
REVIEW ESSAYS

MEXICAN POLITICS: An End to the Crisis?

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- MEXICO IN CRISIS.* By JUDITH ADLER HELLMAN. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978. Pp. 229. \$15.75 hardcover, \$7.95 paperback.)
- MEXICAN DEMOCRACY: A CRITICAL VIEW.* By KENNETH F. JOHNSON. Rev. ed. (New York, London, Sidney, Toronto: Praeger Publishers, 1978. Pp. 267. \$19.95 hardcover, \$5.95 paperback.)
- MEXICAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER ECHEVERRÍA. The Washington Papers: No. 56.* By YORAM SHAPIRA. (Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications, 1978. Pp. 84. \$3.00.)
- LABYRINTHS OF POWER: POLITICAL RECRUITMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY MEXICO.* By PETER H. SMITH. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. Pp. 384. \$25.00 hardcover, \$9.75 paperback.)
- ELITES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE STUDIES ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LATIN AMERICAN CITIES.* By JOHN WALTON. (Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, The University of Texas, 1977. Pp. 257.)
- MEXICO, HOY.* Edited by PABLO GONZÁLEZ CASANOVA and ENRIQUE FLORESCANO. (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1979, Pp. 419.)

It is less fashionable today than in the mid-1970s to assert that the Mexican political system is in crisis. Large oil reserves discovered along the south Gulf Coast have revived the confidence of the Mexican elites in the appropriateness of their institutions for governing the country. The books considered here help bridge the gap between an era of rapid economic growth (1950 to 1965) and the prospect of large petroleum and gas exports (post-1981). The intervening period was marked by agricultural stagnation, widening income gaps, political alienation, violence and repression, and an erosion of Mexican self-assurance. Each of these

books, except the anthology edited by González Casanova and Florescano, was written during this period of crisis. Their value rests partially on their assumptions concerning the fabric of the Mexican political system and the anticipation of future trends.

Political fluctuations have been common in twentieth-century Mexico. Seeking to find its way after the tumultuous Revolution (1910 to 1917), the country appeared to be reconsolidating itself along conservative lines under the *maximato* of Plutarco Elías Calles. Lázaro Cárdenas laid the cornerstones for the modern Mexican state on the basis of an ingenious *triple entente*. First, revolutionary ideals comprised the popular definition of nationhood, and by citing them elites were continually reminded of the state's ultimate obligation to provide benefits to the lower classes. Rhetorical discourse and ample empirical demonstration that *some* members of the popular classes received education, health facilities, land, or jobs helped induce the remainder to stay relatively passive. Second, the government promoted private-sector-led economic growth through timely investment in hydraulic, transportation, and energy infrastructure, a low tax rate for industrialists and modern agriculturalists, and relatively easy entry for foreign capital that bolstered rather than competed with national industry. Third, the state generated an elaborate set of institutions to deal with the thorny problem of deferring gratification among potentially disruptive groups while others (mainly in the middle class or highly skilled workers' trades) marched ahead. The Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos grouped most of the workers employed in import-substitution industries and kept their wage demands at reasonable levels. Agrarian reform agencies habitually redistributed the same land while tactfully leaving certain landowners untouched. Student, labor, or peasant leaders who resisted the temptation of sinecures or political advancement within the system were thwarted or eliminated. For a select few, their loyalty, talent, and hard work paid off handsomely in public offices in which lateral compensation was expected and even encouraged. As long as the economy generated a surplus, the cooptation mechanisms of the Mexican system worked smoothly.

From 1950 to 1965, economic growth was impressive, often surpassing 8 percent. From 1966 to 1976, it varied considerably, but the average was not much greater than population growth. The reasons for this decline have been attributed to: (a) severe restrictions on the size of the domestic market, primarily because of low wage levels; (b) the "exhaustion" of the import-substitution economic model; (c) an overvalued peso and increasingly uncompetitive exports; (d) a leveling and decline in the productivity of the irrigated breadbasket in the northwest, and the absence of new watertables that could be used for agriculture; (e) declines in growth rates generally in capitalist economies; and (f) exten-

sive penetration of transnationals into Mexican industry and commerce, siphoning off surpluses.¹ This malaise worked its way gradually into the political system, and produced symptoms that elites at first diagnosed incorrectly. Restive labor and student leaders, rural and urban land invasions, guerrillas, declines in industrial investment, and voter apathy produced conventional responses either in tax inducements, repression, or appeals to nationalism. The student massacre at Plaza Tlatelolco just before the 1968 Olympic Games crystallized awareness that problems lay deeper. The brutality of the repression was a sign that Mexico was entering a hegemonic crisis, in a Gramscian sense. The state's ideological legitimacy had faltered to such an extent that the government seemed to rely on brute force to sustain itself.

The governing coalition could look either to the Right or Left to meet the historical challenge of the situation. Luis Echeverría, who had been Secretary of Interior in 1968, was deeply implicated in the Tlatelolco massacre. His appointment as the PRI candidate for the 1970 presidential elections seemed to indicate that dissidents would continue to be flogged. Echeverría had other ideas, however. Early in his presidential campaign, he took up the banner of the poor, fustigated domestic and international capital, and promised to pursue the social and political goals of the Revolution. Mexico's dominant economic class did not appreciate the regime's style in consolidating and rearticulating its disparate interests, and Echeverría proved to be very bad for business. After a series of financial missteps, Echeverría was obliged to authorize a severe devaluation in late 1976, and he left office in the midst of rumors of an impending military coup. President José López Portillo acted to correct the alleged mistakes of his predecessor. Declarations calling for austerity preceded a reduction in the public sector deficit, a lowering of real wages, and a restoration of business confidence. More fundamentally, López Portillo hinted that he had a different approach for stabilizing the political system given the weaknesses of the economy. Echeverría had allowed the tacit government-business alliance and the principle of monetary stability to atrophy. López Portillo had faith in these pillars of the system, but early in his presidency indicated that land distribution, the preeminence of the PRI, and public sector corruption were anachronistic. Fuller rights to opposition parties, an announced end to land reform, and dismissal of corrupt high-level officials caught red-handed appeared to be part of an important modification in the Mexican style of governance.

Drastic reform, however, lost its urgency after 1977 when the scale of PEMEX oil discoveries became fully appreciated. With this guaranteed source of income, the system no longer has to generate its own surplus to keep the machinery running as in the past. Without petroleum, the Mexican political system would have been forced to change

considerably; now, with petroleum, it is far from certain that it will change much at all.

These books can be classified into general historical surveys (Hellman and Johnson), academic monographs that are informed by explicit theories or methodologies (Shapira, Smith, Walton), and works that try to synthesize theory, data, and scholarly commitment to arrive at practicable solutions for Mexico's problems (González Casanova and Florescano). Each fills a niche in the literature and has separate audiences. The first two books will prove most attractive to advanced undergraduate students who need an introduction to twentieth-century Mexico. *Mexican Foreign Policy*, *Labyrinths of Power*, and *Elites and Economic Development* are recommended for graduate students or professionals who deal intimately with Mexico in government, business, or diplomacy. *Mexico, Hoy* is a contemporary evaluation of political and economic trends by leading Mexican scholars that sets out a challenging agenda for social reform appropriate for the government to be elected in 1982.

Hellman and Johnson, writing general treatises in English, aspire to emulate other distinguished authors who have helped document political phenomena in Mexico over the past twenty-five years, such as Frank Brandenburg, Robert Scott, Martin Needler, Vincent Padgett, and Roger Hansen.² While these new publications are preferable to the outdated earlier works, neither completely replaces Hansen's book for breadth of coverage or analytical sharpness. *Mexico in Crisis* is a readable general survey of Mexican politics concentrating on the Revolution and describing economic and political policies through the end of the Echeverría regime. The book, however, is not a sympathetic treatment of the Mexican political system. Hellman does not think very highly of the PRI, the national bourgeoisie, official labor unions, or the national security forces, which she toughly accuses of pushing undesirables out of airplanes. She admires Cárdenas but has an ambivalent attitude toward Echeverría. She praises his ambitious program for allotting more benefits to the lower classes but is contemptuous of his caving into the pressures of the system, including his perceptible move to the Right in the latter half of the presidential period.

To the relief of the layman, Hellman eschews social science jargon in her presentation. At the same time, the book contains case study material that could be used by teachers of comparative government treating political stability, social class, charismatic leadership, cooptation, and the behavior of corporatist-like regimes. (Less helpful is her romanticization of the militant 1968 student generation, which by and large is now comfortably incorporated into the system and enjoying its perquisites.) Unlike many general surveys of Mexico, this one contains a succinct analysis of capitalist agriculture and the peasant economy, and Hellman proves to be conversant with current debates in Mexico over

agricultural modernization and the disappearance of the peasant versus the resuscitation of peasant production of staple food crops. Slight irritants are out-of-date data, an awkward footnote style (although the bibliography contains some gems), and errors of fact concerning diplomatic relations with Chile, which have not yet been restored. Considering the system in crisis, Hellman speculates on the future of Mexico: military coup ("probably Rightist") or Leftist revolution ("very unlikely"). Not being a geologist, she did not foresee the large petroleum reserves (estimated in 1980 at about 60 billion barrels, placing Mexico in the world's top five) and their implications for the political system.

Kenneth Johnson's *Mexican Democracy: A Critical View* is an updated and expanded version of his 1971 edition. The book is strong in its treatment of liberalism in the nineteenth century; the organization and tactics of the PRI; profiles of the opposition political parties (especially the little-studied PAN); and individual strategies to achieve power and money in the system. Johnson rightfully considers the Mexican president a dominant influence in the system, describing him as the "nerve center of a legion of demands by interest groups, regional political chieftains or caciques, the three sectors of his party and their subsidiary organizations, the alienated satellite parties and outgroups, and a number of foreign influences (principally North American)" (p. 67). Two new chapters deal with corruption and the drug trade in a border town, and push-and-pull factors affecting international migration. Though making for lively reading, these sections ring more of journalism than scholarship (indeed one appeared separately in a newspaper) and stand in contrast to some of the careful research characterizing the earlier chapters. Other disappointments are an absence of economic analysis (particularly the international economy), a cursory treatment of agricultural issues, no consideration of the country's petroleum resources, and a failure to analyze the role of the bureaucracy in the Mexican state, aside from calling it "slothful." Johnson is captivating in discussing Benito Juárez, the Revolution, and Cárdenas, however, and for these reasons alone the book should be part of any Mexicophile's library.

However, *Mexican Democracy* is also a sort of travel book on the mean and ugly in the Mexican political system. The "methodology" that guides Johnson to his conclusions is a sociopsychological—or better said, psychopathological—inventory of the deprivations of the Mexican character. Influenced by Christian Bay, the author collects isolated thoughts from Mexican and foreign men of letters that discuss the dark side of the Mexican psyche, dwelling on revenge, sadness, loneliness, fatalism, lust, hate, and chicanery.³ The author then combines these literary figments with negative trends in Mexican development to demonstrate that black Aztec symbology lays a heavy hand on political behavior in Mexico. In building his case against the system, Johnson is

inexhaustable in assembling indictments, but is careful to point out that he is quoting Mexicans themselves when he writes of moral *enanismo* (dwarfness). The author waffles occasionally on the "hardness" of his approach, but the demanding scholar will not be reassured by statements such as "That Mexicans have numerous psychological hangups will be denied by few who know them" (p. 15), or "The great unknown, then, is how long Mexicans are likely to legitimize the system through their blind faith in a supernatural father figure" (p. 68).

Once Mexicans do decide, Johnson predicts that choice will be between (a) charismatic hardship communism, (b) total convulsive repudiation of the governing system, or (c) absorption by the United States. Since for most Mexicans Mexico "is a gigantic prison but without enlightened penologists" (p. 237), Johnson seems to view option (c) as the country's salvation. Culturalists and students of Mexican literature will be amused by the methodology; most political scientists will be rankled.

The three monographs (authored by Shapira, Smith, and Walton) are more deliberate in their approach to Mexican politics. Shapira's slim volume is a useful primer for diplomats, businessmen, or journalists who need a quick introduction to the Echeverría period. The basic hypothesis, credited to James Rosenau, is that leaders of developing countries often seem better able to overcome domestic strife and inertia by "focusing upon the hostility of the external environment than by stressing the need for internal measures" (p. 7).⁴ Likewise, "the greater the frustration with domestic reform efforts, the greater the emphasis on foreign policy initiatives . . . accompanied by a watered-down reformist thrust on the home front" (p. 45). Shapira provides a lengthy description of the 1968 student crisis as an example of an internal problem Echeverría was trying to resolve through his activist foreign policy, but does not elaborate on the multiple problems of the Mexican system in 1970 including the erosion of revolutionary myths, political violence, and the apparent eclipse of the "desarrollo estabilizador" economic model. Shapira follows Seara Vázquez in listing the traditional precepts of Mexico's foreign policy: nationalism, nonintervention, collective security, disarmament, juridical equality of all nations, and the pacific settlement of disputes.⁵ He then argues that Echeverría departed from these norms in breaking relations with Pinochet's Chile, taking sides in the Belize dispute, the anti-Zionism vote in the U.N., his criticism of Brazilian authoritarianism, and his strident Third World rhetoric.

While a useful descriptive piece, the monograph does not muster enough data to demonstrate that Mexico's new foreign policy was the outcome of failures at home. The author does not examine any alternative explanations, such as the pendular swings in the ideology of Mexican leadership; the orientation of key appointees (mainly economists) in the Secretariat of Foreign Relations; and the strategic need to countervail

a hemispheric move to the Right after the reversals of the Unidad Popular in Chile, Peronism in Argentina, and the Velasco military regime in Peru, in order to equipose U.S. hegemony. Rosenau's hypothesis was a convenient point from which to start writing but the theoretical discussion does not advance much further.

Smith's *Labyrinths of Power* is one of the most ambitious and successful pieces of social science research to be produced on Latin America in some time. The basic question is disarmingly simple: Has the Mexican Revolution effectively resulted in greater turnover among governing elites compared with prerevolutionary Mexico? Smith finds that the answer is (as expected) yes, but not before leading the reader through a fascinating adventure in data analysis that is a credit to the subdiscipline of quantitative history. The research is based on the career patterns of some six thousand political elites in three distinct cohorts: prerevolutionary at the end of the *porfiriato* (1900–11), revolutionary (1917–40), and postrevolutionary (1946–71). The book tests some of the hunches on national leadership included in general books about Mexico. For example, only 3.8 percent of the *porfiriato* elites participated in the Revolution, while 60 percent of the 1917 to 1940 group either bore arms or worked administratively with one of the factions. Díaz handpicked officials from all sections of the country (with some predilection for the Mexico City-Veracruz axis), while the revolutionary cohort came predominantly from the north and northwest, and the most modern group from throughout the country. Importantly, Mexican leadership since 1900 has come consistently from the middle class and had a university education; workers and peasants have rarely broken into the upper echelons of government, not even from 1917 to 1940. From this datum Smith argues that the Mexican Revolution redistributed political power among relatively dispossessed elements of the nation's middle class, which also helps explain why implementation of the social and economic goals of the 1917 Constitution was less than fervent.

The Revolution, however, did increase the absorptive capacity of the system: more offices, more levels, and more job patronage, in three career tracks (electoral, administrative, and high-level executive). Of these latter, Smith finds that elections were more important in the career of top elites during the Díaz dictatorship than for leaders of Mexico today. Ironically, 84 percent of dictator Díaz's top officeholders once held elective office, whereas only 29 percent of the latest "democratic" cohort have gone before the voters. This "bureaucratization of the Revolution," however, is ambiguous. Smith devises a continuity index, based on the percentage of top-level individuals in his samples who held a top-level post at any prior time. The continuity rate under Porfirio Díaz was about 65 percent; since 1920, about 35 percent. The recent turnover figures for Mexico are remarkable, even by international standards.

Quoting Smith, "rates during Soviet crises, even in the purges of the 1930s, have been within the normal range of continuity for Mexico. For a one-party system, Mexico seems to have an absolutely minimum amount of continuity." Despite this rapid displacement, the book points out repeatedly that turnover is not random, that the flushing out of top elites makes room for aspirants below, and that the tacit rules for career advancement, which heighten uncertainty for the individuals, lend considerable stability to the system as a whole.

A book of this scope could not have been produced without flaws. Some readers will take exception to the definition of top elite and total elite (which may underrepresent workers and peasants), the suppression of certain years from the analysis (1911–17, 1940–46), gaps in the data (thus weakening the analysis of Mexico's "power elite," which is one of the less satisfactory sections of the book), and occasional repetitiveness in the prose (especially chapter 4). The research still emerges as a major contribution to scholarship. Smith gracefully bridges classic and modern theorists on elites and political systems; establishes imaginative new techniques to order bibliographical data in illustrative ways; and sets high standards for similar works undertaken in Latin America or any other developing area.

John Walton chose to examine elites at the local level and ascertain their variable effect on regional economic development. The four cities are Guadalajara and Monterrey in Mexico, and Cali and Medellín in Colombia. The principal methodological tool is a questionnaire administered during 311 interviews in 1968 and 1969, followed by the gathering of historical and statistical data. The book is of interest to students of Colombia and Mexico (where regional disparities in economic growth are often slighted by metropolitan-based scholars), of Latin American urbanism, and of development theory. The historical treatment of the four cities is excellent, and more helpful for explaining regional development variations than are the restricted data on elite attitudes and behavior.

Guadalajara since Independence has been characterized by relatively small-sized farms and industries, and smooth collaboration between the public and private sectors. Monterrey's isolation from colonial and republican power centers lies behind the exceptional and original economic model that began with the pooling of industrial capital between the Garza and Sada families at the beginning of this century. Medellín has traditionally had a small farmer sector, and an upper class renewed by self-made men with a civic consciousness who preferred conservative government. Cali has developed under the strictures of a large latifundio class, small middle peasantry, marginal urban proletariat, penetration of foreign investment, and diminutive urban middle class. Walton places these cities' elites on a liberal-conservative spec-

trum which also seems to correspond to the level of regional development. The order is Guadalajara, Medellín, Monterrey, Cali.

The author utilizes no fewer than five theoretical approaches to analyze the data. These are (1) sequence and timing of change (e.g., Bendix, Dos Santos, O'Connor), (2) social stratification (Hoselitz, Nash), (3) functions of the state (Horowitz), (4) decision-making (Hirschman), and (5) the dependency school. The book can be viewed quite independently as an exercise in the sociology of learning. The research design and questionnaire were derived from U.S. community studies of the 1960s, and enhanced by concepts related to N-achievement and modernization. While the book was being written, it appears that the author became influenced by structuralist and dependency writers, including Frank and Cardoso. He also found merit in concepts such as Apterian consummatory values, coalition theory, and Parsonian evolutionary functionalism. Eclecticism of this sort is valid, but at times the argument is convoluted. The reader trails along after the author as he tries to fit the data into each of the theories or hypotheses, and achieves no more than partial confirmations of any.

Part of the difficulty rests on the ambiguity of the concept of development (is it growth or redistribution?) and limitations in the data (all too few closed-ended questions to allow for firm classifications of elite ideology). Indeed, the study is weakest in its definition of these dependent and independent variables. The initial design of the research proved to be too narrow for the author's taste as his thoughts progressed; subsequently more data were mobilized to fill out new propositions; some of the variables are suggestive but information is insufficient to operationalize them; coding the responses permitted too much leeway and lowered the reliability of the conclusions, even for the author himself. The reader's lingering impression is of a tour de force of author persistence and intellectual honesty rather than the definitiveness of the findings. Aside from the specialized audiences mentioned above, the book should be recommended to prospective dissertation students who are not convinced of the need for a tightly reasoned research design, with the table of contents of the thesis pretty much in mind, before they head for the field.

By contrast, methodological consistency is not foremost in the minds of Pablo González Casanova and Enrique Florescano. According to the editors, the twenty-two contributors to *Mexico, Hoy* share a belief that Mexico's future is most promising under socialism and within a new world economic order; the book is not an ideological tract, however. The fifteen chapters are informed statements of Mexico's current problems by some of Mexico's most accomplished social scientists. Not content to sit back and pester the ruling class with criticism and omens of disaster, almost every author makes a deliberate effort to derive practical

suggestions for government policy or opposition strategy to accomplish the goal of a more equitable and just Mexican society. Those knowledgeable of the self-imposed detachment of many Latin American social scientists (at least while they reside in academe) will find this approach to be atypical. It clearly relates to the cycle of *sexenios* in Mexico and permits these social scientists to help set the agenda for the presidential campaign of 1982. Also, the discovery of vast oil reserves makes cries of government penury a less valid reason for postponing services and social justice to poor segments of Mexico's population.

All of the articles are important, some for their introduction of new material and others for innovative analysis. Armando Labra, Guillermo Knockenhauer, Rolando Cordera, José Blanco, and José Ayala collaborate on a detailed discussion of economic trends through the beginning of the López Portillo regime, and isolate the causes of the country's economic crisis including excessive tariff protection for consumer industries, increased dependence on international capital, importation of capital intensive technologies, and financing public sector expenditures through the use of private sector deposits rather than tax receipts. The authors recommend an increase in the size and regulatory authority of the state as part of an economic development model that would spread the benefits of the system more evenly to poorer groups. Guillermo Bonfil and Arturo Warman address rural issues, including the place of indigenous populations in Mexican society and the design of more rational agricultural policies. In an article on Mexican unions, Raúl Trejo does not indulge in self-righteous denunciations of sold-out (*charro*) union leaders, but searches for weaknesses in state domination for increasing the possibilities for independent union organization and action. His contribution is rich in data and is a starting point for students of the current status of the workers' movement in Mexico.

Alejandra Moreno examines the reasons why state authorities responsible for housing and urban development in Mexico are under the influence of private investors and construction lobbies, and chides Mexico's opposition parties for their simplistic appreciation of the complexity of the problem and primitive policy suggestions for reform. Dealing with the health sector, Daniel López Acuña analyzes the scope of coverage in Mexico (considerably less than half the population), and recognizes that universal health care is unlikely until marginal populations are sufficiently organized to demand it. Nutrition, education, scientific research, and international relations are treated in separate chapters by Adolfo Chávez, Olac Fuentes, Enrique Leff, and Olga Pellicer. Two quite readable and stimulating essayists among Mexico's intelligentsia, Carlos Pereyra and Carlos Monsiváis, analyze the relationship between structure and ideology with illuminating examples of half-truths and distortions in the official line, while Fátima Fernández provides an intriguing

account of a succession of abortive state efforts to control the mass media. Arnaldo Córdova, Luis Villoro, and Pablo González Casanova examine different dimensions of the Mexican Left and the conditions for democratic reform.

González Casanova's two chapters in the volume, "Democratic Alternatives" and "Mexico: Her Most Probable Course," are fair reflections of the spirits of important segments of the moderate Left in Mexico. On the one hand, it is obvious to all what urgently needs to be done: independent organization of workers, peasants, shantytown dwellers, indigenous communities, cooperatives, and university students under a banner of democratization and with well-thought-out ideas on how to improve the lot of the Mexican masses. There is some doubt, however, about whether these invocations will inspire any dissidents to action, given the cooptative power of the state. The senior editor of *Mexico, Hoy* concludes that past patterns are likely to continue into the future, and that the Mexican system will resemble what he aptly calls "monopolistic liberalism." He foresees some opportunities for progress, but obtained only gradually, with sacrifice and some risk in the organization of the popular sectors and preparation of alternative policies that are workable, but which may also be ignored.

With its financial future secure, the Mexican system has been able to pull back from the precipice. The massive influx of petroleum income could have a destabilizing effect on a less well-consolidated institutional setting, as factions compete furiously for advantage. After an unsettling decade, however, Mexican elites have regained their sense of security and their self-discipline. The validity of the Mexican state is likely to be reaffirmed from now until the end of the century. As such, the long-term patterns identified in each of these books, and not sudden swerves, are probably the best predictors of the future. An important research challenge lies in the preparation of additional monographs on various sectors of Mexican society of the detail and quality of the Smith, Walton, and Shapira pieces. Although it is a safe bet that oil income will be filtered through a political system that differs little from the one described by Hellman and Johnson, the nuances will be important because of the size of the resources involved.⁶ Moreover, the flexibility of the Mexican system has not been fully tested. The state is not unmoveable, and certainly not omnipotent. Works such as *Mexico, Hoy* combine new information, a clear vision of structural relations, and an endorsement of the art of the possible. They can help orient the system more faithfully toward the still unrealized objectives of the Revolution.

NOTES

1. The baseline study for recent economic trends is Clark W. Reynolds, *The Mexican Economy: Twentieth Century Structure and Growth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). Important works of more recent vintage are Fernando Fajnzylber and Trinidad Martínez Tarragó, *Las empresas transnacionales: expansión a nivel mundial y proyección en la industria mexicana* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1976); Rosario Green, *El endeudamiento público externo de México 1940–1973* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1976); Mario Ramírez Rancaño, *Crecimiento económico e inestabilidad política en México* (Mexico City: UNAM, 1977); Carlos Tello, *La política económica en México: 1970–1976* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1979); Leopoldo Solís, *Economic Policy Reform in Mexico: A Case Study for Developing Countries* (Elmsford, New York: Pergamon Press, 1980).
2. Frank R. Brandenburg, *The Making of Modern Mexico* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1964); Robert E. Scott, *Mexican Government in Transition* (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1964); Vincent L. Padgett, *The Mexican Political System* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966); Martin C. Needler, *Politics and Society in Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971); Roger D. Hansen, *The Politics of Mexican Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).
3. Johnson cites Bay's *The Structure of Freedom* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), and acknowledges the intellectual influence of Oscar Monroy Rivera, especially in *El señor presidente de Enanonia* (Mexico City: Costa-Amic, 1973).
4. See Rosenau's "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area," in J. N. Rosenau, ed., *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 11–50.
5. See Modesto Seara Vásquez, *La política exterior de México: la práctica de México en el derecho internacional* (México: Esfinge, 1969). The serious student of Mexican foreign policy should also be familiar with Mario Ojeda's *Alcances y límites de la política exterior de México* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1976) which was published after Shapiro's volume was in print and is not treated.
6. Economists have been swifter than political scientists to begin to examine the consequences of oil income for the country. See Centro de Estudios Internacionales, *Las perspectivas del petróleo mexicano* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1979); *Economía Mexicana*, Revista del Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), I:1 (March 1979); Sócrates Rizzo and Leopoldo Solís, "Opciones de economía política," *Documentos de Investigación*, Banco de México, 12 (September 1979); and Solís, *Alternativas para el desarrollo* (Mexico City: Editorial Joaquín Mortiz, 1980), especially pp. 47–72.