorship of Laurence Steinhardt. His conclusions are not very favorable. He states that Steinhardt may have been adequate for a conventional station, but that he was hardly a counterweight for

the diplomatic efforts of the USSR. He "was a conventional rather than an innovative or outstanding diplomat." It was not primarily his problem, however, since "Washington temporized and muddled, zig-zagging through policy decisions." Good wishes and hopes were not enough then, nor are they enough today.

The book could have profited by more careful proofreading. For example, on page 177, the United States Relief and Rehabilitation Administration is cited as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

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BÖHMEN UND SEINE NACHBARN: GESELLSCHAFT, POLITIK UND KULTUR IN MITTELEUROPA. By *Karl Bosl*. Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum, vol. 32. Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1976. 346 pp.

No less than three Festschriften have been published on the occasion of the sixty-fifth birthday of Karl Bosl, the renowned, and now retired, social historian at the University of Munich. The Collegium Carolinum of Munich has added a fourth one in honor of the founder and organizer of its institute, which is dedicated to research in the field of Bohemian area studies. It was a fortunate idea to let Professor Bosl himself speak in this volume on one of the main themes—by no means the only one—of his distinguished scholarly career.

The twenty-one essays and two book reviews compiled in the book appeared in print between 1958 and 1973 in various collections of essays and serials, but primarily in the yearbook *Bohemia*, which Bosl sponsored and elevated to international scholarly prestige. The central theme of the essays is Bohemia, with emphasis placed on its relationship to its neighbors—Germany, primarily southern Germany, and the Habsburg Monarchy, mainly the Hereditary Austro-German Alpine lands. The volume covers more than a millenium, from the Christianization of the Bohemian lands to the Czechoslovak republic of Masaryk and Beneš. Regarding interpretation, one finds, as expected, a certain emphasis on structural social analysis in the selection of essays; but several of the studies, including some of great significance, deal with political history.

It should be clear from the foregoing that in a brief survey it is virtually impossible to evaluate any of the author's specific contributions. It must suffice to call attention to characteristic features in Bosl's work in general that are reflected in this notable book. Bosl is undoubtedly a specialist in the topics presented but he never ties his subject to a limited area. He perceives even the most specific issues as samples of a historical process measured in various comparative aspects of time and space. The results of this method may not always lead to general agreement among historians, but they are always challenging. Another marked feature of Bosl's work as a distinguished bibliographer and reviewer is his view of historiography not as the history of individual contributions linked together by a common theme, but as the trends apparent in the overall evolution of history. The reader of these essays, as of Bosl's entire literary *oeuvre*, will spot another characteristic feature of his writing: little is expressed cautiously in tentative terms, modified by "perhaps," "but," and "although." Bosl is very clear and firm in his views and always very self-assured. Is he too confident, some of his confreres may ask? The answer to this question and the justification of Bosl's method is anchored in the remarkable personality of the man and the outstanding significance of his scholarly achievements.

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