

“World War Zero? New Literature on the Russo-Japanese War 1904/05”

Gerhard Krebs

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Japan had the predominant role in creating the discourse of Pan-Asianism because it won the Russo-Japanese War. Gerhard Krebs’s “World War Zero? New Literature on the Russo-Japanese War 1904/05” surveys some of the recent work on that war and the impact of Japan’s victory around the world. It captured global attention as a racial war, since it was the first time an Asian nation had defeated a white nation. The greatest impact was in China and Korea, but Japan’s success also influenced Pan-Islamic thought and the “Japanizers” of Ethiopia.

Although the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 had radically changed the relationship between Japan and China, it was the Russo-Japanese war that lifted Japan out of the mass of Asian nations and into the status of a world power. Victory in this war first gave Japan a chance to speak as the voice of Asia to the Western powers. This achievement encouraged many in China and elsewhere in Asia to model their national reconstruction efforts on Japan. In Southeast Asia colonial subjects of the European empires hoped that Japan would help them gain independence. Although these hopes would not be dashed immediately, some people became aware of the contradictions between Pan-Asianism and the growing Japanese empire very early. Chinese intellectual Zhang Taiyan (who had famously said that the relationship between Japan and China should be as close as “lips and teeth”) became convinced that Japanese Pan-Asianism was not leading to what he desired, an “Asian Humanitarian Brotherhood,” but to Japanese imperial domination. By 1907 he was denouncing Japan as the “public enemy” of Asia.

World War Zero? New Literature on the Russo-Japanese War 1904/05

Gerhard Krebs

On the occasion of its Centennial the Russo-Japanese War has found great attention among historians who organized many symposiums and published their studies, many of them based on conference papers. Some of the publications will be introduced in this review article.¹

The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5: a Collection of Eight Volumes. Compiled & Introduced by Ian NISH. Folkstone: Global Oriental 2003.

Rotem KOWNER, *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War*. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press 2006. pp. LIII, 567 (henceforth: *Kowner/Dictionary*).

Josef KREINER, Ed., *Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg (1904/05)*. Bonn: Bonn University Press 2005. pp. 186 (henceforth: *Kreiner*).

John W. STEINBERG, Bruce M. MENNING, David SCHIMMELPENNINCK VAN DER OYE, David WOLFF and YOKOTE Shinji, Eds., *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*. Bd.1, Leiden: Brill 2005. pp. XXIII, 671 (History of Warfare, Vol. 29), (henceforth: *Steinberg*).

David WOLFF, Steven B. MARKS, Bruce W. MENNING, David SCHIMMELPENNINCK VAN DER OYE, John W. STEINBERG and YOKOTE Shinji, Eds., *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*. Vol. 2, Ibid. 2007. pp. XV, 583 (History of Warfare, Vol. 40), (henceforth: *Wolff*).

Maik Hendrik SPROTTE, Wolfgang SEIFERT and Heinz-Dietrich LÖWE, Ed., *Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg 1904/05. Anbruch einer neuen Zeit?* Wiesbaden, Harassowitz Verlag 2007. pp. XI, 302 (henceforth: *Sprotte*).

Rotem KOWNER, Ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*. London and New York: Routledge 2007. pp. XIX, 348 (Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia, Vol. 43). (henceforth: *Kowner/Impact*).

Ibid., Ed., *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05*. Vol. I : Centennial Perspectives. Folkstone: Global Oriental 2007. pp. XXVIII, 512 (henceforth: *Kowner/Rethinking*).

John CHAPMAN and INABA Chiharu, Eds., *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05*. Vol. II: The Nichinan Papers. Folkestone: Global Oriental Ltd 2007. pp. XXXV, 348 (henceforth: *Chapman/Inaba*).

Cemil AYDIN, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought*. New York: Columbia University Press 2007. pp. VII, 299 (henceforth: *Aydin, Politics*).

Cemil AYDIN, "A Global Anti-Western Moment? The Russo-Japanese War, Decolonization and Asian Modernity", Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, Eds., *Competing Views of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s-1930s*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2007, pp. 213-36 (henceforth: *Aydin, Global*).

HIRAMA Yōichi, *Nichi-Ro sensō ga kaeta sekaishi*. “Samurai” *Nihon no isseiki* [The World History, Changed by the Russo-Japanese War. One Century of the “Samurai”-Nation Japan]. Tōkyō: Fuyō Shobō 2004. pp. 299.

GUNJISHIGAKKAI hen [Study Society for Military History, Ed.], *Nichi-Ro sensō* [The Russo-Japanese War], Vol. I: Kokusaiteki bunmyaku [The international Context]. Tōkyō: Kinseisha 2004 (also Vol. 40, 2/3, = Nos. 158/159 of the Journal *Gunjishigaku*). pp. 347. (henceforth: *Gunjishigakkai I*).

Ibid., Vol. II: Tatakai no shisō to isan [Comprehensive Aspects and the Heritage of the Fight]. Ibid. 2005 (= *Gunjishigaku* Vol. 41, 1/2, = Nos. 161/162). pp. 339. (henceforth: *Gunjishigakkai II*).

NICHI-RO SENSŌ KENKYŪKAI hen [Research Society on the Russo-Japanese War, Ed.], *Nichi-Ro sensō no shin-shiten* [New Aspects of the Russo-Japanese War]. Yokohama: Seibunsha 2005. pp. 541. (henceforth: *Nichi-Ro sensō*).

Alex MARSHALL, *The Russian General Staff and Asia, 1800-1917*. London and New York: Routledge 2006. pp. XII, 274 (Routledge Studies in the History of Russia and Eastern Europe, 4) (henceforth: Marshall, *Staff*).

Felix PATRIKEEFF and Harold SHUKMAN, *Railways and the Russo-Japanese War: Transporting War*. London and New York: Routledge 2007 (henceforth: Patrikeeff/Shukman).

Martin AUST and Ludwig Steindorff, Eds., *Russland 1905. Perspektiven auf die erste Russische Revolution*. Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang 2007 (henceforth: Aust/Steindorff).

Renée WORRINGER, Ed., *The Islamic Middle East and Japan: Perceptions, Aspirations, and the Birth of Intra-Asia Modernity*. Princeton: NJ, Markus Wiener 2007 (= Princeton Papers: Interdisciplinary Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 14, 2007) (henceforth: Worringer).

SHIMAZU Naoko, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*. Cambridge University Press 2009. pp. XV, 335.

Steven ERICSON and Allen HOCKLEY, Eds., *The Treaty of Portsmouth and its Legacies*. Hanover, New Hampshire: Dartmouth College Press 2008. pp. VII, 249 (henceforth: Ericson/Hockley).

MATSUMURA Masayoshi, *Baron Kaneko and the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5: A Study in the Public Diplomacy of Japan*. Morrisville, North Carolina: Lulu Press 2009. XVI, 518 S.

Turning-point of epochs and historiography

In the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War nobody outside Japan had expected a Russian defeat but rather saw the national existence of the Tennō's empire endangered. The result of the war, however, was immediately seen as a turning-point in world history since for the first time an Asian nation had defeated a European great power so that global events hence were not exclusively determined by the occident. Rather Japan became an important actor in world politics. Due to the impact of the outcome of the war which was not restricted to the two warring nations but obtained a global character and led to a new constellation of powers and therefore became a prelude for the next conflict, World War I, Steinberg and Wolff are using in their co-edited volumes the expression “World War Zero”. Similar is the conclusion that the Russo-Japanese War was a forerunner of the trench and fortification warfare at the western front

1914-18 (K. Hildebrand in *Kreiner*) and the sacrifice of mass armies in offensive as well as in defensive warfare (J. W. Steinberg et al. in *Steinberg* pp. xix-xxi): Port Arthur as a test ground for Verdun. Likewise the Russian revolution of 1905 appears to anticipate the October Revolution of 1917 (J. W. Steinberg et al. in *Steinberg* pp. xix-xxi)—and the end of monarchies in the defeated nations Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey in 1918 as can be added. In a similar way Japanese authors are using titles like “The Russo-Japanese War as World History”² or “The Century of the Russo-Japanese War”³ which had been followed by a chain reaction. Shillony/Kowner in *Kowner Rethinking* (p. 4) und Kowner in *Chapman/Inaba*, too, are interpreting the conflict of 1904/05 as a path to World War I since it changed the balance of power in Europe by leading to the Entente and finally the Triple-Entente thereby isolating Germany and leading to a great-style armament race. In contrast to later wars, however, no further countries were drawn into the Russo-Japanese conflict which did not assume the character of total war as R. Kowner in *Kowner/ Impact* (p. 4) stresses.

J. W. Steinberg et al. (in *Steinberg* pp. xix-xxi) also come to the conclusion that global conflicts did not start in 1914 but with the Russo-Japanese War which was fought on foreign territory, financed to a large extend by foreign money and for which other countries had delivered most of the war ships and weapons. Peace was also concluded on foreign territory. Furthermore, despite several declarations of neutrality the different alliance systems made themselves felt and the war stirred up national passions in colonial territories and among the population under Russian rule in East Europe.

Influential strategists in almost all countries, above all those of the great contracting nations of 1914, Germany and France, drew grave and probably wrong conclusions from the Russo-Japanese War: That the mass attack particularly by infantry regardless of own losses was the key to military success and therefore was commendable even against a superior enemy - to use a contemporary expression: To use human bullets (jap.: nikudan)—though the defensive operations of the Boers against the British some years before had doubted such conviction.⁴ Even the antiquated bayonet was celebrated as decisive weapon in trench fighting, while the disastrous effects of machine guns and modern artillery in the hands of the defenders did not find sufficient attention.

Not enough attention attracted the fact that neither party had been able to defeat the enemy completely but both were bled out, were economically exhausted and had to carry high social costs so that they had to conclude a compromise peace. Therefore, in the judgement of many historians,⁵ among them Steinberg (in *Steinberg* pp. 106, 128), unfortunately the devastations caused by the technology of the industrial revolution and the mass employment of modern weaponry resulting in high numbers of victims did not caution the statesmen and the military of the world so that the lesson was not learned and World War I not prevented.⁶

While the volume edited by *Steinberg* et al. deals more with the Russian perspective the following volume edited by *Wolff* et al. is concentrating more on Asia. Among the authors, however, as far as they are from Far Eastern countries, most are Japanese besides two Koreans and one Chinese. New Russian archival sources could be used, particularly for the first volume, but without coming to new findings. Both books, subdivided in subject groups, are, however, so voluminous that the editors obviously have sometimes lost the synopsis resulting in diverse repetitions. The volumes are illustrated with contemporary pictures, photos and maps.

Unfortunately a bibliography as found at the end of the publications *Kowner/Rethinking*, *Chapman/Inaba*, *Nichi-Ro sensō* and *Gunjishigakkai II* is missing.

The recent boom of studies on the Russo-Japanese War can be called the second wave since in the first decade after the outbreak of hostilities a sea of publications appeared, among them reports of observers on the battlefields and official operation histories of different countries. Later, however, the Russo-Japanese War found rather little attention. The official side in several countries tried to avoid dealing with this history: Japan feared being put on the pillory for opening the war in 1904 as initial act of her expansion policy until 1945. So for example S. M. C. Paine (in *Gunjishigakkai II*) and H. P. Willmott (*Ibid.*, pp. 21-22) see a continual development of Japanese aggression against the West with the greatest eruption in World War II to be traceable to the conflict of 1904/05—and in the case of Paine even to the war against China in 1894/95—so that they explain history in the same way as the pacifistic Japanese historians, while the Marxists blame capitalism entirely for this and other wars. For China on the other hand it was embarrassing to have glorified the victor of 1905 - and that meant: the wrong side. The same can be said about Great Britain, Japan's ally of that period, who had encouraged Japanese expansion on the continent but in the long run had destroyed her own empire. The United States which initially had incited Japan to see America's own rival Russia weakened in the end had to cope with a strengthened Japan in a struggle of life or death and besides that was criticized for its own imperialist policy in Asia also tried to avoid discussing her role of 1904/05. Russia herself even in Soviet times was still ashamed of the historic humiliation in the war with Japan (Shillony/Kowner in *Kowner/Rethinking* pp. 1-4). Anyway, until the end of the Cold War a fruitful cooperation between Japanese and Russian historians was hardly to be accomplished as I. Chiba in his introducing article "Invitation to a new perspective" in *Nichi-Ro sensō* (pp. 10-11) stresses. The inclusion of Russian authors in the same volume can serve as prove how much the situation has changed since the 1990s. With the distance of time to the war of 1904/05 and lessening bilateral tensions between Japan and Russia it appears to be possible to interpret the global effects of that war *sine ira et studio*.

An overview on historiographical tendencies about the war of 1904/05 during one century can be found in H. Nakanishi and S. Naraoka in *Nichi-Ro sensō*. Their conclusion is that in the beginning only studies on military history appeared, most of them with an official character. After World War I Marxist historiography blamed the Russo-Japanese War as "imperialistic". Only after World War II were works with diplomatic, economic and social history in the centre written, only slowly in the beginning but had become a real boom with the nearing of the centenary.

How much the Russo-Japanese War was used and misused for patriotic propaganda until 1945 is treated by F. R. Dickinson in *Steinberg*. I. Chiba in *Wolff* and in *Nichi-Ro sensō* is dealing with the further development until about 1980 coming to the conclusion that the enthusiasm of the Japanese people artificially aroused by a press manipulated by the government and the military soon calmed down and the disappointment about the peace conditions allegedly to mild for Russia even led to riots. Besides that, a nationalistic historiography justified the war. Only at the 25-year celebrations in 1929/30 the subject was dealt with in an exaggerated way by the military in the heated atmosphere of the London naval conference and found a much wider treatment on the 30th anniversary when in 1931/32 after the annexation of Manchuria the aims of the Russo-Japanese War were propagated as accomplished. In the historiography after World War II among other questions the problem was discussed if the war of 1904/05 was in the first place fought for

Manchuria or Korea since in the first case it would have been a war of aggression while in the second case it could be interpreted as a war of defence.

The Russo-Japanese War found a greater interest due to the writings of fiction author Shiba Ryōtarō (1923-96), first published in 1968-72 as a news paper series and later reprinted in a 6-volume book publication. His treatment influenced the image of the war in Japan until today. For Shiba, the Russo-Japanese War represented the successful apex of Japan's modernisation (Shimazu, *Society* p. 275). I. Chiba in *Wolff* and in *Nichi-Ro sensō* attributes the nationalistic tendencies found in Shiba's work to the increased self confidence of the Japanese people, being proud about the economic success at the time of publication.⁷ In contrast Shimazu (*Society* p. 276) calls Shiba's writings revisionistic, since the author for example mercilessly deconstructs the myth surrounding the usually deified General Nogi Maresuke because of his catastrophic warfare. She sees Nogi as essentially an anachronistic aesthete, a surviving relic of the Tokugawa period and a highly incompetent general, especially in the latter's disastrous campaign to capture the 203 Metre Hill and Port Arthur. The author even interprets Shiba's writings as a vehicle to criticise the militarism of Japan in the 1930s which led to the Second World War but she has to admit that the narrative had a cathartic quality, and allowed the post-war generation to be proud of its modern history, or at least of a part of it. This is the reason, as Shimazu (p. 279) judges, why Shiba's work appealed to the generally conservative mainstream readership, and in turn made him the target of the accusation of being pro-war by the Left.

The review article of D. Pavlov in *Nichi-Ro sensō* demonstrates that Russian historiography has seen even more turns: Until the October Revolution a commission led by general staff officers wrote an official war history followed a little bit later by a voluminous study by the navy on sea warfare. Both works intensively inquired after the causes of defeat. Besides that several officers published books, quite often with apologetic tendency, as well as contemporary observers did. Many foreign books were translated demonstrating the great interest in Russia. In the second period, according to Pavlov the years 1917-1991, the communist doctrine became the guideline. After the end of the cold war the era of free scholarly research began in 1991. Review articles on Western publications on the Russo-Japanese War are presented by Inaba in *Nichi-Ro sensō* and—limited to recent research - Sh. Yokote in *Gunjishigakkai I*. Also in *Gunjishigakkai I*. T. Hara and N. Kanno are listing the documents in the Research Institute of the Japanese Self Defence Forces (Bōeikenkyūjo).

I. Chiba in *Nichi-Ro sensō* reports about the presentation of the war with Russia in Japanese movies after 1945. It is surprising that in the year 1957 a production with the Meiji-Tennō in the leading role became a box-office magnet. It was for the first time that a Japanese emperor was shown in a movie. Until 1945 such an act would have been considered sheer blasphemy. Obviously the nation after the catastrophe of the Second World War was glad to remember a conflict which with some favour could be interpreted as a defensive measure. Many intellectuals, however, criticized the movie severely for its apologetic tendency. This discrepancy between box-office success and rejection was to find a continuation in the case of productions with the same subject until the 1980s as Chiba demonstrates.

Renewed interest

R. Kowner (*Dictionary* p. XIII) complains that the Russo-Japanese War was largely forgotten after the first boom years following the peace treaty. In connection with the centenary, however, historians promoted a second boom with Kowner as one of the main actors. In his *Dictionary* the

course of events is described as the most thorough one of the publications under consideration. The author deals with the Russo-Japanese War in a very wide sense based on Western, Russian and Japanese material so that he not only describes battles, weapons and persons involved, but also the conditions which have led to the outbreak of hostilities as well as the political, social and military consequences until World War I. The main part of the book consists of almost 600 articles, presented in alphabetical order. They reflect also the contents of publications in Russian and Japanese, that means in languages the average Western reader does not know. An author's introduction, maps, a chronology, an annex with key documents, a glossary, an index and a bibliography of more than 60 pages are also added. The bibliography is subdivided in many parts so that several titles are mentioned more than once.⁸ Such a voluminous book written by a single author, though he profited from the support by many colleagues, must be called a superhuman accomplishment.

In the edited volumes presented here it is noticed that in the German language publications with few exceptions only German authors are included while in the English and some of the Japanese language books scholars from many countries are included. Ian Nish, the *grand old man* of Japanese contemporary history who is engaged with studies on the British-Japanese alliance and the Russo-Japanese War since more than half a century⁹ is of course an author present in several of the publications. In *Steinberg* he examines the causes of the war which he finds in the weakness of China as well as Korea. Their traditional tactic to play one rival country off against the other was to end with the victory and the following preponderance of Japan in East Asia. In the volume edited by *Kreiner*, Nish deals with war planning, warfare and the conclusion of peace. In *Kowner/Rethinking* his subject is land warfare which in his opinion made the conflict a collision of two continental powers and the two largest armies of world history until that era despite the spectacular sea battle of Tsushima. Nish stresses the far too great self confidence of imperial Russia which despite the approaching dark clouds could not believe, that a country like Japan considered to be inferior would dare to attack (in *Kowner/Rethinking* p. 67). In Chapman/Inaba he writes about Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō and the British-Japanese alliance preceding the war and then about the war itself.

Besides that, some years ago Nish edited the British diplomatic documents on the subject¹⁰ as well as the eight-volume series *The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5* mentioned above which are reprints of reports and studies on the war. In the first volume extracts from books, journals and news papers are found, some of them commented by the editor, while the other volumes are monographs reprinted in photostat way. With one exception they contain the complete text of books which have been out of print for decades. Ian Nish wrote an introduction to the series and presents an overview with short descriptions of the publications and their authors. He stresses that he, when selecting the texts, had attached great importance to the fact that the authors had dealt with the political and economic background rather than with the course of the war itself. In the reprinted monographs¹¹, however, no Japanese authors are found. only British and Russians.

The path to war

All edited works dealt with in this review article follow the same intention as announced by the authors of the work of M-H. *Sprotte* which is based on a symposium at Heidelberg University, namely to overcome a narrow analysis of the war centred on national history as well as on causes and consequences but rather widen the research on Asia and the United States in order to add a

global perspective to the traditional historical interpretations. The effects for Europe, however, are restricted on Russia and the Balkan region in *Sprotte*.

M. R. Auslin in *Steinberg* goes far back describing how Russia 150 years earlier than the Anglo-Saxon nations vigorously had already knocked at the door of the then secluded Japan, i.e. about the year 1800, to establish contacts and to start trade relations. The Tsar's empire did not succeed at that time but after the opening of Japan in the mid-19th century it made many efforts to reduce tensions arising from overlapping territorial claims though, as the war begun in 1904 demonstrates these endeavours had not succeeded for important regions in East Asia. While Auslin largely presents the Japanese perspective, D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye in the same volume describes the Russian side whose relative reduction of power since 1895 and its seesaw policy towards China appear not to be compatible with its territorial ambitions. The author had already written a monograph on the ideology of Russian imperialism among other subjects posing the question if and how far Russia understood herself as an Asian nation and how thereby the path to war with Japan was influenced.¹² Within the Russian elites he differentiates between representatives of several currents from demagogues of the "yellow peril" propaganda type to imperialists with expansionist or economic aims as well as to idealists with a Eurasian vision. In *Ericson/Hockley* Schimmelpenninck comes to the conclusion that the European powers, allegedly having legitimate interests overseas, had developed a system since 1880 not to allow their colonial quarrels in Africa and Asia to lead to a great war but had not taken into consideration an outsider like Japan, so that Russia's inability to take Tōkyō seriously as a player with equal rights in the imperialist game led to war.

D. Goldfrank in *Steinberg* also goes far back comparing the Crimea War of 1853-56 with the Russo-Japanese War. He sees several parallels: In both cases the origin of the conflicts was Russia's refusal to end the occupation of a weak neighbour's border regions, Ottoman-Turkish territory in one case and Chinese land in the other. Other imperial powers were not ready to tolerate the increase of power and the economic strengthening of their Russian rival and intervened instead. In both cases, as the author maintains, the chances for a peaceful solution in the negotiations which preceded the outbreak of war and still could have prevented the hostilities were wantonly abandoned by St. Petersburg since the respective Tsar more and more listened to radical circles. Finally Russia with her extended borders and a periphery difficult to defend turned out to be a colossus with clay feet.

Nicholas II., the Tsar at the time of the outbreak of war in 1904, had made as crown prince in 1890/91 a long Orient tour including Japan in the program, since Russia believed in her "historic mission" in Asia. This episode is dealt with by R. Utz in *Sprotte*. It was the first visit a heir to the throne made to the Asian part of the vast Russian empire and among other aims the tour served for celebrating the opening of the works on the Trans-Siberian railway in its Eastern section. Utz in his study stresses the Russian inferiority feeling against Europe and the superiority feeling against Asia. His prove that in connection with the Orient tour there was some hope in Russia for a cooperation in Asia with Germany against England and Japan, particularly in order to strengthen the influence in China deserves attention (pp. 129-32). Utz, however, limits his study to the role of the Far East in the Russian nationalism and neglects the Japanese-Russian relations. So the assassination attempt on Nicholas near Kyōto in 1891 when the crown prince was injured and had a narrow escape and the consequences thereof on the bilateral relations are ignored.

The internal development in Russia and Japan until the outbreak of war is described by H.-D. Löwe und M.-H. Sprotte in *Sprotte* respectively. Therein the Tsar's empire appears as extremely disrupted due to the effects of industrialization and autocratic rule compared with the successfully unified and modernized state of the Tennō. Sprotte in a second contribution examines the interaction of external and internal events in Japan from the German-French-Russian triple intervention of 1895 aimed at limiting the booty for Japan from the war against China which was sensed as bitter defeat by Tōkyō. The author follows the development until the end of the Katsura cabinet in 1906 and Japan's continental policy during this decade. A helpless Japan had to watch in 1898 that Russia secured for herself as leased territory from China out of all things the Liautung-peninsula which the Tōkyō government had to renounce in 1895 (Sprotte in *Sprotte* p. 85). In the year 1898 other European powers, too, obtained territories and special rights but it does not become clear in the article that Germany with Tsingtau had led off the "leasing orgy"¹³ while Russia, Great Britain and France only followed her policy as is found correctly described by Schimmelpenninck in *Ericson/Hockley*. Sprotte further traces the militarisation of Japan following the war connected with economic and strategic interests as well as he describes the radicalisation under the influence of anti-Russian nationalistic secret societies. U. M. Zachmann in *Kowner/Rethinking* demonstrates that there was a change of mind towards Russia also in the Japanese public after the crisis of 1897/98 and a growing readiness to wage war while M.-H. Sprotte in *Sprotte* deals with the approval the government found after the opening of hostilities in 1904. Though the patriotism reached new heights the author also found pacifist currents, particularly within the hesitantly arising Socialist movement for whose further development he considers the discussion of that period as important though it had no political effect for the time being. Opposition within the Japanese parliament against an eventual war course and against the massive naval rearmament is the subject of Y. Katō in *Wolff*, though the author has to admit that in the Lower House, parallel to the growing sense of crisis in 1904, the willingness to risk a war was growing.

As main points of friction between Russia and Japan all authors see unanimously Manchuria and Korea but the importance attached to the two regions can differ. T. Kanō in *Nichi-Ro sensō* and in *Chapman/Inaba* investigates Russia's regional policy in East Asia particularly in these two disputed areas. In the beginning Russia was relieved that Chinese rule over Korea was prevented by Japan but soon it feared the growth of strength of the Tennō's empire. Therefore, the author's impression is that Russia's tactics was extremely cautious in order not to provoke Tōkyō. In contrast to conventional historiography Kanō takes the view that St. Petersburg until the last days before the outbreak of war showed willingness to accept compromise proposals presented by Tōkyō (similar Hirono in *Nichi-Ro sensō*), so that Japan would have gained great influence in Korea and equal rights as all other states in Manchuria. The telegraphic report to Tōkyō, however, was delayed, perhaps by the hawk faction in Russia which was aiming at the breakdown of the negotiations. To a large extent Kanō sees the causes of Russian weakness in the insufficient financing of institutions and personal. He analyses among other subjects the anti-government press in Russia which criticized the handling of disputed questions in the Far East and he stresses the great unrest among the workers which had flared up already before the war started.

In this historiography the question quite often is asked who was to blame for the hardening of Russian policy interpreted by Japan as provocation. In most cases Minister of Interior Plewe is named as the bad guy—he was to die as victim of an assassination attempt in July 1904—so by

his opponent and long-time Minister of Finance Witte who ascribed to Plewe the word of the “small victorious war” against Japan which was quoted to satiety in historiography. This allegedly desirable war would prevent demands of dissatisfied circles for social reforms and thereby forestall a revolution. Perhaps the suppression of the Boxer rebellion in China in 1900 should have served as a model to justify a military action. H.-D. Löwe in *Sprotte* considers it possible that the famous word has never been used in the quoted way but rather that Witte had tried to avoid becoming the scapegoat for the lost war himself. On the contrary, as the author maintains, Russia had stumbled into the war without the necessary preparations though sure of the own victory (Löwe in *Sprotte* p. 147; similar Grüner in *Sprotte* p. 173). According to Löwe Witte himself has to bear a great part of the responsibility for the increasing gravity of the situation which led to war due to his railway construction and his plans for economic expansion as means to create an *informal empire* in Manchuria despite his demand for a mere “peaceful penetration” though he later—too late—had given the advice for moderation thereby causing the loss of power for himself (Löwe in *Sprotte* p. 52; similar F.B. Schenk in *Aust/Steindorff* pp. 51–54). With the controversy of Witte’s role and responsibility for the path to war are also dealing D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye in *Kowner/Rethinking* und Y. Iijima in *Gunjishigakkai I*. These authors also see both a strong responsibility of the former finance minister who did not get rid of the ghosts he once had called.

Nevertheless, Witte was ready to compromise and would have agreed to renounce any claims on Korea but the much more radical elements in Russian policy got the upper hand. They are dealt with in articles by I. V. Lukoianov in *Nichi-Ro sensō* and in *Steinberg*. In the first line the entrepreneur and radical politician Alexander M. Bezobrazov with his entourage appears as an influential warmonger who had come to a vast economic engagement in the North of Korea and at the same time served as special envoy of Tsar Nicholas II. Lukoianov makes clear that Bezobrazov over a long period exerted great influence on the Tsar, so that his agitation caused extreme danger in the deadlock situation for which his arch-enemy Witte was responsible. How much Japan’s economic interests clashed with those of Russia, particularly those of Bezobrazov’s companies, becomes also clear in a contribution from N. Kanno in *Gunjishigakkai I*. In contrast to most authors Bezobrazov in the article of Wada in *Wolff* appears as less radical having been influenced in a moderating sense among others by the former military attaché to Tōkyō, Konstantin I. Vogak, who had developed deep respect for the Japanese army because of its performance in the war against China in 1894/95. Bezobrazov even proposed a military alliance to the Japanese side on January 10, 1904 but left the Tennō’s embassy in St. Petersburg guessing if he was authorized to do so.¹⁴ Until the outbreak of war several weeks later there was not enough time for clarification.

In a study on Russian strategy in Manchuria, D. Schimmelpenninck in *Gunjishigakkai II*, comes to the conclusion that the refusal to withdraw the troops stationed in that area after the Boxer rebellion was caused by the underestimation of the Japanese to whom no chance at all was given in a fight with a European power. Since an attack from their side was excluded because of such reasons no serious preparations for war were made and the Tsarist troops finally limited their actions to a largely defensive nature when war started. J. Kusber in *Kreiner* describes the change from Russian confidence of victory to contrition and critique towards their own military and allotment of guilt. The author includes in his treatise the perception of the enemy by Russians dealing with persons of influence one after the other. “Good credits” are given to Prince Esper Uchtomskij who as a specialist for Asia had accompanied Crown Prince Nicholas on his Orient

tour and who was full of admiration for the successful Japanese modernization and who already at the beginning of the war had warned not to underestimate the enemy. No attention is given to the fact that Uchtomskij soon took a hard attitude when he became one of the most eloquent advocates for a continuation of the war until a complete victory would be gained (see N. E. Saul in *Steinberg* p. 488). Other moderate voices could not succeed in the time preceding the war either since the Tsar inclined to listen to the most radical elements. As an exceptionally tragic figure appears War Minister Kuropatkin: He of all people had warned not to underestimate the Japanese, particularly when he came to know the high standard of their military forces and the state of their society when visiting the country in 1903 and gave the advice to avoid a conflict with such an enemy if ever possible (D. Wright in *Steinberg* pp. 596, 601). On the other side he recommended after the Boxer rebellion to use the chance for a complete occupation of Manchuria (Parikeeff/Shukman p. 24) so that one has to question how a collision with Japan could have been prevented. Kuropatkin who after the outbreak of war was appointed Supreme Commander of the Russian forces in the Far East lost one battle after the other. After the end of war the fighting continued on the book market, particularly between Witte and Kuropatkin who blamed each other for the catastrophe. Their publications were translated into several languages.

War Minister Kuropatkin's moderate stand towards Japan becomes also evident in his diaries of the years 1902/03 which showed up only little by little and which are analysed by Y. Hirono since some time. The author in *Nichi-Ro sensō* presents the contents of the part of June 9-29, 1903 about the general's travel to Japan which have become known only in 1996. Kuropatkin in Tōkyō held interviews with the most prominent politicians, among them Itō Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo. War Minister Terauchi Masatake showed an interest in the maintenance of peace since Japan even in the case of victory would be weakened. Furthermore Kuropatkin held talks with Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, among other subject on the Korean problem. In that period Russia enjoyed several rights in Korea based on a treaty with Japan of the year 1895, among them the right to station troops to protect Russian citizens at certain places including the legation in Seoul. The number of soldiers, however, must not exceed that one of Japanese troops. In contrast to these agreements Kuropatkin is said to have won the impression in his talks with Komura that Japan would not honour other important Russian rights. Nevertheless, so Hirono's conclusion, Russia little by little reduced the demands and claims concerning Korea making many concessions in the following negotiations but the "Korea-Manchuria-problem", obviously seen in Tōkyō as indivisible, could not be solved.

Kuropatkin of course also plays a leading role in A. Marshall's great study on the Russian general staff in Asia. He calls Kuropatkin one of the few to truly merit the label of being a geopolitical thinker but comes to the conclusion that the Far East did not have great importance for the general with respect to Russia's position as a great power, since he saw the Tsar's empire endangered from the Western flank meaning from Germany. The lesser priority he gave to East Asia resulted in insufficient preparations for a war against Japan (Marshall, *Staff* pp. 2, 90-91, 94-95). According to Marshall the Russian military, not only in East Asia but in general, suffered from financial and organizational weakness. The armed forces budget had been cut to a barely sustainable minimum in the period from 1881 to 1897 so that many soldiers marched to war against Japan in 1904 in ill-fitting boots and with inadequate greatcoats. The second factor obstructing the most effective use of even these limited resources was organizational. The role of the Asiatic Department of the general staff in intelligence gathering was never clearly defined so that Russia went to war with Japan in 1904 armed with inadequate maps, a poor cultural

knowledge of its opponent, and with a critical lack of reliable interpreters (Marshall, Staff pp. 180-82). The author explains convincingly how the discredited Asiatic Department lost influence after the defeat playing only a role in language training for officers henceforth. Instead the *Main Directorate* of the General Staff gained influence and took over the field of intelligence gathering.

In Japan, too, over a long period a tug-of-war was held about the course to be taken during the years preceding the war. S. Naraoka in *Chapman/Inaba* treats the close relations between Katō Takaaki and the political party Seiyūkai as well as the efforts to keep a certain distance between the foreign ministry and the army. Katō, the former minister to London (1894-1900) and main architect for close bonds with Great Britain held the position of foreign minister in the cabinet of Itō Hirobumi 1900/01. After the resignation of that administration he refused to stay in office since in his opinion the new Prime Minister Katsura Tarō had too close relations with the influential *genrō* (elder statesman) General Yamagata Aritomo and that meant: with the army. Though the new Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō pursued a different policy as Naraoka convincingly demonstrates he followed towards Great Britain the same course as his predecessor, concluded the alliance with England thereby earning the fruits of Katō's efforts. Katō himself at this time was concentrating his activities more on domestic policy as deputy in the Lower House. In the parliament as well as in the press he continued his fight against the cabinet and particularly against Foreign Minister Komura. Naraoka emphasizes particularly the differences between Yamagata and Katō who provoked the *genrō* with his demands to develop a more democratic and more constitutional base for national policy and therefore kept close contact with the Seiyūkai party. As president of a newspaper Katō made full use of winning the Japanese public for his hard line to demand an unconditional Russian surrender during the war of 1904/05. His hard line almost was to cost him the return into office once the war ended, but in 1906 he succeeded to take over the foreign ministry again for a short period in Saionji Kinmochi's Seiyūkai cabinet. Surprisingly Katō does not get his own article in Kowner's *Dictionary* in which he is not mentioned at all.

The attitude of the Meiji-Tennō, according to the constitution the supreme commander of the military forces, towards the war finds its treatment by Y. Itō in *Nichi-Ro sensō* and in *Chapman/Inaba*. For these studies the author had the testimonies of court officials at his disposal. The emperor appears as hesitant towards the decision to open hostilities and concerning several operations. It further seems that he had not always fully understood the views of the different army factions and the strategy to be pursued.

As a decisive cause of the war the construction of the Russian railway in Siberia and Manchuria is given great attention to in the historiography. In 1903 the East China Railway was completed in a record time of only six years offering a shortcut from Europe to Vladivostok and resulting in the settlement and stationing of many Russians on Chinese territory. The greatest influx was to the town of Harbin which was developed into an important junction and a boom city from where another railway line branched off leading as the South Manchurian Railway to the ice-free ports of Port Arthur and Dalien (Dal'ny, Dairen) on the Liautung-peninsula reducing - as long as it was in Russian hands - the importance of Vladivostok being ice bound during four months per year.

The development of railways and their importance for warfare is the subject of the monograph of *Patrikeeff/Shukman* and the article of S. J. Ericson in *Wolff*. Japan had the advantage to transport

troops and supply in great quantities and short time across the sea which Japan ruled. Within the homeland Japan, too, had to rely on the railway which belonged to a lot of private companies and was therefore difficult to coordinate as S. J. Ericson in *Wolff* demonstrates. Because of this bad experience soon after the end of the war most lines were nationalized. In Korea and Manchuria Japan began to construct railways already during the war to support military operations. M. Fujita in *Gunjishigakkai II* deals with food supply for the fighting forces.

It is an irony that both sides in the conflict were supplied by American and British companies with material and rolling stocks for their railway lines (*Patrikeeff/Shukman* pp. 45, 94). The Trans-Siberian railway was impressive on the map but suffered besides its sheer length from several difficulties: in practice it was susceptible to trouble, was only single-track therefore having only a limited loading capacity, closed the last gap only in autumn 1904 and due to the numerous slopes allowed only a low average speed. Besides these problems Nomadic bandits often attacked the trains and installations. Nevertheless the achievements of the Russian railways were impressive and without it warfare would have been impossible. *Patrikeeff/Shukman* (p. 84) are contrasting the modernity of the railway achieved thanks to Finance Minister Witte with the old Russia represented by the army with its corruption and inefficiency.

Patrikeeff/Shukman see in the railway system both an advantage and a disadvantage. It allowed the transport of troops and material within a very short time but extended the Russian rule so far to East Asia that the military forces were overstretched. Furthermore, the authors are convinced that without the Russian railways the war would not have broken out at all since Japan, being an expanding nation herself, would not have felt provoked and endangered. Manchuria could have been a buffer and security zone, a cordon sanitaire, saving troop capacities on both sides.

E.-M. Stolberg in *Kowner/Rethinking* extends the research on railways until the year 1922 stressing that the economic boom following the Russian construction activities attracted Japanese entrepreneurs interested in raw materials as well as settlers to the region. As a result St. Petersburg was uneasy if the area being only thinly inhabited could be held by Russia. In the author's eyes Siberia was the hinterland of the Russo-Japanese War and could be saved for the Tsar's empire in the peace treaty but that agreement did not end Japanese greed as the participation in the allied intervention from 1918 proved. Finally Tōkyō dispatched the greatest troop contingent which stayed the longest on Russian soil.

Patrikeeff/Shukman (p. 121) call the reader's attention to the fact that Russia during the Soviet era had largely passed over in silence its "Manchurian past" which was dealt with only sometimes by Russians in exile, for example those in Harbin which after World War I was a stronghold of anti-Bolshevik Russians. They, however, at the latest after World War II left the city. Oxford University emeritus Harold Shukman's interest in Manchuria obviously arises from the fact that his father had been a private in the Imperial Russian Army from 1902 to 1906 and had fought in the battle of Mukden. After the end of the cold war, however, the Russian interest in the common history with Manchuria has grown considerably. Nowadays in the streets of Harbin being not far away from the Siberian border many Russians can be seen promenading in a nostalgic mood on the tracks of the former settlers and many young people from Russia are studying the Chinese language at the universities of the city.

The conduct of war

Not only Russia but almost all other nations had underestimated Japan so that the opening of the war came as a great surprise. A. Iikura in *Nichi-Ro sensō* and in *Chapman/Inaba* (there with changing writing of the author's name) deals with the new image of Japan in the West in the course of the war instead of the earlier picture of a romantic country. The author maintains that the image was basically "paternalistic": Japan as protégé, student or child of the Western nations, particularly of the USA and Great Britain. Their sympathy had lain from the beginning on on the side of the *underdog* Japan but this feeling was soon superseded by admiration for the "David" being so successful on the battlefield at "Goliath's" cost and by praise for the "docile" student who has grown into a state of "civilization" though even his masters began to fear him. Iikura sees parallels in the paternalistic attitude Japan was to assume from the 1930s on towards the other Asian countries. Surprisingly Germany is hardly mentioned in the article though Germany also claimed to be the father of the Japanese successes, particularly in the field of land warfare.

In most of the edited works introduced here the conduct of war plays only a minor role and only in *Steinberg* and *Gunjishigakkai II* one section is found. Steinberg himself in *Steinberg* gives an overview over the operations with land warfare in the focus but he presents only known facts. The efficiency of Japanese warfare is dealt with in contrast to the confusion about competence and the improvisation on the Russian side. B.W. Menning in *Steinberg* in his article on Russian strategy also comes to the conclusion that the Tsar's empire could not use its superiority in material and troop strength because of its surprising dilettantism. Furthermore, despite having an impressive fleet in Far Eastern waters at her disposal Russia did not rule the sea as would have been absolutely necessary—also as precondition for a successful land warfare—according to the theory of the leading and internationally acknowledged naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan (so also V. L. Agapov in *Gunjishigakkai II*, p. 114). That Mahan's theory was thoroughly studied in Japan is demonstrated by F. Takahashi in *Gunjishigakkai I*: Even the lowest echelons among the officers had to write related studies again and again.

In the contribution of O. R. Airapetov in *Steinberg* on the mistakes of the Russian army the warfare of the Tsar's empire also appears as chaotic. The same author in *Nichi-Ro sensō* deals with Russia's strategic planning on the eve of the war. He stresses the handicap that the military had due to geographic reasons only a very limited and complicated access to ocean waters. B.W. Menning in *Steinberg* takes the view that neither side in the war had learned the lesson of German strategist von Moltke—or at best the Japanese in a relatively late moment for the battle of Mukden—"to march separately and to fight jointly", so that mobile warfare with pincer attacks to encircle the enemy was a rare exception. This failure is demonstrated for the battle of Liaoyang in August 1904 by Y. Shinohara in *Gunjishigakkai II*: Though the Japanese were the winners the encirclement of the Russian forces did not succeed so that General Kuropatkin could save most of his troops and could build up a new defence line at Mukden. There, defending the city half a year later they inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese but finally were defeated. Y. T. Matsusaka in *Steinberg* also stresses the great mistakes on the Japanese side. Though the conquest of Port Arthur required half a year and cost losses of almost 50.000 men a myth in the Tennō's empire around the vestige and the "hero" Nogi Maresuke arose so that critic on his conduct of war could not be uttered openly. Actually the assault against the fortifications by infantry had turned out as imprudent so that Marshall Ōyama Iwao had to come to the troubled Nogi's aid with heavy siege artillery. Matsusaka, however, refuses the wide-spread opinion that the ruthless strategy against the own soldiers had to be attributed to the instruction by Prussian

officers. Actually, he maintains, after the period of German instruction, particularly in the war against China 1894/95, the Japanese had undergone their own experiences and as a result had modified the conduct of war (pp. 186-87).

One episode, General Nogi's contact with the spirit of Buddhism is dealt with by I. Matsumoto in *Gunjishigakkai II*: The priest Ōta Kakumin who arrived in Manchuria in early 1905 to take care for the Japanese soldiers met Nogi near Mudan at the battlefield which was littered with corpses. The monk included in his prayers also the fallen Russian soldiers and reached an understanding with the general that the victims would be justified if thereby security and peace could be reached for the general public. Nogi who had lost two sons in the war with Russia himself committed ritual suicide together with his wife after the death of the Meiji-Tennō in 1912. The motive for this deed, usually interpreted as archaic henchman's loyalty is seen by Matsumoto also as the burden of responsibility for the numerous war dead of 1904/05 which had become too heavy for Nogi. Ōta Kakumin in June 1938 published a report on the meeting with Nogi obviously criticizing the cruel war against China which Japan had begun the previous year.

Back to the Russo-Japanese War: M. Sevela in *Kowner/Rethinking* researches a secondary theatre of war, the almost unknown fighting on the island of Sakhalin. The invasion there began only in July 1905, that means after the decisive battle of Tsushima. The Russian defence was chaotic, the more so as the Japanese now controlled all sea routes. Sevela examines all possible motives for the conquest, may they be of psychological, strategic or economic nature. Another author comes to the conclusion that the occupation of the island "was considered by many as the last nail driven into the coffin of Russia's early twentieth century Asiatic ambitions" (N. E. Saul in *Steinberg* p. 486). One has to take into consideration that Sakhalin in contrast to other disputed territories like Manchuria and Korea was Russian territory so that the loss hurt very much, when the southern half of the island came into the possession of victorious Japan for 40 years. Another border region is the subject of an article by T. Nakami in *Wolff* demonstrating that during the war Russia as well as Japan tried to pull Mongolian tribes on their side. This tug-of-war was to continue for decades. Most of the Mongolians were *de jure* subjects of China to whose territory their homelands still belonged.

Despite the fact that the Russo-Japanese War had seen the greatest sea operations since Napoleon and despite the decisive importance of the battle of Tsushima—in Japan called the naval battle of the Japanese Sea (*Nihonkai kaisen*)—naval warfare finds less attention in historiography than the land battles which dragged on over a long period of time. Nevertheless some articles deal with naval problems like Papastratigakis/Lieven in *Steinberg* with their article on the operation plans of the Russian far eastern fleet. They view the study on sea warfare conducted immediately after the war in Russia as unsatisfactory since too many restraints were exercised because of political reasons. The authors stress the fact that the Japanese fleet construction program was more or less completed in 1903 while the Russian one was not. Therefore, time would have worked in favour of Russia so that Japan was interested to open war as soon as possible. Not only in pure strength was the Japanese fleet slightly superior to the Russian Far Eastern Fleet but it was of one founding and on the latest technical standard in contrast to the enemy's patched up and obsolete units. Furthermore, the Russians had adhered too much on Mahan's theory of the crucial role of large fleets and great battleships to be able to fight a decisive battle, thereby ruling the seas and dominating the land warfare as well so that they neglected the alternative respectively the supplementation by following the French model of the "cheap variant" to concentrate on mines, torpedo boats and submarines as they were foreseen for the protection of the Baltic coast. The

reader, however, remembers that the Japanese navy suffered from several losses inflicted by Russian mines and the fear of that weapon hampered operations so that for example the plan for a thrust into the bay of Port Arthur had to be given up.

Russian warfare at sea is the subject of an article by Luntinen/Menning in *Steinberg*. It becomes clear how chaotic and full of blunders already the defensive measures of the Far Eastern Fleet and the journey of the Baltic Fleet to the Far East had been. Furthermore, the latter one had not had the time nor the chance for a common manoeuvre before going into battle. So the leadership of the Russian navy appears as rather following a policy of wait and see what was to be expected in the waters of East Asia dominated by Japan. It must be mentioned, however, that the authors used Russian sources only, so that the weak points of the Japanese navy are largely ignored. After all, the ships having been in action for more than one year showed considerable signs of attrition. One has to consider further that alone the transfer of the Baltic Fleet to the Far East under adverse circumstances was a masterly accomplishment from the logistic point of view. Finally, the fleet being equal to the complete Japanese navy in number of ships and even superior concerning battleships was outmanoeuvred by the tactic of the enemy and sent to the bottom of the sea almost in its entirety near the island of Tsushima. The whole world was amazed, and Commander Tōgō Heihachirō received the nimbus of a “second Admiral Nelson”.

In view of this victory the judgement of the Russian Navy Attaché Rusin from prewar days strikes the reader as funny: that Tōgō was just incompetent concerning tactics and strategy (B. W. Menning in *Wolff* p. 52). Articles by K. Aizawa in *Wolff* and in *Gunjishigakkai II* on the opening of war by the surprise attack on Port Arthur, however, seem to justify this view largely stressing Tōgō's mistakes. The author in the beginning explains the differences during the planning stage between the navy general staff and Tōgō who insisted to make only a limited attack with a destroyer squadron on Russian units in order to provoke with this sensational opening of war the Russian fleet to leave the harbour for a decisive battle instead of using from the start on the Japanese fleet including battleships and cruisers to make a devastating strike on Port Arthur. Though Tōgō had to give in he put the great warships into action during the operation only with a certain delay so that he could not make full use of the element of surprise inflicting on the enemy mere pinpricks. The Russians used the chance to remain in the safe bay of Port Arthur to wait for reinforcements and to induce the Japanese navy to blockade the mined harbour entrance thereby binding many ships. Thereby Tōgō's attack on Port Arthur turned out to be a flop so that Japanese troops had to conquer the fortifications under heavy losses to bombard the Russian fleet from land. They succeeded only ten months later in a race with time since they had to reckon with reinforcements for Russia over sea and land. Discussing Tōgō's alleged failure one has to consider, however, that his tactic locked the Russian fleet up in the harbour of Port Arthur, forced it to inactivity and prevented it joining the units based in Vladivostok. The fleet there remained rather passive, seldom made a thrust to the open sea to engage Japanese ships in fighting and did not even show up for the decisive battle of Tsushima but it bound certain forces of the enemy (see V. L. Agapov in *Gunjishigakkai II* and the commentary of A. Tsutsumi in *ibid.*).

General Kuropatkin obviously was right to complain that if the Russian fleet had dominated the sea Russia would not have had to face the terrible battles on land. The worldwide conclusion from the battle of Tsushima was that Mahan's theory was correct that a large fleet of big battleships being able to fight a decisive battle was the base for a great power. So it is no wonder that after the Russo-Japanese War a new round of the naval rearmament race began. R. Kowner

and C. Eberspächer in *Kowner/Impact* describe the consequences of the Russo-Japanese War for the navies worldwide. Above all the exit of Russia as a sea power led to a completely new political orientation on the international stage. Great Britain, now bound to France, had to fear only Germany and made rearmaments according to the new situation, the more so when Russia joined the entente in 1907. The naval armament race witnessed a quantum leap in the following years¹⁵ but Kowner finds it outdated that the navies worldwide continued to give priority to great battleships since they were not only extremely expensive but soon turned out to be the dinosaurs of the sea facing the revolutionizing of naval warfare by innovations like submarines and later airplane-carriers. In Eberspächer's article some overlapping with Kowner's are found but it is written more from the German perspective.

Some studies deal with the parallel of strategy in 1904 and 1941. In both cases Japan was underrated and its enemies could not imagine that such a weak nation would dare to attack a superior nation thereby committing national suicide. Aizawa in *Wolff* (p. 81) stresses that Japan twice opened hostilities with a naval attack far away from her home waters prior to a declaration of war¹⁶ considering it essential to take advantage of the element of surprise to inflict initial physical and psychological damage because of the limits Japan's own economy imposed on war making capabilities. The initiative gained, it was hoped, would carry Japan through to victory. Yamamoto, the planner of the attack on Pearl Harbor, had participated in the Russo-Japanese War from which he learned the lessons as he claimed that Japan must make efforts, based on the successes and failures of 1904, to handle the opening of the war with America much more successfully to secure victory on Day One of hostilities. Indeed the Russo-Japanese war appears to have served as a blueprint for the Pacific War (on the parallel also Steinberg in *Steinberg* p. 107; H. P. Willmott in *Gunjishigakkai II* pp. 19-20; S. C. M. Paine in *ibid.*, pp. 235-36).

Japanese sources also prove that the Russo-Japanese War served as a model for the Pacific War.¹⁷ After the initial devastating strike against the enemy's fleet in his home waters it was hoped to provoke the USA into a decisive battle near the Japanese coast and then induce the United States to negotiate a peace largely under Tōkyō's conditions using the mediation of a neutral country—as the United States were so used in 1905 for the peace treaty of Portsmouth.

By the way, in the Soviet Union a comparison was made between the Japanese attack of 1904 and the German attack of 1941 but at that time it was not mentioned openly (D. Oleinikov in *Steinberg* p. 520). While the USA had applauded the Japanese strike on Port Arthur in 1904 as a brilliant act, they called the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 an "infamy". In similar expressions Tsar Nicholas had called the Japanese attack without declaration of war "treacherous", but was reminded by a British vice admiral that many similar cases could be traced in European history so for example the Russian surprise attack on the Ottoman fleet in the bay of Sinope on November 30, 1853 starting the Crimean War, with the slight difference, as the authors added ironically, that "only some hundred Mohammedan Turks were killed there in contrast to Port Arthur, where a great number of Christian Russians fell while defending their fatherland".¹⁸ Until Pearl Harbor, however, international law had changed. The problem of opening hostilities without declaration of war is treated by T. Saitō and Ch. Inaba in *Nichi-Ro sensō* (pp. 394-95, 450). The Japanese attack of 1904 became the cause of the 2nd peace conference in Hague in 1907 which decided in the new "Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land" that henceforth a declaration of war or an ultimatum must precede the opening of hostilities of one state against another.

Several authors deal with the conclusions Russia draw for military reforms. A. Marshall in *Kowner/Rethinking* describes the influence of the war experience on military planning in Eurasia and the reorganization of the army until the outbreak of World War I. This subject, however, is found more detailed in his monograph (chapters 6-8). D. Wright in *Steinberg* concentrates his article on the lessons learned from the war in the field of spirit and social situation. The Japanese were not any more the laughed at monkeys of prewar racism but became models for the new Russian soldiers. The reasons for the superiority of the enemy were analysed without hesitation: heroism and defiance of death, patriotism as result of an efficient school-system, implanting classical values of the samurai class in the entire population, the will to serve the Tennō and the nation, a fairly just social system including a broad strata of land-owning independent farmers and racial homogeneity instead of the multi-ethnic mixture of the Russian military with uneducated, ill-treated, half-starved and miserably equipped conscripts showing a fatalistic attitude (so also *Patrikeeff/Shukman* pp. 1-2, 75-79). The view of the foreign observers about the reasons for the Japanese fighting moral was similar, and also General Kuropatkin, trying to exculpate himself, in his memoirs attributed the failure of the owns troops with the bad Russian education system and the insufficient patriotism resulting thereof. In contrast to prewar times Kuropatkin now also made use of the yellow peril propaganda presenting the vision of large armies with millions of Japanese and Chinese soldiers instructed by German advisers (A. Marshall, *Staff* pp. 95-96). Kuropatkin was lucky to escape punishment while leading military figures were sentenced to death though they were finally pardoned to long prison terms (*Patrikeeff/Shukman* p.82).

The purge of the officer corps after the lost war had sometimes more the character of revenge or looking for scapegoats than reform. D. Wright in *Steinberg* describes in detail the will expressed by the Russian army after the war for military, educational and social reforms as precondition for victory in a future conflict. The author, however, does not answer the question if and how deeds followed the declared intentions except the reduction of the average age in the officer corps. B.W. Menning and J.W Steinberg in *Ericson/Hockley* hold that Russia failed to draw the consequences of the effects on modernization of the military: Lack of unity and coherence plagued Russian military strategy not only during the war but also after the end, and postwar efforts to address the problem by creating an independent general staff and State Defence Council in 1905 but rather than providing overall direction and integration of imperial defence, these two new organs ended up simply adding to the fragmentation of decision making. Nicholas II. remained the “final interpreter and arbiter” of military and foreign-policy matters. He eventually ignored the recommendations of the State Defence Council and the lessons of the war by pushing for construction of a Mahan-style blue-water Dreadnought style navy and the creation of a Naval General Staff at the expense of ground-force modernization, with serious consequences for Russian military preparedness at the outbreak of World War I.

Japan seems to have not learned the lessons from the war, either. The army adhered, as demonstrated by T. Hara in *Gunjishigakkai II*, until World War II to the doctrine that a glorified infantry attack with the bayonet was the key to victory. J. Kreiner deals in the volume edited by himself and based on a symposium at Bonn University, with the influence of the war of 1904/05 on Japanese history coming to the conclusion that the victorious nation viewed the results as the completion of the Meiji era reforms. In the article it becomes also clear that the military triumph led to a kind of megalomania so that Japan was convinced from that time on that it was invincible and that her traditional fighting spirit could cope with a superior enemy. When in 1941

the decision for war against the United States was made, Japan hoped that again David would get a chance against Goliath.

In the exaltation of 1905 the insight that Japan had won only a Pyrrhic victory and herself had been so exhausted that it was hardly in the position to have continued the war became lost. The overestimation of Japan's own strength found the most visible expression in the Hibiya riots in Tōkyō protesting against the peace conditions regarded as too mild (Kreiner in *Kreiner* pp. 58-59; Kowner in *Kowner/Impact* pp. 34-35). Particularly the military became presumptuous missing the chance for a long-term peace order which would have saved Japanese resources. This aspect is dealt with by M. Tadokoro in *Wolff*: The Japanese victory was everything else but complete and should have been supplemented by a strategy like the British one after Trafalgar, to establish a "Pax Britannica" und "balance of power" policy in order to keep Great Britain out of the continent thereby avoiding costly ventures. At the same time England protected herself with a battle fleet second to none which also allowed the nation to dominate world trade. Instead of following such a course Japan had decided to gain a foothold in Korea and Manchuria and to widen her influence permanently. For that purpose Japan maintained a huge army of conscripts much too large for a mere defence of the home territory in contrast to Great Britain with her small army of professional soldiers. Furthermore, Japan built up a fleet which was too large to protect the own coast but too small to dominate the sea in Alfred Thayer Mahan's sense. Japan's failure to become the "Britain of Asia" avoiding to be involved in conflicts on the continent other wars erupted for which the country was too weak so that it finally perished as an imperial power. The author names as chief witness the prominent navy officer Satō Tetsutarō, the "Mahan of Japan", who after intensive studies on military history in Great Britain and the USA came to the conclusion that a policy of restriction for activities on the continent would be advisable for Japan. Therefore he demanded rearmament restrictions for the army to give priority to the navy. In Tadokoro's study, however, it does not become clear, that Satō not only provoked the army but that he became increasingly isolated in the navy. His image in historiography is that one of a "hawk" who had advocated a large rearmament program of the navy against the USA and had fought vehemently against the restrictions put upon Japan at the Washington conference in 1922 which established a ratio for great warships of 60% compared with the Anglo-Saxon nations. In 1923 Satō with the rank of vice admiral was put on the reserve list by Navy Minister Katō Tomosaburō because of his opposition of the official navy policy visible in the Washington treaty.¹⁹

The finances

G. Distelrath in *Kreiner* explores Japan's economy and armament production as basis for warfare having become possible by the surprisingly quick industrialization since the beginning of the Meiji era. Nevertheless, financing the war was a big problem and that for both sides. In contrast to Russia, however, Japan at the time of opening hostilities disposed of sound finances since it could still rely on the reparations China had paid since 1895. K. Ono in *Gunjishigakkai I* explains how these reserves were used by Tōkyō to prepare the war against Russia. Since both countries suffered from a deficit despite raising taxes and using the national bond market, half of the war costs had to be covered by loans from abroad so that the war was made "on credit". That is why T. Suzuki in *Nichi-Ro sensō* even talks about a second war which had to be waged, a "war about money" (p. 84). The decisive sum was lent to Japan by the investment bank Kuhn, Loeb and Co. by intermediation of the Jewish banker Jacob Schiff after negotiations with Japanese government financial commissioner and Vice President of the Bank of Japan Takahashi

Korekiyo. Usually this transaction is viewed as an act of revenge for anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia and this version is also reported by Schiff and Takahashi themselves but D. Gutwein in *Kowner/Rethinking* comes to the conclusion that the true motives have been to ease the burden of British bankers who were in danger to get into political and economic trouble because of their loans to Japan. Furthermore, the circle of bankers involved aimed at a Russian defeat in order to help Witte, who was excluded from politics at that time, and his efforts for a quick industrialization to a breakthrough—and that intention succeeded temporarily after the conclusion of peace in 1905. Therefore, as Gutwein claims, Schiff's meeting in London with Takahashi was no "mere accident" as Takahashi himself assumed and reported but was brought about intentionally by banking circles. The author opposes the conviction found in the historiography over many decades that the bankers' support for Japan was motivated by Russian anti-Semitism or that has been at least one important reason (though to the old interpretation adhere B.-A. Shillony in *Kowner/Rethinking* pp. 397-98; M. Matsumura in *Chapman/Inaba* p. 59; R. Smethurst in *ibid.* pp. 67-71; E. S. Miller in *Steinberg* pp. 471-72; T. Suzuki in *Nichi-Ro sensō* pp. 94-95). R. Smethurst in *Chapman/Inaba*, however, comes insofar to a similar conclusion as Gutwein as the meeting between Takahashi and the American investors was no mere accident but was striven for by them because of the common interests with their British partners. Therefore, Schiff acted out of a double motive, one of them being the fight against the Russian anti-Semitism.²⁰ In connection with that question B.-A. Shillony in *Kowner/Rethinking* examines the mixed feelings of Jews worldwide towards the war. Many of their fellow-believers served and died in Russian uniform but in general the sympathies were on Japan's side whose final victory was welcomed with great relief. *Patrikeeff/Shukman* (pp. 9-13, 77-78) stress the fact that Jewish soldiers suffered more than others from the arbitrary and cruel Russian military apparatus. At least Sergej Witte who was to become the leader of the Tsar's delegation at the peace conference of Portsmouth seems to have learned the lesson: Before the conference was opened he worked out a plan to attract American public opinion to his side, particularly Jewish opinion, hoping to overcome the negative image that prevailed of Russia as a despotic autocracy and he met with the most powerful American Jewish bankers, though no direct success of his efforts can be ascertained (Lukoianov in *Ericson/Hockley* pp. 52, 54).

N. Sussman and Y. Yafeh in *Kowner/Rethinking* also studying the British loans come to the conclusion that Japan's victory was more attributable to the country's reputation as a reliable debtor than the preceding reforms of the Meiji era. Attention should be paid to the evidence that the interest rates rose or sank parallel to the military development. K. Ono in *Kowner/Rethinking* demonstrates that Japan even after the war due to the costs of warfare suffered from financial problems, the more so since army and navy were expanded, and that the country was only saved by the economic boom during World War I. The same author in connection with the war finances directs his attention in *Nichi-Ro sensō* and in *Wolff* on the Bank of Japan whose money policy he views as decisive and whose role in historiography he regards as neglected. Without the bank's skilful measures the government could not have financed the war since it had calculated the costs much too low. T. Suzuki in *Nichi-Ro sensō* particularly praises Takahashi Korekiyo for the acquisition of loans but has to admit that the banker has had a good dose of luck and that he could use the global network of the trading banks and their interests.

Even more than Japan, Russia had to rely on credits from abroad where it was already in debt very much anyway. How much the Tsar's empire even before the outbreak of war owed money to the French becomes clear in the study by N. Shinonaga in *Gunjishigakkai I*. B. Ananich in

Steinberg describes that in the early phase of war it was relatively easy for Russia to borrow money, though against high interest rates, particularly further on from France and in second place from Germany. The total war costs the author estimates at 6,5 billion rubels. In March 1905 the French, however, learning of the Russian defeat of Mukden refused to conclude a new credit agreement which had been already prepared for signature. Only after the catastrophe of Tsushima had it become evident to the Tsar's empire that without a peace treaty no new loans would become available. Even after the successful conference of Portsmouth, however, the French hesitated to grant new credits due to the revolution in Russia, and changed their mind only in 1906 and demanded higher interest rates. In contrast loans for Japan during the war became easier and easier to obtain so that E. S. Miller in *Steinberg* talks in the headline of his article about "Japan's other victory". Furthermore, the author stresses that New York developed into a global finance place during the Russo-Japanese War while it had been in the shadow of London before.

The foreign observers

In contrast to the Japanese-Chinese War of 1894/95 the conflict of 1904/05 immediately after its outbreak attracted great international attention. Many countries dispatched not only correspondents to both sides of the front but also military observers who hoped to win insights for a future war. Their status would nowadays probably be called "embedded" (on this group see D. Jones in *Wolff*). After the war the perceptions won during the conflict were used as base material for official studies in both contracting countries but in many cases were kept under lock and were accessible only for official purposes for many years (see Sh. Yokote in *Wolff*). In some neutral countries such studies were compiled as well. Besides that, many observers, journalists and military officers, published their reports, some of them still during the war. Book authors wrote non-fiction works as well so that it can be concluded that an active market existed. Some of the most important publications are found in the reprint series *The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5*, edited by Ian Nish. Translations into other languages enlarged the distribution. The interest in studies on the Russo-Japanese War, however, was replaced one decade later by that one in World War I.

Ph. Towle in *Kowner/Rethinking* is dealing with the largest observer group, the British. For them the perceptions had been particularly valuable since the battles in the Far East were fought soon after their traumatic experience in the Boer War. Most of the British observers were on the side of their ally Japan but a minority was also with the Russian troops. Both had to suffer from the censorship of the belligerent parties. In their reports the prejudices and fears of the epoch are reflected but they did not include predictions and warnings of a future mass war though trench warfare, fire-power of the defenders, barbed wire, machine guns and heavy artillery which would have given a foretaste of what was to be expected in World War I. In a retrospective view it still surprises that the people of the world after the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War went into an even more catastrophic war so easy-minded and optimistically or even enthusiastically in 1914. Towle (p. 320) therefore quotes some voices which later blamed the reporters for having aroused the war enthusiasm of World War I with their passion for war in and after 1904/05. Sober warning voices were hardly listened to as in the case of the Russian-Polish banker and railway entrepreneur Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch (1836-1902). He already in a strategic analysis of 1899 titled *Is War Now Impossible?*, published in Japanese translation in 1904, had warned that dragged on siege wars on an industrial base would supersede the mobile and limited wars of earlier times and would benefit the defender, but in the end due to the high costs would cause the

economic collapse and revolutions on both sides. Bloch who came to his conclusions based on earlier wars, particularly the Boer War, did not live to see the Russo-Japanese War. Even after that conflict ignored his Cassandra warnings since Japan had allegedly proved that with industrialized conduct of war a convincing victory was possible despite all sacrifices (Tohmatsu in Wolff²¹ and in *Gunjishigakkai II*). Only after World War I Bloch's book found some attention and lead to a certain reflection.

What historians on the British army only much later said about the lessons not learned instead adhering to a cult of offensive in the United Kingdom was also true for strategists in almost all other countries:

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 emphasized the following points: the importance of machine-guns and heavy artillery; that artillery had to adopt the new technique of indirect fire from covered positions instead of assembling long lines of guns wheel to wheel in the open; the utility of hand grenades and mortars and the importance of signal communications. It was one thing, however, to read the omens correctly, but quite another to change the ideas of men so traditionally conservative as soldiers.²²

The British observers were very much impressed by the efficiency, braveness, spirit of sacrifice and the successes of the Japanese. Sometimes, however, they had a misgiving how much the strengthening of their Far Eastern ally would do harm to the British Empire and the position of the white powers in general, as Homer Lea's popularised opinion became known later. Therefore Y. Hashimoto in Wolff points out how in England a feeling of twilight of the gods concerning their own colonial empire spread. In some reports also the misery of the population in Korea and Manchuria is treated, the people of which had to suffer from the conduct of war and presence of foreign troops (Towle in Wolff pp. 325-26).

British accounts are also researched by J. Ferris in *Chapman/Inaba*, be they from professional officers like General Ian Hamilton and Colonel Aylmer Haldane or from newspaper correspondents like Charles Repington of the *Times* who himself was a former army officer. Though the British as nationals of an allied power enjoyed a favourable treatment they, too, were kept at distance from the front in the first half year of the war. They did not understand the language of their hosts anyway. Only parallel to the military successes the Japanese did lessen their reserved attitude. Ferris views Hamilton together with Repington as the most pro-Japanese observers and Haldane as the most critical one who thought to perceive the lack of individualism as the decisive weakness of the Japanese and did not believe them capable of convincing successes in future wars. The conclusions drawn from the observations by the British who had learned more from the Russo-Japanese War than the specialists of any other countries had, as Ferris maintains, a great influence on the following development of the British military and the conduct of war in 1914-18. The importance of the tactical defence and the technics of trench warfare had been recognized but the British suffered heavy losses, particularly in the years 1915/16, when they practiced self-sacrifice the Japanese style to bring their infantry through the enemy's barrage by all means. Therefore, Ferris comes to the conclusion that the British officers at the Western front between 1914 and 1918 had successfully transformed their men into Japanese (p. 132).

Y. Sheffy in *Kowner/Impact* also examines the importance of the Russo-Japanese War for World War I and the alleged inability to learn the lesson of the 1904/05 conflict, though 83 officers from many countries had been dispatched to support the work of the military attachés in Japan.

The author also deals with Ian Hamilton who is mentioned frequently in other articles, too, but he doesn't treat lessons the officer did or did not learn though in this general the whole dilemma and contradictions from experiences and conclusions are disclosed. So for example Hamilton in his great study on the Russo-Japanese War which became a bestseller sneers at the Japanese mass frontal attack in closed formation learned from Prussia which he finds archaic and outdated tactics facing modern artillery. He traces this kind of warfare back to the fact that Germany had not made a great war for 30 years so that it remained behind in modern warfare with her "trust in sabre and lance".²³ By the way, this passage is missing in the German language edition of Hamilton's book.²⁴ The critical question if he did not think that the employment of so dense a formation from the outset must entail useless loss of life was answered by a Japanese officer in a way considered by Hamilton as "stock German" that without loss of lives no successes could be gained.²⁵ It is strange, however, that the same Hamilton himself in a book published five years after the war declared the frontal attack regardless of the enemy's armament as the key to victory and therefore must be maintained at all costs: "...all that trash written by M. (sic!) Bloch before 1904 about zones of fire across which no living being could pass, heralded nothing but disaster."²⁶ Acting accordingly as commander of the expedition forces in the invasion battle near Gallipoli at the Dardanelle straits in 1915 he used the same tactics as the Germans and the Japanese throwing one wave of soldiers after the other in the attack against the Turkish fortifications regardless of losses and suffering terrible casualties—the same way as the British tactic at the Western front. After several months he had to break off the operation and Hamilton's military career ended abruptly. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Spencer Churchill, being responsible for the operation had to resign. Obviously both had not learned their lesson from the Russo-Japanese War. Churchill, however, was to prepare very well the next great invasion battle, that was in 1944 against Germany in Normandy, though he failed in smaller amphibious operations like in Senegal in September 1940 and Dieppe in August 1942.

The German observers on the Japanese side like those from all other nations suffered from the secret-mongering of their hosts while with the Russians they found more openmindedness because friendships and bribery allowed more insights. The Japanese who in the beginning of the war were not taken seriously became more respected in course of time. Along with their growing strength among the Germans a feeling that their own role in East Asia would end sprang up (see C. Eberspächer in *Kowner/Impact*). These military observers, their conclusions and the attitude of Germany resulting thereof is the subject of the contribution by O. Griffin in *Kowner/Rethinking*. Among them often mockery about the military "achievements" of the Russians found vent. They were characterized as apathetic, insufficiently trained, inflexible and undisciplined. The most favourable attribute was "defensive minded". This negative estimation was to have effects and should be paid dearly for in the preparation of World War I as the author maintains. Chief of the General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen at this time worked out an offensive plan which was to determine the German strategy in 1914. In his memorandum on the Russo-Japanese War he allotted no important military importance to Russia so that he neglected in his "strategic testament" the German Eastern front, as Griffin claims. This underestimation was to have negative results for Germany in the early phase of World War I (see also Kowner in *Chapman/Inaba* p. 300; P. Berton in *Kowner/Impact* p. 119-20). M.S. Seligmann in *Kowner/Impact* shares this opinion though he realizes that in a part of the historiography also the conviction is found that the German military had come to the conclusion that the Russian fighting strength had not seriously suffered from the war with Japan and had been fast reinforced and modernized in the following years. Also from Schlieffen remarks of June 1905 exist that

Russia would have at her disposal at the Western border the same number of troops within six months after concluding a peace as it had before the war and would be a menace if by their mass only.²⁷

Unpublished reports in German archives, first of all in the military archive (Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg/Br.) are the main base of B. Martin's article in *Kowner/Rethinking*. The author examines the findings and the bearing on German policy towards Russia to demonstrate that Germany tried to use the war in the Far East to prevent their own encirclement by the other European great powers but finally ended in isolation. Berlin assuming an attitude of benevolent neutrality incited St. Petersburg to go to war and getting involved in a long-term struggle in East Asia instead of meddling into Balkan problems. Germany with her still young navy tried to learn from Russia's experience from the war while the brilliant accomplishments of the Japanese army often were reduced to the instruction by German officers in the 19th century so that the observers could also be proud of their own country. The reports, however, in the first line reflect the Russian failure and the breakdown of discipline. Among the reports of foreign observers usually those from the democratic model state Switzerland are overlooked. It is therefore to be welcomed that A. Nakai introduces them in *Gunjishigakkai I*.²⁸

The policy of the European powers

M.S. Seligmann in *Kowner/Impact* and G. Krebs in *Chapman/Inaba* deal with Berlin's policy during the war. The attitude was controversial within Germany but the policy of the Emperor and his entourage was dominant seeing Russia forever bound in Asia thereby also weakening the Tsar's ally France whom Germany humiliated by bringing about the Moroccan crisis during this time. Instead of gaining a hegemonial position in Europe using the conflict of 1904/05 Germany in the end was faced with overall isolation and a dwindling of her strength in the next decade.²⁹ Seligmann (pp. 112-13) further takes the view that Japan intended to take the German colony of Tsingtau as hostage to force Berlin to good conduct concerning Tōkyō's interests. Krebs describes the unstable course of German policy during the war sometimes aiming at a rapprochement with Great Britain, sometimes with Russia, then with the United States and even with Russia and France. In the end Wilhelm II. stood there with empty hands. By Japan's alliance with Great Britain the menace from Asia he had warned of over the years became a self-fulfilling prophecy when Japan in 1914 belonged to Germany's enemies. M. Berg in *Sprotte* und Ph. Gassert in *Sprotte* deal with the racist agitation of the "yellow peril".³⁰ They see in this propaganda in the first line German hegemonial ambitions since Wilhelm II. thereby tried to use the white world for his own purposes.

Berlin's endeavours to profit from Russian weakness is examined by J. Chapman in *Chapman/Inaba* examines particularly concerning the implications on British strategic planning, coming to the conclusion that since the battle of Mukden Germany had gained the position of main enemy for England. He further stresses that London's intelligence activities against Berlin had been extended considerably even during peacetime. Besides that the author proves that British officers in Asia, partly in cooperation with Japan, had great success in dismantling German spy activities in World War I. Nevertheless, even after the Russo-Japanese War, as Chapman claims, for Japanese professional soldiers the model was still the army of Germany which now tried to sell the latest technology to the British educated Imperial Japanese navy and did not even hesitate to use bribery of the highest officers for that purpose. Chapman further proves that Berlin supported the nascent independence movement in India which on the other

hand was inspired by the Japanese victory over a European great power in 1905 while Tōkyō bound itself in the same year in the revised version of the alliance with London to defend India for the British Empire. These contradictions were solved only by World War II.

In close connection with German policy one must see the French attitude as P. Beillevaire in *Chapman/Inaba* demonstrates. Paris did the splits to obtain an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the Russian alliance partner but on the other hand tried everything to avoid being pulled into the conflict despite rising tensions. Since Great Britain, too, was interested in evading an entrance into the war, the loose bonds of the entente concluded in April 1904 facilitated it for both to fulfil this aim. Both had no influence at all to effectively hold back their respective ally, Russia or Japan, from starting a great war. Instead, France together with her arch-enemy Germany supplied the Baltic Fleet with coal and other goods on the long way to East Asia. P. Beillevaire in *Kowner/Impact*, however, points out that Japan, in contrast to the official policy, could count also on sympathies in France where in left and liberal circles the alliance between their republic and autocratic Russia was viewed unnatural, holding the Tennō's empire as much more democratic and progressive than that one of the Tsar. In France the war was also seen with great uneasiness because many investors feared for the credits they had granted to Russia.

From 1907 on a rapprochement between St. Petersburg and Tōkyō took place, though only relatively gradual but surprisingly fast, which found its expression in several conventions. Among them was a secret agreement in 1908 to divide Manchuria into spheres of interest as is treated by P. Berton in *Kowner/Impact* who continues his study until the alliance concluded in 1916 and by S. Yokote in *Ericson/Hockley* with an outlook until the 1920s.³¹ This policy was facilitated by the Russian access to the British-French entente in 1907, so that *de facto* a Four-power-entente against an isolated Germany developed. The surprising quick rapprochement between the enemies of the 1904/05 war is compared by Berton (p. 78) with the reconciliation between Japan and Germany on one side and the Western powers on the other after World War II. One of the reasons for the rapprochement after 1905 was the motive to keep the United States off Manchuria where American investment sought influence while the area was controlled by Japan and Russia by way of their respective railways and where both powers tried to block potential rivals. Later, during World War I, both countries were enemies of the Central Powers. While Tōkyō's policy aimed at preventing the conclusion of a Russian-German separate peace St. Petersburg depended on Japanese supply of war material for which it recognized special rights for Japan in China in a secret agreement.

Russia's successful efforts to overcome their own isolation after 1905 is also dealt with by T. Saitō in *Nichi-Ro sensō* and the path to the new constellation of powers developing thereof is also researched in detail by K. Neilson in *Kowner/Rethinking* who stresses that Great Britain's policy of "splendid isolation" had worked only in Europe but not overseas since it had not prevented the menace of her colonial empire by France and Russia. By the policy of reducing tension followed since 1904, however, these risks had been removed for Britain.

Intelligence

Usually it is assumed that the underestimation of Japan by Russia before the outbreak of war and in its initial phase had been among other reasons the result of insufficient intelligence.³² This judgment is qualified by B. W. Menning in *Wolff* who points out that intelligence activities had been more successful than usually recognized, particularly concerning the Japanese navy. H. Wada in *Wolff* reaches even the conclusion that the Russian military and navy attachés in Tōkyō

had absolutely understood the high level of the Japanese military and its readiness for war and had also influenced War Minister Kuropatkin with their respect but their reports were given credence in St. Petersburg only very hesitantly and when the government was ready to execute a turn in politics it had been too late to prevent the Japanese attack.

Russian spy activities are researched more thoroughly by D. B. Pavlov in *Chapman/Inaba*, finding definitely some successes rendered possible with the help of some befriended Koreans. It becomes evident that the foreign ministry in St. Petersburg was very active in this field, could rely on a spy network in China and all that independently from military agencies. Besides that it becomes clear how much Korea, particularly the court, was longing for protection from Russia to prevent their impending inclusion into the Japanese sphere of influence. The same subject is dealt with by E. Y. Sergeev in *Steinberg* but this author views the Russian secret service at the time of the beginning of the war as very backward and susceptible to misinformation launched by the Japanese counterespionage. He recognizes, however, some progress made until the time of the peace conference and after. He stresses that Russia could not only rely on Asian spies but also on a row of agents from different European countries. Though he is of the opinion that the history of Russia's secret service is not nearly researched sufficiently he sees some reason for optimism due to the far-reaching opening of the related archives since the 1990s.

On the other side C. Inaba and R. Kowner in *Kowner/Rethinking* can prove, based on an admirable amount of archival documents that Japan spied against Russia much more thoroughly using a lot of money. The activities included the observation of the Bosphorus and the Suez Canal which the British could not close for Russian warships due to international treaties. The authors maintain that there were still blunders, errors of judgement and amateurish behaviour in this field being still new for the modernizing nation. It becomes clear that the foreign ministry, general staff and navy general staff though working separately from each other concerning intelligence, they finally exchanged material of a certain relevance. Furthermore, Japan received intelligence material from the ally Great Britain and agents were recruited in different countries: Russia, China and Turkey as well as in Europe, among them Switzerland, Finland and Poland. These activities became much more successful than the efforts undertaken at the same time to support the independence movements in Finland and Poland with money or weapon deliveries. So during the war with Russia Japan prepared the ground to cooperate in politics and the more so in the field of intelligence against the Soviet Union with Finland and Poland after World War I when these countries became independent.³³

This story is described in greater detail by A. Kujala in *Steinberg* concentrating on the activities of Colonel Akashi Motojirō. When this officer lost his position as military attaché at the legation in St. Petersburg with the outbreak of war he was transferred to Stockholm. From there and from London he organized the support for the independence movements for people under Russian domination, the revolutionary activities of Social Democrats and acts of sabotage along the railway lines and even financed Vladimir I. Lenin living in Switzerland—the same way as did the Germans in World War I—to destabilize the enemy nation and to hope for a second front which would bind Russian forces. Particularly close was Akashi's cooperation with the Finn Konni Zilliacus who succeeded in getting deliveries of weapons from Japan though the greatest quantity of them got lost when the freighter transporting them ran on a rock before the Finnish coast and had to be blown up. Kujala mentions that the Japanese showed less interest in relations with the Poles who had become unquiet during the Russo-Japanese War, too, but the author does not give a reason. After all Józef Pilsudski who was to become as "Marshall" the ruler of

independent Poland after World War I sojourned in Tōkyō in 1904 to negotiate on an alliance between the Polish underground and Japan. Perhaps this idea was thought to be without foundation since the Polish part of Russia in contrast to Finland had no coast to land supports. This episode is dealt with by W. Benecke in *Aust/Steindorff* who can prove that Pilsudski though he was not able to conclude an alliance got considerable financial means from Japan. Also his rival, Roman Dmowski, was in Japan at the same time, but he did not aim at a revolutionary break from Russia but only at a greater autonomy within the Tsar's empire. The rivalry between both politicians was to continue even after the refounding of independent Poland in 1919. Furthermore, newly found documents prove that Pilsudski had made in Tōkyō proposals far exceeding what was known before: To organize a Polish military unit to be recruited among Poles in the USA and to be sent to Manchuria. It would be enlarged by Polish soldiers who had deserted the Russian troops at the front and by prisoners taken by the Japanese army in the battle field.³⁴

Akashi's subversive activities were uncovered by Russia soon after the end of the war and official Japan seeking better relations with St. Petersburg in the meantime felt urged to keep some distance from the officer. Kujala comes to the conclusion that Akashi's importance was exaggerated in Japan after the Russian Revolution when Tōkyō reactivated the bonds with Poles and Finns. Also other information deserves attention that Józef Teodor Konrad Korzeniowski, a Polish writer showing an extreme anti-Russian attitude and better known under his *pen name* Joseph Conrad, took sides with Japan as a publicist in the British exile during the war of 1904/05 (Y. Hashimoto in *Wolff* p. 387; *Patrikeeff/Shukman* pp. 59-61, 63).

D. Wolff in *Steinberg* described the role of Chinese spies who worked for both sides and were forced to collaborate out of sheer poverty. China herself was neutral but on her territory most of the battles were fought. While Japan already for many years since had organized an intensive intelligence educating many specialists in Chinese and Russian language, Russia had neglected language training so that hardly one Russian was able to understand Chinese or Japanese. Only little by little Russia developed a spy network in China but this became effective only when the war was almost finished. The great differences in quantity and quality of intelligence is judged by Wolff as one of the reasons for the Japanese victory. Tōkyō's extended spy network in China, organized by the army and the foreign ministry with the consulates as main bases is also treated by D. Cao in *Chapman/Inaba*. Alex Marshall (*Staff* pp. 96-101) demonstrates that Russian intelligence work in China as well as in Japan due to the lessons learned painfully in 1904/05 was decisively improved and expanded in the following years.³⁵

Conclusion of peace

US-President Theodore Roosevelt's willingness for mediation paved the way for the conference of Portsmouth and the conclusion of peace. This aspect is dealt with in the edited volume by Ericson/Hockley based mainly on a symposium at Dartmouth College. The United States, particularly President Roosevelt, originally had hoped that Japan would block an uncontrollable Russian expansion in the Asian-Pacific region thereby working for American interests. Furthermore, there were strong antipathies in the USA against the Tsar's empire because of its autocratic government and anti-Semitism flaring up again and again so also during the revolutionary actions in 1905 caused by the hardships of the war with Japan. In inciting this anti-Russian mood the prominent journalist George Kennan exercised great influence as is demonstrated by L. Inoue in *Nichi-Ro sensō* as well as by E. P. Trani and D. E. Davis in

Ericson/Hockley. Kennan had travelled a great deal particularly in Russia and had won the reputation of a sharp critic of the Tsar's rule. Therefore he was not allowed to enter Russia any more, so that during the war 1904/05 he reported from Japan and that for the influential journal *Outlook*. As normal in western countries he interpreted the conflict as a fight between David and Goliath showing strong sympathies for Japan as a modern and civilized nation struggling with medieval barbaric Russia. During this time he led a correspondence with President Roosevelt recommending an act of mediation at an early point of time for which idea he also met with interest in talks with Japanese politicians. Both Americans shared a disrespect for Korea. For the discontent of the Japanese public concerning the allegedly too small concessions of the enemy in the peace treaty of Portsmouth Kennan showed great understanding. During the war he also visited in their camps Russian prisoners of war whose language he spoke fluently trying to convince them of liberal ideals and providing information material, supported by Russians in exile. The prisoners got additional news about the revolutionary situation in their fatherland from letters they got from home so that among them a Social Democratic spirit spread (see T. N. Yasko in *Gunjishigakkai II*). Kennan welcomed this development among the Russians while he later opposed vehemently as publicist the Bolshevik October Revolution of 1917 and the regime arising thereof. By the way, George Kennan (1845-1924) was the elder cousin of the prominent diplomat George F(rost) Kennan (1904-2005) who after World War II set up the policy of "containment" against the Soviet Union and worked in a leading position to include the former enemy nations Japan and Germany into an anti-Soviet block. E. P. Trani and D. E. Davis in *Ericson/Hockley* (p.74) see a continuing line from George Kennan's activities over George Frost Kennan's diplomacy which morphed into Paul H. Nitze's rollback policy in 1950 to Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), often referred to as "Star Wars" and his "evil empire" rhetoric.

On both sides of the warring nations there were considerations already in summer 1904 about the advisability of a peace, on the Japanese side particularly by Minister Hayashi Tadasu in London and on the Russian side by the former finance minister Witte. Both, however, were forced by their respective government to inactivity. I. V. Lukoianov in *Ericson/Hockley* deals with St. Petersburg's policy based on Russian sources. He proves that particularly Tsar Nicholas II. under the influence of his advisers was unyielding, only showing interest in ending the war after the catastrophic defeat of Tsushima in May 1905. It was a disappointment, however, when not the pro-Russian Itō Hirobumi was appointed leader of the Japanese delegation but the hardliner Foreign Minister Komura Jūtarō. Therefore the negotiations proceeded only very slowly. According to Lukoianov Russia still had at her disposal some trumpcards, among them the fact that she had broken the Japanese cipher so that it became possible to read numerous diplomatic telegrams. Furthermore the imperturbable will to continue the war and the vast Russian territory were scary for Japan. In addition, St. Petersburg succeeded to cause other countries to exert pressure on Japan, in first line by the United States. By this strategy Tōkyō could be induced to give up several demands, among them the payment of reparations and the cessation of North Sakhalin and the China Eastern Railway. Not only Witte's diplomacy but also the Tsar's unshakable attitude get "good credits" in Lukoianov's article.

While the United States in general were content with the Russian defeat a total Japanese victory would have been a nightmare as well since a strong rival for the USA would have emerged in the area. Therefore it was quite in the American interest that both contractors in states of exhaustion accepted President Roosevelt's mediation offer leading to the conclusion of peace on September

5, 1905. These efforts to maintain the balance of power in the Far East are described in the articles of M. Berg in *Sprotte* and N. E. Saul in *Steinberg*. Berg elaborates Roosevelt's idea of the rise and decline of civilizations and "racial" accomplishments. Soon after the end of war many Americans got the feeling they had backed the wrong horse or as a historian titled: "The Deus ex machina that failed"³⁶. With the fear of the Japanese *superman* in the United States the movement to exclude Asians from immigration grew considerably. The last chapter of the Russo-Japanese war for the USA was not the *happy end* of the *gentlemen's agreements* on the immigration question between Washington and Tōkyō in 1907 and 1908 with which Berg's article ends but the bilateral tensions were even to rise. Saul in *Steinberg* deals thoroughly with the preparation and the handling of the peace conference for which Roosevelt at the outset had to overcome opposition from both warring sides. To have won over the Tsar and his government the author attributes in the first line to the US-ambassador to St. Petersburg, George von Lengerke Meyer. The access to Japan was easier due to the close personal relations between Roosevelt and special delegate Kaneko Kentarō. Negotiation leader at the peace conference was on the Russian side the former finance minister Sergej Witte who had risen to the president of the ministers' council (prime minister) supported by Roman Rosen, since May 1905 ambassador to Washington and until 1904 minister to Tōkyō³⁷ and on the Japanese side Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō whose policy is described by T. Minohara in *Wolff*. Originally as delegation leader Itō Hirobumi was foreseen but had declined since he with his relatively friendly attitude towards Russia had criticized the war from the beginning on. Komura in contrast belonged to the hawk faction. His right hand in Portsmouth was the minister to Washington, Takahira Kogorō, while Kaneko Kentarō acted as special assistant. Minohara stresses Roosevelt's pro-Japanese attitude who for example had recommended to conquer Sakhalin in order to further the Russian readiness for negotiations and peace (p. 558). The author rejects the thesis that the president had deceived Japan to convene a new conference dominated more by himself after a failure of the peace negotiations therefore having withheld information on the Russian approval to cede the Southern half of Sakhalin to Japan. Rather, the author claims, the president, considering the infamous inconstancy of the Tsar, had waited for confirmation from St. Petersburg (pp. 561-66).

Also M. Matsumura, probably the best expert of the Russo-Japanese War, deals with Roosevelt and the Portsmouth conference in *Chapman/Inaba*. For this author the personal relations of the president to the diplomat and the Upper House deputy Kaneko Kentarō played an important role. Both had studied at the same time at Harvard University though they met personally not in those years but only about a decade later. Kaneko even was awarded an honorary doctorate in law by Harvard in 1899. He took over several ministries in different cabinets and was sent to the USA as special envoy during the Russo-Japanese War. *Matsumura Masayoshi* had published a voluminous study on Kaneko's role during the Russo-Japanese War in 1980 - written while he was consul in New York - and an updated edition in 1987 in Japanese. Now an English language translation with minor additions is available, translated by Ian C. Ruxton. Unfortunately the list of used sources and literature is not updated. Matsumura traces back Kaneko's appointment to the trauma of 1895 when Tōkyō due to the Triple Intervention in 1895 had to give up a great deal of the booty from the war against China. Therefore, it now seemed advisable to stage a propaganda campaign in favour of Japan to oppose the Russian publicity campaign for an alleged new crusade led by a nation guided by Christianity. Matsumura therefore calls Kaneko "Ambassador for Public Diplomacy" who had to cope with pro-Russian feelings in the public, among industrialists and in the press. He succeeded, however, in first line to win over President Roosevelt to a favorable attitude towards Japan.

While Russia could count on sympathies in the United States as a Christian country T. Niita in *Gunjishigakkai I* sees in the attitude of the orthodox Russian church a great share of guilt already in the ideological preparation of the war before its outbreak. The same role as Kaneko in the USA was plaid in Great Britain by Baron Suematsu Kenchō, who was also an Upper House deputy and was the son in law of Genrō Itō Hirobumi. His activities aiming to prevent an eventual renewed fear of the “yellow peril” are described by M. Matsumura in *Gunjishigakkai I*.

Matsumura in *Nichi-Ro sensō* and in his monograph finds Roosevelt’s attitude towards Japan contradictory so that different interpretations could be possible. It puzzles the author that the US-president never got a Japanese decoration for his mediation, totally in contrast to the banker Jacob Schiff who was awarded the highest order a foreigner could receive by the Tennō. The neglect of Roosevelt, however, was probably caused by the fact that the Japanese public made him the scapegoat for not having been paid the expected war reparations because of the US-president’s appeals for moderation. In this disappointment D. Wolff in *Ericson/Hockley* (pp. 131-38) views the beginning of Japanese anti-Americanism which was to be observed very soon also in other countries of East Asia like Russia, China and Korea which all saw themselves as losers respectively victims of the war and the growing US-engagement in the Far East. After all, however, Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel peace prize as the first head of state to be honoured that way though in the opinion of T. Minohara in *Wolff* (p. 566) rather the leader of the Russian delegation Witte would have deserved it.

I. Nish in *Chapman/Inaba* also researches Komura Jutarō’s role giving him the best credits since the diplomat, together with Katō Takaaki and Hayashi Tadasu, was the architect of the alliance with Great Britain, had also during the war with Russia stayed in close contact with London and succeeded in keeping other countries out of the conflict. Furthermore, as the author maintains, Komura got in touch with the USA thereby rendering possible Roosevelt’s peace mediation, had shown a remarkable sense of proportion dissuading the own military to insist on the annexation of Vladivostok and North Sakhalin and had followed the American advice to renounce war reparations. That Komura on the other hand brought about concessions from Russia which lead Japan on a dangerous path to further expansion and collision with other countries is convincingly demonstrated by N. Fujita in *Gunjishigakkai II*: The cession of the Liautung-peninsula allegedly lying in Japan’s “national interest” and even obtaining the Chinese consent to the “change of the leaseholder” thereby launching the economic penetration by the Tennō’s empire.

The condition of the peace treaty brought many benefits for Japan: The recognition of her hegemonial position in Korea, the cession of the Kwantung leased territory (Liautung) and South Sakhalin, the conveyance of the South Manchurian Railway from Chanchun³⁸ to Port Arthur, fishing rights in Russian territorial waters and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria. Despite these benefits the Japanese public was not content since it had expected more gains particularly the payment of war reparations. On the day of signing the treaty of Portsmouth heavy riots broke out spontaneously in the Hibiya section of Tōkyō so that martial law had to be declared. These events would have deserved their own article but they are only remarked upon in passing by some of the authors (H. Tohmatsu in *Wolff* p. 193; I. Chiba in *Ibid.* p. 359-60; Y. Kitamura in *Ibid.* p. 428; T. Mihohara in *Ibid.* p. 567; Kreiner in *Kreiner* pp. 58-59; Kowner in *Kowner/Impact* pp. 34-35; Shimazu, *Society*, passim). I. Nish includes in Vol. I (pp. 161-65) of his edited work *The Russo-Japanese War* a report on the riots from the British diplomatic documents. That even in the countryside protests movements arose which quite often were stirred up by the local press is demonstrated with Nagasaki as example by H. Yokoyama in

Nichi-Ro sensō. In this case the public was probably upset the more since from the neighbouring navy base of Sasebo the Combined Fleet had sailed for the battle of Tsushima. Instead of paying the expected reparations to the victorious nation Russia soon after signing the peace agreement demanded that Japan to compensate individuals for damages caused by Japanese warfare so for example for businessmen or for the sinking of ships not justified by international law of war. In the beginning Tōkyō refused stressing the final character of the Portsmouth treaty but eventually entered negotiations which dragged on until 1911 leading to financial compensation in some cases (see Sh. Itō in *Nichi-Ro sensō*).

The home front

Not only soldiers in the field found attention in the literature but also the situation at home, particularly the fate of the women in different roles linked to the war and the families of the bereaved. Sh. Bejarano in *Kowner/Rethinking* publishes an article on illustrations dealing with the subject. While impressive paintings and photos on the course of the war are widely known and have been distributed by the government, official Japan did not grant a greater role to women despite their importance for the economy as well as for the health and welfare system. Therefore this contribution fills a gap by presenting the fate of the female part of the population: Women left behind or mourning, nurses and men, dreaming of their home. The role of Russian women as “forgotten heros” is examined by Y. Mikhailowa and M. Ikuta in *Nichi-Ro sensō* and *Kowner/Rethinking*. The authors undertake a subdivision in four parts: Nurses, combatants, journalists and the female population in the battle zone. It becomes clear that the women, though glorified for the care they furnished the men with, remained in an underprivileged position. After all, however, they got the chance for a vocational training and an own income, though very low, which allowed them a certain independence.

The traces of the war—the first one to be widely discussed in the media—in Japanese literature finds an investigation by F. Y. Kleeman in *Chapman/Inaba* comparing the methods of treatment by male and female authors respectively, some of them with experiences in the battle area. While men often show a macho behaviour women usually appear to be more thoughtful. The author attributes the difference to the roles of the sexes during the war: Here active participation in the fighting, there passive endurance of the consequences. At that time the word *jūgo* (= home front) emerged in the Japanese language (p. 250). In some way different is the case of the female spy Kawahara Misaoko, the “Japanese Mata Hari” who was decorated after the war with a high award, with her own work as well as with the treatment her life found by other authors. Kleeman in the literature also came across voices which did not join the hero-worship of the majority but took a critical stand towards the war and rejected it, be it out of Socialist or Christian spirit for example. The author comes to the conclusion that in general the treatment of the subject was freer than in later eras, since after World War I “unpatriotic” voices were not tolerated any more.

The Russo-Japanese War is called by Shillony/Kowner in *Kowner/Rethinking* (pp. 5-6) “the last gentlemanly war” in which the opponents showed the highest respect to each other, the civil population was not affected unnecessarily and - as demonstrated in the exhaustively in the contribution of Y. Kita in *Gunjishigaku I*—the prisoners of war on both sides got fair treatment according to the Hague Convention. V. G. Datsyshen in *Chapman/Inaba* deals with the Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in Russian hand who were either held in Siberian camps or were brought to the European part of the vast empire of the Tsar. The United States as protecting power for Japan took care of them. An equally fair treatment was accorded to Russian

prisoners who had fallen in Japanese hands and whose number finally had reached 70,000 men. Their fate is described by N. Shimazu in *Steinberg* and in her monography (*Steinberg* pp. 370–83; Shimazu, *Society* pp. 157–96). It is surprising that their life conditions were bearable—as well as those of the German and Austrian defenders of Tsingtau fallen in Japanese hands in World War I—and completely different from the treatment of their fellow-sufferers in World War II. Shimazu traces the humanitarian treatment of the Russians in 1904/05 to the fact that they were Europeans and with the wish of Japan to be recognized as a civilized nation thereby winning the goodwill of the public opinion in the West (in *Steinberg* p. 370). One has to consider, however, that the Chinese, i.e. non-Europeans, in the war of 1894/95 had not become the targets of cruelties comparable to those in the 1930s and 1940s, either. Furthermore, it can be asked why the Japanese prisoners of 1904/05 did not become victims of contempt in their country to the same degree as those in World War II.

The home front in Russia is dealt with by Y. Tsuchiya in *Nichi-Ro sensō* and in *Wolff* while in *Chapman/Inaba* the same author includes also Japan in his research. He examines the support by different institutions for families which had fallen into poverty and misery because of the war. For that purpose he made use of regional archives in both countries besides other sources coming to the conclusion that there had been in Japan from the state hardly initiatives to prevent the families of soldiers to sliding down into poverty but that on the local level solidarity and support was found. This is demonstrated also with Kyōto as example by T. Takemoto in *Wolff* and in *Gunjishigakkai II*. Similar was, as Tsuchiya maintains, the situation in Russia though the activities there were organized less systematically and the solidarity by the people had been suppressed for a long time since the leadership of the state had in first place been interested in the preservation of autocratic rule and public order. In contrast the government in the constitutional monarchy of Japan had had to listen willy-nilly to the people. The author proves that there had definitely been a patriotic outburst in Russia after the beginning of the war arising from the anger about the Japanese assault but because of the inhuman policy of the own government against the people this feeling had fizzled out very fast. The disappointment about the inability of the Tsar's regime had led to the loss of authority and to demands for reforms from intellectual circles. In contrast to Russia the patriotism in Japan had grown steadily, as Tsuchiya concludes. Life circumstances in both capitals of the warring states are also the contents of memoirs by British diplomats, reprinted in Vol. I (pp. 116–44) of I. Nish's edition *The Russo-Japanese War*.

U. Eppstein in *Kowner/Rethinking* observes the rise of Japanese nationalism by militant songs becoming radical more and more and introduced to elementary schools and that already in the decade before the outbreak of war. The influence of the war resulted in a gradual militarization of society finding an expression in the identification with the armed forces and enthusiasm for their music. The army as well as the navy sent a music corps to the troops near the front to strengthen the moral, as becomes clear in the contribution of M. Tanimura in *Gunjishigakkai II*. Together with the modernization of Japan Western music had been introduced including march music.

The influence of the war on art and literature is the subject of several publications. Y. Mikhailova and M. Ikuta in *Nichi-Ro sensō* and in *Kowner/Rethinking* introduce to the reader poems on the theme “war” while A. Cohen in *Kowner/Rethinking* comes to the conclusion that Russia's artists in contrast to World War I and the October Revolution and unlike what is generally believed had largely continued to lead their own life without being influenced by the

war. That in Russia already before the beginning of hostilities the dominating negative image of the Japanese and Asians in general was further cultivated and even strengthened by propaganda is dealt with by R. Stites in *Steinberg* so that the enemy appeared as an inferior creature or even as monkey—exactly like in Anglo-Saxon agitation during World War II. In Russia's satiric press the nation having been hurt at bottom in their pride by the Japanese attack gave vent to its rage by clichés and racism as well (T. Filippova in *Steinberg*). A. Frajlich in *Kowner/Rethinking* examines the impact of the war on Russian poetry: Due to the traumatic experience by war and revolution the poets yearned for an identification with Europe and had longed for a role for Russia as a “third Rome”. F. Grüner in *Sprotte* inquires into the representation of the war in the Russian press and that particularly in conservative newspapers which did not suffer so much under censorship. The opportunity to exert influence, so its conclusion, was extremely limited but the situation improved due to the readiness for reform after the defeat so that after many years of muzzling a heyday for the press had begun. The author found in the newspapers - as well as in statements from the government—no exaggerating war enthusiasm or even warmongering but a patriotic-nationalistic tendency grown he concludes from the resentment at the Japanese surprise attack.

In Japan at that time there was a boom of woodblock prints—for the last time in history - which found mass distribution (see J. Ulak in *Steinberg*). The motives were in first line war heroes and their exploits. In contrast to the Japanese efforts to be noticeable in other fields to present the war as the successful completion of the Meiji modernization here the artists used traditional technique though photos and films had long existed and paintings in Western style were made. The purpose was perhaps to rekindle old samurai ethics. Not only Japan, however, was hungry for pictures: also in Western countries illustrations on the war were eagerly acquired or self-produced.³⁹

Though there are some related articles in other volumes, particularly in *Steinberg* and Wolff, N. Shimazu's monography is the first full-length study to examine the war from the perspective of its impact on Japanese society. Some of the articles the author had published earlier elsewhere, so for example in *Steinberg*. Using a wide range of sources as diaries and letters N. Shimazu sheds light on the attitudes of ordinary Japanese people towards the war. She deals with themes such as conscripts and battlefield death, war commemoration, heroic myths, and war in popular culture. As S. Lone⁴⁰ has done in his study on antimilitarism she questions the orthodox view of Meiji Japan as monolithic, demonstrating that there existed a complex and ambivalent relationship between the Japanese state and a pluralistic society so that sources of power, and forces of social and cultural change, did not emanate solely from the authority of the state downwards to the people. In her opinion state-society relationship rather was more symbiotic and interactive in nature than hitherto understood. In the war-torn society pro-war chauvinists and anti-war activists were opposed to each other, whilst the “silent majority” including the conscripts at the front wrote freely about their fears, worries and hopes from encampments at the front.

Shimazu pays special attention to the individual soldiers at the front instead of treating them as an anonymous mass writing in spite of wartime censorship about their thoughts, fears, joys, sadness and daily life in the trench. Particularly on the battlefield, conscripts longing for their families and their home town or village the state or emperor were of lesser importance. The author also judges the Hibiya riot not as an extraordinary outburst of popular nationalism, but as an expression of underlying social forces that had existed for some time. In contrast to World

War II she proves that the people's attitude was markedly different, obvious in the treatment of prisoners of war, the strength of the anti-war movement and the fact that during the war Japan was not internationally isolated but was in communication with all major powers and was observing international law.

Shimazu demonstrates that the media emerged as a key agency, acting as an intermediary between state and society. The "modern" war propaganda used photography as well as cinematography which were directed not only at the public at home but toward foreign countries as well. In contrast old fashioned prints (*nishikie*) became also very popular in Japan. The Russo-Japanese war is usually seen as a stepping stone to a higher grade of Japanese nationalism but Shimazu's study evokes the impression that it also built a bridge to Taishō democracy. So it is not surprising that the author comes to the conclusion that the 1904-05 war lost its general appeal in Japanese society during that era. The media attention of the late Meiji years in film, newspapers, exhibitions and art, however, was revived as an important national memory in the militaristic 1930s and the creation of Manchukuo was seen as completion of the 1905 war aims and therefore justified the losses almost thirty years ago.

Revolution and democratic currents

Japan was more democratic than Russia, had a constitution and an elected parliament, political parties and a legal opposition, more freedom of the press and a population with a broad education (Shillony/Kowner in *Kowner/Rethinking* p. 8). Therefore, for the Russian society the defeat in the war was the final proof for the bankruptcy of the rule by police and reactionary bureaucracy. So Lenin in exile rejoiced at the fall of Port Arthur not only as weakening of the Tsar's regime but also as triumph of the progressive Asia over the reactionary Europe, and as the victory of the suppressed against the suppressors (F. R. Dickinson in *Steinberg* pp. 523-24). It is strange that Japanese Marxists after World War I criticised the war as "imperialistic" in Lenin's sense (I. Chiba in *Wolff* p. 369). Who after all might be the real Lenin? The coincidence of war and revolution prevented Russia fighting with all her might against one of the enemies: against the exterior, Japan; or the interior, the revolting social strata of the people. The long war, which finally got lost and with all its hardships lead to the first Russian revolution which in Western imagination is mainly connected with the armoured cruiser *Potemkin*. J. Kusber in *Kowner/Rethinking* deals with its pendant on land, the unrest among the soldiers after their demobilization who often switched over to mutiny and implanted revolutionary spirit into the population, particularly into the farmers, with implications until 1917. The author had already demonstrated in a monograph the interrelationship of the Russo-Japanese War and the first revolution in the Tsar's empire.⁴¹ Therefore it is strange that in a recent book on Russia in 1905, co-edited by Kusber, the war is hardly mentioned and is dealt with in only one single article.⁴²

J. Bushnell in *Steinberg* views the revolution and the mass strikes as the origin of the path to the October manifesto in 1905 when the Tsar saw himself compelled to guarantee civil rights and a parliament (Duma) with legislative authority. Nicholas II. had even before that date appointed the relatively liberal Sergej Witte to the president of the ministers' council thereby strengthening his position as head of the Russian delegation at the conference of Portsmouth (see also Schimmelpenninck in Kowner *Rethinking* p. 41). Before that time Russia had been the only European power without a constitution which finally was enacted in 1906 with the Basic law of State granting voting right, parliament (Duma) and Council of Ministers (Binder-Iijima in *Sprotte* pp. 10-11). As a matter of fact, however, the reforms were restricted several months later

and Witte lost his position (D. Dahlmann in *Kreiner*; D. McDonald in *Steinberg*; J. Frankel in *Kowner/Impact*). H. D. Löwe in *Sprotte* (pp. 41-42) sees a parallel between the changes of 1905/06 and the first reform movement caused by the defeat in the Crimea War 1863-66. This movement, too, grew weary later.

The victory of the constitutional monarchy Japan over autocratic Russia also obviously strengthened movements for a constitutional policy in third countries so for example in Iran. Russia was so busy with her interior conflicts and the war that she could no longer back the Shah's autocratic regime and could not continue meddling in the affairs of the neighbouring country as had been the case for several centuries. This new situation strengthened the position of Iranian revolutionaries who interpreted Japan's victory as a triumph of democracy and now, following the model of the Russian revolution viewed as a mass uprising against a tyranny, demanded a constitution and a parliament. The Shah, facing growing unrest, agreed on August 5, 1906 willy-nilly but limited the right to vote to a small minority (see Bieganiec in *Kowner/Rethinking*; *Hirama* pp. 134-35).⁴³ It may be permissible to add here that the Shah in contrast to the Japanese constitution had only limited rights since the constitution of Belgium where the king had only a weak position had been taken intentionally as a model, the more so in the supplementary constitutional law of 1907.⁴⁴ While in Japan the pro-monarchical circles had enforced a constitution it were the anti-monarchical ones in Iran.

The developments in Russia and in Iran were watched by reform-minded officers in Turkey with jealousy and was sensed as a challenge to their own feeling of superiority and pride since the Ottoman Empire had enacted a constitution already in 1876 and a parliament one year later, but these reforms were suspended by the sultan in 1878. Turkey had observed the war between Russia, seen as the greatest enemy of the Ottoman Empire, and Japan with great interest but took officially a neutral stand and sometimes even an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards Russia in order not to provoke St. Petersburg and had even introduced censorship on war news. This policy is described by D. Akarca in *Kowner/Rethinking* but the author demonstrates that in the Turkish public and in circles of intellectuals there had been great enthusiasm in favour of Japan, and that not only because it hit the common enemy Russia but also because of its rise against the Western world. Also the revolutionary Young Turks' press in exile rejoiced at "progressive" Japan's victory over "reactionary" Russia thereby indirectly attacking also their own government. The sultan came into a precarious situation: Though he also welcomed the military defeat of his arch-enemy Russia, he is said to have regretted the set-back for the autocratic form of government, the more so as he had to fear the spread of revolutionary currents (see also H. Nezi-Akmeşe in Worringer pp. 67-70). That affected his own country, too, were the Young Turks enforced the reinstallation of the constitution in 1908.

Aydin in *Politics* offers a rare, global perspective on how religious tradition and the experience of European colonialism interacted with Muslim and non-Muslim discontent with Western-dominated globalisation, the international order and modernization. With a comparative focus on Ottoman pan-Islamic and Japanese pan-Asianist vision of world order from the middle of the nineteenth century to the end of World War II he offers a global history perspective on modern anti-Western critiques. The Russo-Japanese War receives full treatment but the author comes to the conclusion that the anti-Western movement in both countries had started much earlier with the Christian-Islamic tensions in the case of Turkey and the white-yellow antagonism in the case of Japan. In this strained atmosphere the result of the Russo-Japanese War was felt as a blow of liberation in both societies. It empowered the claims of non-Western intellectuals in the debates

about race, the Orient, and progress, and became the strongest evidence against the discourse of the white race's permanent and eternal superiority over the coloured races. Therefore, the author observes the following development until the decolonisation process, beginning with the period 1905-1914, usually viewed as the "awakening" of the East against the Western hegemony, a slogan that became the symbol of an intellectual decolonisation preceding the political one. This mood led to an increase of pan-Islamic thought in Turkey and pan-Asianist ideology in Japan and to a rise of self confidence in other regions of Asia, where their own underdevelopment was now viewed only as just a temporary delay in progress that could be altered by a set of reforms, such as the ones Meiji Japan had implemented in just three decades (Aydin, *Politics* pp. 9-10). Though Japanese pan-Asianists were mainly in opposition to their government until the late 1920s they gained influence in the 1930s with their old claims that in face of the superiority of Asian civilisation against the declining West it was better for Japan to be the leader of a future free Asia than a yellow race partner discriminated against in the club of white great powers. Eventually pan-Asianist thought was used to achieve the aims of Japanese imperialism under the slogan invented in Tōkyō: "return to Asia" (ibid. pp. 11, 160-89).

Aydin proves that there were contacts and cooperation between pan-Islamists like Abdurresid Ibrahim and Japanese pan-Asianists like Tōyama Mitsuru, Uchida Ryōhei and Inukai Tsuyoshi with an anti-Western orientation already before the Russo-Japanese War and the more so thereafter (*Politics* pp. 83-89). The Russians who had fought the war under the banner of Christianity and had been instigated by Wilhelm II. and other German propagandists in that sense had to recognize that together with nationalism, three major non-Western world religions, namely, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism, experienced a reawakening and revival in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War (Aydin, *Politics* p. 78).

Similar to Aydin, *Politics*, the enthusiasm in Turkey for Japan because of racial reasons is dealt with by Bieganiec in *Kowner/Rethinki*. Intellectuals took notice of the victory of an Asian nation over a European one with sympathy since they accused the Western countries to treat the Turks together with the "yellow" Japanese as standing at the bottom of the race hierarchy. They saw now an end had come to this kind of arrogance so that the Turks also would get back their pride. The evidence seemed to have been furnished that modernization must not necessarily mean Westernisation (so also *Hirama* pp. 126-30).⁴⁵

Worringer in *Worringer* maintains that the provincial Arab elites under Ottoman rule viewed Japanese ancestral rites and respect as a pattern for Muslims to imitate in revering their Arab forefathers. Their admiration for Japan, however, had a bad effect on Turkey because they did not get cultural recognition as a special group within the empire and a share in real political power. Therefore, their identity as Arabs became more pronounced, and the discourse on Japanese modernity in the pages of the Arabic press shifted to a politicized critique of Ottoman failures in comparison with Japanese successes, particularly where education was concerned.

D. Akarca in *Kowner/Rethinking* mentions that Turkey dispatched an officer as military observer to the Japanese side, Colonel Pertev Demirhan, while Russia refused to grant her consent for such an endeavour. For this episode the reader would have welcomed a more detailed narrative: Japan and Turkey had no diplomatic relations so that a German intervention became necessary. Pertev was lucky to have at his disposal an influential mediator, General Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, who in 1883-96 had been in the service of the Ottoman government for the modernization of the Turkish army. Goltz was not only Pertev's former superior but a deep friendship existed

between them. The German general succeeded to win over the sultan for the idea to dispatch Pertev to the Far Eastern war theatre. Furthermore, he provided letters of recommendation to the Japanese army in favour of Pertev who was attached to General Nogi's staff, always stayed near the front and was even wounded once. From there he led an extensive exchange of letters with Goltz in German language and visited him on his way back to Turkey in Königsberg. By this way the German military got first-hand reports about the course of war. Goltz, as much impressed by the Japanese military achievements as his former student, recommended the Tennō's empire as a model for Turkey since it had been proved that a weaker nation could win against a stronger one with the necessary fighting spirit. So it is small wonder that an enthusiastic Pertev himself prophesied that the Ottoman Empire will rise with the same brilliance as Japan in the near future.⁴⁶

H. Nezir-Akmeşe in *Worringer* stresses the obvious cultural significance of military traditions in both countries, the samurai in Japanese and the warrior ethos in Ottoman societies respectively, so that it is no surprise that the Ottoman armed forces looked to Japan for ideas on how to integrate the military into the modern state. Seeing the development in the Tennō's empire they held it possible that in Turkey, too, the army could function as an elite guard to protect the country, educate the masses, and guide the state polity into modernity. Many of the figures influenced by the Japanese example in their earlier days at the military War College were among the leaders who later founded and nurtured the Turkish Republic after the First World War, including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü. In contrast, before 1908, as the author stresses, the army had been kept under firm political control by the ruling sultan and any political activity on the part of officers or men had been severely repressed. The turning point came with the constitutional monarchy, in which the reigning Sultan and his ministers would be controlled by an elected parliament. The Young Turks saw traditional Turkish moral values, and in particular, Turkish martial values, such as courage and readiness for self-sacrifice, as the bedrock of a powerful army and nation. Western science, technology, and methods of organization must be adopted, but Eastern moral values must be maintained alongside them. Japan's success over the Russians was invoked as justification for this view. They argued that the Japanese had combined their indigenous moral values with imitation of Western technical improvements, and thereby achieved their current power and status. This perfect combination of old and new, manifested in the Japanese army, represented a model worthy of emulation (Nezir-Akmeşe in *Worringer* pp. 65-66)

The contribution of E. Binder-Iijima in *Sprotte* on the "oriental question" centering on the Balkan area also covers Turkey. The author attributes to the Russian defeat in 1905 the Bosnian Annexation Crisis of 1908/09 which had anticipated the July Crisis of 1914 in many aspects and can be viewed as path to the First World War: The Tsar's navy had now the main base in the Black Sea where it had their only fleet at its disposal which still deserved the name. To reach the open sea, however, it had to pass through the Turkish straits. To procure Istanbul's consent Austria-Hungary promised to exert pressure against a Russian toleration for the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the treaty of Berlin signed in 1878 this area was still under Ottoman jurisdiction and with the Young Turks' revolution of 1908 the old constitution was reinforced which included Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russian aims concerning the straits, however, failed due to British opposition and the Russian approval of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was followed by a sharp protest from Serbia so that in the end empty-handed St. Petersburg experienced a "diplomatic Tsushima" (Binder-Iijima p. 13).

There was a certain enthusiasm for Japan also in China after the victory over Russia. A. Li (in *Wolff* p. 503) even uses the expression “shockwaves” which were running through every level of Chinese society. In the country pride was felt because of the success of the racial related nation over a European great power so that in contrast Russia earned contempt. The euphoria prepared the end of the Chinese monarchy which was unable to reform itself. The imperial government heading for the revolution of 1911 and a phase of modernization was now put on a level with the weakened Tsar’s regime. Many Chinese went to Japan to study at the universities and a row of officers attended the military academy, so also from 1908-10 did Chiang Kai-shek who later as leader of the Kuomintang would rule the country for a long period. A militarization of China also appeared as a path to strengthen the nation. Sun Yat-sen, the father of the Chinese revolution, rejoiced at the Japanese victory (G. Müller in *Sprotte* pp. 210-11, 230-31; *Hirama* pp. 105-11; Aydin, *Politics* pp. 72-73). The constitutional movement was given a fresh impetus since obviously the fact that Japan was a constitutional state had led to her victory over an autocracy so that she became the model for a “revolution from above” (H. Z. Schiffrin in *Kowner/Impact*; G. Müller in *Sprotte* pp. 216-19; A. Li in *Wolff* pp. 503-04). On Sun’s movement the first Russian revolution of 1905, too, exerted great influence. In the same year in China the first political party was founded and the infrastructure for a constitutional monarchy inaugurated. The government carried out some reforms, among them the establishment of an elected assembly. In the meantime Sun Yat-sen was looking for political allies in Tōkyō (H. Z. Schiffrin in *Kowner/Impact*; Y. Shichor in *Kowner/Impact* pp. 213-16).

In Japan the constitutional system was also strengthened by the war. With Prince Saionji Kinmochi a politician became prime minister who did not belong to the oligarchy dominating the state until that time but was the president of a political party, the Seiyūkai. Furthermore, from now on more consideration was given to public opinion, since the discontent of the people had exploded in connexion with the Portsmouth treaty. The government became dependent on the Lower House more and more which had to approve the budget, first for the warfare and later for the rearmament in peacetime. Therefore the oligarchs increasingly made compromises and entered alliances with the political parties so that Japan saw a prelude to the “Taishō democracy” which was to come into being after World War I. These events are described by N. Ovsyannikov in *Kowner/Rethinking*, and Itō Yukio wrote a monograph on the question what influence the war with Russia had on the development of the constitutional state in Japan. He is of the opinion that if Itō Hirobumi had not resigned from the position as president of the Seiyūkai in July 1903 to become the President of the Privy Council, his party would have continued the efforts for a settlement of tensions with Russia and perhaps would have avoided war.⁴⁷ The new prime minister Katsura Tarō and his foreign minister Komura Jūtarō in contrast were convinced that an understanding with Russia would give Japan only a postponement for a conflict which would have been unavoidable anyway as is treated by Y. Teramoto in Ericson/Hockley who can prove how much the cabinet came under the pressure of the army so that a war became more and more likely.

R. Kowner in *Kowner/Impact* who views the war more as a continuity of the preceding Meiji policy than a caesura in the Japanese history and therefore differs from most other authors also stresses how much the military as result of the war again and again intervened in politics and could enforce a large-scale rearmament, too (pp. 40-42). Without doubt in Japan there was a certain radicalisation noticeable with which Y. Shichor in *Kowner/Impact* is dealing. Though he perceives some critique on the war from the Socialist camp he comes to the conclusion that in

the same way as in Europe in World War I the national identity had largely overshadowed class identity. Eventually the fragmentation of the Socialist movement had been the result. Furthermore, the increasing military successes had weakened pacifism and many former Socialists had changed sides and entered the nationalist camp. Thereby a national socialist movement in the true sense of the word had developed whose most prominent ideologue became Kita Ikki. This agitator later was made responsible for the military coup d'état of February 1936 and was sentenced to death. Also the Christians, Shichor maintains, had become increasingly patriotic in order not to be regarded as the "fifth column" of the West any more.

On the other hand St. Lone in a monograph recognizes very strong antimilitaristic and pacific voices in Meiji Japan which had been silenced only temporarily by national passion, particularly during the war with Russia but had been revived fast after the conclusion of peace, mostly in rural areas where the hardships by conscription, war victims and tax increases were felt more than in the big cities.⁴⁸ S. Konishi in *Ericson/Hockley* finds a similar tendency among intellectuals finding expression in an anti-war-movement and anarchism. Their circle also established contacts with mind-mates in Russia like Peter Kropotkin and Lev Tostoi. For them war and imperialism were just inhuman (similar M.-H. Sprotte in *Sprotte*). Shimazu in her monograph also demonstrates that an anti-war movement arose including among other groups journalists - particularly from the newspaper *Heimin Shinbun* -, socialists, pacifists and Christians, who had started their anti-war campaign already in 1903 though this camp appears as a minority. Nevertheless the state had to fear this movement and categorised it as a leftist opposition, a dangerous "disease" to be contained and eradicated.

It is surprising that according to Shimazu's conclusion the mood of low level patriotism did not change during the victorious campaigns and by official hero worship during and after the war. The soldiers did not feel to be the successors of the glorious samurai class but rather as the underdogs of the modern state. Their loyalty did not lie with abstract concepts such as state or throne, but with the family and locality which were concrete sources of individual identity. The ordinary soldier was not interested in the "honourable war death" of government propaganda but wanted to survive, in order to return home to continue to fend for his family. Those who survived received a hero's welcome while the fallen soldiers got a funeral service and commemoration ceremonies by local elites and enshrinement into the Yasukuni Shrine by the state.

The impact on Korea and China

Though in the years following the peace treaty it became evident that Korea and China were the main victims of the Russo-Japanese War they are not sufficiently taken in consideration in the volumes introduced here, perhaps because not many scholars from those two countries are among the participants. At the beginning of the war Korea out of weakness had no other choice than to declare her neutrality as S.-H. Lee in *Chapman/Inaba* describes. This action can be viewed as a continuation of the policy of the previous years hoping that tensions between Russia and Japan would lead to a balance of power between the two rivals. Lee maintains, however, that the Korean emperor and his government had trusted too much in protection by Russia, therefore leaned too much towards the Tsar's empire and provoked growing pressure from Japan which forced Seoul to conclude an alliance in February 1904. The expectation that the war would be limited to Manchuria and on solving the Manchurian problem so that Korea would stay in the wind shadow of the conflict preserving her independence was soon disappointed. Also S. I (possible reading of the family name also: Yi) in *Nichi-Ro sensō* characterizes the Korean hopes

as illusion born out of the wrong estimation that not their own country but only Manchuria had been the apple of discord leading to the Russo-Japanese War. Eventually, as Lee shows, the country was abandoned equally by Great Britain which had no great economic interests there and the United States which expected better trade chances in a Korea “civilized” by Japan. K.-J. Kim in *Wolff* also, as well as W. Seifert in *Sprotte* stress the expectations the USA entertained in this “civilising” mission.

Including the prehistory of the conflict, D. Ku in *Wolff* deals with Korea from the end of the Japanese-Chinese War until the protection treaty with Tōkyō (1895-1905), usually called the “lost decade” which the author views as living under the “sword of Damokles”. After the assassination of the queen in 1895 the house of the Korean monarch had sought a rapprochement with the Tsar’s empire but had thereby, as the result of the Russo-Japanese War demonstrated, not only backed the wrong horse but also, as the author claims, failed to carry out urgent necessary reforms. In this period the country also lost considerably sympathies in the Anglo-Saxon nations which were shocked by the prevailing chaos and the monarch’s incapability so that Great Britain as well as the United States indicated a growing willingness to tolerate a Japanese predominance. Not only St. Petersburg but also Tōkyō had a “fifth column” at the disposal in Seoul. N. Kanno in *Nichi-Ro sensō* demonstrated with the diplomat Yamaza Enjirō and the entrepreneur Ōmiwa Chōbei and their cooperation as an example of how manifold the semi-official and unofficial channels between Japan and Korea were. At the very beginning of the war with Russia Japan violated the neutrality of Korea launching operations from her territory without provoking any international protest. Following the judgement of D. Ku in *Wolff* the house of the monarch understood only too late which danger the war meant for the independence of the country therefore reacting with optimism and awkwardness. The reader, however, has to question if there had been any chance at all to save Korean sovereignty since the country was betrayed by the whole world.

K.-J. Kim in *Wolff* presents in greater detail the American attitude which was guided by the wish for closer cooperation with Japan. Therefore, the United States conceded not only a free hand to Tōkyō in Korea during the Russo-Japanese war but also severed as the first nation diplomatic relations with Seoul immediately after the signing of the protectorate treaty in 1905. Decisive was the principle of the *open door* declared by the USA in 1899 opposing European colonialism in demanding equal opportunities for economic activities and trade. The abrogation of the unequal treaties for Korea soon after the conclusion of the protectorate treaty by no means strengthened the rights of Seoul but secured Japanese rule also at the cost of other great powers (see M. Asano in *Nichi-Ro sensō*).

H. Seok in *Kowner/Rethinking* pictures the path to the annexation of Korea in 1910 for the decisive years from the Russian-Japanese convention in 1907 over a second one in 1910 dividing Manchuria into spheres of interest granting Russia special rights in Outer Mongolia among other agreements. Only now Japan could be sure to receive a full free hand from Russia for the annexation of Korea which in the author’s opinion was a mere by-product of the policy of rapprochement with St. Petersburg. These secret concessions became known only by the publication of Russian documents after the October Revolution in 1917. The author maintains that Japan even after the Portsmouth treaty had to proceed cautiously not to risk an intervention by other nations and be humiliated as during the triple intervention in 1895. How much the annexation of 1910 traumatised the Koreans until today can be understood from the contribution of G. Podoler and M. Robinson in *Kowner/Impact*. In the retrospective view, the authors

conclude, the complex arising from that experience had led to an exaggeration of the opposition movement and a belittling of the extent of collaboration.

Also China's neutrality, decided by the government in Peking already at the end of 1903, became a problem as is shown by Sh. Kawashima in *Gunjishigakkai I*. The author gives much space to the considerations of the minister to St. Petersburg, Hu Weide, whether a Russian or a Japanese victory would be more favourable for his country concerning the recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. He could not imagine that Russia, in case of Japanese superiority, would easily give up all rights and interests in the contested region so that possibly some room would be left to play both rivals off against each other, while the extent of Tōkyō's demands was unclear. Minister Hu Weide therefore recommended strict neutrality instead of a benevolent attitude in favour of Japan. After the outbreak of war China on February 12, 1904 declared her neutrality for her entire territory, i.e. also for Manchuria. The warring powers, however, did not care about violating China's sovereignty making foreign territory into battlefields at their will.

The danger arising from the Japanese victory in 1905 was recognized in China only with some delay. Sun Yat-sen as a Chinese nationalist on a trip through the Suez Canal established bonds of solidarity with ordinary Egyptians accepting their congratulations to the Japanese triumph with pride (Aydin, *Global* pp. 215-16; Aydin, *Politics* pp. 72-73), viewed the outcome of the war as a victory of Asia over Europe. The enthusiasm many Chinese intellectuals showed towards Japan is strange in view of the arrogance and disdain the winner nation showed to their "weak" country and let it understand how much it would be at the mercy of the new hegemonic power due to the weakening of Russia. Their applause is therefore called rather naïve by A. Li in *Wolff* (p. 491) the more so as the government in Peking had fully recognized the danger and therefore had urged a mediation to prevent the war or at least to bring about a quick end. Eventually it had insisted, though in vain, on a participation at the peace conference as is dealt with thoroughly by S. Hirakawa in *Wolff* and in *Gunjishigakkai I* in a rare study on this historic chapter about the official policy of the Qing/Manshu-Dynasty which was fighting for survival. Both warring parties, however, as well as President Roosevelt who feared complication if a nation could bring wishes to bear without belonging to the recognized great powers, declined. Therefore, not even Chinese observers were admitted. Because of this attitude a massive boycott of American goods started in China as well as strong pressure exerted on their own government which had no other choice than to tolerate the conditions of the Portsmouth treaty. At the same time tensions grew in the relations because of restrictions on the immigration of Chinese to the United States. President Roosevelt's assertion in the context of the Portsmouth treaty that he would struggle with all his might for the integrity of China had no great value considering the true power conditions in East Asia. Though Manchuria formally returned to China after the evacuation of Russian troops it was *de facto* a tempting vacuum for an aggressive great power like Japan which because of the cession of the Kwantung leased territory and the assignment of the South Manchurian Railway by Russia largely controlled the Northeast of China (Kreiner in *Kreiner* pp. 60-61). So it was small wonder that even those Chinese who were enthusiastic about Japan's victory in 1905 were soon disappointed, the more so when a direct link led to the annexation of Manchuria in 1931.

The United States, too, felt deceived by Japan. President Theodore Roosevelt had expected that Tōkyō would support his principle of the *open door*, particularly in Manchuria but rather Japan tried to exclude other countries from economic activities the same way as Russia had done before. Furthermore, Tōkyō and St. Petersburg divided Manchuria into spheres of interest in which there was no space foreseen for the United States. C. Oberländer in *Kreiner* stresses the

common interest of Japan and Russia against the *open door* in China as demanded by the USA. It is an irony that Tōkyō in its rhetoric before opening the war had justified its growing will to go to war with the promise to defend the principle of the *open door* in China against Russian machinations in order to get the *goodwill* of America and England as Y. Katō in *Wolff* explains. This argument of free trade conditions together with the justification to spread civilization was used also by moderate Japanese intellectuals like Yoshino Sakuzō to justify an attack against “uncivilized” Russia (Katō in *Wolff* pp. 222-24). Yoshino later was to become the model liberal of Taishō democracy.

Japanese-American relations after 1905

All authors view the Russo-Japanese War as a watershed on the path for the deterioration of the relations between Tōkyō and Washington (so e.g. D. A. Ballendorf in *Gunjishigakkai II*) being diametrically opposed to the quick rapprochement between Tōkyō and St. Petersburg. Tovy/Halevi in *Kowner/Impact* see the conflict settled with the Portsmouth treaty as the beginning of a Japanese-American cold war which lasted over several decades and burst into a hot war in December 1941 on the control over the Pacific (so also Kowner in *Kowner/Impact* p. 21) so that the Russo-Japanese War had more influence on the outbreak of the Pacific War than it had exerted on World War I. One could, however, object to this kind of determinism that over several decades all options had remained still open. Kowner in *Kowner/Impact* does not view Japan’s rise to a great power already by the victory over Russia but rather the Tennō’s empire was still a regional power in his opinion. Only at the earliest by World War I, which forced the other nations to limit their engagement in East Asia and in which period China disintegrated, Japan became a great power or even a *world power* in his opinion (p. 30). In any case, however, one can state that Japan whose existence had been viewed as a curiosity before the war was treated after the victory over Russia as equal by the great powers which therefore elevated their legations in Tōkyō to the rank of embassies.

The change in the attitude of influential Americans from sympathy for the *underdog* Japan to a revival of the “yellow peril” is demonstrated by J. Henning in *Kowner/Impact*. According to the author the shock about the victory over white, Christian Russia was deep and led to anti-Japanese manifestations finally culminating in restrictions for immigration. Y. Hashimoto in *Nichi-Ro sensō* deals with the renewed fear of the “yellow peril” using the writer Jack London as example who was sent by the Hearst Press immediately before the outbreak of war to Japan, but stayed only half a year. He was disappointed that the authorities and the military tried to hold him off the front by all means and apprehended him several times suspecting him of spy activities. At sight of Russian prisoners of war London developed a “white” solidarity which he obviously did not lose over many decades. In 1910 he published a book titled *The Unparalleled Invasion* about a fictive war of the West against China and her masses, awakened by the Russo-Japanese War and modernized under Japanese guidance, to be fought in 1976 using biological and chemical weapons.⁴⁹ That Jack London’s attitude towards East Asia can be interpreted in a completely different way is shown by Daniel A. Métraux: London deserves to be remembered as a writer on Asia and the Pacific who directly confronted Western racism against Asians, denounced such concepts as “the yellow peril” and showed great sympathy for Japanese and Chinese in his literature. London saw that Asia was in the process of waking up and that countries like Japan and China would emerge as major economic powers with the capacity to compete effectively with the West as the twentieth century progressed. He urged that Westerners make concerted efforts to meet with Japanese and Chinese so as to understand each other better as equals.⁵⁰ The

image of the Japanese which was spread by Jack London's writings, however, was bad enough to use or misuse the author for a propaganda movie during World War II thirty years after his death. Director Samuel Bronston's 1943 film was based loosely on London's widow Charmian's 1921 biography of her husband and starring Michael O'Shea, Virginia Mayo, and Susan Hayward. London's life was almost restricted in the movie to the months he spent in Korea in 1904 and presented him as prophesying the growing Japanese militarism that would result in Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, one of the Liberty Ships was named after him.⁵¹

Even the small minority of Japanophiles, most of them American missionaries stressing the alleged higher civilized level of the Japanese compared with the Russians, could not change the rising racist motivated fear. J. Henning in *Kowner/Impact* introduces a couple of strange race theories, in favour as well as in disfavour of the Japanese. Despite the fact that President Roosevelt criticized the racist immigration laws on Hawaii and in California, towards which as regional decisions the administration in Washington was helpless, there are enough indications that he disliked both Russia and Japan equally and would have liked it best of all if both countries would have slaughtered one another thus being totally exhausted as result of the war. Though the immigration problem bred bad blood it was not this question which led to the deadly American-Japanese tensions but the fact that due to the results of the war of 1904/05 both were expanding imperialist nations in the Asia-Pacific area so that it was natural that they became rivals. In the preceding years the United States had acquired or conquered there several territories as there were Alaska, Hawaii, Midway, Guam and the Philippines. Now they were engaged so much in East Asia that they defied the new great power Japan. Since 1907 the navies of both states in their strategic planning regarded the other as the most probable enemy (see Hiram pp. 144-56).⁵² These growing bilateral tensions also made the alliance with Japan problematic for Great Britain as Seok in *Kowner/Rethinking* points out and with the renewal of the treaty in 1911 the United States were exempted as a possible enemy so that there would no longer be obligation for military assistance by England against the United States in favour of Japan. So in the long run Great Britain would have to choose between Japan and the USA as most important partner, and during World War I the decision fell more or less automatically in favour of Washington.

A potential main enemy as constructed in 1907 in the USA as "enemy no. 1" was necessary for the Japanese navy if only to get the plans for rearmament sanctioned. With the end of Russian naval power the Tsar's fleet could not serve as an excuse for naval rearmament any more. The navy's plans, however, met with stiff resistance from the rivalling army for which Russia was still the probable main enemy and which also struggled for a greater share of the military budget and that at a time when Japan was financially bled out. This rivalry is dealt with by J. C. Schencking in *Steinberg* who particularly describes the endeavour which was temporary successful to conclude a political alliance with the political party Seiyūkai. Thereby the navy received parliamentary support for the own budget demands, and with Yamamoto Gonnohyoe even an admiral was appointed prime minister in 1913. A corruption scandal involving navy officers who had received bribes from the German Siemens company toppled the cabinet in the next year. The army thereby had the upper hand but could not dictate politics alone and struggled with the navy for the superior role in the state, both trying to use the political parties for own purposes. Schencking opposes the opinion often found in historiography that the navy in contrast to the army was "unpolitical".

Despite the American-Japanese rivalry becoming obvious only very few people predicted the policy Japan would follow later leading to the Pacific war, one of the few was the autodidact Homer Lea already in the year 1909.⁵³ He had, as is known from his foreword, written the manuscript immediately after the peace treaty of Portsmouth but published it only four years later to wait and see if his hypothesis would become true. Lea warned of neglecting American armament facing the growing military danger from Japan which would be enabled to open hostilities by conquering the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska and the West coast of the United States from Washington State to California. As confirmed in December 1941 he even predicted correctly the landing places for the Japanese invasion on the Philippines. Though he was widely read in the USA he usually was smiled at as a *science fiction* author instead of being taken seriously. After Pearl Harbor he was reputed suddenly as a far-sighted prophet⁵⁴ and was immediately reprinted. In contrast to the United States where only very few military officers took him seriously, in Japan the translation of his book became a bestseller advancing to compulsory reading for navy officers. A little bit later Lee also criticized the short-sightedness of Great Britain whose alliance he viewed as a heavy mistake: the drive of Russian expansion would be turned from the Far East to Central Asia and India. Furthermore, in his opinion Japan had become stronger than the British Empire by the victory of 1905, had won a sphere of influence including all British territories in the area, and the situation was becoming worse by American indifference.⁵⁵ In the publications under review here almost no attention is paid to the Pearl Harbor prophets who were all fascinated and influenced by the Russo-Japanese War, though in the science fiction genre a future American-Japanese war became a frequent theme.⁵⁶ While Homer Lea is mentioned if only remarked in passing (P. Towle in *Kowner/Rethinking* p. 328; A. Hashimoto in *Nichi-Ro sensō* pp. 219-20, 227; T. Saitō in *Ibid.* p. 386) other Pearl Harbor prophets like Hector C. Bywater⁵⁷ und Satō Kōjirō⁵⁸ are not dealt with at all.

The reason for ignoring the impending danger could have been that the Japanese policy for the time being followed a moderate course. In the first cabinet of Prince Saionji Kinmochi the prominent Hayashi Tadasu took over the position of foreign minister for most of the time during the critical years 1906-08. His policy is dealt with by Y. Teramoto in *Nichi-Ro sensō*. Hayashi is characterized as an exception among the Japanese policy makers of his time in having reasonable and rational ideas including a fair treatment of China. He, former minister and later ambassador to London, despite rising tensions struggled to continue a policy of close cooperation with Great Britain and the USA. Furthermore, he aimed at preventing isolation of Japan by seeking better relations with France and Russia. The policy towards the Asian continent, however, was in contradiction to these interests since Tōkyō attempted to fasten the grip on Manchuria. Therefore, Hayashi's diplomacy became a difficult act of balance.

The impact of the war on the colonized peoples

An additional reason for deteriorating relations with the United States was the fact that the Japanese victory over Russia made a great impression on the people of the US-ruled Philippines awakening hopes of gaining independence (Hirama pp. 160-69). Not only there, but worldwide the attention the Russo-Japanese War gained influenced world history by challenging the claim of the white race to dominate other peoples. Asian Intellectuals felt particularly encouraged by the Japanese victory as a stimulus for pan-Asianist, pan-Islamic, anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic ideas. Therefore, the Russo-Japanese War, though itself an imperialistic conflict *par excellence*, became the starting point for the fight against imperialism in the colonies and half-colonized countries like China and Korea (so also A. Iriye in *Wolff* p. 2-3). As a result in Europe,

despite great admiration for Japan, many voices claimed that their own interests were endangered by the strengthened empire of the Tennō which had awakened Asia (A. Iikura in *Chapman/Inaba*; G. Westerman in *Kowner/Rethinking* pp. 413-15).

Several contributions in the publications under review deal with the phenomenon of not viewing “white rule” as irrevocable. The mood of awakening among the colonized peoples is in the focus of Y. Hirama’s monography on the Russo-Japanese war as a turning-point in world politics. In this study Japan’s military endeavours appear mainly as rebellion against “white colonialism” having begun already with the Meiji Restoration. Not only the peoples of Asia had been awakened and inspired to independence movements but also Turks, Arabs and Africans as well as Finns and Poles. Also the emancipation movement had received a decisive impetus. Hirama obviously expects gratefulness from other nations towards Japan but he ignores the fact that the victory of 1905 was a blow for the independence of China and the more so for Korea upon whom the treaty of protection was enforced in the same year. The author’s excuse is that Korea would have come under Russian rule without question if the war would have been avoided. He further maintains that China, because of the Japanese victory in 1905, had got the chance, used particularly by Sun Yat-sen and a great number of students, to prepare and organize the necessary reforms in their fatherland using Tōkyō as base. He further stresses - and obviously exaggerates—the influence of the Komintern in interwar Asia to justify Japan’s military interventions on the continent (pp. 172-85, 197-99). Hirama views the Japanese proposal of the Versailles conference to declare the equality of races as a continuity of the “burden of the yellow man” by Japan criticising the refusal by the Western powers. It has a strange smack that he sees also the expulsion of the colonial powers in the Pacific War as part of this continuity as do the long-winded explanations that the claim of the Japanese Empire for global rule under the slogan *hakkō ichiu* (The eight corners of the world under one roof) had been determined by a humanitarian spirit in contrast to Western-style racism. Though it is true that Japan in World War II could use her prestige as an anti-Western power in Southeast Asia to find collaborators, particularly in Burma and Indonesia, those “liberated” peoples soon recognized that their situation had changed from bad to worse. The author does not restrict his study on Japan’s influence on the independence movements in many parts of the world, but also includes pan-Asianist ideas after the war with Russia, so for example visible in the case of the nationalistic leader Ōkawa Shūmei (On Ōkawa’s activities see also Aydin, *Politics*, pp. 111-24, 150-1, 143-4, 147-50, 152-3, 167-74, 177, 181f, 184-6, 195-6, 199 and on Ōkawa’s interest in Islam Aydin in *Worringer*), and on the emerging of nationalist societies in Japan. Ōkawa became famous for his “clash of civilizations” thesis, which sounds so modern, forecasting a military confrontation between the United States and Japan as early as the mid-1920s (Aydin, *Politics* p. 112).⁵⁹

Hirama’s study reminds the reader of the Japanese propaganda from the 1930s to the end of World War II including the tenor of schoolbooks claiming that the Russo-Japanese War was the prologue to the war for Asian liberation, and the Greater East Asia war its conclusion.⁶⁰ It is small wonder, therefore, that the same author wrote an article on the “liberation of the coloured peoples” for a publication by the highly controversial Yasukuni Shrine on the occasion of the centenary of the Russo-Japanese War.⁶¹

The “jewel in the British crown” of all territories, colonial India, responded with sheer enthusiasm to the Japanese victory seen as defeat of Europe against Asia (G. Dharampal-Frick in *Sprotte*; T. R. Sareen in *Nichi-Ro sensō* and in *Kowner/Impact*; St. G. Marks in *Steinberg*; Y. Hashimoto in *Wolff* pp. 396-400) and as a gleam of hope for regaining independence so much

longed for. Evidence of leaders of the movement like Mahatma Gandhi who does not appear as very pacifistic-minded and Pandit Nehru who now viewed Japan as a model and the other Asians as co-victors speaks for itself. So it was natural that Japanese pan-Asianists closely cooperated with Indian activists fighting for independence and took care of them while in exile in Tōkyō (Aydin, *Politics* pp. 111-21). Gandhi as well as Nehru, however, during World War II denounced Japanese colonialism advanced in the name of Asian solidarity (Aydin, *Politics* pp. 181-82).

It is an irony of history that the Japanese victory of 1905 so much admired in India led to a revision of the alliance with Great Britain in 1902⁶², so that Tōkyō's obligations for support in case of war would not be restricted to East Asia any more but would include India. The British, having become nervous, now feared that Russia could direct her drive for expansion in the direction of Afghanistan and India. By the treaty revision London got the additional advantage to be able to withdraw a great part of the naval units from Indian waters back to Europe against the steadily expanding German fleet. Dharampal-Frick in *Sprotte* (p. 275) and Hiram (pp. 202-211) view also the alliance between Japan and the Indian nationalist leader Subhas Chandra Bose of 1942 against Great Britain as a consequence of the Russo-Japanese War. T.R. Sareen in *Kowner/Impact* as well points out the longevity of the Indians' enthusiasm who even organized relief actions for wounded soldiers and bereaved families in Japan. Many students hoping that independence was near at hand for their country went to the admired Japan to study there. After all, as Sareen maintains, the British recognized the growing "maturity" of the Asians conceding them more political participation in the administration of the colony. Thus their ally's victory became a double-edged sword but it still required two world wars to reach independence for India.

G. Westermann in *Kowner/Rethinking* appears somewhat isolated with her judgement on the reactions on the war in colonies like Philippines, Vietnam and Burma. Despite the overt admiration for Japan the author denies, at least for Southeast Asia, decisive bearings on the anti-colonial liberation movements maintaining that also Marxism, Woodrow Wilson's call for self-determination of the peoples and the Indian Congress had exerted great influence. Similar conclusions concerning Southeast Asia are found in P. A. Rodell in *Steinberg*, but this author views just the Philippines and Vietnam as exceptions where the Japanese victory had long-term effects since only these colonial areas in Southeast Asia had nationalist movements being far enough developed. The reader has to question anyway if the result of the war, though it did not evoke spontaneous upheavals in the colonial regions the intellectuals impressed by Japan like Nehru and Gandhi in India, Sukarno in Indonesia and Ba Maw in Burma, did not over several decades cultivate thoughts which gradually ripened and only because of the Pacific War had a chance to be realized. It will be allowed at this point to quote Ahmed Sukarno, one of the most prominent leaders of the Indonesian independence movement. He, being strongly impressed by the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905, prophesied already in the 1920s a great war between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon nations. This conflict would, as Sukarno maintained, even if Japan would lose, give the chance of liberation for the suppressed peoples. Egypt, China, India and Indonesia would then take over the leading roles.⁶³

Almost all authors come to conclusions different from those of G. Westermann, namely that is to say that great segments of the peoples in Southeast Asia from 1905 on developed great self-confidence and strong nationalism as for example Y. Shichor in *Kowner/Impact* maintains. For the Philippines, however, who had been impressed deeply by the Japanese victory and had themselves fought and lost a war for independence against their new American masters some

years before, the policy of the government in Tōkyō at that time was disappointing: Japan recognized the rule of the USA over the Philippines as the price for the American recognition of Japanese supremacy over Korea. Therefore Japan hence reduced contacts with Philippine patriots to a minimum. The Philipinos themselves from that time on struggled to gain greater rights by a pragmatic cooperation with the United States (Kowner in *Kowner/Rethinking* p. 20). Therefore, from this time on, the interest of Philippine patriots in the “Japanese model” waned considerably (see also P. A. Rodell in *Steinberg* pp. 650-52; *Hirama* pp. 118-20).

Very similar was Tōkyō’s attitude towards Vietnam which was under French domination. The leader of the anti-colonial opposition movement, Phan Bội Châu, stressed the importance of the Japanese victory as stimulus for the national awakening of his own people (Aydin, *Global* p. 216; Y. Shichor in *Kowner/Impact* pp. 211-12; *Hirama* pp. 113-18).⁶⁴ For his cause, however, the Japanese policy was troublesome. Aiming at being accepted as equal to the European nations, Japan as a “Western power” the French colonial empire in Indochina, even banishing activist Vietnamese students from its territory following a wish from the government in Paris. In 1909, Phan Bội Châu also had to leave Japan.

Japan saw even the British rule as a model for her own colonial empire. Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu uttered in 1910 that the English colonial experience in Egypt could serve as a model for the Japanese domination of Korea. It is an irony that Egypt herself saw in the Japanese victory of 1905 a torch for decolonisation (Aydin, *Global* pp. 222-23; Aydin, *Politics* pp. 78-79). The idea to “Egyptize” Korea can even traced back to the war with China in 1894/95.⁶⁵ Therefore, the Japanese cooperation with the white imperialist powers was harmful for the colonized peoples longing for independence and led to ill-feeling since the Tennō’s empire was accused of having betrayed the Asian brothers (A. Iriye in *Wolff* p. 3). It might be of interest that Japan until the war with China 1894/95 saw a similarity between the own situation with that one of Egypt since both countries suffered from unequal treaties being permanently in danger of half-colonial dependence.⁶⁶

M. Laffan in *Kowner/Impact* describes how Japan in the Muslim world of Southeast Asia engendered enthusiasm as the “light of Asia” or “Mekka of modernity”. It had appeared as a saviour from Dutch colonialism so that it could count on sympathies after the invasion of 1942, utilizing a great readiness for cooperation. In other parts of the Islamic world stretching until the Balkan region the Japanese victory was celebrated as a liberation coup of the coloured peoples suffering under Western colonialism or tutelage and the Tennō’s empire was viewed as a possible model for modernization instead of the detested West, particularly in the Ottoman Empire and in Egypt (Aydin, *Global*; Aydin, *Politics*; R. Bieganiec in *Kowner/Rethinking*). So it is small wonder that S. Ezenbel in *Kowner/Rethinking* can trace back the cooperation of Japan with Muslims under pan-Asiatic slogans in the 1930s to contacts started during the Russo-Japanese War. How much Japan became the idol of intellectuals in Egypt which could not get out of the British grip for several decades is demonstrated by Bieganiec in *Kowner/Rethinking*, St. G. Marks in *Steinberg* and *Hirama* (pp. 130-33). Even the hope that the Japanese would collectively convert to Islam was uttered including the emperor who would then become caliph (Laffan in *Kowner/Impact* p. 220; *Hirama* pp. 136-39). Th. Eich in *Worringer* and Worringer in *Worringer* inform how particular Arab writers redesigned the implications of “yellow peril” into a metaphor of Asian liberation. Particularly impressive was the proof that Japan had modernized without giving up her own culture and heritage (ibid. p. 4).

Though official Tōkyō disassociated itself with the coloured peoples in order not to revive the fear of the yellow peril, several nationalist societies were founded in Japan propagating pan-Asian aims and claiming leadership for the Tennō's empire (Aydin, *Global* pp. 220-23). Such ideas could become official policy only one generation later. S. Saaler in *Chapman/Inaba* deals with the "clash of races" from the yellow peril propaganda over pan-Asianist thoughts and the racist immigration policy in the United States to the race conflict of the 1930s, dominating politics at that time. The obsession of the Japanese to be recognized by the West as civilized in contrast to "barbarian" Russia is dealt with by N. Shimazu in *Steinberg*. Now in contrast to the pre-1904 years the "yellows" became the civilized people and the "whites" the wild ones. It is an irony of history that Russia whose defeat in 1905 was celebrated with enthusiasm by the colonized peoples after World War I and even more after World War II claimed herself to be the advocate of the "coloured" races against "white imperialists".

And what about Africa?

Most publications emphasize the novelty that in the Russo-Japanese War for the first time an Asian nation defeated a European great power. Most of the authors, however, do not seem to realize that it was in no way the first victory of a "coloured" nation over a "white" one. That pioneer work was rather achieved by Ethiopia in 1896 in the decisive battle of Adua in the war against Italy. The Italians at that time had to endure the mockery of the other Europeans including the Russians. Among the colonized peoples, however, Adua produced the same result as later in 1905 by the Japanese victory so that for the new world order arising in the 20th century both events should be regarded as a double-pack: an impetus for a global anti-colonial and anti-Western movement.⁶⁷ In the publications under review here, however, Africa is with minor exceptions ignored. Thus *Hirama* (pp. 10-11) in a general way refers to the impact of the Russo-Japanese War on the development of an anti-colonial respectively emancipation movements in Africa and among Afro-Americans, while K. Hildebrand in *Kreiner* (p. 36) mentions the Russian mockery on the expense of the Italians because of their defeat at Adua. M. Berg in *Sprotte* (p. 253) points to the fact that a spokesman of the Afro-Americans like the intellectual and prominent fighter for civil rights W.E.B. Du Bois had rejoiced at the Japanese victory which had after all frightened the white oppressors in Europe and America. Therefore, until the 1930s many Afro-Americans had not regarded Japan as the aggressor or rival of the USA but as the predominant power against white colonialism in Asia.⁶⁸

W.E.B. Du Bois, who often mentioned that he was born in the year of the Meiji Restoration, i.e. 1868, set his hope in an African-Asian partnership as becomes clear from the following quote: "... the fire and freedom of black Africa, with the uncurbed might of her consort Asia, are indispensable to the fertilizing of the universal soil of mankind, which Europe alone never would nor could give this aching world."⁶⁹ For Du Bois the development for the time ahead was predetermined by the result of the war of 1905, namely that the brown and black races would join the upheaval of the Asians unleashed by Japan. He viewed pan-Asianism and pan-Africanism as two sides of the same coin and was convinced that the political fronts in the world would be determined by the white/coloured borderline.⁷⁰ Other Afro-Americans also showed enthusiasm for Japan since 1905, assuming common interests and hoping for Japanese leadership of an alliance of coloured peoples. Even the strange theory sprang up that the Japanese people were descendants of dispersed Africans.⁷¹ Marcus Garvey, the more radical Afro-American activist, who was born on Jamaica and became the spiritual father of the Rastafari movement named after the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie⁷² also demonstrated great enthusiasm for

Japan in his campaigns. He lived many years in the United States where he was to lead an organization for the emancipation of the Afro-Americans. Garvey attracted the black masses much more than Du Bois and other protagonists for the rights of the Afro-Americans and for pan-Africanism. In connection with the Russo-Japanese War he called for a bond of the black people and the Japanese.⁷³ The US-authorities observed his movement with great mistrust, not only because he mobilized the black masses but also because he declared his solidarity with Japan.⁷⁴ So it was small wonder that one of the Pearl Harbor prophets, General Satō Kōjirō, in his scenario of a Japanese invasion of the USA included in the planning an insurrection of ten million Afro-Americans under the leadership of Marcus Garvey.⁷⁵ In 1927, however, Garvey was deported back to Jamaica.

Similar to 1905 facing the Japanese victory some European observers viewed the battle of Adua in 1896, which by the way had found some attention in Japan,⁷⁶ as a menace to the white supremacy in the world and the Italian defeat as disadvantageous for all of Europe which perhaps would in the near future be conquered by the awakened Africa.⁷⁷ It might be pure coincidence that the officer Enrico Caviglia who researched the war of 1904/05 as Italian observer on the Japanese side had participated in the battle of Adua.

The great idol of the Africans, Afro-Americans and the black population of the Caribbean Sea all longing for liberty and civil rights was naturally the Empire of Ethiopia, which was, besides US-protected Liberia, the only independent country in Africa. It was opened to the West almost at the same time as Japan in the mid-nineteenth century after both countries had been secluded since the 17th century as protection against the dominating influence of the Portuguese and the Jesuit missions. Ethiopia thereafter was also modernizing though not with the same speed and success as Japan. For the unity of the nation and struggling for progress the worship of a divine emperor played an important role in both countries. Ethiopia finally developed a sense of comradeship with the Tennō's empire due to the parallel history and similar situation in the world, though that feeling can be traced only from the 1920s on when Japan's rise was taken as a model for the own modernization to be forced.⁷⁸

Japan's first diplomatic contacts were possible after Ethiopia became a member of the League of Nations in 1923. In 1927 both countries concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Trade and three years later an ambassador extraordinary from Japan took part in Haile Selassie's coronation ceremony in Addis Abeba. In 1931 Foreign Minister Heruy Wolde Selassie spent seven weeks in Japan where he was very impressed by the modernization of the country. At this time Japanese nationalists with pan-Asiatic ideals sympathized with Ethiopia dreaming of a future day when they together with the African country would begin the fight against colonialism and imperialism against the white world.⁷⁹

A group of Ethiopian intellectuals, called the "Japanizers" and led by Foreign Minister Heruy pursued a policy of reforms since World War I oriented at the Japanese model.⁸⁰ Part of this efforts was the introduction of a constitution in 1931 which was largely taking the Meiji constitution of 1889 as a model and the founding of a parliament with two chambers though with precious little rights.⁸¹ With the constitution the position and the prestige of the emperor were elevated, not least by the declaration included therein of a mythically explained origin. While in the Japanese constitution Emperor Jinmu was named founder of the dynasty which ruled the country in an unbroken line, in Ethiopia this position was taken by King Solomon of Jerusalem, the alleged father of Emperor Menlik I—whose alleged mother was the Queen of Sheba -, the

founder of the Ethiopian kingdom. Even in the revised Ethiopian constitution of 1955 this passage remained. While Emperor Jinmu was the descendent of the sun goddess Amaterasu, Menelik as well as his father Solomon were descendants of David, to whose house also Jesus Christ belonged. So in contrast to the occidental divine right as base for legitimation of European monarchies a divine nature is attributed to the Tennō as well as to the Ethiopian emperor so that their rule and legitimacy are completely different from those in other countries.

Obviously Emperor Haile Selassie hoped to strengthen his prestige abroad by introducing constitutionalism and a parliamentary system, thereby securing the independence of his country. His reform policy following the Japanese model may be traced back to the admiration of his father, Ras (= Prince) Makonnen, the hero of Adua, had shown to the Tennō's empire after the victory over Russia which had proved that a nation outside of Europe was in culture and technics equal to the West and could defy it.⁸²

In the year 1931 or 1932 Lij Araya Abebe, a young Ethiopian nobleman and relative of the emperor, made the plan to marry a Japanese woman. The idea met with favour in Tōkyō and the search for a suited candidate began. Among the numerous applicants Kuroda Masako, daughter of Viscount Kuroda Hiroyuki, was chosen. Obviously she was a young lady with a sense for adventure who joyfully agreed so that the news could be announced in the press in January 1934. The plan was given up, however, soon afterwards, not the least out of fear of international implications for Ethiopia. All neighbouring colonial powers—Italy, France and Great Britain—had reacted with embarrassment to the plan.⁸³ It seems that because of the same reasons, under the pressure of the government in Tōkyō, negotiations of a private Japanese company held with Foreign Minister Heruy in 1933 on the acquisition of vast estates were discontinued. This land would have allowed growing of rice, vegetables, tea, coffee and tobacco as well as organising a certain amount of immigration from Japan would have been possible.

According to Haile Selassie's autobiography the plan of leasing land to Japanese was a mere rumour without any foundation and arising from Italian propaganda only,⁸⁴ but some foreign observers believed in the authenticity of the project.⁸⁵ Anyway, it cannot be denied that Japan due to the successful trade had become the most important partner for Ethiopia for imports of various goods as well as for the export of cotton. Therefore, Japan was watched with the greatest mistrust by Italy which had to fear most from the competition.⁸⁶

It can also be noticed that in many countries the assumed menace of a fraternization of "yellows" and "blacks" against "whites" was feared and the mere existence of Ethiopia was perceived as a "storm centre" which as an independent country threatened to attract the colonial areas to follow the model, becoming a danger for Western imperialism as a combination of "yellow peril" and "black peril". Therefore, the aggression of Italy in 1935 could expect a certain tolerance despite lip-service in the League of Nations demanding to observe the independence of Ethiopia or even appeared as a preventive measure against a foothold by Japan. British King Edward VIII. even declared frankly to Italian Ambassador to London Dino Grandi, at the time when the Abyssinian conflict was heading to its close, that Mussolini's war was a necessary surgical operation to heal Africa from a centuries-old infective focus holding the prospect of English-Italian cooperation concerning colonial politics.⁸⁷ In February 1936 London had refused Haile Selassie's appeal to Edward VIII. to take over a protectorate or mandate over Ethiopia so that the country could remain independent from Italy.⁸⁸

On a particularly low level semi-official writers from racist Germany agitated against Ethiopia as well as against Japan⁸⁹, and that at a time when Hitler delivered weapons and military equipment to Haile Selassie, aimed at an alliance with Mussolini and opened the path to conclude the Antikomintern Pact with Tōkyō.

In 1934/35, before the outbreak of the war, official Japan assumed such an unclear attitude concerning the rising tensions between Ethiopia and Italy that in Rome mass protests against Japan were organized⁹⁰, while in the Japanese public, the press and in right-wing organizations Ethiopia enjoyed great sympathies during its defence against Italian imperialism. For example the nationalist society *Kokuryūkai* (Amur Society) which since some time had stressed the interconnections of pan-Asianism and the situation of Africans in the colonies of the white powers in 1935 and early 1936 led a campaign in its organ *Dai Ajia Shugi* (Great Asianism) against the Italian war in Ethiopia. Mussolini was blamed for treating the Ethiopians, descendants of Arabs with Asian roots, with contempt despite their long glorious history and culture.⁹¹ The conflict was considered the origin of a racial world war being ahead.⁹² It was stressed that one of the motives for the war was revenge for Adua,⁹³ and that the Ethiopian-Japanese economic relations was felt as menace by the European powers.⁹⁴ In the same journal indignant diplomat Kajima Morinosuke criticized in the name of Japan as the leader of the suppressed coloured nations of Asia the passivity of Great Britain and the League of Nations being responsible for Mussolini's triumph in Ethiopia. Japan had demonstrated, as Kajima wrote, in her war of 1904/05 against Russia how to resist the expansion policy of a white power and how much rearmament was a must for coloured people.⁹⁵

The official Japanese policy changed only near to the end of the conflict so that Tōkyō tended more and more towards Mussolini since the emergence of the "Axis" with the totalitarian powers of Europe appeared in outlines. On January 1, 1936 the Japanese government inaugurated a legation in Addis Abeba while an Ethiopian consulate general had already existed in Osaka for some time. Mussolini's Abyssinia war, however, soon terminated the diplomatic relations which had been taken up hesitantly. Therefore, the legation in Addis Abeba was converted to a consulate general in December 1936 so that the conquest by Italy was *de facto* recognized. Mussolini reciprocated by opening a consulate general in Mukden, i.e. in the Japanese puppet state of "Manchukuo".

In 1935 when Mussolini's war of revenge raged in Ethiopia one of the most prominent propagandists of the Afro-Americans, Du Bois, expressed his hope that Japan would act as the logical leader of all coloured peoples.⁹⁶ At the end of 1936 he spent several weeks in the Tennō's empire where he was received by high official representatives of the country and by private organizations. The Japanese-Chinese war which broke out in the next year rocked the Afro-Americans' belief in the existence of a non-white united front, but Du Bois often showed sympathy for Japan for bringing China to reason which allegedly was as the "Asian Uncle Tom" too obsequious towards the West, though basically he would have preferred an alliance between the two great "yellow" nations against the white world. Furthermore he reproached Western politicians who criticized Tōkyō for their earlier passivity during the Italian war of aggression against Ethiopia. He declared not to understand why the Chinese people showed a greater hostility towards Japan than against the West and made the white powers responsible for the war which broke out between Japan and China in July 1937. Later, during the Pacific War he denounced the internment of citizens of Japanese origin after Pearl Harbor as racism.⁹⁷

In contrast to Du Bois, another Afro-American publicist, George Padmore, who belonged to the communist camp and was born on the British Caribbean island of Trinidad warned Ethiopia of a rapprochement with the imperialist nations. So far he was in unison with the Soviet Union but when Moscow a little bit later encouraged Italian aggression justifying the war in Africa the break with the Afro-Americans and with Padmore occurred.⁹⁸ The Soviet intention was to keep Mussolini in the anti-German camp and to prevent a possible Japanese expansion in East Africa. Out of sheer opportunism Stalin denied support for the anti-imperialistic fight of an African people instead stressing the interests of the “white” people against the yellow peril threatening from Japan.⁹⁹

Italy took revenge on Ethiopia because of the defeat at Adua in 1896 having become a national trauma exactly 40 years later while Stalin justified his entrance into the war against Japan in August 1945 breaking a pact of neutrality with the humiliation Russia had suffered from in 1905 (see Sh. Yokote in *Wolff* p. 106 and in *Ericson/Hockley* p. 121; Wolff in *Ericson/Hockley* p. 130), also exactly 40 years after. Documents in Russian archives declassified in the 1990s suggest that the main reason for the Soviet entrance in the war in 1945 had been in fact revenge for the defeat of 1905 and the consequences thereof.¹⁰⁰

It shall still be added that the Japanese and the Ethiopian emperors are the only non-whites who until now have been incorporated into the British Order of the Garter: Meiji 1905 (see N. Kimizuka in *Gunjishigakkai I*), Taishō 1912, Shōwa (Hirohito) 1929 (expelled 1941, reincorporated 1971), Haile Selassie 1954, Akihito 1998. On October 14, 1975 the order held a memory service for Haile Selassie who was murdered in that year.¹⁰¹

By the way, Emperor Haile Selassie was the first head of state who after World War II, in 1954 respectively 1956, who rendered a state visit to the vanquished nations Germany and Japan, the former allies of Italy. Thereby, at least this chapter of the history of the twentieth century found a conciliatory end.

Gerhard Krebs, born in 1943, taught at universities in Tokyo, Freiburg, Trier and Berlin and worked in research institutes in Tokyo and Potsdam. Now living as a free historian in Berlin. His books include Japan's Deutschlandpolitik 1935-1941. 2 Vols., Hamburg 1984; [Das moderne Japan 1868-1952](#), München 2009; [Japan im Pazifischen Krieg](#), München 2010.

Notes

¹ This is an updated version of a review article originally published in German as:

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Also: http://www.uni-hamburg.de/Japanologie/noag/noag183_184.html

I am grateful to Steve Barnett for correcting my English manuscript.

² Ōe Shinobu, *Sekaishi toshite no Nichi-Ro sensō* [The Russo-Japanese War as World History] (Tōkyō: Rippū Shobō 2001).

³ Yamamuro Shinichi, *Nichi-Ro sensō no seiki: rensa shiten kara miru Nihon to sekai* [The Century of the Russo-Japanese War: Japan and the World Viewed from the Perspective of Chain Reaction] (Tōkyō : Iwanami Shoten 2005).

⁴ Christian Müller, "Anmerkungen zur Entwicklung von Kriegsbild und operativ-strategischem Szenario im preußisch-deutschen Heer vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg," *Militär-geschichtliche Mitteilungen*, 57, 1998, pp. 384-442, here pp. 298-402.

⁵ See S. P. MacKenzie, "Willpower or Firepower? The Unlearned Military Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War," David Wells und Sandra Wilson, Eds., *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904-1905* (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1999), pp. 30-40.

⁶ See also Sönke Neitzel, "Das Revolutionsjahr 1905 in den internationalen Beziehungen," Jan Kusber and Anderas Frings, Eds., *Das Zarenreich, das Jahr 1905 und seine Wirkungen: Bestandsaufnahmen* (Berlin: LIT 2007), pp. 25-29.

⁷ On Shiba Ryōtarō see also Shiba Ryōtarō to Nichi-Ro sensō kenkyūkai, Ed., *Shiba Ryotarō to Nichi-Ro sensō* [Shiba Ryotarō and the Russo-Japanese War], 2 Vols. (Tōkyō: Ōbirin Daigaku Hokutō Ajia Sōgō Kenkyūjo 2008, 2010); Harald Meyer, *Japans Bestseller-König: Eine narratologisch-wirkungsästhetische Erfolgsanalyse zum Phänomen Shiba Ryōtarō*. München: iudicium 2010; Shimazu, *Society* pp. 273-80.

⁸ In the section on the Japanese-Chinese War one would have expected rather the book-length study of Rolf-Harald Wippich than his small publication mentioned: *Japan und die deutsche Fernostpolitik 1894-1898* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 1987).

⁹ See in first line Ian H. Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907* (London: Athlone Press 1966); *ibid.*: *The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War* (London: Longman 1985).

¹⁰ *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*. General Eds.: Kenneth Bourne et al., Pt. 1, From the Mid-nineteenth Century to the First World War, Ser. E, Asia, 1860 – 1914. Ed.: Ian H. Nish, Vols. 7-12 (Frederick, Md., University Publications of America 1989-93).

¹¹ Included are:

Ian Hamilton, *A Staff Officer's Scrapbook*, Vols. 2, 3 (Originally London: Edward Arnold 1905, 1907).

M. Barin, *With the Russians in Manchuria* = Vol. 4 (London: Methuen 1905).

Military Correspondent of *The Times* [Charles à Court Repington], *The War in the Far East 1904-5* = Vol. 5 (London: Murray 1905).

Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, *Port Arthur: The Siege and Capitulation* = Vol. 6 (Edinburgh: Blackwood 1906).

Eugene S. Politovsky, *From Libau to Tsushima: A Narrative of the Voyage of Admiral Rojestvenky's Fleet to Eastern Seas, Including a Detailed Account of the Dogger Bank Incident* = Vol. 7 (London: John Murray 1906).

(Captain) Vladimir Semenoff, *The Battle of Tsushima Between the Japanese and Russian Fleets, Fought on 27th May 1905* in Vol. 8 (London: John Murray 1912).

Lieutenant-general A. A. Ignatyev, *A Subaltern in Old Russia* in Vol. 8 (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1944, pp. 153-288).

¹² David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press 2001).

¹³ So the expression of K. Hildebrand in *Kreiner* p. 28. A. Li in *Wolff* (p. 491) mistakenly speaks about the German control over Liaodong (Liautung). Correct is: over Shantung. Die Liautung-peninsula was rather “leased” in 1898 by Russia and fell in 1905 to victorious Japan.

¹⁴ Wada in *Wolff* pp. 30-31.

Wada published a facsimile of the memorandum in Yamagata Shinbun December 7, 2009 (http://www.yamagata-np.jp/news_core/index_pr.php?kate=Main&no=2009120701000184).

¹⁵ Neitzel pp. 28-29.

¹⁶ Menning in *Steinberg* p. 147 mistakenly assumes that a declaration of war preceded immediately before the assault on Port Arthur. Actually the declaration of war followed on February 10, 1904, that means two days after the attack.

¹⁷ On the model character of the Russo-Japanese War for the Pacific War see the opinion of Army Minister Tōjō Hideki expressed in an interview with Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro on October 13, 1941 in Konoe's *Memoirs (The Memoirs of Prince Konoye, Tōkyō : Okuyama Service 1945, p. 57)* and the testimony of Sejima Ryūzō, at that time Major in the strategy division of the general staff (Moto-Daihonei-sanbō no Taiheiyōsensō. Sejima Ryūzō Intabyū [The Pacific War of a Former Staff Officer. Interview with Sejima Ryūzō.] Tōkyō: Tōkyō Shinbun Shuppankyoku 1995), pp. 40-41. On the Portsmouth peace conference as a model for an early peace in the Pacific War see Yoshida Shigeru, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1962), pp. 23-24, 246.

¹⁸ Sir C.C.P. FitzGerald, “Die Flottenlage im Fernen Osten”, *Deutsche Revue*, 29,1, 1904, p. 343.

¹⁹ Satō died on March 4, 1942, not in 1941 as Tadokoro (p. 323) maintains so that Satō would not have lived at the time of Pearl Harbor.

²⁰ In the meantime Smethurst has also published a long biography of Takahashi including a thorough description about his activities during the Russo-Japanese War: *From Foot Soldier to Finance Minister: Takahashi Korekiyo, Japan's Keynes* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2007), chapters 8 and 9.

²¹ In Wolff p. 187 is, probably by mistake of the translator, the year of Bloch's death as 1904 wrong. The correct year 1902 is found in *Gunjishigakkai II*, p. 294.

²² Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, *Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945* (London: George Allen & Unwin 1982), p.2.

²³ Ian Hamilton, *A Staff Officer's Scrap-Book during the Russo-Japanese War*. 2 Vols. (London: Edward Arnold 1905, 1907), here Vol. 2, p. 97. A shorter one volume editions exists, London: Edward Arnold 1912.

²⁴ Ian Hamilton, *Tagebuch eines Generalstabsoffiziers während des russisch-japanischen Krieges* (Berlin: Siegmund 1910).

²⁵ Hamilton 1905, Vol. 1, p. 143; Hamilton 1910, p. 95.

²⁶ Ian Hamilton, *Compulsory Service: A Study of the Question in the Light of Experience* (London: John Murray 1910), p.121.

²⁷ Schlieffen to Chancellor von Bülow June 10, 1905, *Die Große Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes*. Vol. XIX, 2: Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte 1925), pp. 423-24.

²⁸ See also in German: Nakai Akio, "Deutsche und schweizerische Beobachter auf dem Schlachtfeld – 100 Jahre nach dem Russisch-Japanischen Krieg", *Geschichte, Politik und ihre Didaktik*, 33, Heft 1-2, 2005, p. 85-92.

²⁹ On the German policy see also Rolf-Harald Wippich, "Nis-Shin – Nichi-Ro sensō to Doitsu" [Japanese-Chinese and Japanese-Russian War and Germany], Kudō Akira and Tajima Nobuo, Eds., *Nichi-Doku kankeishi 1890-1945* (The History of Japanese-German Relations, 1890-1945), Vol. I (Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai 2008), pp. 133-83, especially pp. 157-83.

³⁰ Iikura Akira, *Ierō periru no shinwa. Teikoku Nihon to "kōka" no gyakusetsu* [The Myth of the Yellow Peril. Imperial Japan and the Paradox of the "Yellow Peril"] (Tōkyō: Sairyūsha 2004).

³¹ On the relations for the time after 1907 see Joseph P. Ferguson, *Japanese-Russian Relations, 1907-2007* (London: Routledge 2008).

³² For example Alex Marshall, "Russian Intelligence during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05," *Intelligence and National Security*, 22, 2007, pp. 682-98.

³³ See thereon Inaba Chiharu, "Japanese Intelligence Operations in Scandinavia During World War II. Cryptographic Cooperation with Finns and Onodera's Activities in Sweden," *Scandinavian Journal of History*, 33, 2, June 2008, pp. 122-138; Gerhard Krebs, "Japanese Mediation Attempts Between Poland and Germany 1938/39," Agnieszka Kozyra and Romuald Huszcza, Eds., *To Commemorate 75 Years of the Japanese Language Teaching at Warsaw University. Proceedings of the Warsaw Symposium on Japanese Studies, 23-26 November, 1994* (Warsaw: Department of Japanese and Korean Studies, Oriental Institute Warsaw University, Academic Publishing House DIALOG 1999), pp. 77-99.

See also the review article of Ch. Inaba in *Nichi-Ro sensō* pp. 456-59.

³⁴ See Bandō Hiroshi, *Pōrandojin to Nichi-Ro sensō* [The Poles and the Russo-Japanese War] (Tōkyō: Aoki Shoten 1995).

³⁵ On the rather poor Russian successes in the field of intelligence during the war see Alex Marshall, "Russian Intelligence during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05," *Intelligence and National Security*, 22, 2007, pp. 682-98.

³⁶ Lloyd C. Gardner, *Imperial America. American Foreign Policy since 1898* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1976), p. 40.

³⁷ Rosen of course had not just left his position as minister to Japan to become ambassador to the USA (as Saul p. 497 maintains) but had lost his position in Tōkyō with the outbreak of war severing diplomatic relations in February 1904.

³⁸ Chanchun under the name Hsingking [New Capital] became the capital of the Japanese puppet state Manchukuo in 1932.

³⁹ See for example the exhibition publications *Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg 1904/05 im Spiegel deutscher Bilderbogen. Herausgegeben von Inaba Chiharu und Sven Saaler* (Tōkyō: Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien 2005); Frederic Alan Sharf, Ed., *A Much Recorded War: The Russo-Japanese War in History and Imagery* [Exhibition, Organized by the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, from January 1, 2005 to March 28, 2006] (Boston: MFA Publications 2005).

⁴⁰ Stewart Lone, *Provincial Life and the Military in Imperial Japan: The Phantom Samurai* (London: Routledge 2009).

⁴¹ Jan Kusber, *Krieg und Revolution in Russland 1904-1906. Das Militär im Verhältnis zu Wirtschaft, Autokratie und Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 1997).

⁴² Jan Kusber and Andreas Frings, Eds., *Das Zarenreich, das Jahr 1905 und seine Wirkungen: Bestandsaufnahmen* (Berlin, LIT 2007). Therein only S. Neitzel on military questions, see above.

⁴³ See also Roxane Haag-Higuchi, "A Topos and Its Dissolution: Japan in Some 20th Century Iranian Texts," *Iranian Studies*, Vol. 29, 1-2, Winter/Spring 1996, pp. 71-83.

⁴⁴ Said Amir Arjomand, "Constitutions and Struggle for Political Order: A Study in the Modernization of Political Traditions," *European Journal of Sociology*, 33, 1992, pp. 39-82, here p. 55; Cyrus Schayegh, *Constitutionalism and Autocracy in Modern Iran* (Genève: Université de Genève 2001), pp. 40-41.

⁴⁵ On the enthusiasm in Turkey after the Russo-Japanese War and its influence on the Young Turks' revolution in 1908 see also Renée Worringer, *Comparing Perceptions: Japan as Archetype for Ottoman Modernity, 1876-1918* (Ph. D. Thesis University of Chicago 2001), pp. 184-221; *ibid.*, "'Sick Man of Europe' or 'Japan of the Near East'? Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 36, 2, 2004, pp. 207-23.

⁴⁶ Pertev Demirhan, *Generalfeldmarschall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz. Das Lebensbild eines großen Soldaten. Aus meinen persönlichen Erinnerungen* (Göttingen: Göttinger Verlagsanstalt 1960), pp. 66-93; Colmar von der Goltz, *Denkwürdigkeiten* (Berlin: Mittler 1919), pp. 271, 273.

Thereon also: Handan Nezir Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to WW I* (London: I.B. Tauris 2005), pp. 28-31, 72-79.

⁴⁷ Itō Yukio, *Rikken kokka to Nichi-Ro sensō* [The Constitutional State and the Russo-Japanese War] (Tōkyō: Mokutakusha 2000).

⁴⁸ Lone, op. cit.

⁴⁹ A similar vision is found in a German publication during the Russo-Japanese War warning against the yellow peril: The plan of the Japanese is, to force now the Tsar's Empire to give up the superiority in East Asia, so that the Japanese take over that role themselves, teaching and guiding the Chinese masses and eventually expel with their support all Europeans from East Asia (Carl Tanera, *Der russisch-japanische Kampf um die Vorherrschaft im Osten*, Lahr: Groß & Schauenburg 1905, p. 3).

⁵⁰ Daniel A. Métraux, "Jack London, Asian Wars and the 'Yellow Peril,'" *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 4-3-10, January 25, 2010. Japan focus (http://japanfocus.org/-Daniel_A_-M__traux/3293).

⁵¹ Jeanne Campbell Reesman, *Jack London's Racial Lives: A Critical Biography* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press 2009), pp. 103-06.

⁵² See also Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 1991).

⁵³ Homer Lea, *The Valor of Ignorance* (New York: Harper 1909).

⁵⁴ See Clare Boothe' foreword in the new edition of 1942 (New York and London: Harper & Brothers).

⁵⁵ Homer Lea, (New York: Harper 1912), pp. 85-99.

⁵⁶ H. Bruce Franklin, *War Stars: The Superweapon and the American Imagination* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988) pp. 39-45.

⁵⁷ Hector C. Bywater, *The Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33* (Boston: H. Mifflin Company 1925).

⁵⁸ Satō Kōjirō, *Nichi-Bei sensō yume monogatari* [The Fantasy of the Japanese-American War] (Tōkyō: Tokuma Shoten 1921).

⁵⁹ See also Yukiko Sumi Barnett, "India in Asia: Ōkawa Shūmei's Pan-Asian Thought and His Idea of India in Early Twentieth-Century Japan", *Journal of the Oxford University History Society*, 1, 2004, pp. 1-23.

⁶⁰ Goto Ken'ichi, *Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World* (Athens: University of Ohio Press 2003), p. 279.

A tendency similar to that one of Hirama is found in Nakamura Katsunori, *Nichi-Ro sensō shōri no sekaishi ni oyobashita eikyō* [The influence exerted by the victory in the Russo-Japanese War on World History] (Ōsaka: Kokumin Kaikan 2005).

⁶¹ Hirama Yōichi, “Daitōasensō e no michi – Soren to Beikoku, soshite Chūgoku,” [the Path to the Greater East Asia War – the Soviet Union and America as well as China] Yasukuni jinja Yūshūkan, *Nichi-Ro sensō hyakunen zuroku* [The diagram of the Russo-Japanese War of 100 years] (Tōkyō: Yasukuni jinja 2005), pp. 68-70. On the role of Yasukuni Shrine in the context of the 1904-05 war see Shimazu, Society pp. 147-54.

⁶² See as newer publication on the alliance Phillips Payson O’Brien, Ed., *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922* (London: RoutledgeCurzon 2004).

⁶³ Gotō Ken’ichi, *Shōwaki Nihon to Indoneshia. 1930nendai “nanshin” no ronri – Nihon-kan no keifu* [Japan and Indonesia in the Shōwa Era. The Theory of the “Southern Strike” and the Genealogical Tree of the Japan View in the 1930s] (Tōkyō: Keisō Shobō 1986), pp. 345-46; *ibid.*: “Returning to Asia”: *Japan-Indonesia Relations 1930s-1942* (Tōkyō: Ryukei Shyosha 1997), pp. 301-304.

⁶⁴ Another Vietnamese intellectual, Phan Chau Trinh, visited Japan in 1906 together with Phan Boi Chau and held talks among others with the reformer Fukuzawa Yūkichi. See Vinh Sinh, Ed., *Phan Chau Trinh and his Political Writings* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2009), pp. 16-20.

⁶⁵ Richard Albert Bradshaw, *Japan and European Colonialism in Africa, 1800-1937* (Ph. D. Thesis Ohio University 1992), pp. 150-56.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 115-47.

⁶⁷ So also Bahru Zewde, “The Italo-Ethiopian War of 1895-6 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5: A Comparative Essay,” Abdussamad H. Ahmad and Richard Pankhurst, Eds., *Adwa. Victory Centenary Conference 26 February - 2 March 1996* (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University 1998), pp. 299-318; Erich Müller, “Abessinien im weltpolitischen Entscheidungsraum,” Max Grühl, *Abessinien. Die Zitadelle Afrikas* (Berlin: Graf von Schlieffen-Verlag 1935), pp. 9-17.

⁶⁸ On the release of the awakening mood among Afro-Americans due to the battle of Adwa see James Quirin, “African American Perceptions of the Battle of Adwa, 1896-1914,” Siegbert Uhlig et al., Eds., *Proceedings of the XVth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Hamburg 2003* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 2006), pp. 343-47.

⁶⁹ W.E. B. Du Bois, *The World and Africa: An Inquiry into the Part Which Africa has Played in World History* (New York: International Publishers 1965), p. 260.

⁷⁰ Thereon also Bill V. Mullen, “Du Bois, *Dark Princess*, and the Afro-Asian International,” *Positions*, 11,1, Spring 2003, pp. 218-39; Marc Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895-1945* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press 2000), pp. 39, 44.

⁷¹ Gerald Horne, *Race War. White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire* (New York: New York University Press 2004), pp. 43-47; Reginald Kearney, *African American Views of the Japanese: Solidarity or Sedition?* (Albany: State University of New York Press 1998), pp. 18-91; William R. Scott, *The Sons of Sheba's Race: African-Americans and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-1941* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1993), pp. 143-44; Gallicchio, pp. 14-15.

⁷² Ras (= Prince) Tafari was the original name of Haile Selassie [Power of the Trinity] until his coronation in 1930.

⁷³ See out of his numerous writings for example A. Hill, Ed., *The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Papers*, 9 Vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press 1983) particularly Vol. 1, p. 312 and Vol. 4, p. 235.

⁷⁴ Gallicchio pp. 44-48; Gary Y. Okihiro, *Margins and Mainstreams: Asians in American History and Culture* (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1994), pp. 127-28.

⁷⁵ John J. Stephan, *Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press 1984), p. 60.

⁷⁶ Bradshaw pp. 296-97.

⁷⁷ Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination* (Boulder: Westview Press 1996), p. 72.

⁷⁸ Massay Kebede, "Japan and Ethiopia: An Appraisal of Similarities and Divergent Courses," Fukui Katsuyoshi et al., Eds., *Ethiopia in Broader Perspective. Papers of the XIIIth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Kyōto, 12-17 December 1997* (Kyōto: Shokado Book Sellers 1997), Vol. 1, pp. 639- 51.

⁷⁹ Aoki Sumio and Kurimoto Eisei, "Japanese Interest in Ethiopia (1868-1940): Chronology and Bibliography," Fukui Vol. 1, pp. 713-28, here p. 715; Bradshaw pp.315-18.

⁸⁰ Addis Hiwet, *Ethiopia from Autocracy to Revolution* (London: The Author 1975), pp. 67-77; Salvatore Tedeschi, "La carrière et les idées de Heruy (1878-1938)," Luigi Fusella et al.. *Trois essais sur la littérature éthiopienne* (Paris: aresae 1984), pp. 39-104; Bradshaw pp. 300-11; Baruh Zewde, "The Concept of Japanization in the Intellectual History of Modern Ethiopia," *Proceedings of the Fifth Seminar of the Department of History (AAU)* (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University 1990), pp. 1-17; Reidulf K. Molvaer, *Black Lions: The Creative Lives of Modern Ethiopia's Literary Giants and Pioneers* (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press 1997), pp. 1-27; Hidéko Faerber-Ishihara, *Les premiers contacts entre l'Éthiopie et le Japon* (Paris : aresae 1998); *ibid.*, "Heruy, le Japon et les 'japonisants'," Alain Rouaud, ed., *Les orientalistes sont des aventuriers. Guirlande offerte à Joseph Tubiana par ses élèves et ses amis* (Paris: Sépia 1999), pp. 143-49; J. Calvitt Clarke III, *Alliance of the Colored Peoples: Ethiopia & Japan before World War II* (Woodbridge: James Currey 2011), pp. 44-48.

⁸¹ Baruh Zewde, The Concept; Clarke pp. 37-38.

⁸² Hans Wilhelm Lockett, *The Mission: The Life, Reign and Character of Haile Selassie I.* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1987), pp. 32-33, 124f; Bradshaw pp. 298-300.

⁸³ Yamada Kazuhiro, *Masukaru no hanayome – maboroshi no Echiopia ōji-hi* [The Bride of the Maskal Flower – the Vision of an Ethiopian princess consort] (Tōkyō: Asahi Shinbunsha 1996), pp. 230-33; Clarke pp. 83-91; Report of Military Attaché Cortlandt Parker, Tōkyō, March 19, 1935, *U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Japan 1918-1941* (Bethesda: University Publishers of America 1986), Microfilm Reel 15, pp. 126-28.

On Italy's fear of a Japanese economic engagement in Ethiopia see also: *I documenti diplomatici italiani*. 7th Series, 1922-1935, Vol. 11 (Roma, La Libreria dello Stato 1952), Nos. 42, 148, 204.

⁸⁴ Edward Ullendorf, Translator, *The Autobiography of Emperor Haile Selassie I. "My Life and Ethiopia's Progress, 1892-1937"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1976), pp. 208-09.

⁸⁵ Report of Military Attaché William C. Crane, Tōkyō, January 17, 1934, *U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Japan 1918-1941*, Microfilm Reel 15, pp. 129-131.

⁸⁶ See *I documenti diplomatici italiani*. 7th Serie, 1922-1935, Vol. 11, Nos. 42, 148, 204.

⁸⁷ Grandi to Mussolini April 29, 1936, *I documenti diplomatici italiani*. 8th Serie, Vol. 3, No. 796.

⁸⁸ George W. Baer, "Haile Selassie's Protectorate Appeal to King Edward VIII.," *Cahiers d'études africaines* 9,2, 1969, pp. 306-12.

⁸⁹ H.W. Bauer, "Japans Vordringen in Afrika und in der Südsee – ein Schlag gegen das Herrschaftsrecht der weißen Rasse," *Afrika-Nachrichten* 15, 10, 1934, pp. 249-51; *ibid.*, "Die Japaner in den ostafrikanischen Ländern – Folgen auf die Eingeborenen," *Afrika-Nachrichten* 15, 11, 1934, pp. 288-89; Hans Gerd Esser, "Weiß gegen Schwarz. Eine rassenpolitische Betrachtung zum Abessinien-Konflikt," *Afrika-Nachrichten* 16, 8, 1935, pp. 200, 202; Maximilian Claar, "Japan und Abessinien. Ein Vorstoß des japanischen Imperialismus," *Deutsche Rundschau*, 60, February 1934, pp. 83-88; Anton Zischka, *Der Kampf um die Weltmacht Baumwolle* (Berlin: Wegweiser-Verlag 1936), pp. 102-12; *ibid.*, *Italien in der Welt* (Leipzig, Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag 1937), pp. 277-79; *ibid.*, *Abessinien, das letzte ungelöste Problem Afrikas* (Leipzig, Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag) 1935, pp. 171-77, 195, 219; Major a.D. Paul Schnöckel, "Abessinien in der Weltpolitik," *Deutsche Kolonial Zeitung* 47, 3, März 1935, pp. 51-51; Roman Freiherr von Procházka, *Abessinien: Die schwarze Gefahr* (Wien, Saturnverlag 1935), pp. 7-8, 12, 69-71, 96-101; Max Grühl, *Die Wiedergeburt des Imperiums. Entscheidungskampf im Mittelmeer? Eine geopolitische Abhandlung* (Berlin, Graf von Schlieffen-Verlag 1937).

⁹⁰ Bradshaw pp. 330-58; Valdo Ferretti, *Il Giappone e la Politica estera Italiana 1935-41* (Milano: Guiffre Editore 1983), p. 27, 41-49; Clarke pp. 109-115; Aydin, *Politics* p. 179.

⁹¹ Shimonaka Yasaburō, "I-E funsō mondai to Nihon" [The Problem of the Italian-Ethiopian Conflict and Japan], *Dai Ajia Shugi*, August 1935, pp. 32-25, here p. 34. The Ethiopians had immigrated from Southern Arabia 2000-3000 years ago.

⁹² Utsunomiya Kiyo, “Hakujin teikokushugi no kokujinkoku gōryaku hishi” [Secret History of the Pillage of the Black Men’s Country by the Imperialism of the Whites], *Dai Ajia Shugi*, August 1935, pp. 39-41, here p. 39. Utsunomiya Kiyo was the pen name of Naval Captain Inuzuka Koreshige who became known for his anti-Semitic writings under this pen name. From 1939 to 1942 Inuzuka was commissioner for Jewish problems in Japanese occupied Shanghai.

⁹³ Murakawa Kengo, “I-E funsō no sekaishiteki igi” [The Importance of the Italian-Ethiopian Conflict for World History], *Dai Ajia Shugi*, October 1935, pp. 2-5, here p. 4.

⁹⁴ “Echiopia mondai to Nihon” [The Ethiopian Problem and Japan], *Dai Ajia Shugi*, September 1935, p. 102.

⁹⁵ Kajima Morinosuke, “Echiopia no higeki to Ajia minzoku” [The Tragedy of Ethiopia and the Peoples of Asia], *Dai Ajia Shugi*, May 1936, pp. 30-34.

Kajima Morinosuke himself has written a book on the Russo-Japanese War in his series on Japanese diplomatic history: *Nichi-Ro sensō* [The Russo-Japanese War] (Tōkyō: Kajima Heiwa Kenkyūjo 1970). English and German language editions are available.

⁹⁶ W.E. B. Du Bois, “Inter-Racial Implications of the Ethiopian Crisis,” *Foreign Affairs*, 14, 1, October 1935, pp. 82-92, here pp. 87-88.

⁹⁷ David Levering Lewis, *W.E.B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and the American Century, 1919-1963* (New York: Holt 2000), pp. 414-19, 461-70; Gallicchio pp. 73-76; Aydin, *Politics* p. 179; Takemoto Yūko, “W.E.B. DuBois to Nihon” [W.E.B. Du Bois and Japan], *Shien*, 54, 2, March 1994, pp. 79-96.

⁹⁸ Clarke p. 148.

⁹⁹ See also J. Calvitt Clarke III, *Russia and Italy against Hitler: The Bolshevik-Fascist Rapprochement of the 1930s* (New York, Greenwood Press 1991), pp. 168-69, 190.

¹⁰⁰ Boris Slavinsky, *The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History, 1941-1945* (London: RoutledgeCurzon 2004).

¹⁰¹ Edward Ullendorf, *From Emperor Haile Slassie to H. J. Polotsky: An Ethiopian and Semitic Miscellany* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz), pp. 1-10.