

The second danger is that we engage in an unacceptable form of casuistry, especially if, following a suggestion of Swinburne's on p 133, we attempt to classify biblical imperatives according to the two types of act. However, Swinburne notes that Protestants have rejected the doctrine of supererogation, and that Catholic statements of it are 'far from uniform or always clear' (p 130).

My chief query concerns Swinburne's account of Christ's redemptive work. In particular I wish to raise some questions of consistency with regard to Swinburne's view that Christ offered substitutionary atonement (in his sense of the noun). On p 149 he endorses the statement that 'no man can atone for the sins of another' but only 'help another to make the necessary atonement'. How, then, can Christ thus be our substitute? Again on p 161 he affirms that we must join our atonement to the one offered by Christ and even that repeated and sincere repentance suffices for God's forgiveness. Yet again, although Swinburne says that Christ's sacrifice is a perfect reparation and penance he does not say that it includes the other elements in atonement (repentance and apology). Does Christ's sacrifice then have the all-sufficiency that has been traditionally ascribed to it? Furthermore Swinburne criticizes (rightly in my view) the theory of penal substitution on the grounds that it is too 'mechanical' and is not explicitly in the New Testament (p 152). Do not the same criticisms apply to Swinburne's own theory? Finally, even if his theory is both consistent and true it would surely cover only one aspect of Christ's redemptive work and so only one element in the doctrine of the Atonement.

Nevertheless, this book has the qualities that we have come to expect from its author. It is lucid, closely reasoned, and reaches firm conclusions. Like Swinburne's earlier books, it clearly merits (*de congruo* if not *de condigno*) the attention of both philosophical and doctrinal theologians.

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WHAT IS IDENTITY? by C.J.F. Williams. *Clarendon Press, 1989.*
Pp. xx + 207.

The nutshell answer to the title is: identity is what is *shown* in the pattern 'X is F is X and G' by the repetition of 'X'. If identity were a relation, what would it relate? Objects? But there is only one of them. Synonymous expressions? But they are synonymous, not identical. Wittgenstein denied that it is a relation and that a formalism able to bring out logical structure needs a sign for it; use only one sign for any given object, and identity is shown by repetition of sign. Williams agrees that identity is not a relation, but is a matter of one thing's satisfying both of two predicables (e.g. being both my sister and my secretary) and that it can always be shown, but he disagrees that we need no sign for it. It is an essential moment in some thoughts (e.g. the identity of what is thought old with what is thought wise in 'Catherine is old and wise' or the identity of voter and candidate in 'Smith voted for himself'). Essentially the argument that we need a sign is that we need it in connection with A's reports of what B says or thinks. If A says that B thinks that one the same thing is F and not-F, we need to know whether the identifying of the F thing with the not-F belongs to A's

comment on the implications of beliefs of *B*'s, which do not involve *B*'s awareness of the identity, or whether it is supposed to belong to the content of *B*'s thought; is *B* being accused of thinking *that* a contradiction holds, or merely of thinking things which could only be true if it did? In practice it will normally be clear that the identity is meant to stay outside the scope of the belief-operator. But since these structures differ vitally (so that to confound them may lead to fallacious inferences) we need to be able to mark the difference with a sign which we may write *either* to the left of the belief-operator, or to the right of it so that it falls within its scope. Thus '(One and the same Smith): Jones believes that Smith voted for Smith' will not imply that Jones believes Smith voted for himself, whereas 'Jones believes that: (one and the same Smith) Smith voted for Smith' will have that implication; and in the former, though not in the latter, we may harmlessly substitute any synonym for either occurrence of 'Smith' in the *that*-clause.

This is very important, and I think Williams establishes his point. In the course of doing so he intensively explores the logical structure of propositions, especially with reference to *oratio obliqua*. All this is difficult, often provocative, often illuminating. But what of mathematical equations? Do these essentially say that one quantity (say $7 + 2$) stands in the identity relation to another ($3 + 4$)? In Chapter 7 Williams effectively dispels this notion for elementary arithmetic, and sketches a programme for eliminating it from the higher reaches.

Three important philosophical morals emerge from the logical background. Chapter 5 concedes that there could be a two-term relation of self-sameness, but argues it is useless except to those who hold that *X* may be the same *A* (e.g. person) as *Y* but not the same *B* (e.g. man). But this 'relativist' view is said to be untenable, on the basis of an argument designed to show that Locke's story of the prince who swapped bodies with a cobbler is incoherent. If some person both opened Parliament on Tuesday and cobbled on Wednesday, and if that person is a man, some man did both these things; yet *ex hypothesi* the man who did the one is not the same man as the one who did the other. If it were true that someone, *X*, was the same person, but not the same man as *Y*, it must be possible to supply names in place of '*X*' and '*Y*'; and this, Williams holds, cannot be done.

The second moral is that no clear sense has been given to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory according to which Bill's pain at 3 o'clock might be the very same thing as the firing of C-fibres in his brain at that time. If identity must be capable of being *shown* by repetition, then if there is something which is both the pain and the firing, it must be possible to say what that thing is. Williams clearly suspects that this cannot be done. The third moral (in Chapter 9) aims to give content to the notion that the meaning of 'same person' transcends the criteria for its application. A long, subtle and complex discussion of pronouns leads to the conclusion that when, say, I expect to do or undergo something, I am undoubtedly contemplating *my* future, yet I may not identify myself in any way, and may not even know who I am. But there is a great deal more in the chapter than that.

This book, is in a high degree important, controversial—and difficult. Those who want the philosophy must be prepared to wrestle with the logic. And that too will be rewarding.

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