

THE AMERICAN NON-POLICY TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE 1943-1947: UNIVERSALISM IN AN AREA NOT OF ESSENTIAL INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES. By *Geir Lundestad*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1978. 654 pp. \$18.00, paper. Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.

For those who are weary of American polemics on the origins of the Cold War this cool book by a Scandinavian scholar provides welcome relief. The author has read all the revisionists and the traditionalists and offers brief assessments of their works. He is not primarily interested in their controversies or the proportion of blame to be assigned, respectively, to America and Russia, however. Perhaps the day will come, he suggests, when Americans will rise above the moralism underlying the interpretations on both sides of this debate and accept the thesis that, given the vacuum in Europe and the fact that both the United States and the USSR combined great power and strong feelings of insecurity, the Cold War was inevitable.

Why should there be so much debate about a "nonpolicy"? The title catches the eye, but whether it is accurate or fair is questionable. It may be a matter of definition. Those in the U.S. government who were weighing the issues and making decisions about Eastern Europe over this four-year period (all documented here in great detail) may be forgiven if they take exception. It may have been unsound, foolish, inadequate, or inconsistent policy, but nonpolicy? In spite of all the "universalist" talk, it was a realistic policy, fitting action to interests, neither reckless nor supine.

Actually this is the story Lundestad tells. His solid job of research, deliberately limited to U.S. policy in Eastern Europe and not wandering all over the East-West scene, is well organized and above all thorough. The material comes mainly from the U.S. National Archives, now open for this period, and from a large number of manuscript collections, interviews, and oral history material, as well as from the voluminous amount of published literature. The author has done an excellent job of pulling it all together. Plodding along country by country and cable by answering cable, he gives consistent proof of his diligence and his scholarship, even if he does not lift us from our seats with his style or his conclusions (the title is the only catchy thing about the book).

As in any book of diplomatic history, there are occasional misreadings of the situation caused by overfaithfulness to documentary sources and lack of knowledge of personal facts and other elements that go unrecorded, but in no case do the misreadings distort the treatment of a major issue. The views from the field are presented clearly—including the activism of Arthur Bliss Lane in Poland and of Maynard Barnes in Bulgaria and their impatience with the State Department's immobility, caution, and appeasement—but what lies behind the gray anonymity of "the Department" is a bit harder to fathom. The author tends to exaggerate the personal role of Secretary Byrnes in the many policy zigzags, although he is certainly right in stressing Byrnes's responsibility both for the decision to take a tough line on Rumania and Bulgaria in London in September 1945 and for the abandonment of that line in Moscow in December.

The study of Soviet policy, which is appended in order to balance the "American-centered perspective," is much less weighty than the main part of the book. Not having much primary material at hand, the author picks his way rather skillfully through a variety of secondary works to arrive at some sensible conclusions. The main theme is that Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe was not determined in advance (except on a few vital points) and was not uniform for the area. He differentiates among four "spheres," ranging from territories which the Soviets insisted on annexing (Bessarabia and eastern Poland, for example) to those where they probed but did not push for domination when they met solid Western resistance (such as in Greece). Concerning the countries that lay between, the distinction is drawn between the "inner sphere" (Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria), in which the Soviets set about establishing control and made no real concessions to non-Communists there or to the Western

powers, and the "middle sphere" (the other countries of Eastern Europe), where they moved more cautiously, experimented, and only moved to full control when local conditions and Western weakness made it possible without real risk. The pieces generally fall into place to support the theory, but we still do not know whether Stalin actually made his decisions in those terms. There is much that we do not and probably never will know about the reasoning and strategy behind Soviet policy, or nonpolicy, in those days.

As for our knowledge of American policy, Professor Lundestad has performed a valuable service. Historians who wish to spin theories about the origins of the Cold War will have to take account of this sober exposition of the views and actions of official Washington.

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TRANSPORTATION IN EASTERN EUROPE: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS. By *Bogdan Mieczkowski*. *East European Monographs*, 38. Boulder, Colo.: *East European Quarterly*, 1978. xvi, 221 pp. Tables. Figures. \$14.50. Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.

This study breaks new ground in providing an economic study in English of transportation in Eastern Europe. Except for occasional comparisons, the Soviet Union is not included, but much light is thrown on the functioning of Soviet-type transport systems. As Professor Mieczkowski himself notes, his major contributions are found in chapters 3–5 on planning, the growth of the several types of transport, and the costs of transportation. The treatment of national planning—using both the descriptive and analytical approaches—is particularly valuable. Under the heading of costs, the author tabulates and interprets data on capital used for transport, the changing numbers employed in the transportation industries and the contribution of transport to national income, relationships between costs and distance covered, and many other figures. The coverage of the Comecon countries is necessarily uneven because of variation in available material, but statistics for all countries are presented wherever possible. In general, Poland receives the best coverage. The penultimate chapter deals briefly with international transportation (mainly within Comecon), and lists the participation of East European countries in international transport organizations. In addition to a concluding review of the recent trends, an attempt is made to present the main alternatives to East European planning of transport.

Professor Mieczkowski is least convincing in his treatment of the geographical background. The first chapter is rather misleadingly entitled "Geographic and Economic Determinants," for the material discussed is generally of a resultant nature rather than determinant (which is perhaps just as well in view of the present-day rejection of determinism). An attempt to present some material on network analysis suffers from excessive compression. The author, moreover, has been poorly served by the publishers and printers in the reproduction of the maps, a few of which can only be described as disastrous. Some of the cartographic and other material is rather aged. For example, the map of domestic air routes in 1959 is from a 1962 source, instead of a more recent source. Similarly, citations of statistics for the 1950s and 1960s frequently cast doubt on the use of the present tense in arguments and conclusions. Distinctions between material or comments which can be relied upon to apply to a recent date (some sources are dated 1975 and 1976) and information which is ten–twenty years old should have been made.

These are, however, minor criticisms in relation to a valuable treatment of a subject on which so little has been published in the Western world.

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