

# DEMOCRACY WITHOUT PEACE : The Cultural Politics of Terror in Peru\*

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The twelve years of military rule in Peru between 1968 and 1980 witnessed few abuses of human rights, in marked contrast to the activities of military governments in Southern Cone countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Yet paradoxically, the return to democracy in Peru, with the election of Fernando Belaúnde in 1980 and Alan García in 1985, has brought sharp escalations in political violence and terror. Guerrilla activity by the Sendero Luminoso ("Shining Path") in the highlands, urban terrorism, and a severe economic crisis have combined to pose a serious challenge to the authority of the state.<sup>1</sup> Thus it is problematic to speak of a "return to democracy" while Peruvians are being subjected to expanding military control and repression.<sup>2</sup>

Peru's leaders today are facing the challenge of widespread violence in an environment transformed by twelve years of military rule and the subsequent resurgence of party politics. The political inheritance of military rule and the ideologically constructed memory of past regimes now shape the perceptions of the political, economic, and social alternatives available to civilian governments. President García heads a regime that must create an identity from the past while finding the resources to meet the challenges posed by the rapid escalation of violence and the fear and confusion it has produced among Peruvians.<sup>3</sup>

Analyzing the situation in Peru calls for examining the interplay between democratic politics and violence. To understand how these two factors have been experienced by Peruvians, we will explore two political and cultural processes. The first deals with the government's use of ideologically crafted images of past regimes, called "political memory" in this analysis, to legitimize its actions and argue for specific current options. The second process examined will be the development of contested understandings of terrorism and violence in the Peruvian mass

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media that become a vehicle for expressing long-standing and unresolved cultural concerns.

#### THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY

The concepts of democracy and democratic politics have particular meanings in the Peruvian context, and both APRA (the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) and the Peruvian military have played key roles in defining these meanings.<sup>4</sup> Prior to the Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada of the 1960s, democratic party politics were dominated and manipulated by the Peruvian elite and were greatly discredited as a reflection of the popular will. When a popular vote negated elite wishes, military intervention was the alternative chosen. The vast majority of Peruvians found that democratic politics gave them only a marginal voice in the political process because electoral results were always contingent on the acquiescence of the elite and their military supporters.<sup>5</sup>

Paradoxically, the military intervention of 1968 was meant to end this abuse of "democratic procedures." The military's imposition of semicorporatist political institutions and its implementation of sweeping social and economic reforms were intended to give Peruvians a degree of participation that they had not previously enjoyed. What is most intriguing about the Peruvian case is that the self-labeled Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada in power from 1968 to 1980, did not destroy party politics or political organizing. While the military failed to create its own popular base or mobilize support for its wide-ranging reforms, it nevertheless stressed an ideology of citizen participation on the local level in a corporatist political system.<sup>6</sup> Block organizations and local elections were instituted throughout the *pueblos jóvenes* (the squatter settlements surrounding Lima), and they continue to serve as effective units of political action. Unions proliferated between 1969 and 1978, and more than sixteen hundred local agricultural groups joined the newly created Confederación Nacional Agraria (Palmer 1984, 53). The military's rhetoric urging the creation of a fully participatory system that rejected old hierarchies and Western imperialism had its effect: the left and leftist parties experienced unprecedented growth.<sup>7</sup>

Many Apristas who had been frustrated by the compromises of their party's leadership during the Manuel Prado administration (1956–1962) and the first Belaúnde administration (1963–1968),<sup>8</sup> were pleased at the political stands taken by the military under General Juan Velasco. Several Apristas joined his government in key positions and directed some of its most significant programs. Similarly, many young people on the left found the Velasco government and its mobilizing organization,

the Sistema Nacional de Movilización Social (SINAMOS), well-suited to their political vision.

In this case, military rule did not depoliticize Peruvians but helped create and sustain new patterns of political participation.<sup>9</sup> The military was nonetheless reluctant to foster participatory politics outside its own control. The military justified its 1968 coup by claiming that the civilian parties were corrupt and serving Peru's interests poorly. But the military, in turn, had difficulty governing the country. The regime of General Velasco, which lasted until 1975, marked the period of greatest innovation: a major agrarian reform was promulgated, the problems of urban migrants were addressed, the state's participation in the economy was broadened, and a more independent foreign policy was pursued. When General Francisco Morales Bermúdez replaced Velasco in 1975, however, the reforms and the momentum for change slowed appreciably. After ten years of struggle, the military decided to return to the barracks rather than to continue trying to deal with a crumbling economy, general strikes protesting austerity policies of the International Monetary Fund, and charges of widespread corruption.

Democratic electoral procedures were reinstated in 1978 for the drafting of a new constitution by the Asamblea Constituyente. Following the general elections of 1980, the military returned power to elected officials and to the same political parties that had dominated the pre-1968 political spectrum.<sup>10</sup> Fernando Belaúnde won the election easily with 45 percent of the vote out of a field of fifteen candidates. Yet despite this apparent continuity with political configurations before 1968, the political spectrum had shifted dramatically to the left. Municipal elections in 1983 demonstrated the strength of the Izquierda Unida (IU) coalition and made Alfonso Barrantes (the IU candidate) the mayor of Lima.

Belaúnde's second administration, however, proved a great disappointment for those who had hoped the return to democracy would curtail the economic decline of the late 1970s. Events and incompetence combined to deepen the economic and political crisis. Belaúnde's free-market approach—a direct contrast to the statism of the military regime—proved incapable of halting the decline in Peru's economy. Moreover, Belaúnde appeared perplexed and enervated by the mounting guerrilla threat.

In April 1985, Peruvians went to the polls for the fourth time in less than a decade. A revitalized APRA was led by dynamic young Alan García, who was clearly identified with the reform elements in the party. For the first time, the Peruvian electorate included illiterate as well as literate voters. APRA won the presidency as well as control of the Cámara de Diputados and the Senado. APRA's plurality of 48 percent in the presidential contest so outstripped the IU coalition that it

withdrew from the constitutionally mandated runoff, thus insuring García's victory. On 28 July 1985, he was formally sworn in as the new president.<sup>11</sup>

During the twenty-five years between 1962 and 1987, Peruvians have lived under contrasting civilian and military regimes. The range of reform attempts initiated have spanned the spectrum from military-led participatory corporatism to a civilian version of free-market democracy to the current amalgam of diverse trends under García and the Apristas. But the democratic politics of the current regime are not those of the 1960s. The intervening twelve years of military rule paradoxically resulted in an expanded electorate that is better organized, more fully committed to reform and social change, and more willing to support candidates of the refurbished left. Yet the debate in Peru still revolves around the question of how reform and change should take place.

Moreover, the tentativeness and vulnerability of civilian rule is palpable. While no one seriously believed that a military coup would forestall García's inauguration in 1985, this nonevent was attributed to a lack of desire "to fight over a carcass that has already been picked clean."<sup>12</sup> But García's difficulty in dealing with the growing violence and his surprise announcement nationalizing two Peruvian banks in July 1987 have elicited new talk of military intervention and have revitalized the somnolent civilian right.<sup>13</sup>

#### POLITICAL MEMORY: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF REGIMES PAST

When Alan García took power, Peruvians believed that their political alternatives were limited by what had been tried in the past. During his first months in office, García consciously attempted to broaden his base of support by cloaking himself in the history of the two political traditions shaping current perceptions, APRA and the *Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada*. Born into an Aprista family, García inherited direct ties to APRA. His father was persecuted as an Aprista under the administration of General Manuel Odría in the late 1940s and 1950s. Alan García grew up in the party, nurtured by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre and other party leaders, and served as Haya de la Torre's secretary during the *Asamblea Constituyente* of 1978–79. Although Haya de la Torre never achieved the presidency of Peru before he died in 1979, García emphasized his ties to his mentor, casting himself as a loyal and deserving heir to the revered leader's mantle. García's carefully charted path to party leadership culminated in his presidential victory in 1985. Appropriately, he received the presidential credential in Haya de la Torre's study at the Villa Mercedes, accompanied by Luis Alberto Sánchez and Ramiro Prialé, two respected members of APRA's old guard.<sup>14</sup>

As is true of most mass-based political parties, various currents coexist within APRA. Moreover, its complexity has been enhanced by the party's long history of opposition. As a result, García inherited both the positive and negative elements of his party affiliation. Among the negative aspects are the memory of the Aprista "*búfalos*," or bullyboys, of the 1940s and the lingering fear of many non-Apristas of the party's exclusionary tactics and strict internal discipline.<sup>15</sup> In response, García has attempted to de-emphasize some elements of his ties to APRA by making nationalistic appeals to all Peruvians. But this decision to widen his base of support also risks alienating those elements within APRA who have waited a long time to enjoy the political perquisites attached to the presidency.<sup>16</sup>

García's independent posture toward the international banks and oil companies and his desire to enhance Peruvian leadership among the nonaligned nations are reminiscent of the military regime of General Velasco.<sup>17</sup> Some Peruvians feel that the Velasco reforms were cut short prematurely and that a more equitable society would have emerged under military rule had Velasco not been replaced by Morales Bermúdez in the internal coup of 1975. Others on both ends of the political spectrum believe that the military experiment proved unworkable and effectively discredited the development of "a third way," one neither capitalist nor socialist in domestic and foreign policy. In this respect, the inheritance of the Velasco period is also mixed. On the one hand, García has garnered some support from those who feel that the Velasco reforms were stalled in midcourse. On the other hand, those who watched the Velasco government fail may conclude that to whatever extent García follows the same route, his plans too will falter. Peru's recent experience with both a failed reformist experiment under Velasco and a problem-ridden free-market approach under Belaúnde makes the process of establishing momentum for national policy and social change that much more difficult. Yet many believe that García represents Peru's last chance at democratic government before the eruption of a full-scale guerrilla war or a right-wing military dictatorship.

Herein lies the paradox of Peruvian reconstructions of the political past: they both enhance and limit the political space in which governments operate. Political memories have been exploited to make the populace amenable to accepting regimes that are less than ideal because Peruvians have become convinced that the likely alternatives would heighten violence and bring "chaos." Political memory is by its nature constantly reshaped and manipulated by political actors. Contemporary events become politically charged as they are assigned deeper meanings and conflicting interpretations that are rooted in the reconstruction of past events.

For example, political memory has shaped civil-military relations

during the return to democracy. The memory of military coups is ever present. Throughout Belaúnde's second administration, the military continued to be a significant political force having almost unchecked power to determine its own levels of spending.<sup>18</sup> Because Belaúnde had been overthrown by the military in 1968, he was reluctant during his second administration either to incur the military's wrath or increase its considerable power. Thus in 1981–82, when the Peruvian police seemed unable to control Sendero Luminoso in the Ayacucho region, Belaúnde was slow to call in the army. His hesitation was widely attributed to fear of another coup.<sup>19</sup> But ultimately, Belaúnde was forced to deploy the military in January 1983. Since that decision was made, however, the death toll has risen sharply and basic civil and human rights have been ignored.

Political memory also affects the way the current terrorist and guerrilla movements are being interpreted. Some observers see Sendero Luminoso as a modern parallel to APRA's struggle to achieve legitimacy in the 1930s and 1940s. As Peruvians observe García in power, many recall the long years when APRA was outlawed and its leaders imprisoned. APRA's tactics also included violence, although on a much smaller scale, and some officials in García's administration were involved in APRA's attempted coup in 1948. The years have remolded these individuals, but one must nevertheless remember that APRA's early history was based on a fundamental challenge to the social order. Consequently, some Peruvians argue that Sendero too will one day find a respectable place on the political spectrum.<sup>20</sup> These observers, although highly critical of Sendero's violence and particularly the repression it has brought on the Indian population, sympathize with Sendero's critique of existing institutions and inequities.

A similar echo from the past finds its way into the current interpretation of the other major guerrilla threat to the government, the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA). The revelation that "Comandante Rolondo," a key leader in the MRTA's operation in the *selva* is Víctor Polay Campos, a contemporary of García's and a former Aprista, provoked journalists to draw comparisons with APRA Rebelde, the 1960s breakaway faction, and its failed attempt at armed struggle.<sup>21</sup>

One leader of the guerrilla movement of the 1960s, Héctor Béjar, contrasts that era with the present, arguing that the struggles of the 1960s were successfully resolved by nationalization and agrarian reform carried out by the Revolutionary Military Government. He views the economic injustices that persist in Peru as resulting from more powerful and "anonymous" forces (rather than from the clearly identifiable elite families of the old order). Béjar argues that no one knows how to attack the new sources of power and that Sendero inevitably lacks a concrete

program for political change. Now that available approaches have been tried and exhausted, what is emerging is diffuse violence: "Certainly those in the armed struggle know why they are fighting, but I doubt if they know for what. . . . What we have today is a confusing mix of guerrilla fighting, sabotage and terrorism, propaganda and intimidation, clean fighting and dirty war, revolution and vengeance over social resentment" (Béjar 1983, 56–57).

A lively debate is still going on over just what Sendero Luminoso represents. Some view the movement as the last gasp of a rural peasantry on its way to defeat, abandoned by both capitalists and Marxists. Others see Sendero as an outgrowth of leftist revolutionary groups inspired by student trips to Cuba in the late 1960s and nurtured by the frustrations of the abandoned sierra. Still others view it as a group that will become less radical and eventually find a route back into legitimate politics as the system moves further to the left. The picture has been further complicated by increased evidence of a link between Sendero and the drug trafficking groups in the upper Huallaga River valley as well as by the accelerated activity of the MRTA in urban terrorism and in armed struggles in the department of San Martín.<sup>22</sup>

Whatever their interpretation, all observers agree that Sendero and the MRTA pose a substantial challenge to the current government and to the continuation of democratic processes in Peru. In addition, the conflicts that gave rise to Sendero Luminoso and the responses of Peruvian governments to its challenge illustrate the enduring and unresolved conflicts in Peruvian national life. One of those conflicts is embodied in Peru's troubled record of democratic politics and the historic failure of democratic governments to address adequately the problems of Peru's heavily indigenous sierra population and its incorporation into national life on a more just and democratic basis. Sendero and government responses to this movement reflect the long-standing conflicts and tensions between indigenous *serrano* Peru and urbanized, rapidly changing coastal Peru.

#### SENDERO LUMINOSO: REGIONALITY AND ETHNICITY AS UNRESOLVED CONFLICTS

In 1982 the threat posed by Sendero Luminoso was viewed as limited to a remote corner of the Andes.<sup>23</sup> This appraisal has been increasingly belied by frequent urban *apagones* (blackouts resulting from sabotage of power lines), car bombings, an ever-widening circle of rural "emergency zones," and reports of Sendero control of the coca-growing zones around Tingo María. The movement's emergence, its base of support, and government responses are all closely linked to Sendero's rural roots and the enduring complexity of ethnicity in Peruvian politics and

national life. The increasing threat of social disorder has occasioned renewed recognition of the political implications of cross-regional tensions and Indian ethnicity in shaping the origins, ideology, and spread of the guerrilla threat.

The department of Ayacucho, like much of the sierra, has been badly neglected throughout the twentieth century. Palmer (1986) and McClintock (1983, 1984) have attributed the origins of Sendero Luminoso to three sources: the reactions of the local populations to precipitous declines in their standard of living, the failure of the Agrarian Reform of 1969 to benefit this marginalized region, and the frustrations of politicized graduates of the newly reconstituted University of Huamanga, who found few rewards in Peruvian society for their provincial academic achievements. Both authors suggest that the return to democratic politics in 1980 appeared to offer little promise for Ayacucho. Consequently, Sendero's recruiting and training tactics, which emphasized the exploitation of the region and particularly the Indians for the benefit of the urbanized coast, won support from the local population.

To the extent that outside analysts are correct, Sendero's political challenge to the Peruvian state has exhibited five stages:<sup>24</sup> converting backward areas into centers of revolutionary support (accomplished between 1968 and 1980); attacking the symbols of the bourgeois state and its revisionist elements (from 1980 to 1982); generalizing violence and guerrilla warfare (apparently begun in 1983); conquering new areas and expanding support; and laying siege to the cities and causing the collapse of the state.

During the initial phases in Ayacucho, Sendero's campaign against local symbols of authority, including attacks on outlying posts of the Guardia Civil and a raid on the Ayacucho prison in March 1982, took few lives but publicly embarrassed groups like the Guardia Civil (the national police) and the Guardia Republicana (the prison guards). Because the Guardia Civil have long served as enforcers for local elites and are therefore viewed by campesinos as a source of oppression, any demonstration of their incompetence brought a certain amount of pleasure to their former victims. Similarly, the support for Sendero evidenced at the funeral of Edith Lagos, a young Senderista, in September 1982 occurred before Sendero escalated its tactics into greater violence and before the military began its widespread repression in the region. Much of the initial violence, which had caused some two hundred deaths by late 1982,<sup>25</sup> was attributed to the arbitrary behavior of the Guardia Civil and specially trained counterinsurgency police, the *Sinchis*.<sup>26</sup> In sum, regional support for Sendero was clearest during the pre-1983 era and seemed tied to a generalized anger at the neglect of the region by the central government (whether civilian or military) and the arbitrary and brutal exercise of authority by government agents.

Events changed rapidly late in 1982. On 31 December 1982, Lima suffered a massive blackout. The only light radiated from a hammer and sickle blazing on the San Agustín hill that overlooks the city. The next day, Belaúnde sent the Armed Forces into Ayacucho and declared a state of emergency in the zone. On 26 January 1983, eight journalists were killed while investigating reports that a community of campesinos had assassinated a brigade of Sendero guerrillas. When the news of these events reached Lima, the regional conflict acquired national dimensions and became part of the national, and ultimately the international, political consciousness.

Sendero's development and emergence on the national political scene can be understood as a reflection of the unresolved conflicts in the relations between Lima and the hinterlands and the significance of ethnic difference. The killing of the journalists, an event described by many national journalists and documented by the national Comisión Investigadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay (1983), reinforced public perception of the split between the two regions and identified the sierra and *serranos* with a sense of unchecked and irrational violence. Fears of the indigenous population have long been a factor in the calculations of political leaders. Such fears have surrounded democratic politics that would enfranchise this population and have inspired military solutions on more than one occasion (compare Campbell 1973). Instead of responding to the social and economic needs of the region, the Peruvian government has responded primarily with repression (Vásquez and Doughty n.d.).

The record of escalating violence and the number of deaths since January 1983 dramatically underscore the consequences of such a solution. Six months after the Armed Forces entered Ayacucho, the death toll surpassed 1,000, with 318 killed between 15 May and 1 June 1983.<sup>27</sup> In May 1985, *Andean Focus* reported that the total number of deaths included 2,435 terrorists, 2,430 civilians, 78 civilian authorities, 35 members of the Armed Forces, and 191 members of the police forces (the Guardia Republicana, the Policía Investigaciones Peruanas, and the Guardia Civil).<sup>28</sup> While the distinction between civilian and terrorist deaths is often arbitrary,<sup>29</sup> the total of both categories was about 5,000. By October 1987, however, the figure for total deaths was reported to have exceeded 10,000.<sup>30</sup>

What these figures cannot measure is the sense of helplessness and vulnerability that has grown with the "disappearances," or *las desapariciones*. This chilling term (borrowed from the pattern that emerged in Argentina under military governments between 1975 and 1983) now represents part of the regional experience of Ayacucho. As happened in Argentina, fear grows that kidnappings and disappearances will inevitably be followed by the discovery of tortured corpses.<sup>31</sup> Reports of re-

prisal killings by Sendero and the military leave the rural population at the mercy of both, with shots in the night raising fears of attack by either the guerrillas or the military. In actuality, peasants are often uncertain as to who is doing the shooting. Moreover, those who seek information about missing kin become vulnerable to suspicion and reprisals from the police and military authorities.<sup>32</sup>

Mass graves have been discovered in highland communities, and in several recent cases, the military has been directly implicated.<sup>33</sup> President García's initial response to such findings was forceful. Upon learning that military personnel had killed 76 persons in two incidents in the sierra, he relieved the top military commanders and made certain that charges were filed against the suspects. Werlich reports that in February 1986, García placed the three branches of the police force under a single director and dismissed 1,700 corrupt officers, including 120 police generals and colonels (Werlich 1987). García also established the national Comisión de Paz to investigate cases of abuses of human rights, but most members of the peace commission resigned in frustration within several months. A smaller commission was then appointed, but it has not succeeded in bringing about the prosecution of police and military personnel. The commission's weakness was underscored by its limited role in the prison massacres of June 1986.

Nor is the pattern of violence confined to Ayacucho, having spread throughout much of the central and northern Andes and to the jungle regions of Tingo María and Moyobamba in the Department of San Martín. Cerro de Pasco and San Martín have been declared emergency zones, and incidents in La Libertad and Puno have increased. Indeed, recent articles in Peruvian magazines have described the "Aya-cuchanization" of Puno (Salcedo 1985a, 51–64). By 1987 a state of emergency was in force in 20 of 126 Peruvian provinces that effectively suspended the rights of assembly and movement, waived requirements for search warrants, and allowed the indefinite detention of suspects. Guardia Civil posts have been enlarged throughout the highland departments of Lima and Ancash and in various parts of the jungle. Also, the Peruvian Army has increased forced drafts of rural youth who lack the required registration papers. As one Peruvian observer commented, "the sons of peasants are conscripted to kill the sons of other peasants."<sup>34</sup> In the process, rural inhabitants are left with the choice of subsisting in fear of both sides or fleeing to the cities.

#### THE WIDENING CONFLICT: THE RURAL-URBAN LINKS

By 1985 all doubt had vanished that terrorism had arrived in the cities. As early as 1983, half of all terrorists acts were committed outside the Ayacucho region; two years later, significant numbers of acts were

occurring in Lima and other coastal urban zones. The most spectacular events early on were the car bombings during the visit of Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín and just prior to the inauguration of Alan García. Both incidents occurred in circumstances that directly challenged the control of security forces. During Alfonsín's visit, a bomb was placed in a car stolen from a Guardia Civil officer that was left undetected, despite all-points bulletins describing its loss, in the Plaza de Armas while Alfonsín dined in the presidential palace. The second bomb was set off in front of the Ministerio del Interior. While terrorist acts are notoriously difficult to anticipate and even high-priority targets cannot be protected with limited resources, the Peruvian government and its security forces lost much credibility and public confidence as a result of these bombings.

Car bombings have since escalated to political assassinations, beginning in Lima with the attack on the president of the national election board, Dr. Domingo García Rada, during the April 1985 elections and on two high-ranking military officers in the first half of 1986. After government attacks on the prisons in June 1986, Sendero threatened to kill ten Apristas for each Senderista killed in the prisons. Since making that threat, Sendero members have systematically targeted and murdered party leaders. A particularly forceful example of this cruelty was the brutal murder in 1987 of Rodrigo Franco, a close personal friend of García.

Another serious problem for the government has been the shift in the activities of the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA).<sup>35</sup> For a time, the MRTA engaged primarily in such "Robin Hood" activities as intercepting truckloads of chickens destined for a market, driving them to *pueblos jóvenes*, and calling the inhabitants together over a loudspeaker for a mass redistribution. In November 1985, however, the MRTA took credit for dynamiting and machine gunning the U.S. Embassy, acts it characterized as a protest against U.S. imperialism.<sup>36</sup> Five months later, the MRTA took credit for bombing the residence at the U.S. Embassy. Moreover, the car bombing during the Alfonsín visit in June 1985 suggested to some a coordinated activity between Sendero and the MRTA. Urban-based groups have also taken over several radio and television stations for brief periods to broadcast such slogans as "Long live the armed struggle." During the regional soccer play-offs with Argentina for the World Cup in 1985, some areas of Lima heard this message along with the match. This broadcast sparked speculation that the guerrillas had a mobile transmitting unit moving throughout the city. While the terrorists' degree of technological sophistication remains a source of controversy, their attention to the media in urban Peru is not in doubt.

Prior to García's inauguration, reports emerged of talks between

the President-elect and the MRTA. Similarly, some hoped that Sendero's leadership might be more open to an Aprista government. In the first days of the new administration, a limited amnesty was announced and a peace commission established. But initial hopes for an end to the violence vanished with the increased attacks against Aprista leaders and party headquarters. Escalating urban bombings led García to declare a state of emergency and a curfew in Lima in February 1986. As the differences between Sendero and the MRTA sharpened, García made another attempt at amnesty aimed mainly at the Túpac Amarus. The MRTA answered these overtures in November 1987 with an attack on police headquarters in Juanjuí, in the department of San Martín, killing a police sergeant and embarrassing the police and the government. García responded by mobilizing the army and sending a substantial force of counterinsurgency troops to the area.

Growing urban violence has not discouraged migration to the cities, however. Although migration from sierra to coast in search of employment and education has been occurring since the mid-1940s, the depopulation of certain sectors of the sierra, especially in the Ayacucho and Huanta regions, is a relatively new phenomenon.<sup>37</sup> It now appears that the ultimate result of violence combined with repression may be to dispossess large numbers of peasants as they flee their homes. Moreover, the migration of peasants from their subsistence base may create new dependency in the cities and break the ties of reciprocity that linked rural and urban populations. Thus the repression and terror accompanying the activities of Sendero, the MRTA, and the military in the sierra and now in the selva will undoubtedly lead to further deterioration in peasants' standard of living.

New pueblos jóvenes have mushroomed around Ica and other coastal cities like Pisco that have roads connecting with the emergency zones. These new settlements, along with Lima's pueblos jóvenes, have become the new homes of refugees fleeing the sierra violence. The cities in turn have become the locus of pressures that the highlanders sought to escape. Catholic missionaries have reported that Sendero Luminoso recruits actively among the urban youth. Young people in the cities and countryside face the dilemma of how to respond if approached by representatives of Sendero. The police consider the pueblos jóvenes to be hotbeds of Sendero activity, and because migrants tend to settle close to others from their home regions, certain neighborhoods have become the particular focus of police and government concern. For example, from time to time, the police set up blockades along the transportation routes into Villa El Salvador and Ciudad de Dios to inspect everyone's identity cards and packages. Nevertheless, blackouts in the cities continue to be followed by torch-lit hammer and sickle symbols on the hills above these squatter settlements.

The frustrations of Peru's young over the future of their country and their personal prospects add a troubling element to attempts to analyze the sources of Sendero and assess the spread of armed struggle. Carlos Iván Degregori, a noted authority on Sendero Luminoso, has concluded that it has a very limited peasant base: "They can win sectors of the peasantry, but only by imposition and that is quite another thing. Sendero is not a peasant movement but a movement of intellectuals and young people without hope."<sup>38</sup> In this respect, Degregori's analysis parallels that of David Scott Palmer, who identified the role of the reconstituted University of Huamanga in Ayacucho as a central source of Sendero recruits. It was not simply the influence of radical professors and trips to Cuba that convinced the young students to take up armed struggle but also their frustrated aspirations as graduates of a provincial and less prestigious academic institution. In a country where more than half the population is under twenty and the current economy cannot provide enough work for today's adult population, the diminished hopes of young people are understandable. Unless the future offers some opportunities to fulfill their hopes within the existing structures, the Peruvian government will face a potent internal problem.

While the police are attempting to sort out the guerrillas from the general population, the problem has become yet more complex as the vocabulary of terrorism is applied to old disputes and antagonisms. Peasant communities have accused one another of being aligned with Sendero in hopes of some short-term gain in long-standing property disputes. In one case in the Callejón de Huaylas, a mine owner was caught dynamiting a bridge. He had planned to blame the destruction on a group of peasants with whom he had a land dispute and to accuse them of being aligned with Sendero. Such instances exemplify the difficulty of distinguishing guerrilla threats from common manipulation of the rhetoric of terrorism. Thus it has become very difficult to determine who is responsible for any given act in Peru. Sendero members themselves appear unconcerned with taking credit for their own actions or differentiating acts they commit from those attributed to them but committed by others. Because the aim of Sendero Luminoso is to create social and political chaos and thus destroy the legitimacy of the state, this end is served equally by either situation. Aprista leader Armando Villanueva expressed the frustration of the government: "We are at a point where we do not know who is a terrorist and who is not. . . ."<sup>39</sup>

#### TERRORISM AND CULTURAL MEANING

Equally as important as examining the political constructions of present and past regimes is recognizing the political symbols and collective perceptions being formulated to interpret the current situation.

Isbell (n.d.) and Gitlitz (n.d.a, n.d.b) point to unexplored cultural dimensions of the conflict for rural Quechua and Aymara populations, but closer attention also needs to be paid to urban interpretations as they shape experiences and events. In Peru, knowledge about current conflicts is mediated by a sensationalistic press that employs arresting images of violence. This imagery appears again and again in newspapers and news magazines, from the Lima dailies to publications by prominent newspaper editors like Guillermo Thorndike of *La República*, a major daily, and well-known politicians like Javier Diez Canseco of the Izquierda Unida. Novelist Mario Vargas Llosa has internationalized this discourse through his essays in the *New York Times*. Television has further publicized this cultural imagery.<sup>40</sup>

Typical examples of Peruvian photojournalism published in the daily press and news magazines or aired on television include: a journalist's photographs of highland peasants taken just before he and seven colleagues were murdered in a remote Ayacucho village; pictures of these journalists' bodies being disinterred, with colleagues, military officials, and peasants observing the process; pictures of heavily armed, crisply uniformed police searching a terrified, half-undressed youth; photos of tortured corpses displayed on the ground in rows, surrounded by grim-faced onlookers; and the video of a prison break and violent confrontation with the police.<sup>41</sup> Each of these recurring images acquires great cultural significance by graphically showing the consequences of violence. Also, the narratives that accompany these visual images link specific events to wider political issues and interpretations.<sup>42</sup> Together they form what Taussig (1984) calls "counterdiscourses" or "counterrepresentations" to the official story of terrorism.

In a country that has suffered frequent periods of press censorship, most recently during the *Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada*,<sup>43</sup> journalists explicitly justify their role in covering the current violence. Editor Thorndike argues:

Journalists from Lima and Huamanga were obliged to witness the terrible history of Ayacucho from its beginnings. Despite all their differences, they were united by the necessity of serving their country through communication, and by their love of truth. The history of Ayacucho, first denied or belittled by the authorities in Lima, grew to its present bloody stature in the dispatches sent by these men, none of them famous, who exercised their journalistic profession between two lines of fire, always between two dangers [the guerrillas and the police]. (Thorndike 1983b, 40–41)

Peruvian journalists argue that it is the nature of violence to rob victims of their capacity to be the narrators of their own experience and to free governmental authorities from the responsibility of explaining their actions. Photojournalism repeatedly shows examples of victims who can speak only "with their eyes" because they have been beaten

and intimidated. Those who are dying or dead, it is pointed out, have been robbed of even this body language (for example, see Thorndike 1983b, 8). A special target of repression by both police and Sendero Luminoso activists are local intermediaries, such as small-town mayors or officials who try to intercede on behalf of others. In the present climate, these intermediaries are portrayed as intervening with the police to argue that other interpretations can be made of local events and the actions of townspeople. When faced with the guerrilla opposition, they are said to resist Sendero overtures. Photojournalists often picture these local leaders twice, first at work and later beaten to death. The photos vividly illustrate not only the vulnerability of local authorities but the cost of speaking up and the thin line dividing life and death in the current circumstances.

Thorndike's (1983) account of the murder of eight liberal and leftist journalists at the hands of Indian peasants in 1983 in Uchuraccay relates directly to these photojournalistic constructions. The journalists became a new set of intermediaries who were challenging government accounts of the murders of suspected Senderistas. These journalist-intermediaries were in turn killed, their bodies left without eyes or tongues. Their deaths also underscored for urban readers the vulnerability of Limeños in the sierra.

Another account of the journalists' murder was published by Vargas Llosa in the *New York Times Magazine*. This famous novelist gave Peruvian violence a narrative form and a carefully constructed international message about Peruvian society (1983).<sup>44</sup> Although "Inquest in the Andes" is often treated as if it were primarily a historical account of the tragic massacre, this view is a superficial one. As Vargas Llosa observed, "it seemed that another, even more terrible story about my own country was being revealed." He uses the incident to discuss the two major concepts of "otherness" and "democracy" in the Peruvian context.<sup>45</sup> On the one hand, he portrays Indian peasants as inherently violent, uncomprehending of the modern world, innocent, ignorant, and frequently used by others. According to his account, the peasants mistook the journalists for guerrillas and killed them as a result of endemic isolation in the adversity, poverty, and violence of their culture.<sup>46</sup> On the other hand, Vargas Llosa talks about current military excesses as the legacy of the Velasco military regime. He views it as an authoritarian dictatorship that left citizens, the military, and the press "out of training for democracy." According to Vargas Llosa, the revolutionary experiment caused the ensuing terrorism because it muted the democratic spirit and inevitably led to abuses. Peru needs to turn away from this form of government politics and economy in order to achieve democracy. By arguing against specific past alternatives like the reformist military government and in favor of the cultural assimilation of peasant

Indian populations, Vargas Llosa's explanation of Peruvian violence establishes imperatives for a certain political order. He argues that the cultural gap must be closed if rural populations are ever to understand democracy and find their place in a politically integrated social order.

Significantly, the Uchuraccay massacre holds various meanings for other segments of the Peruvian population. Many view the journalists' death as a case study in Peruvian ambiguity, demonstrating once again that nothing in Peru is quite what it first appears to be. At the time, the question that preoccupied urban and rural inhabitants as well as the press was whether one should believe government accounts, such as those of the government commission and Vargas Llosa. A strong countervailing interpretation adopted by Thorndike, Diez Canseco, and many others was that the massacre was really a case in point of government interference.<sup>47</sup> The government had offered the peasants financial incentives to report guerrilla movements and to kill suspected Senderistas. Also, according to these interpretations, government counterinsurgency troops may have dressed as peasants to facilitate the massacre. To explain why the government would go to such lengths to deceive, many commentators concurred that creating the impression that peasants were rejecting the guerrillas would greatly alleviate fears of an alliance between peasants and guerrillas.

Diez Canseco (1985) goes a step further in criticizing the military after the murder of the journalists, arguing that the military had been attempting to discredit the mainstream left by systematically blurring distinctions, for peasants and others, between leftist party activities and terrorism. Diez Canseco views the massacre as only one consequence of a wider military policy to undermine political opposition.<sup>48</sup> This interpretation was reinforced by the subsequent barring of journalists from the emergency zone, which left the public dependent on official military communiques for news.

Each of these searches for the truth interweaves wider cultural and political messages with descriptive details and archetypal photographs. Clearly, no language is free from political nuances when a society is working through such tensions. Peru is airing conflicting arguments that attempt, from various ideological viewpoints, to differentiate state violence aimed at preserving the established order from violent challenges to the established order.<sup>49</sup> Alternative formulations appeal to different audiences. Vargas Llosa captivated American readers with an interpretation of events that emphasized the central issues of ethnicity and antirevolutionary democracy. Thorndike and others, however, have more successfully captured the intimacy of violence and echoed the contradictions of democracy in action for many Peruvians.

On yet another front, a battle is raging within the urban prisons of Peru that has riveted the national consciousness by means of on-

going television coverage. Once again, the narration of current crises is being amplified by broader cultural messages.

Since 1983 four major prison riots have made national news. During a riot at El Sexto, a prison in downtown Lima, the public watched the execution of one hostage and the burning of another on "live" television. Year-end reviews of the news reprinted these dramatic pictures under the headlines, "What have we become?" and "To what [depths] have we descended?"<sup>50</sup> The second event occurred in December 1984, when a dozen prisoners at the Lurigancho prison took three visiting nuns hostage and demanded an ambulance for their escape. All of the prisoners and one of the nuns were killed in the barrage of gunfire unleashed by the police on the fleeing vehicle. This bloody event was carried live on television and is even available on video. The film footage shows the police dragging bullet-ridden bodies from an ambulance by the hair and stacking them in the street "as if they were animals" (Diez Canseco 1985, 55). It is evident that some of the prisoners were still breathing as they were piled in a heap. This coverage makes rough viewing for even the most hardened observers and offers a sobering lesson for the public about the kind of treatment that one may encounter from the police forces.

Another incident occurred at Lurigancho in the fall of 1985. More than thirty prisoners were killed in a fire in the Pabellón Británico, an area housing many of those held on suspicion of terrorism. Conflicting claims have emerged about how the prisoners died. One report claimed that guards were involved in the killings, but another claimed that one group of prisoners turned on the others and killed them before the guards entered.

In reviewing all these incidents, it is critical to remember what kinds of prisoners are being held in Peru. Most of the prison population has not been brought to trial. The newspaper *Hoy* reported that out of twenty-three thousand individuals being held in the nation's prisons, only seven thousand had been formally prosecuted.<sup>51</sup> In other words, sixteen thousand of the nation's prisoners had not been found guilty of anything. In the investigations following the latest deaths, officials discovered more than eight hundred prisoners who had completed their sentences but were still being held. Among those accused of terrorism, the figures were even worse in 1985: of the one thousand individuals detained on this charge, only sixteen had been sentenced. Given the abominable conditions and dangers in the prisons, the numbers of those caught in the net are disturbing. The Minister of Justice appointed by García in 1985 was moved to ask forgiveness from the country's twenty-six thousand prisoners for the inhuman living conditions that they must endure.<sup>52</sup>

Yet despite the concerns of the Minister of Justice, the most sig-

nificant prison brutality has occurred since the García administration took power, in June of 1986. Following a coordinated mutiny by Sendero Luminoso prisoners in Lurigancho, El Frontón, and Santa Bárbara (the women's prison), the government ordered troops to invade and retake the prisons. El Frontón was shelled and more than 250 prisoners died; at Lurigancho more than 100 prisoners were shot to death at close range after they surrendered. The government's role in handling the prison riots and the cold-blooded murder of inmates who surrendered have dealt a serious blow to the García administration's claims to respect human rights. Although García initially promised strong action against those responsible, to date no significant action has been taken. The commission established to investigate the prison deaths, headed by Rolando Ames of the Izquierda Unida, issued a report on 1 December 1987 condemning President García and his ministers. But the report was signed by only six of the thirteen commission members, having been rejected by the Aprista majority as inaccurate and politically motivated to undermine the government.<sup>53</sup>

For young people, the cultural subtext that accompanies news photos of detentions, the tortured bodies of "subversives," and prison attacks is especially ominous. These messages threaten the self, not Vargas Llosa's remote other but the self who may be caught at any moment in police dragnets to be perhaps released "with a record" (*fichado*) or perhaps tortured and killed. These images portray the state government as violent, capricious, and arbitrary. Prisoners are portrayed both as subhuman animals when they torture other prisoners and as hostages victimized by an arbitrary imprisoning power. The overwhelming message for the populace is that the situation is dangerous and seemingly out of control.

Youths fear the police, and many have friends whom they view as having been falsely accused and unjustly incarcerated. Thorndike's photojournalism and accompanying narratives give voice to such fears: "At times, it was enough just to be young to end up in the police wagons. Enroute to the detention centers, the tragedy became almost entertainment, a laugh, with the officers and their soldiers playing with the fears of those detained, with the muzzles of their machine guns, with the unpredictableness of their respective fates" (Thorndike 1983b, 24).<sup>54</sup>

Young rural migrants living in Lima often fear the police more than they fear Sendero Luminoso. Many feel hopeless in the face of the deteriorating economic situation and interpret the government's inability to deal with the economy as indicating its lack of effectiveness. Their despair leads them to be sympathetic with groups who seem to condemn and challenge the authority that young migrants view as insensitive to their needs and a threat to their well-being.

In examining these examples of the cultural interpretation of violence, it is striking that two disparate situations—the journalists' massacre and the aborted prison revolts—share important cultural issues. First, both events sparked moments of self-examination for Peruvians in the midst of continual crisis. Second, in both cases, Peruvians were left with an intense sense of ambiguity about who were the victims and where the blame should be placed. Tension has mounted over whether to blame individuals, who might also be victims, or to blame larger economic and political structures and social processes. In symbolic terms, at least, these very different events that occurred in contrasting locales have embodied similar, and painful, cultural contradictions.

#### THE VULNERABILITY OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: HOBBS'S STATE OF NATURE

In the *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes painted a scenario of the conditions under which individuals live before they can agree to the establishment of a commonwealth. His description of the state of nature is that of a state of war. Because life is nasty, brutish, and short, individuals employ reason to agree to seek peace, throw down their arms, and turn over authority to the Leviathan, thus creating civil society. Watching recent political events unfold in Peru gives the impression that Peruvian civil society is deteriorating into the state of nature. Hobbes's description of "war of all against all" characterizes in many ways the Peruvian situation in the emergency zones, where guerrilla, soldier, and peasant can be synonymous. Terrorism as it is occurring in Peru today constitutes a struggle over power, legitimacy, and the political meanings of crisis and change.

The current situation reminds us of Hobbes's assertion that the source of a government's legitimacy lies in its ability to protect its citizens from the fear of violent death. As the fear of terrorism has spread in Peru and become part of the repertoire of symbols used by the general population to understand and adapt to violence, the government's legitimacy has been challenged. In the process, the Peruvian state, particularly under Belaúnde, failed Hobbes's minimal test of political legitimacy. García's administration is now being severely tested in the emergency zones, where it has been unable to prevent acts of revenge against the peasantry by its own troops or by Sendero Luminoso, as is attested by the mounting civilian death toll. The government is being further undermined by the glaring mismanagement of its judicial system and prisons and by the growing violence in Lima. In each of these cases, the Peruvian state's claim to legitimate use of coercive powers is open to public question.

Hobbes's political answer to the state of war was the creation of an authoritarian regime whose cornerstone was a powerful and unchecked sovereign. Some observers fear that such a government will become Peru's fate if the violence continues unabated. They argue that if conditions continue to deteriorate, Peruvians will reason that even an authoritarian regime would be preferable to widening conflict. Such a consensus would then pave the way for a military regime similar to recent governments in Chile, Argentina, and Guatemala.

In fact, such a solution has already been tried in Peru in the Ayacucho highlands. On this point, the observations of General Adrián Huamán Centeno, who became military commander of this emergency zone in 1983, are instructive. After a year of command, he concluded: "Here the solution is not military, because if it had been military, I would have resolved it in minutes. If it were a question of destroying Ayacucho, it would not exist for half an hour, nor would Huancavelica. We would be done with the problem. But that is not the answer. What is happening is that we are talking about human beings from the forgotten *pueblos* who have been crying out for 160 years, and no one has paid any attention to them. Now we are reaping the result. . . ."55

These somber words were spoken by neither a radical leftist nor a naive liberal but a tough-minded career military officer. Two days after this interview was published, Huamán was relieved of his command.

#### AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY?

The *Americas Watch Report* published in September 1985, entitled *A New Opportunity for Democratic Authority*, argued that Alan García could inject the government of Peru with new authority based on his claim to popular support. García's inaugural address and early policy decisions charted that direction: reform of the Guardia Civil, formation of a peace commission, a crackdown on the narcotics trade, speedier trials for those in police custody, and an offer of limited amnesty to those not accused of violent acts or murder. As previously noted, some attempts were also made to reorganize the police and purge corrupt officers. Yet despite García's initial peaceful overtures, violence has accelerated, and his government has become implicated. Two subsequent reports from Amnesty International and Americas Watch in 1987 criticized the García administration's behavior in the 1986 prison riots as well as its subsequent failure to prosecute those responsible. The *Americas Watch Report* notes, however, that the number of unresolved disappearances have dropped from some six hundred a year under Belaúnde to one hundred a year under García.<sup>56</sup>

The problems facing the García government would be daunting in a healthy economy. But the combined economic and political crisis facing Peru, including the imposition of "value impaired" status by the

U.S. bank regulators in 1985,<sup>57</sup> suggest that Peru's problems may be intractable. While the economy showed marked growth in 1986, new signs of difficulty emerged in 1987. In December 1987, the government devalued the *inti* by 40 percent. Also, García's surprise decision to nationalize several Peruvian banks in July 1987 deepened investor doubts about the direction of the economy and the government's intentions. This decision also provoked discussion of a possible coup and reawakened the Peruvian right, this time under the leadership of Mario Vargas Llosa.

Yet paradoxically, one aspect of Peru's political history and collective political memory may provide García with some room to maneuver: the widespread belief that the options for an alternative government are extremely limited and—should this government fail—very frightening. The Peruvian public is fully aware of the cruelty of both Sendero activists and the security forces. They have seen refugees from the sierra conflict arrive on the coast, and consequently, they harbor few illusions about the violence that would follow in the wake of a Sendero success in destabilizing the government. The middle classes have also had the opportunity to read Vargas Llosa's *Historia de Mayta*, a fictionalized account of a self-destructive Peru in which chaotic violence thrives along with rumors of great power invasions. Thus an all-out battle between the Peruvian military and the guerrillas is not an attractive option.

For many Peruvians in 1988, the choices appear to be either Alan García and the Apristas or a rightist military government. The idea of a Peruvian Pinochet or Videla is one that most Peruvians would reject. García has tried to wrap himself in the mantle of both Haya de la Torre's Aprismo and the leftist reformist military legacy of Juan Velasco. Many Peruvians view García as their only defense against a society that will grow increasingly violent, plunging the country into scenarios like those described in press accounts of Central America, in the fictional writings of Vargas Llosa, or in Thomas Hobbes's state of nature. Vargas Llosa, in his recent transformations from novelist to political commentator to a leader in the reemergent civilian right, wants to challenge this view. Whether he will succeed in crystalizing discontent with García's experiment in democracy is not yet clear. But Vargas Llosa's entrance into the political arena as a major interpreter of Peruvian violence further underscores our argument that Peruvian politics must be understood as a struggle over cultural meanings as well as a clash of political and economic interests. In Peru today, violence is experienced not as patternless chaos, although some authorities may prefer to portray it that way. Violence is experienced instead as forcefully contested political understandings of governmental legitimacy, police authority, political opposition, democracy, cultural differences, and the roots of deadly conflict.

NOTES

1. The Sendero Luminoso guerrillas want to topple the Peruvian state. This Peruvian movement uses terrorist acts—bombings, political assassinations, and reprisals against communities that sympathize with the government—to prove the vulnerability of the state it seeks to destroy. Sendero uses psychological and physical intimidation in its dealings with the peasantry.
2. This statement is not meant to suggest that the Revolutionary Military Government of the Armed Forces (1968–1980) did not severely limit civil rights. That military government became notorious for being thin-skinned due to its detaining or deporting critics and closing down the opposition press in 1974. It also declared several states of emergency that limited public assembly and protest, the most severe instance lasting from July 1976 to August 1977 (Handelman 1981, 103). For a vivid account of the military government's abuses between 1968 and 1976, see Guillermo Thorndike's *No, mi general* (1976). There is nonetheless a substantial difference between deporting one's opponents and the current pattern of violence, disappearances, torture, and common graves.
3. The current regime also inherited a severe economic crisis that is far from over. While high rates of growth characterized 1986 and the first half of 1987, the government's announcement on 28 July 1987 that it planned to nationalize the banks sparked new fears of inflation and capital flight. This decision, which is reminiscent of the military government's attempts to control the banks, has aroused fears that the negative consequences of the military's policy will also characterize this civilian regime.
4. The Apristas have a long history of seeking national power. Their ideology has drifted from leftist positions in the 1930s and 1940s to compromises with former enemies on the right in the 1950s and 1960s.
5. This conclusion does not dismiss important efforts by APRA and Belaúnde's Acción Popular to organize substantial parts of the electorate to support reform prior to 1968. Saba argues effectively that a common commitment to reform characterizes all Peruvian actors, including Belaúnde, the military, and APRA from at least 1963 on (1987).
6. In the Peruvian context, corporatism has signified a centralized and hierarchical political order in which different sectors (such as miners, agriculturalists, and teachers) were independently tied to the center. This participatory structure was combined with an attempt to mobilize citizen support for a new social order that would take political and economic control away from the old elites and allow Peru to attack problems of internal inequities and international dependencies. Recent scholarly assessments have stressed the conflicting tendencies and ideologies within the military government as explaining its failure after Velasco's illness in 1974 (see Pease García 1977; North 1978).
7. This growth can be perceived easily in the voting patterns. In the 1962 and 1963 elections, the left won an insignificant percentage of the popular vote. But in the voting for the 1978 Asamblea Constituyente, the various leftist parties (the Frente Obrero Campesino Estudiantil, or FOCEP, the Partido Socialista Revolucionario, or PSR, the Partido Comunista Peruano, or PCP-Unidad, and Unidad Democrática Popular, or UDP) included both Marxists and Velasquistas. They polled 28 percent of the vote and won twenty-eight seats in the assembly. These parties also made a strong showing in the 1983 municipal elections in Lima; Alfonso Barrantes of the Izquierda Unida (IU) won the race for mayor with 34 percent of the vote. The IU captured 23 percent of the presidential vote in 1985 and took forty-eight seats in the Cámara de Diputados and sixteen seats in the Senado, in both instances accounting for about 25 percent of the vote. Alliances on the left change from one election to the next, however, and the combined figures do not necessarily indicate an ideologically or programmatically coherent bloc. For a good discussion of Peruvian political alignments and voting patterns in 1978 and 1980, see Handelman (1981).
8. These compromises included the *convivencia* during the Prado regime (1956–1962) and the agreements with former enemy General Manuel Odría in 1963, as well as

- the obstructionism during the first Belaúnde administration (1963–1968). Such opportunism caused some of APRA's youthful members to break away from the party and form APRA Rebelde. These young men retreated to the sierra and the selva to launch an unsuccessful armed struggle.
9. Among the many studies of the Peruvian military regime, the following are especially useful for their treatment of the themes of continuity and change: Palmer (1973, 1984), Scurrah (1986), Lowenthal (1975), Sanders (1981), Handelman (1981), North (1978), and Pease García (1977).
  10. Handelman (1981) discussed the widespread belief that the military government under Morales Bermúdez (1975–1980) attempted an agreement with the Apristas prior to the 1978 elections to the Asamblea Constituyente and the 1980 general elections. In return for allowing the elections and what appeared to be a likely Aprista victory, the military received assurances that no investigations would be made into corruption during their regime. Even if such a deal had been struck, the irony is that Acción Popular and Belaúnde won the elections. The military did not intervene in the change of government.
  11. On the same day, in an act unprecedented in Peru, García was publicly recognized by the military chiefs as the Comandante Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas. See "En la era de los balconzos," *Quehacer* 37 (Oct.–Nov. 1985), p. 8. *Quehacer* is published by DESCO.
  12. That is, the years of military rule and the second Belaúnde administration had left the country in extreme economic difficulty, under a burgeoning debt and pressure from the International Monetary Fund to adapt austerity programs widely believed by Peruvians to be unfair and disproportionately onerous on the poor. Another widespread belief was that both the military government and the civilian administration had lined their pockets by taking funds from the now-bankrupt public coffers.
  13. "Cisneros por el golpe," *Resumen Semanal* 10, no. 441, 16–22 Oct. 1987, p. 3. *Resumen Semanal* is also published by DESCO.
  14. The Lima press, and particularly the pro-Aprista *La República*, emphasized the historical dimensions of García's victory, the latter publication running special sixteen-page supplements with Haya de la Torre's political history and the banner headline proclaiming "En la victoria, presente!" (15 April 1985).
  15. This fear has resurfaced in the current debate over nationalizing the banks. Critics fear that APRA will be the primary beneficiary of the reorganization of the banks and that access to these funds would give the party an unfair advantage over all others.
  16. As Mario Vázquez has pointed out, the García administration is the first to include ministers with authentic Quechua names and a number who were born in the provinces. Further, Alan García himself is not a scion of the elite, being (like Velasco) of middle-class origins.
  17. "Peru Bids for Diplomatic Lead," *Latin American Weekly Review (LAWR)* 85, no. 38, 27 Sept. 1985, pp. 5–6.
  18. Some estimates place the military's share of the Peruvian budget as high as one-third. See "Mass Arms Purchase by Peru," *LAWR* 83, no. 40, 14 Oct. 1983, p. 1. García's calls for a cutback in arms purchases are considered a significant contrast to the previous regime's inability to limit military spending and behavior.
  19. During Belaúnde's first administration, the military's experience in putting down a far less extensive guerrilla movement was credited with convincing a generation of officers of the need for a military government.
  20. For this observation, we are indebted to Mario Vázquez, an Aprista during his university days in the late 1940s. A similar allusion to this process is found in Georges Bruss Huamán's *Un futuro irreverente* (1986), which depicts Peruvian politics in the year 2037. In this mythical future, Sendero Luminoso occupies the center of the political spectrum and has just elected to the presidency a young man who promises "a government for all Peruvians."
  21. Mario Campos, "Monte adentro," *Caretas*, 23 Nov. 1987, pp. 10–17.
  22. Carlos Chávez Toro, "'Rolando' se define," *Caretas*, 16 Nov. 1987, pp. 8–17; and

- "MRTA en Juanjú," *Resumen Semanal* 10, no. 444, 6–12 Nov. 1987, pp. 1–3.
23. The Sendero Luminoso guerrilla movement is a Maoist offshoot of the Peruvian Communist party. For good summaries of Sendero's origins and what is known of its ideology, see Palmer (1986), McClintock (1983, 1984), and Gitlitz (n.d.a, n.d.b). For an early treatment of Sendero activities in Ayacucho, see Pareja (1981), and on Sendero's relations with the Peruvian left, see Mercado (1982). Documents produced by Sendero can be found in Mercado (1987).
  24. For fuller analyses of these stages, see Mercado (1982, 1987) and Palmer (1986).
  25. "Congress Continues Massacre Inquiry," *LAWR* 85, no. 41, 18 Oct. 1985, p. 4.
  26. In retaliation for the raid on the Ayacucho prison, the Sinchis brutally killed three prisoners recovering in the local hospital. The press gave full photographic coverage to this excessive response.
  27. "Spiral of Violence in Ayacucho," *Peru Update* 30 (July 1983):1–3. This periodical is published by Eco-Andes, the Ecumenical Committee on the Andes.
  28. *Andean Focus* 2, no. 2 (May 1985):2.
  29. *Visión*, 19 May 1985, as reported in "Time of Transition," *Andean Focus* 2, no. 3 (Aug. 1985):3.
  30. Roger Cohen, "Peruvians Beset by Faltering Economy, Rising Violence," *The Washington Post*, 9 Oct. 1987, p. 20.
  31. *Quehacer* has published several excellent reports on the recent series of massacres, mass burials, and the Andean exodus. See especially the article by Raúl González, "Sendero: cinco años después de Belaúnde," *Quehacer* 36 (Aug.–Sept. 1985):37–40; and the series entitled "La guerra contra Sendero," which includes articles by Carlos Iván Degregori, Raúl González, Nelson Manrique, and José María Salcedo, *Quehacer* 37 (Oct.–Nov. 1985):52–85. The U.S. Department of State's summary findings can be found in U.S. Department of State (1986). For the best weekly reporting on terrorist acts, see *Resumen Semanal*.
  32. The most famous case of this kind concerns a young reporter, Jaime Ayala, who sought information from the military in Ayacucho and was last seen entering the local barracks. Inquiries about his disappearance were met with denials and silence (Diez Canseco 1985, 4). In many cases, the military claims that those supposed to have disappeared have actually gone off to join Sendero.
  33. Evidence of multiple killings in August and September of 1985 with military involvement was uncovered in the towns of Pucayacu, Accomarca, and Umarm-Bellavista.
  34. Several sources have reported the formation of *rondas campesinas* (peasant night patrols) in a number of highland communities. Originally described by Gitlitz and Rojas (1983) as a local form of community protection against cattle rustlers in the Cajamarca region, the current adaptation involves the local population's organizing to protect themselves from infiltration by Sendero or other outside groups. Recent accounts of military tactics in the emergency zones describe the formation of civil defense committees and the efforts of peasants to avoid serving on these committees by fleeing the rural areas (Salcedo 1985b). In the sense that these groups are organized by the military and peasants are required to join them to avoid being labeled subversive, they recall the security patrols forced on the peasants of Guatemala in the 1980s.
  35. *Hoy* reported that Sendero and the Túpac Amarus (MRTA) had joined forces in several attacks in Lima during June 1985. See "Sendero y Tupacamaras aliados en el crimen," *Hoy*, 5 July 1985, p. 8. By 1987, however, the two groups were fighting one another in the jungle regions, with the Túpac Amarus reporting that Sendero had assassinated some of their guerrillas and that the MRTA had decided to move to a new territory to avoid further conflict. In an interview published in *Caretas*, "Comandante Rolondo" of the MRTA is quoted as saying, "We have profound ideological, political, and methodological differences with Sendero." See interview by Carlos Chávez Toro, "Extraña propuesta de paz," *Caretas*, 16 Nov. 1987, p. 10.
  36. See Alan Riding, "Peruvian President Finds His Charm Is Slipping," *New York Times*, 10 Nov. 1985, p. 1.
  37. The outlying areas of the emergency zones remain areas of intense violence. Peasants who cannot afford to flee to Lima have sought safety in new squatter settle-

- ments surrounding provincial cities like Ayacucho and Huancavelica. See José María Salcedo, "Zona de emergencia: el precio de la paz," *Quehacer* 37 (Oct.–Nov. 1985):70–84.
38. See interview with Carlos Iván Degregori, *Caretas*, 14 Sept. 1987, pp. 34–37.
  39. See "Violencia y amnestia," *Resumen Semanal* 10, no. 439, 2–8 Oct. 1987, p. 3.
  40. This analysis of political memory and photojournalism draws inspiration from the works of such interpretive scholars as Geertz (1973), Todorov (1982), Anderson (1983), Turner and Bruner (1986), and Warren (1978).
  41. For examples of this imagery, see Vargas Llosa (1983), Thorndike (1983b), and Diez Canseco (1985).
  42. In covering "international terrorism," U.S. and European presses have been particularly self-conscious about other issues, mainly the conflicts between the public's right to know about terrorists actions, the presses' unwitting role as a propaganda tool used by terrorists to advance their psychological warfare against Western states, and national governments' desire to intervene and regulate press coverage. See Bassiouni (1982), Kelly and Mitchell (1981), and Theberge and Alexander (1984) for discussions of these dilemmas and analyses of the factors shaping Western coverage.
  43. For background on the Peruvian press and government censorship, see Alisky (1981).
  44. The story line for Vargas Llosa's account is the reconstruction of a tragic quest, complete with the conventional convergence of individual lives and the moral paradoxes of last-minute decisions to join eagerly, to stay behind, or to go without enthusiasm because of friendship. "Inquest in the Andes" is only one of a series of articles written by Vargas Llosa for the *New York Times* for the purpose of interpreting Latin America for North Americans.
  45. For interpretive discussions of the contrast between self and other, see Todorov (1982) and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983).
  46. The theme of Indian peasant populations as the "other" who embodies fatalism, passivity, violence, and danger is a common one in national culture and politics (cf. Campbell 1973 for political examples). In fact, this theme is common to many accounts of the Uchuraccay massacre, despite great differences in their political interpretations (compare Thorndike 1983b and Diez Canseco 1985). For examples of ethnographic portrayals of peasant communities that reveal cultural distinctiveness and patterns of assimilation challenging this imagery, see Isbell (1978) and Bourque and Warren (1981).
  47. See the evolution of one line of skepticism in the following issues of *LAWR*: "Military Claims Sendero Is on the Run," *LAWR* 82, no. 9, 4 Mar. 1983, p. 4; "Massacre Mystery Remains," *LAWR* 83, no. 14, 15 Apr. 1983, p. 4; and "Guerrillas Strike at Andean Capital," *LAWR* 83, no. 20, 27 May 1983, p. 4. See Thorndike (1983a) and Diez Canseco (1985) for the argument that the Sinchis manipulated local populations into murdering and defacing the bodies of strangers who were "Senderista enemies."
  48. Other policies include the Anti-Terrorist Law (Ley Antiterrorista D.L. 046) and the Law of Disrespect (Ley de Desacato 23321), which were drafted to punish anyone "inciting" terrorism or criticizing governmental or military officials while these officials were exercising their duties. Many feared that these laws would be used to limit press freedoms. The Ley de Desacato was repealed in October 1985.
  49. This problem is not endemic to Latin America only. As Larry Rosen observed in a private note, explaining disorder is a tremendous challenge for social scientists who often ground their social analysis in structural-functionalist assumptions about order. For example, how do we neutrally label the Senderistas: as subversives, guerrillas, terrorists, an insurrectionary movement, commandos, or rebels? None of these terms is without political connotations.
  50. *La República*, 29 Dec. 1984, pp. 9–13.
  51. Nelly Apaza Retamozo, "Reorganización del poder judicial será saludable," *Hoy*, 31 Aug. 1985, p. 6.
  52. A confidential report on Peru's judicial system prepared by a West German founda-

- tion found the system to be "inoperative and riddled with corruption." See "Report Condemns Peru's Judiciary," *LAWR* 85, no 8, 22 Feb. 1985, pp. 5–6.
53. See "Entrega de la informe de la Comisión Ames," *Resumen Semanal* 10, no. 447, 27 Nov.–3 Dec. 1987, p. 2.
54. The photograph captures several frightened youths crouching and holding on to each other, surrounded by police prodding their heads with machine guns. The text draws attention to the glint in the eye and the smile of the guardia member standing immediately behind the boys with his machine gun at their heads.
55. Marcos Roncaglio, "Ayacucho necesita una solución política y no solo militar," *La República*, 27 Aug. 1984, pp. 17–24.
56. Alan Riding, "Peru Urged to Curb Abuses in Fighting Rebels," *New York Times*, 20 Dec. 1987, p. 23.
57. "Peru Value Impaired," *LAWR* 85, no. 43, 1 Nov. 1985, p. 7.

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