second-phase, or metonymic, language. This structure of doctrine became increasingly the compulsory means of understanding the Bible; and so, as Cardinal Newman remarked in the nineteenth century, the function of the Bible, for the Church, came to be not to teach doctrine but to prove or illustrate it. What this means in practice, whatever may be true of theory, is that the doctrines of Christian theology form the anti-types of which the stories and maxims in the Bible, including those of the New Testament, are types" (p 85).

This practice, this function of the Bible as purportedly described by Newman (I trust in a spirit of critical disapproval), represents precisely that corruption of dogmatic theology which has led to its alienation from biblical scholarship. It is certainly not true in theory. This book thus reminds us of our theological duty to go on trying to make it cease to be true in practice.

I lack the space to carry out the second part of my programme and say why I personally enjoyed this book. But I will conclude with a little story which is descriptively or demotically true but also says something metonymically if not metaphorically about The Great Code. On the 17th Sunday of the year, Cycle 2, I preached, more or less extempore, on the connection between the first and third readings, respectively the story of Elisha multiplying some loaves and of Jesus feeding the 5,000. To try and help the congregation bring the right frame of mind to reading the Bible I pointed out the typological connection; how behind both stories was the story of the manna in the desert, and how feeding with food is a regular biblical metaphor (or metonym – words I did not use in the sermon) for teaching the Word of God. After Mass a great friend of mine said, I disagreed with your sermon. It does matter whether things actually happened or not". I protested that I had not said it didn't. And then she said that during the sermon her husband had whispered to her "Northrop Frye".

EDMUND HILL OP

THE INNER LONELINESS by Dom Sebastian Moore, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1982. pp 120 £4.95.

This most unusual study of loneliness by the Downside monk, Dom Sebastian Moore (author of God is a New Language) turns upon the distinction between the notion of 'self-image' - the baggage of impressions, feelings and impulses which condition our discursive life - and the existential, punctual 'me existing', the simple awareness of 'being with myself'. Most people today, inured to generations of psycho-analytical probing, have the impression that our problem is with our selfimage. Moore, on the contrary, has become convinced that our real problem is with the sense of 'me existing', because unless that simple sense can be pushed through to a genuine reference point in the simplicity of God as the 'mystery that thinks us', it is fated to consign us to an intense loneliness in face of the partitions of sex and death.

For most people 'me existing' remains an insubstantial notion compared with

their self-image. But paradoxically, the greater our self-knowledge becomes and the closer we are to grasping our very being as subject than as object, the lonelier we also become, according to Dom Sebastian. So "at the heart of men and women and of the whole history of men and women there is a loneliness that all share and that we cannot relieve in each other". It can, in fact, only be relieved by death, that grand eliminator of all limitations, and we cannot meaningfully talk of that ahead of our own deaths. What we can see now, however, is that the tension involved in self-awareness can only be relieved at all through self-exposure to others. We stretch out to that even now with more altruism than we have come to trust ourselves to have. But only in God, the one who is both wholly involved with me and wholly other, can the tension be completely eliminated. Moore sees Nietzsche's madman as a true prophet pointing us to the fearful consequence of sponging away the horizon by denying God and leaving ourselves totally isolated from each other.

A large part of this book is either explicitly or implicitly to do with sexuality. Dom Sebastian finds a close connection between his central theme and being at one with oneself sexually. Lovers of God, he says, should have 'better relationships'; but the way to these relationships must be 'intraself friendship' with its root in God, an entering into one's own sexual (and therefore deepest) identity, not through direct one-to-one exchange with a complementary partner, but by going beyond all partners to God who is the locus of all sexual identity and through him loving others with God's illimitable love.

Moore is quite drastic in encouraging us to 'embrace' our own hedonism and narcissism of which he believes Christian tradition has been mistakenly afraid. "Our biggest obstacle to believing in God", he says, "is our innate distrust of happiness." He associates our highest happiness with our being wanted for our complete selves, and those complete selves are sexual in the deepest (non-functional) sense — being for

others in love. Sexual identity he defines as the "most intimate visible signature on a person's selfhood" and has less to do with the functions of mating than with our capacity for altruism towards others from within our ultimate and highly particular security in God. The scandal of particularity — 'gentlemen this way, ladies that', as C. S. Lewis put it in A Grief Observed — is in this writer's view the only way in which altruism can operate in creatures, but it has to operate through God, otherwise its very particularity paralyses.

This is a very difficult book. Despite its extremely short chapters and constant recapitulations, it is demanding on the attention. But it is not jargon-ridden, and the effort to penetrate its thought is deeply rewarding.

As an Orthodox, I was fascinated by the many psychological insights which made 'western' sense of our doctrine of theosis (participation in the divine nature), a concept vital to reconciliation one might argue inasmuch without sharing in the loving heart of God we have little hope of keeping our finger off the button.

JUDITH PINNINGTON

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC by A. C. Grayling. The Harvester Press, Sussex, Barnes & Noble Books, New Jersey, 1982. pp 300. £6.95 p/b.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION by Kai Nielsen. Macmillan, 1982. pp xii + 218. £14.00 h/b, £4.95 p/b.

Philosophical logic is hard to define, but its importance as a branch of philosophy is now acknowledged. Dr Grayling's new book covers most of the topics associated with it, and there are chapters on propositions, necessity, existence and predication, truth, meaning, and verification. Authors discussed in some detail include Austin, Davidson, Dummett, Kripke, Quine, Russell, Strawson, Tarski, and Wittgenstein. The blurb on the cover of the book is accurate. Grayling 'provides a clear and comprehensive account of the major issues in metaphysics and the philosophy of language as these are dealt with in contemporary philosophy . . . The book as a whole constitutes a survey of the views of some of the twentieth century's leading

thinkers . . . The references constitute an extensive bibliography of the relevant philosophical literature, and throughout the book technical terms and concepts are carefully explained and analysed'.

There are aspects of Grayling's study with which I am unhappy. It gives little indication of the way in which some currently popular views were anticipated and discussed in classical and medieval philosophy. And the virtues of certain theories are sometimes obscured by Grayling's account. Thus, for example, one gets little sense of the strength of the so-called 'Redundancy' theory of truth, associated with F. P. Ramsey and, in one form, ably defended by Williams, whose What is Truth? (Cambridge, 1976) goes entirely unmen-