


# The Other in Deleuze and Husserl

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*ABSTRACT: There is no consensus regarding whether Gilles Deleuze offers a cogent theory of the Other. Deleuze develops the notion of the Other-structure, but given his scarce remarks on this concept, his treatment of this issue is debated. This article argues that to elucidate Deleuze's philosophy of the Other, his notion of the Other-structure must be analyzed in parallel to Edmund Husserl's intersubjective theory. This comparison, made possible by Natalie Depraz's reading of the Husserlian alterity, reveals nuanced phenomenological traces in Deleuze's Other-structure and its implicated structural moments while substantiating his affirmation of the Otherless world, as an impetus to surpass phenomenology.*

*RÉSUMÉ : Il n'existe pas de consensus quant à savoir si Gilles Deleuze propose une théorie d'autrui convaincante. Deleuze développe la notion d'autrui comme structure mais, compte tenu de la rareté de ses remarques à ce propos, le traitement qu'il en fait est sujet à débat. Cet article soutient que pour élucider la philosophie d'autrui chez Deleuze, la notion d'autrui comme structure doit être analysée parallèlement à la théorie intersubjective husserlienne. Cette comparaison, rendue possible par la lecture de l'altérité proposée par Natalie Depraz, révèle des traces phénoménologiques nuancées dans la conception d'autrui chez Deleuze tout en étayant l'idée qu'un monde sans autrui est une impulsion pour dépasser la phénoménologie.*

**Keywords:** Deleuze, Husserl, Depraz, Other-structure, alterity, intersubjectivity, phenomenology, body without organs

## 1. Introduction

There seems to be no agreement on the question of whether Gilles Deleuze offers a compelling theory of the Other. This issue is not inconsequential in

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light of contemporary debates on the problem of the Other and its ethico-political implications. In continental philosophy, many thinkers from various philosophical orientations have engaged with the intricate problem of the Other. G.W.F. Hegel's master-slave dialectic is the emblematic treatment of this problem, which has been adopted and transformed by many thinkers, such as Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida.<sup>1</sup> This problem has also been addressed and reframed in the Marxist tradition and has ultimately turned into a contemporary problem in political theory. The political theory of 'recognition' has been developed by Charles Taylor based on Hegel's notion of the 'struggle for recognition' and reformulated by Axel Honneth as a normative foundation for the diagnosis of social pathologies; this theory represents the ethico-political connotations of a philosophy of the Other.<sup>2</sup> However, theories of recognition along with identity politics have faced various criticisms from the post-structuralist perspective for ignoring that the categories of identity always have normative and, then, exclusionary implications,<sup>3</sup> and that the search for recognition constantly intimates conformity to existing power relations.

Given this background, the question of the Other is seen as a pivotal contemporary philosophical problem. Nevertheless, Deleuze's treatment of this issue is the subject of some debate, given his "enigmatic" remarks on what he calls the "Other-structure" and a lack of consensus regarding how it fits into his oeuvre.<sup>4</sup> This concept is briefly discussed in *Difference and Repetition* and is addressed in the appendix to *Logic of Sense* (called "Michel Tournier and the World without Others.") In the latter, indeed, Deleuze offers a more elaborate account of his conception of the Other-structure. However, as its name suggests, the conceptualization of an Otherless world has caused confusions and criticisms, insofar as it seemingly prescribes a world *without* others and, as Peter Hallward contests, "denies the philosophical reality of all relations — with and between others."<sup>5</sup> I argue that, to clarify his philosophy of the Other, Deleuze's notion of the Other-structure must be examined in parallel to the Husserlian account of phenomenological intersubjectivity. Such an analysis will disclose the traces of Husserl's account of intersubjectivity in Deleuze's notion of the Other-structure and will present Deleuze's appeal to the Otherless world in terms of his endeavour to go beyond phenomenology.

To achieve this, I will scrutinize Deleuze's article in *Logic of Sense* on Tournier and will emphasize that Deleuze's account of the Other-structure

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<sup>1</sup> See Reynolds, "Deleuze's Other-Structure," pp. 67–78 on the relationship between the Other-structure and master-slave dialectic.

<sup>2</sup> Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition*.

<sup>3</sup> Kelly, *For Foucault against Normative Political Theory*.

<sup>4</sup> Reynolds, "Deleuze's Other-Structure," p. 67.

<sup>5</sup> Hallward, "Deleuze and the 'World without Others,'" p. 530.

goes hand-in-hand with Husserl's philosophy of the Other. This dialogue between Deleuze and Husserl brings to light the implicated conceptual nuances of the Other-structure and shows us that the Other-structure, on the one hand, exhibits the spatial and temporal modes of self-alterity, associated with Husserl's notions of the flesh [*Leib*] and hylé, and on the other hand, echoes Husserl's process of 'pairing' [*Paarung*]. Accordingly, Deleuze's affirmation of the 'Otherless world' will be construed in light of his attempt to surpass the Husserlian conception of the *Leib* while conceptualizing the alternative notion of the 'body without organs' (BwO). Moreover, this comparison can serve to clarify the relationship and tension between Deleuze's philosophy and phenomenology in general.<sup>6</sup> To enable this dialogue between Deleuze and Husserl, I will draw on Natalie Depraz's intriguing interpretation of Husserlian alterity which offers a profound conception of phenomenological intersubjectivity.

In *Transcendence et Incarnation*,<sup>7</sup> Depraz presents a comprehensive and exhaustive formulation of Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity.<sup>8</sup> Placing the Husserlian concept of *alterity* at the centre, Depraz redefines and restructures the whole project of phenomenology. She points out that "phenomenology is an exemplary elucidation of the question of alterity."<sup>9</sup> This reconfiguration of phenomenology through the question of alterity allows Depraz to enact a phenomenological metaphysics — a metaphysics that remains within the framework of immanence.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, *alterity* and *immanence* turn out to be the two

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<sup>6</sup> This tension is summarized by Leonard Lawlor in the form of two significant challenges. The first challenge is related to the problem of *immanence*. In phenomenology, a transcendental subject constitutes the given whereas Deleuze asks how the subject itself is constituted within the plane of immanence. The second challenge is related to *difference*. Lawlor notes, for Deleuze, "a ground must never resemble that which it grounds ... there must be a heterogeneity between ground and grounded .... According to Deleuze, phenomenology does not meet the challenge of difference because the reduction moves the phenomenologist from natural attitude opinions or common sense back to *Urdoxa* or primal faith"; because phenomenology invokes "primordial lived experience" (Lawlor 1998, p. 16). In the present article, it will be shown that Deleuze's appeal to the Otherless world attempts to surpass the requirements of lived experience.

<sup>7</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*.

<sup>8</sup> Depraz is the translator of the volumes of *Husserliana* on intersubjectivity to French; *Sur l'intersubjectivité*.

<sup>9</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 40. All quotes from this book are my translation.

<sup>10</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 335. Lawlor, in his review on *Transcendance et Incarnation*, stresses that, by her redefinition of phenomenology, Depraz moves "the principal theme of phenomenology away from appearance" and,

indispensable themes in Depraz's project. Deleuze's thought is also marked by a return to metaphysics, although an immanent and differential one. Therefore, Depraz's attempt to articulate an immanent metaphysics founded on alterity implies a possible affinity with Deleuze's metaphysics, which is characterized by immanence and difference. They both declare the possibility of establishing a *metaphysics* (as a non-Heideggerian gesture), remain committed to *immanence*, and accord an ontological primacy to the *relation* (relations of alterity and difference). This philosophical affinity between Depraz and Deleuze, along with Depraz's exhaustive and rigorous analysis of all *Husserliana* manuscripts, positions her account of Husserl's intersubjectivity as a suitable mediation to elucidate the relationship between Husserl and Deleuze and show how the Other-structure in Deleuze is related to the phenomenological self-alterity and pairing.

However, this study is not supposed to account for correspondences and incongruities between Deleuze's notion of 'difference' and Depraz's 'alterity,' between self-alterity and self-differentiation. Such an analysis would be indeed integral to another independent project, wherein Deleuze's '*differential metaphysics*' is compared to Depraz's '*metaphysics as an alterology*.' This article, however, will be restricted to the study of a more explicit relationship between Deleuze's theory of the Other and Depraz's account of the Husserlian intersubjectivity. It will merely analyze Deleuze's formulation of the Other-structure in contrast to Husserl's conception of alterity and the dynamic of pairing, as presented in *Transcendence et Incarnation*, to unfold the latent conceptual moments of the Other-structure and account for Deleuze's impetus to surpass the phenomenological conception of the flesh [*Leib*]. This analysis will show that the Other-structure has different modes and moments, namely, the '*Other-flesh*,' the '*Other-hylé*,' and the '*Other-alter ego*.' The first moment of the Other-structure is composed of two modes: the *Other-flesh* as the *spatial* mode of alterity and the *Other-hylé* as the *temporal* mode of alterity. The second moment of the Other-structure, formulated as the *Other-alter ego*, corresponds to the encounter of the ego and the alter-ego and the process of pairing, that involves 'incarnation' and 'incorporation.' Following the elucidation of these structural moments of Deleuze's concept of the Other, I will refer to his account of expression and show how it depicts subject's conflictual status as explication-implication. Finally, I will show how Deleuze's endeavour to surpass phenomenology can be depicted in terms of his appeal to the world without Others.

## 2. A Problematic Alterity

Depraz points out that before Immanuel Kant's Copernican revolution, the *object* was the centre around which the subject had to orbit and adjust its

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instead, prioritizes the question of alterity. Lawlor, "Natalie Depraz: Transcendence et Incarnation," p. 103.

perception and knowledge to it.<sup>11</sup> However, following Kant's transcendental project, the *subject* was placed at the centre and the object started to adjust its appearance to the rules and acts of the subject, gaining its meaning from it. Indeed, the subject became the site of the constitution of all *a priori* conditions underlying the experience. However, as noted by Depraz, phenomenology discloses their *co-dependence* and *co-adjustment*, rather than the conformity of the subject to the object or vice versa. In phenomenology, the subject and the object appropriate their senses through a *relation* that correlates them to each other. This relation, according to Depraz, is the "intentional relation of alterity."<sup>12</sup>

Therefore, Husserl's phenomenology marked a break with all dualistic and static conceptions of the subject and object, that is, the so-called opposition of consciousness, as inside, and the object, as outside.<sup>13</sup> Husserl proposed another conception of the object, framing it as the intentional correlate of consciousness. He conceived the object not as a form of exteriority, but as an intentional *noema*, characterized by the alterity of the object to consciousness. Depraz stresses that Husserl's concept of intentionality emphasized the *relation* between the object and the subject, instead of stressing the terms of this relation.<sup>14</sup> Intentionality is then conceptualized as a relation, whose mode is the alterity of the object to consciousness, the *aboutness* of consciousness toward something other than itself. Intentionality names this relation of otherness and entails an overt transcendence of alterity: "the object is the other of consciousness."<sup>15</sup>

Depraz's formulation of Husserl's phenomenology draws heavily on the concept of alterity. According to Depraz, there is "the structural alterity which is common to consciousness and the world."<sup>16</sup> This alterity structures the relations between consciousness and the world. Then, from this, Depraz makes the important move to the claim that this relation of alterity leads to a 'connaissance' or more precisely a 'co-naissance,' a co-birth of its terms. In fact, what is at stake is that the intentional relation of alterity is not found between the subject and the object qua predetermined entities; instead, it is a relation that *constitutes* its terms. In the last chapter of *Transcendence et Incarnation*, Depraz ontologizes the relation of alterity and articulates the possibility of a 'transcendental alterology' that is characterized by an original self-alterity, "an alterity that constitutes the transcendental ego."<sup>17</sup> In this line of thought, the transcendental ego is no longer the agent of constitution but is itself constituted by an *a priori*

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<sup>11</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 58.

<sup>12</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 59.

<sup>13</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 64.

<sup>14</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 47.

<sup>15</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 48.

<sup>16</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 119.

<sup>17</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 331.

alterity. Depraz's insistence on the primacy of the *relation* of alterity and its genetic power resonates with Deleuze's concern to account for the genesis of subjectivity (rather than presuming it) by according an ontological priority to the *relation* of difference. After all, the differential relation in Deleuze's thought equally expresses the primacy of the relation compared to its terms as well as its transcendental and constitutive character.<sup>18</sup> Now, if we pursue the path sketched through this apparent affinity between Depraz and Deleuze, we might regard the phenomenological relation of alterity as a reciprocal *differential relation* that corresponds to a *problematic field* that actualizes itself in its *solutions*. Deleuze's problematic structure is an ontological field that enacts the actualizations, which are, indeed, the cases of solution to the Ideal problems. The problem, "as transcendental instance,"<sup>19</sup> is resolved by being actualized in diverse spatio-temporal relationships and being incarnated in actual individuals. For instance, as Deleuze notes, "[a]n organism is nothing if not the solution to a problem ... such as the eye which solves a light 'problem.'"<sup>20</sup> Now, reading Depraz with Deleuze, the constituted subject can be seen as the actualized solution that solves the *problem of alterity*. The genetic alterity, according to Depraz, constitutes the self. She writes, "I apperceive myself as other than myself, traversed by this alterity that constitutes me as a *self* ... alterity is first."<sup>21</sup> Then, she adds, "the ego decenters towards the genetic alterity that constitutes it."<sup>22</sup> Thus, applying a Deleuzian twist, the phenomenological relation of alterity can be regarded as a differential relation that characterizes a problematic field and gives rise to certain actualized solutions, namely, the constituted objects and subjects.

In a *differential phenomenology*, if we can envisage such a combination, alterity would become genetic, differential, and problematic and as a differential relation would refer to a problematic field, whose solutions are actualized and incarnated in the constituted subjects and objects. Then, the phenomenological relation of alterity as a differential relation would be constitutive and productive, and as a *co-naissance* would *give birth* to its terms.<sup>23</sup> This genetic alterity, discovered at the source of the constitution of the subject and the world, would not be exhausted in its constitutions but would repeat itself as a latent self-alterity inherent in the subject and the world.

<sup>18</sup> Smith, *Essays on Deleuze*, p. 53.

<sup>19</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 164.

<sup>20</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 211.

<sup>21</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 330.

<sup>22</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 330.

<sup>23</sup> Of course, this is a Deleuzian reading of Husserl. The transcendental, in Deleuze, is truly generative and productive; it is not merely the condition of the empirical. Somers-Hall, *Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation*, p. 4.

This differential phenomenology can be constructed by extracting Depraz's proposed metaphysics of alterology and relating it to Deleuze's philosophy of difference. However, in what follows, I only focus on Depraz's account of Husserl's intersubjectivity (and not her own metaphysics) and investigate how it is related to Deleuze's Other-structure.

### 3. Phenomenology of the Other

In the Fifth Meditation of the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl inquires into the problem of intersubjectivity and attempts to offer a transcendental ground for the experience of the Other (Hua 1). Husserl is concerned with the transcendental analysis of a pure Other, to clarify the underlying conditions of the experience of the alter ego, as well as the objectivity of the whole world, as an infinite sphere of what is alien to one's consciousness and irreducible to it. The experience of the Other involves *empathizing* with the inner life [*Seelenleben*] of the alter ego. Empathy [*Einfühlung*] is our peculiar experience of the alter ego that consists in apperceiving the inner life of the Other in our inner perception without living [*erlebt*] it (Hua 13, 187).

In the Fifth Meditation, to tackle the problem of intersubjectivity, Husserl proposes an additional reduction — as he puts it, a peculiar kind of reduction. This new bracketing that is performed within the transcendental attitude “*disregards all constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or mediately to the other subjectivity* and delimits first of all the total nexus of that actual and potential intentionality in which the ego constitutes *within himself a peculiar ownness*.”<sup>24</sup> This new reduction suspends anything that does not belong to the ego's primordial ‘sphere of ownness’ and all intentionalities related to the other egos. In fact, Husserl appeals to this sphere of the solipsistic experiences of the ego to study what is specifically peculiar to the ego and discover the phenomenological conditions of the experience of an alter ego that resides in the primordial sphere of ownness.<sup>25</sup>

Husserl unfolds the phenomenological structure of the sphere of ownness and illuminates what is found in this *Otherless* attitude. In this primordial sphere without others, the ego encounters the *perspectival appearances* of things. Any perspectival appearance is composed of two elements: something that appears and someone that it appears for — “the appearance *of* something *for* someone.”<sup>26</sup> The perspectival appearances presuppose an embodied subject in space and any horizontal appearance of the objects is correlated with my state of being situated in a primordial ‘here’ (Hua 13, 239; Hua 11, 298). The appearance is always accompanied by an unthematic experience of the position and movement of one's body. This unthematic experience as a form of bodily

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<sup>24</sup> Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 93.

<sup>25</sup> Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 94.

<sup>26</sup> Zahavi, *Husserl's Phenomenology*, p. 98.

self-awareness forms our *kinesthetic experience* (Hua 4, 55). The body is the *centre* around which the ‘egocentric space’ unfolds (Hua 9, 392). Husserl calls this embodied subject with its lived body and kinesthetic self-awareness as the ‘*Leib*’ or the flesh [*Chair*]<sup>27</sup> being differentiated from the ‘*Körper*’ or the objective body (Hua 4, 144).

Therefore, following Husserl’s reduction to the sphere of ownness, what is experienced is indeed the *Leib* qua unthematic kinesthetic self-awareness. As Husserl notes, “[t]he primary [ursprünglich] givenness of a body [Leib] can only be the primary givenness of *my* body and of no other” (Hua 14, 7).<sup>28</sup> Thus, I originally experience *my* body as a zero-body [*NullKörper*] (the zero point of my orientation), as “the unity of my stream of consciousness,” (Hua 13, 265) and a primordial ‘I can’ and ‘I do.’ In this primordial sphere, before any encounter with the other egos, I am only a *Leib* without any apperception of my objective body. Husserl then argues that, for the constitution of our objective body, a self-objectivation (or ‘incorporation’) of the *Leib* is required. In fact, a subject, already existing bodily, needs to be self-objectified and incorporated into an objective body. As Iso Kern puts it, “[m]y own internally felt and perceived body must receive some sense of an outer body from the corresponding external body” — it must receive the sense of a human body.<sup>29</sup> The question then arises: how is the self-objectivation of the *Leib* achieved?

Husserl demonstrates that the self-objectivation of the *Leib* is made possible by encountering the Other. The experience of the Other conditions my capacity to take an external perspective on my flesh and, thereby, experience my body as an object. When the Other enters my field of perception, my lived body encounters the body of the Other, which does not yet belong to a subject with an inner life and, therefore, does not have any fleshy (*charnelle*, in Depraz) dimension. It is just through the process of ‘coupling’ or ‘pairing’ [*Paarung*], as an associatively constitutive component of my experience of the alter ego, that my flesh is put in *relation* with the body of the Other ego.<sup>30</sup> The body of the alter ego is a *similar*<sup>31</sup> body to mine and enters into a phenomenological pairing with

<sup>27</sup> Following Depraz, who has translated “*Leib*” as “*chair*,” my use of the term ‘flesh,’ in this article, refers to “*Leib*.” See Depraz’s remark on her translation. Depraz, *Transcendence et Incarnation*, p. 344.

<sup>28</sup> See Kern, “Husserl’s Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity,” p. 20.

<sup>29</sup> Kjosavik, Beyer, and Frick, *Husserl’s Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity*, p. 26.

<sup>30</sup> Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 112.

<sup>31</sup> But this similarity or analogy is a peculiar one. As Kern stresses, “the system of appearances of a body existing ‘out there’ and the system of appearances of my own body always existing ‘here’ surrounding the center of my point of view ... are completely different, the motivating similarity cannot be a similarity between two externally perceived forms. Further, the recognition of the image of my body in a mirror is, according to Husserl, not a simple perception, but rather presupposes



me. As a result of the process of pairing, the objective body of the Other appropriates its state of being flesh from mine, and my flesh appropriates its state of being an objective body from the Other.<sup>32</sup> As Dan Zahavi puts it, “it is only via another subject’s perception of my body and through an appropriation of this perspective that I can adopt a reifying and abstractive view on my body, regarding it as an object among other objects.”<sup>33</sup> As the dynamic of pairing is indispensable, it is worthwhile to spell it out more closely before exploring Deleuze’s Other-structure.

Depraz draws attention to Husserl’s account of the ‘transfer in imagination’ as a central concept that underlies the dynamic of pairing.<sup>34</sup> In passage 53 of *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl describes the ‘transfer in imagination’ as the possibility of changing any ‘there’ to a potential ‘here’ through one’s kinesthetic capacities. The Other ego is characterized by its primordial ‘there’ as a centre to which a sphere of appearance is manifested. Before pairing with the alter ego, in my primordial sphere, I am only a flesh [*Leib*] without an objective body, and by contrast, the alter ego is merely an objective body lacking a flesh with an inner life. When the alter ego enters my field of perception and pairing is inaugurated, the ego that is in essence anchored to ‘here’ transposes itself to ‘there’ in my imagination and, consequently, the alter ego (that was thus far perceived as an objective body) by analogy with my flesh appropriates its fleshy [*charnelle*] dimension and becomes *incarnated*, in Depraz’s terms, with a flesh. Simultaneously, the alter ego that is anchored to ‘there’ is also transposed from ‘there’ to ‘here’ in my imagination and, consequently, my flesh appropriates an objective body in analogy with the objective body of the alter ego or, in

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similar performances as in empathy. It could even be seen as a special case of empathy: the empathized feeling body in the mirror is my feeling body” (Kjosavik, Beyer, and Frick, 2019, p. 24). (For more on the problem of similarity see, Søren Overgaard, “What Is Empathy?,” p. 178.) This is why Husserl refers to the experience of the mirror while articulating his theory of intersubjectivity. As Depraz elaborates, the experience of the mirror is an antisymmetric experience and the image in the mirror is not a mere copy without life; “I have there a double flesh .... The image is present in its flesh” (Depraz 1995, p. 150). It is the duplication of my flesh. And, it is not just me that looks at the image; the image also stares at me. Thus, my mirror image has a flesh like the Other, and as soon as I change my attitude and pay attention to my body, it changes; it becomes a mere image just like the alter ego that through a change of attitude can turn into the objective body of science or even my illusory mental representation” (Depraz 1995, pp. 151-152).

<sup>32</sup> Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 133.

<sup>33</sup> Zahavi, *Husserl’s Phenomenology*, p. 105.

<sup>34</sup> Depraz, *Transcendence et Incarnation*, p. 158.

other words, is *incorporated* with an objective body.<sup>35</sup> As a result of this dynamic, the ego attains the possibility of apprehending itself as its own exterior. In this simultaneous but asymmetrical process, the objective body of the Other appropriates a flesh by resemblance to my flesh and, in turn, my flesh appropriates an objective body by resemblance to the body of the Other. My flesh is *incorporated* with an objective body, and the body of the alter ego is *incarnated* with a flesh.<sup>36</sup> This is a form of ‘constitutive kinship’ between the ego and the alter ego, as Depraz claims, which requires the accomplishment of a double apperception. It is a relation of *co-revelation*, the *co-naissance* of one by the other, a *co-union*, a unity that lets the difference be.<sup>37</sup>

#### 4. The Other as Structural Self-Alterity

Let us now investigate Deleuze’s account of the Other in his article on Tournier in *Logic of Sense*.<sup>38</sup> Deleuze’s article is devoted to Tournier’s novel, *Friday or the Other Island*, which according to Deleuze, attempts to analyze the characteristics of a world without Others. Deleuze starts his analysis of this novel discussing the effects of the Others in our habitual world.

According to Deleuze, the first effect of the Others corresponds to the organization of a ‘marginal world,’ a mantle or ‘background’ around each object of perception. This background forms a space, in which other objects can come forth. When I consider an object, I bring it forth, and when my attention is diverted, this object falls into the background. In fact, the reason that the new object that comes under my attention does not injure me or collide with me is that I had felt the “preexistence of objects yet to come” along with an entire field of ‘virtualities and potentialities’ having the potential of being actualized.<sup>39</sup> This background as the field of potentialities with its marginal existence is made possible through the presence of others. Deleuze stresses, “[t]he part of the object that I do not see I posit as visible to Others,” so when I posit the part that is visible to me, I also posit the invisible parts *as* visible to Others.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, all parts or objects that are visible to the Other, although not visible to me, come together and form an objective world in virtue of their state of being perceived by the Other. Thus far, Deleuze’s remarks about the Other are inextricably linked to Husserl’s conception of intersubjectivity.

As it was shown, in Husserl’s sphere of ownness the flesh is disclosed as a lived body having primordial kinesthetic self-awareness — a transcendental ‘I

<sup>35</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 160.

<sup>36</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 133.

<sup>37</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 144.

<sup>38</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, pp. 301-320.

<sup>39</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 305. This is related to Husserl’s *horizontal intentionality* and his account of expectation.

<sup>40</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 305.

can' that is able to perceive the objects from its 'here,' accompanied with a non-thetic awareness of its ability to change its place in space ('I can') and perceive the objects from other perspectives. This non-thetic awareness of the ability to change my primordial 'here' resonates with Deleuze's marginal existence of a field of possibilities. The field of possibilities is a space that entails the possibility of changing my 'here' to 'there,' and the non-thematic awareness of this possibility is embedded within my flesh. This possibility constitutes a *background*, as Deleuze notes, which smoothly absorbs the objects. Thus, when my attention is diverted from an object, the object is not abruptly annihilated, but continues to exist for the Other, or for my flesh, with its inscribed possibility of *being there*. This '*virtual being there*' absorbs the objects in a background instead of vanishing them. Thus, Deleuze's field of possibilities and virtualities can be conceived of as a space constituted by Husserl's primordial 'I can' and kinesthetic self-awareness, which characterizes one of the aspects of the flesh. The flesh is a transcendental 'I can' that implies, by virtue of the Other, the marginal existence of a field of possibilities and virtualities. Accordingly, it might be suggested that what is disclosed in Husserl's peculiar third reduction is the flesh, wherein the Other as structure, the structure of the possible, is inscribed in it. In fact, following the suspension of the other egos in the sphere of ownness, what is disclosed is not a solipsist ego, but rather a flesh endowed with an inherent Other-structure (in Deleuze's terms) and a form of self-alterity (in Depraz's terms).

The self-alterity of the flesh to itself [*l'altérité charnelle à soi*] is, indeed, the *spatial alterity* that characterizes the incarnated kinesthetic experience of the flesh and its sensitive motility.<sup>41</sup> The flesh is *heterogeneous* due to its quality of moving sensations: "The flesh *is* its differentiated movements of sensations."<sup>42</sup> It is the coordinating *centre*, inscribed in a *flow*. But, "the flesh is not a radical heterogeneity; otherwise, it would be a pure mobile flow without

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<sup>41</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 270.

<sup>42</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 271. See Alia Al-Saji's intriguing account of sensation in "The Site of Affect in Husserl's Phenomenology" (2000). She writes, "the qualitative possibilities and virtual movements of my Body (as 'I can move') outline the features and possibilities of the world. Kinaesthetic sensations are hence a function of my Body's orientation in the world; they are my way of feeling the active engagement of my Body with an outside" (Al-Saji 2000, pp. 52-53). Al-Saji suggests to regard kinaestheses as a model for rethinking all sensations. Thereby, sensations would be "the way my Body lives in, and experiences, the 'redness' of the thing, the roughness of the surface — as vibrations of its own being ... they express my feeling of being-affected by things, my way of resonating the qualities of the world" (Al-Saji 2000, p. 53). Al-Saji, recalling Depraz's account of alterity, conceives sensation as "an original foreignness" that permits the formation of the lived Body and things (Al-Saji 2000, p. 55). She writes, "[t]hat part of the world which is the 'bearer of sensations' is transformed, constituting the lived Body and

a point of orientation. It is a centred heterogeneity while the centre is itself fluid.”<sup>43</sup> The primordial ‘I can’ represents the *centrality* of the flesh and as a capacity of self-centralization orchestrates the fluid dimension.

The inner alterity of the flesh precedes the perception of the alter ego and the process of pairing.<sup>44</sup> In the sphere of oneness, before encountering the alter ego, the flesh experiences its spatial kinetic alterity and the otherness is not yet accorded to the Other ego. Likewise, when Deleuze describes the disappearance of the Other from Robinson’s world, he also indicates a stage in which the Other-structure is not actualized or filled with real objects and subjects. What is at stake here are different modes and moments of alterity: the alterity of the flesh to itself, and the alterity of the alter ego to the ego. We can regard the alterity that is inherent in the flesh as the first moment of Deleuze’s Other-structure and call it the ‘*Other-flesh*.’ The second moment of the Other-structure is realized when it is filled with the body of the others; when the ego and the alter ego encounter each other and, in the course of pairing, get incorporated and incarnated. This moment of the Other-structure can be called the ‘*Other-alter ego*,’ insofar as the alter ego fills and actualizes the Other-structure. Besides, in this second moment of the Other-structure, parallel to the process of pairing and self-objectivation of my body, the objective world is also constituted and objectified.

Accompanying Tournier on the island without others, Deleuze inquires into the characteristics of an Otherless world and asks what will happen to our perception in a world without Other egos. One of the answers, found in Robinson’s lived experience in the Otherless island, is that his consciousness and the island blend into one. Deleuze claims that in a world without Others, the consciousness cannot distinguish itself from its object. This remark concerning the unification between the consciousness and its object as a consequence of the absence of Others may not be immediately obvious. However, this unification can be elucidated referring to the suggested moments of the Other-structure, that is, the *Other-flesh* and the *Other-alter ego*. In reverse order, if we eliminate first the other egos from the Other-structure, the objective world will be reduced to a world of the ‘I’ (as a flesh). This would be the first stage toward the merging of the consciousness and its object. In the second stage, if the *Other-flesh* is also annihilated, it will entail the elimination of the ‘I can’ and, thus, the removal of the field of possibilities as a marginal world. Without the field of possibilities and the correspondence of appearance to an original ‘I can,’ the world will no longer be the world *of* my consciousness; rather, it will become my

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(continued)

giving the beginnings of subjectivity. The subject then keeps a trace, within its constitution, of the foreign out of which it was made” (Al-Saji 2000, p. 56).

<sup>43</sup> Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 271.

<sup>44</sup> It even precedes the ego as it “corresponds to a pre-egoic or even non-egoic layer of the ego.” Depraz, *Transcendance et Incarnation*, p. 270.

consciousness. As it was shown, the flesh underlies the structure of the perspectival appearance as ‘the appearance of something for someone.’ When this structure is eliminated, the object will lose its state of appearing to consciousness. In fact, the elimination of the *Other-flesh* will dissolve the field of possibilities, along with its reference to the original ‘I can.’ Without this reference, the perspectivity of consciousness will be lost and, as a consequence, the island will no longer be the island of consciousness and, thus, the consciousness of the island will become the island. In short, the annihilation of the Other-structure, in the first stage, will dissolve the *objective space* that is tied to the alter ego (incorporation in pairing) and, then, in the second stage, it will fade the *egocentric space* (‘I can’ and ‘here’) that is weaved into the flesh.

### 5. Temporal Alterity

Thus far, showing the interlacement between the flesh and the Other, characterized by the *Other-flesh*, our analysis has indeed explored the *spatial* alterity of the Other-structure, insofar as it lives a primordial ‘I can,’ tied to the locus of the Other (‘there’). However, following Deleuze, the Other also involves a *temporal* dimension. He writes, “I am nothing other than my past objects, and myself is made up of a past world, the passing away of which was brought about precisely by the Other. If the Other is a possible world, I am a past world.”<sup>45</sup> Deleuze maintains that the distinction between consciousness and its object is not merely due to the spatial dimension, that is, the Other-flesh, but it corresponds also to the *temporal* dimension of the Other-structure. In fact, the consciousness and its object are distinguished in virtue of their distinct temporalities, insofar as the ‘I’ implies a past world and the Other carries a possible world. Then, Deleuze claims that the absence of the Other “allows consciousness to cling to, and to coincide with, the object in an eternal present.”<sup>46</sup> The eternal present is the time accorded to the object. Without the structure of the Other, which was supposed to enable the temporal alterity and otherness, the ‘I’ coincides with the object in an eternal present. This coincidence with the object’s eternal present is the effect of the dissolution of the temporal dimension of the Other-structure or, in other terms, the dissolution of the possibility of temporal alterity. This is why Robinson without the Others, according to Deleuze, becomes the consciousness of the island — “the consciousness the island has of itself” — or even, becomes the island, as he stresses.<sup>47</sup>

Therefore, as this analysis clarifies, Deleuze’s Other-structure is the alterity with spatial and temporal dimensions. In other words, temporality and spatiality are, indeed, two modes of alterity or otherness within the Other-structure. Without this self-alterity of the Other-structure, the consciousness will be

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<sup>45</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 310.

<sup>46</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 311.

<sup>47</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 311.

*co-present* with its object in an *infinite 'here'* and will *coincide* with it in an *eternal present*.

Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness also offers a similar insight. Husserl asks how the consciousness of a temporal object (like a melody) is made possible (Hua 10). He shows that if encountering a temporal object only involved the consciousness of a series of isolated present moments or punctual 'nows,' we would not be able to experience the temporal extension of the object since the momentary flashes would eliminate and overwrite one another. We would have no experience of an enduring object, and being deprived of the feeling of a continuous flow, we would have no sense of an enduring consciousness. As Robert Sokolowski describes this situation, "all we would have would be sheer presence. No sense of pastness could ever have been disclosed to us."<sup>48</sup> This "sheer presence" echoes Deleuze's description, insofar as it also sketches the state of being co-present with the full presence of instantaneous encounters and coinciding with the eternal present of the object because of being deprived of the sense of past. Without the sense of pastness, even a presumed capacity of remembering would only call back and present the earlier moments as another present and not *as past*. Accordingly, the mode of being past would not differentiate itself from the mode of being present. Deleuze attributes the possibility of this differentiation to the Other. He claims that the self is the past world, but the passing away of this past world is brought about by the Other. It is the Other-structure that is responsible for the differentiation of the past. Now the question is: if the Other-structure involves inner alterity, as was the case with the Other-flesh, in what sense does it differentiate the sense of pastness? The answer lies in Husserl's treatment of the above problem and his so-called triple structure of primal impression-retention-protention.

Husserl argues that our immediate impressions must *already* entail a sense of past and future. We are always co-conscious of what has just passed and what is about to come. The primal impression is accompanied by the echo [*Nachklang*] of the 'retentions' of the consciousness of *just-passed* phases and the 'protentional' intentions of the *not-yet-present* phases of the object (Hua 10, 324; Hua 9, 202). The present, which is elapsed and retained, also encompasses its prior retentions and, hence, establishes a continuum of retentions. For Husserl, retentions and protentions condition the sense of past and future. A retention unthematically gives the elapsed present as *just-past*. Indeed, it is the intuition of an *absence* that is *necessarily* intertwined with the *present* impression. Every retentional modification, which modifies the *whole* continuum of retentions, paradoxically introduces an absence that is presented. As Sokolowski notes, its identifiability as past depends on its "relentless passage into absence": "An original absencing takes place within retention, but this absencing is given

<sup>48</sup> Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, p. 135.

or presented.”<sup>49</sup> Retention and protention incorporate a form of absencing, as stressed by Eugen Fink, a “de-presencing” or “de-presentification” [*Entgegenwärtigung*].<sup>50</sup> As Nicholas de Warren describes this absencing, “[r]etentional intentionality runs counter to the givenness of an original impression ... [it] ‘de-presentifies’ in the sense of ‘emptying,’ or reversing, the intuitive fullness of the now.”<sup>51</sup> Therefore, retention introduces an incessant becoming-other or self-alteration in the primal impression. And, this perpetual retentional modification is not an alteration, negation, or differentiation of an original impression “from the outside.” Instead, “an original impression *necessarily* succumbs to, or becomes its own retentional modification.”<sup>52</sup>

Hence, the primal impression *necessarily* is intertwined with, or becomes its own Other because its inscribed self-alterity allows for the differentiation of past and future and the consciousness of temporal succession and duration. Without this temporal self-alterity, such a differentiation would not be possible. Now, it is clear why Deleuze could attribute this differentiation to the Other-structure and its inner alterity. The temporality of the living present is just made possible when it stands outside of itself — when it is endowed with the retentional and protentional alterity. Our impressions become temporal only by self-absencing, by emptying and becoming Other. Hence, the self-alterity resides at the origin of temporality and constitution.

Framing this constitutive alterity, Depraz claims that the “otherness (in the self) is temporally and spatially determined” and “the ego is constituted ... by this originally temporal and spatial self-alterity.”<sup>53</sup> For Husserl, subjectivity is inconceivable without what is foreign to it (Hua 14, 244). This foreignness, as noted by Depraz, corresponds to Husserl’s *Urhytle* or *Urimpression* (Hua 15, 385): “what is foreign to the ‘I’ inside the ‘I.’”<sup>54</sup> The hyletic core of every living present represents something that is non-egoic or alien to consciousness, the facticity that escapes the active contribution of the ego.<sup>55</sup> This hyletic affection is inseparable from the primal impression, as there can be no time-consciousness without the hyletic facticity. According to Depraz, “[t]he primary temporalizing begins with the hyletic affective *anstöß*, which is constitutive for (if not constitutive of) time ... this hyletic affection has a constitutive role to play in the fulfillment of temporality” and “acts as a passive motivation for the process

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<sup>49</sup> Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, p. 142.

<sup>50</sup> Fink, *Studien zur Phänomenologie 1930-1939*, p. 22.

<sup>51</sup> de Warren, *Husserl and the Promise of Time Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 171.

<sup>52</sup> de Warren, *Husserl and the Promise of Time Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 171.

<sup>53</sup> Depraz and Zahavi, *Alterity and Facticity*, p. 35.

<sup>54</sup> Depraz and Zahavi, *Alterity and Facticity*, p. 35.

<sup>55</sup> Depraz and Zahavi, *Alterity and Facticity*, p. 217.

of egoic constitution.”<sup>56</sup> This hyletic impression that characterizes ego’s facticity and its passive openness to that which is alien to it implies the self-alterity of consciousness. Indeed, it is because of its structural self-alterity that consciousness can be open to and affected by that which is foreign to it.

Now, returning to Deleuze’s Other-structure, we are in a position to summarize. The first moment of Deleuze’s Other-structure has two dimensions or modes: the *spatial* mode of the *Other-flesh* and the *temporal* mode of the *Other-hylé*. The inner alterity within the first moment of the Other-structure is composed of spatial and temporal dimensions. This kinetic and hyletic alterity within the Other-structure are at the source of the constitution of the ego and the world.

Moreover, it is this inherent primordial alterity that conditions the apperception of the other egos as well as the ego’s various forms of *self-experience*. This alterity opens the way for the apperception of the alter ego and dwells at the core of the ego’s different forms of self-experience. Whenever the ego *imagines* itself, *remembers* itself, or *reflects* on itself, self-duplication and self-differentiation of the ‘I’ are manifested. This self-duplication is thoroughly analyzed by Depraz. The ‘I’ incessantly duplicates itself in the experiences of imagination,<sup>57</sup> recollection,<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Depraz and Zahavi, *Alterity and Facticity*, p. 38.

<sup>57</sup> Depraz provides a comprehensive analysis of the self-alterity in imagination, recollection, and reflection. Imagination has a non-positional character, as it does not posit the *existence* of the imagined thing. In imagination, two “‘I’s appear, the ‘I’ that is performing the imagination, and the ‘I’ that is implied in the imagined world. The imagined world has an ‘I’ with its flesh and kinesthetic awareness that moves his eye, his hands, and so on” (Husserl 2001, p. 35). Now the ‘I’ that is performing the act of imagination and the ‘I’ that is present in the imagined world do not coincide because one of them is existent and the other is not. Imagination neutralizes the existence of the imagined world and its accompanying ‘I.’ Hence, these two ‘I’s,’ one existent and the other possible, become split and detached although not totally detached otherwise, we would encounter a madness or schizophrenia with a complete dissolution of the unity of the ‘I.’ In imagination, I imagine myself as an Other and two ‘I’s’ coincide in a conflictual manner. Thus, we encounter two egoic streams of givenness in a single immanent presence.

<sup>58</sup> In the act of ‘recollection,’ when I transpose myself inside my past memories, two ‘I’s’ appear. The ‘I’ is fractured; the actual ‘I’ of the present that is performing the recollection, and the ‘I’ of the past that is made present through the act of recollection. The strange fact about ‘I’ is that it can transpose itself in its *present* and to its *was* and yet stay conscious of its identity while duplicating itself (Depraz 1995, p. 246). Therefore, in this modality of consciousness, two temporal flows coexist while keeping their distinction as well as their identity. When I traverse to the past, “I do not belong completely to myself anymore: my ‘I’ alienates itself, by becoming stranger to itself” (Depraz 1995, p. 250).



and reflection<sup>59</sup> and it is, in fact, the structural alterity of the ego to itself that enables such duplication and, then, various forms of self-experience.

## 6. The Expressivity of the Other

Let us now return once again to Deleuze's article on Tournier. As already pointed out, the Other-structure refers to the kinesthetic experience of the flesh as a structure of possibilities. Continuing his articulation of the Other, Deleuze employs the following formula: the Other = "*the expression of a possible world*; it is the expressed, grasped as not yet existing out of that which expresses it."<sup>60</sup> Elucidating this formula, Deleuze invites us to suppose that the Other perceives a terrifying thing, whereas I have not yet seen that scene. When the Other faces a frightening thing that I have not yet seen, it *expresses a possible world* to me, in this case, a possible frightening world. The terrified face, insofar as it is the *expression* of a possible world, bears no resemblance to the actual terrifying object; it has no resemblance to what has caused the fear, but rather *implicates* that frightening world, or in other words, *envelops* it. These are the terms used by Deleuze: the *expression*, *implication*, and *envelopment* of a possible world by the Other. The frightening world is implicated, contracted, and enveloped in the Other that gives rise to "a kind of torsion which situates what is expressed in the expressing."<sup>61</sup> Let us now envision that I turn my head and see what the Other was seeing. As soon as I perceive what the frightening face was seeing, I 'develop' (in contrast to 'envelop')

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<sup>59</sup> While perceiving an object, I intend an object by being directed toward it; however, upon 'reflection,' what I intend is my act of perception itself. This secondary perception implies a new 'I,' which arises *above* the act of 'I perceive.' When I perceive an object, the 'I' is a perceiving 'I,' which is performing the act of perception. However, when I intend to grasp this 'I' in reflection, I can never reach it in its original *perceiving* modality, as at the moment of reflection a new 'I' will perceive the act of perception and will transform the prior 'I' to something *perceived*. So, I can never reach the 'I' in its original perceiving modality; rather I can only grasp it by turning it into a perceived thing. This process of duplication in reflection is indefinite, as each new reflection on the previous reflection creates a new 'I' (Depraz 1995, p. 279). The reflective alterity is characterized by an 'I' whose life of consciousness is indefinitely differentiated in its acts, an 'I' whose life is a continuous self-splitting (Depraz 1995, p. 280).

<sup>60</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 308. 'Expression' is a rich and complex concept used by Deleuze, and the relationship between the notion of expression in the article on Tournier and in Deleuze's other works could be undertaken in an independent study. In what follows, I try to stay close to the way Deleuze articulates the 'expression' in his article on Tournier. For more on the expression in Deleuze, see Bowden 2017; Wasser 2007.

<sup>61</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 307.

and ‘explicate’ a world that was thus far expressed by the Other; I explicate a possible world. As Deleuze puts it, “I do nothing but *explicate* the Other, as I develop and realize the corresponding possible world.”<sup>62</sup> In phenomenological terms, the possibility of turning any ‘there’ into a ‘here’ is, in fact, the possibility of explicating the Other, explicating a possible world that is implicated in and expressed by the Other. The Other *implicates* and *expresses* a possible world while the self is the *development* and *explication* of that possibility, “the process of its realization in the actual.”<sup>63</sup>

Now, the question is how the Other-structure as “the expression of a possible world” is related to the dynamic of pairing, which, as discussed, was regarded as the second moment of the Other-structure, namely, the *Other-alter ego*. How can we weave the Husserlian account of pairing into the Deleuzian theme of expression? The alter ego that I encounter in the process of pairing can be regarded as the *expression of a possible world*. The Other *implicates* a possible world and I can turn its corresponding ‘there’ to ‘here’ by *explicating* that possible world. My subjectivity always entails the *development* and *explication* of the actual world. The ‘I’ is the centre of the explication of the world. However, the peculiar fact is that, while the Other expresses a possible world, I am also included in its perceptual field and, therefore, part of that possible world. The Other expresses a possible world and, by doing so, expresses *me* as well, as a part of that expressed world. Encountering the Other, I apperceive myself as a part of the world that the alter ego is expressing. Therefore, when the ego, as the centre of explication encounters the alter ego, it enters into a conflictual situation: it takes part in what is *implicated* and *expressed* in the Other; it becomes the *expressed* within the expression of the Other. The ‘I’ apperceives itself as the *possible* that was expressed and implicated in the Other. Thus, the dynamic of pairing contributes to the constitution of an ego that is, at once, a *centre of explication* and an *implicated centre*. It is the *explication* of an actual world, insofar as it can transfer itself in imagination and turn any ‘there’ into a ‘here.’ Yet, it is an *implicated* centre, insofar as it is what the Other has implicated in a possible world. Hence, the flesh comprehends itself as the centre of development and explication of the world but it is also aware of itself as a possibility that the Other implicates and expresses. Apperceiving itself as a *part* of the world the Other expresses, the flesh becomes a part of the world and then gets objectified. This amounts to the self-objectivation of the flesh, or indeed *incarnation* in the dynamic of pairing.

The above status of *explication-implication* is a conflictual state and implies a tension that gives rise to a *fractured I*. To visualize this tension, we can conceive

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<sup>62</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 307. My emphasis. See Deleuze’s discussion on the movements of expression in relation to *complicatio*, *explicatio*, and *implicatio* in Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*, pp. 175–179.

<sup>63</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 307.

the explication as a form of *opening* or *diastole*, and the implication as a kind of *contraction* or *systole*.<sup>64</sup> Then, for instance, when I see what the Other was seeing, the world that was contracted in his face is opened and developed for me. Accordingly, the 'I' is a centre of explication and opening and, yet, is itself implicated and contracted in the face of the Other. This simultaneous push and pull and the status of being the centre of the opening while being contracted in the Other portrays the conflictual state of the 'I.'

## 7. The World without Others

After unfolding the conceptual implications of the Other-structure, we are now finally in a position to see how Deleuze's conceptualization of the "world without Others" expresses his endeavour to go beyond phenomenology. At the beginning of this article, Deleuze presents the Otherless world as a kind of phenomenological reduction to reveal the structure of the Other. However, ultimately the world without Others, far from being a mere methodological heuristic, ends up in Robinson's metamorphosis and, then, his great Health. In fact, Deleuze promises this Health just at the beginning of his article and writes, "the end, that is, Robinson's final goal, is 'dehumanization,' the coming together of the libido and the free elements, the discovery of a cosmic energy or of a great elemental Health which can surge only on the isle."<sup>65</sup> This valorization of the world without Others, I argue, echoes the well-known Deleuzian impetus to surmount the phenomenological flesh.<sup>66</sup>

As already discussed, the Other as structure constitutes a marginal existence of a world that regulates the transformations of form and background. This structure prevents the assaults from behind, insofar as it fills the world with a field of potentialities and virtualities and, indeed, in this way pacifies the world. This recalls Deleuze's claim in *Foucault* that "phenomenology is too pacifying."<sup>67</sup> It pacifies the world because constituting a background, as a field of possibilities, prevents surprises or assaults from behind. Moreover, the Other pacifies the world, insofar as it relativizes the not-known. It has the function of *relativization* of the non-perceived, as it carries "the sign of the unseen in what I do see."<sup>68</sup> Conversely, in an Otherless world, the non-perceived is not relativized. Tournier portrays such an Otherless world as a brutal opposition of the sun and the earth, with an unbearable light and an obscure abyss, wherein we face

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<sup>64</sup> Compare to Levinas's account of subjectivity, which is structured as a diastolic-systolic movement. Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, p. 109.

<sup>65</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 303.

<sup>66</sup> See Beaulieu, "L'expérience Deleuzienne du Corps," and Beaulieu, "L'incarnation Phénoménologique à l'épreuve du « corps sans organes »."

<sup>67</sup> Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 113.

<sup>68</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 306.

the battle of the perceived and the unperceived.<sup>69</sup> This world is a harsh and black one that, along with the Other, has lost its potentialities as well as its ‘category of the possible.’ There are no more harmonious forms that gently surge from the background and are absorbed in it. However, what remains are the harmful abstract lines in a ‘groundless abyss.’ The objects cease to bend toward each other and, instead, appear threateningly as though without the relief of the Other they slap us in the face with their harsh lines and strike us from behind.<sup>70</sup>

Thus, the absence of the Other-structure for Robinson was at the outset revealed as a fundamental disorder of the world — nothing remained, but the harsh opposition of light and night. The world without its structure of possibilities had become harmful. However, Deleuze draws our attention to the fact that Robinson slowly discovered “that it is the Other who disturbs the world. The Other was the trouble.”<sup>71</sup> Given this new revelation, the consciousness becomes a phosphorescence internal to things, and “in this light, something else appears, an ethereal double of each thing.”<sup>72</sup> Robinson glimpses another island. The double of things is just liberated in the absence of the Other. The Other, Deleuze claims, imprisons the elements, whereas the liberated double in an Otherless world is “the new upright image in which the elements are released and renewed, having become celestial and forming a thousand capricious elemental figures.”<sup>73</sup> The Other was the pacifying *leveler*, “and consequently the de-structuration of the Other is not the disorganization of the world, but an upright organization ... it is the detachment of a pure element which at last is liberated.”<sup>74</sup> The liberation of the four elements — earth, water, air, and fire — on the island, which is depicted as upright image, consists in raising the elements from their terrestrial configuration to a free state, that is, an aerial or celestial configuration. The liberation of these elements, as the building blocks of the cosmos, allows another organization of the elements and, thereby, the emergence of another island that entails Robinson’s great Health.

Furthermore, when Friday appears on the island, Robinson does not experience him as an Other, because the Other qua structure has collapsed and can no longer be actualized by any person.<sup>75</sup> He, instead, appears “in an entirely different way — he indicates another, supposedly true world .... Not an Other, but something wholly other (*un tout-autre*) than the Other; not a replica, but a Double: one who reveals pure elements and dissolves objects, bodies, and the earth.”<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 306.

<sup>70</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 306.

<sup>71</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 311.

<sup>72</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 312.

<sup>73</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 312.

<sup>74</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 313.

<sup>75</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 315.

<sup>76</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 317.

Endorsing the world without Others, Deleuze attempts to defy the *pacifying* Other-structure, which is intimately tied to the phenomenological flesh; and, in doing so, he aims at substituting it with a BwO.<sup>77</sup> The Other-structure that inscribes the flesh as one of its structural moments amounts to an ideal harmonization between the body and the world. The flesh is pre-oriented toward the world that conditions the coherence and harmony with the world. Alain Beaulieu plausibly shows that the concept of the BwO is, indeed, Deleuze's substitute to the phenomenological flesh.<sup>78</sup> Here, I suggest that, in Deleuze's article on Tournier, the Other-structure, with all its structural modes and moments, namely, the *Other-flesh*, the *Other-hylé*, and the *Other-alter ego*, is replaced with a dismantled Other or a non-organic body, which stands against the structure.<sup>79</sup> In fact, the Otherless world instead of conditioning the lived experience enables a *limit-experience* that is prone to the *unlivable* dimensions of life.<sup>80</sup> It might be said that the Other-structure as the expression of a *possible* world is substituted with the Otherless world just to account for the 'category of the *impossible*.' The world without Others and the BwO are conceptualized to account for the conditions for going beyond the organism and reaching the limits of the lived body.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Deleuze and Guattari develop this concept in *L'Anti-Oedipe* (1972) and *Mille Plateaux* (1980). They take the term 'body without organs' from Antonin Artaud, who regarded the organism with its static concretion of organs having particular functions as "the emblem of the tendency toward stasis" (Adkins 2015, p. 98). The body without organs is a non-organized and non-stratified field that should not be conflated with a body deprived of organs. It is opposed to the organization or the organizing principles of the organs and allows us to think the de-stratification and continual becoming. For more on the body without organs, see Smith 2018; Beaulieu 2004; Olkowski 1994.

<sup>78</sup> Beaulieu, "L'incarnation Phénoménologique à l'épreuve du « corps sans organes »."

<sup>79</sup> See Smith, "What is the Body without Organs?," in which the relation of the organism to structure is thoroughly discussed.

<sup>80</sup> See Beaulieu's quote from Foucault who explains the anti-subjectivism of Nietzsche, Blanchot, and Bataille (Deleuze can be added to this list as well) as a position against phenomenology and their appeal to a form of limit-experience that aims the maximum intensity and impossibility. Beaulieu 2004, pp. 304–305.

<sup>81</sup> Also in *Francis Bacon*, Deleuze endorses going beyond the phenomenological flesh because of its insufficiency to account for the unlivable Power [*Puissance*] (Beaulieu 2004, p. 305). Deleuze writes: "This ground, this rhythmic unity of the senses, can be discovered only by going beyond the organism. The phenomenological hypothesis is perhaps insufficient because it merely invokes the lived body. But the lived body is still a paltry thing in comparison with a more profound and almost unlivable Power [*Puissance*]. We can seek the unity of rhythm only at the point where rhythm itself plunges into chaos, into the night, at the point where the differences of level are perpetually and violently mixed." Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, p. 44.

In *Difference and Repetition*, where Deleuze discusses the last stage of the genesis of representation, he invokes the Other-structure and describes it as an *a priori* Other “that ensures individuation within the perceptual world. It is not the ‘I,’ nor the self: on the contrary, these need this structure in order to be perceived as individualities. Everything happens as though *the Other integrated the individuating factors and pre-individual singularities within the limits of objects and subjects*, which are then offered to representation as perceivers or perceived.”<sup>82</sup> The Other is the condition that renders possible to perceive distinct objects and subjects in the perceptive field as identifiable and recognizable individuals. We have already seen how the Other-structure functioned as the condition of individuation by distinguishing consciousness from its object. As Deleuze clarifies in this passage, the Other integrates the individuating factors and pre-individual singularities within the limits of objects and subjects; however, he seeks a non-organic BwO that can liberate these pre-individual singularities. He attempts to dismantle the Other to liberate<sup>83</sup> its organized and imprisoned alterity and, thus, condition the beginning of something *wholly other* and novel. In fact, Deleuze uses the phenomenological framework to describe the Other as a condition of representation (in the sense this term is used in *Difference and Repetition*), and then, his critique against representation, in favour of the ‘world of difference,’ takes on the form of seeking the Otherless world.

If we take Depraz’s claim seriously — that original alterity is at the source of constitution and creation — then Deleuze’s gesture of dismantling the Other-structure would amount to liberating this genetic alterity to untether the emergence and co-naissance of a *wholly other* world and subjectivity. Deleuze’s imperative to disarticulate the Other-structure involves a decoupling (de-pairing) from the alter ego (of *this* world) and also a dis-structuration of the flesh; an imperative to liberate differential relations of alterity that are ossified in a specific organization in the flesh. The BwO is the site of such disarticulations. Deleuze is interested in pulling back every stratified determination to its moment of formation, such that renegotiating a new path is made possible. Here, also Deleuze by disarticulating the Other takes the flesh to its moment of formation to renegotiate a new beginning,<sup>84</sup> because the flesh is just *a* stratified organization of relations and not *the* essential site of our subjectivity. Indeed, a new

<sup>82</sup> Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 281.

<sup>83</sup> Compare to Deleuze’s use of the term ‘liberation’ in relation to difference: “Difference is recovered, liberated, only at the limit of its power ... by repetition in the eternal return.” Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 300.

<sup>84</sup> In *Desert Island and Other Texts*, Deleuze emphasizes the importance of the *new beginning*. Deleuze regards the desert island as the locus of the new beginning, as its mythical/geographical formation is characterized by *separation* and *creation*. The humans on the desert island also are “absolutely separate, absolute creators,

articulation of the relations of alterity — for instance, a new dynamic of ‘here’ and ‘there’ — would give rise to a new spatiality and a wholly other body-world. BwO, insofar as it is not a sedentary organization, fuels other compositions of the genetic relations of alterity and, hence, other modes of corporeality.

To sum up, the Other-structure guarantees the organization and sustainability of an objective world, perceivable by all others. It implies the *convergence* of the world to a unified objective world, perceived from all different perspectives [*Umwelt*]. Whereas, the Otherless world gives rise to something wholly different, to the BwO instead of the flesh, and to the *other of the world* rather than the *world of the Other*. It implies a *wholly other* world [*Welt*]<sup>85</sup> with infinite *divergent* possibilities. “Solar and dehumanized,”<sup>86</sup> Robinson, the subject of this Otherless world, far from being a pacifying flesh, is an intensive body subject to the excess of singularities, a disorganized body that being open to the limit-experience of the impossible is capable of unblocking the event.<sup>87</sup> The Other-structure ensures that the world of the Other is *our* world, whereas the Otherless world erects the *other of the world*, in which, the coherency and harmony of the flesh with the world are substituted with discords and divergent series. This Otherless world does not seek to eliminate the concrete other egos but rather strives to condition a wholly other [*un tout-autre*] relation to the alter ego (as was the case with Friday). Therefore, Deleuze denigrates the phenomenological account of the Other, endowed with our established lived and livable experience, to open up a space for the limit-experience of the impossible<sup>88</sup> and the unlivable, to unlock the event and the conditions of the new.

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(continued)

in short, an Idea of humanity” (Deleuze 2004, p. 11). Now, it is clear that it is the *separation* from the Other-structure that leads to *creation*.

<sup>85</sup> Sjoerd van Tuinen writes: “*Umwelt* is redefined as the synthesis of singularities according to convergent series, actualised around sedentary centres of individuation and realized in corporeal aggregates making up an ‘Other-structure’; *Welt* is redefined as the ‘chaosmos’ common to all worlds, a multiplicity unbound from any pre-established and fully individuated order, and traversed by nomadic ‘persons’ or ‘Egos’ that transcend their monadic individuality and form divergences between different worlds” (van Tuinen and McDonnell 2010, p. 173).

<sup>86</sup> Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 312.

<sup>87</sup> See Smith, “What is the Body without Organs?,” on the relation between the event and the body without organs.

<sup>88</sup> The ethico-political implications of Deleuze’s theory of the Other can be pursued from here. The ‘impossible’ is that which has been excluded from our actual social sphere. Our bodies inscribe the existing power relations; our bodies carry the institutions, and the Otherless world involves a critical endeavour to think about how a shift is possible in the way our bodies and their associated practices are organized.

## 8. Conclusion

This article aimed at highlighting the intimate relationship between Deleuze's Other-structure and Husserl's philosophy of the Other to make clear the meaning of Other-structure, disclosing its phenomenological traces, and present the Otherless world in terms of Deleuze's impetus to go beyond phenomenology. This comparison cast Deleuze's Other-structure and Otherless world in a different light and contributed to fit them in his broader oeuvre. First, it was shown that when the alter ego enters into the ego's perceptual field, the phenomenological dynamic of pairing is inaugurated. In this process, the alter ego by analogy with my flesh appropriates a flesh and is *incarnated* with the *Leib*, and simultaneously, my flesh appropriates a body in analogy with the body of the alter ego and is incorporated with an objective body. This double dynamic of incarnation and incorporation pronounces the co-revelation and the co-naissance of the ego and its Other. To distinguish different dimensions of the Other-structure, we projected the dynamic of pairing to Deleuze's Other-structure and defined it as the *Other-alter ego*. However, further textual analysis revealed that even before the ego encounters the alter ego, there is a form of primordial self-alterity at stake. This inherent alterity in Husserl's texts, along with Deleuze's analysis in his article on Tournier, revealed that this self-alterity must be composed of two modes: the spatial mode of self-alterity anchored in the flesh and the temporal mode of self-alterity tied to the *hylé*. Consequently, Deleuze's Other-structure, before encountering the alter ego, was reframed as the *Other-flesh* and the *Other-hylé* to account for the spatial and temporal self-alterities embedded in the Other-structure.

This comparative analysis was developed referring to Deleuze's formula of "the expression of a possible world" and, laying out the 'expression' in the framework of pairing, the conflictual status of the subject as a form of explication-implication was pointed out. Finally, Deleuze's impetus to surmount the phenomenological flesh was discussed in terms of his appeal to the Otherless world. It was argued that Deleuze's world without Others is not a mere regress to the sphere of ownness, which only accounts for the transcendental conditions of the constitution of the alter ego and our habitual world (as is the case in phenomenology), but is an attempt to liberate the genetic relations of alterity in order to enable the new formations of body-worlds through the rearticulation of relations. In fact, he invokes the world without Others to open up a space for the exposure of the *outside* of the pre-individual singularities as well as the production of the event.

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