

teenth-century Russian historians, and an account by a Soviet historian. Five of the twelve readings have been translated from Russian into English by Professor Dmytryshyn.

Except for the Soviet account by M. V. Nechkina, which offers little in the way of interpretation, the readings on Peter—by Perry, Weber, Vockerodt, Shcherbatov, and Kliuchevskii—are excellent and should contribute much to the students' understanding of Peter's reign and its significance. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the readings on Catherine, which stress the old themes of vanity, hypocrisy, and superficiality, and say little about her modernizing reforms outside the realm of art and culture. After Shcherbatov and Masson something more than Ikonnikov is needed to explain how anyone could ever have thought of Catherine as "great." Especially objectionable is the implied contrast between Peter's *ukazy*, introduced by the heading "modernization by administrative decrees," and Catherine's *nakaz*, introduced by the heading "modernization through plagiarism." Catherine issued her share of decrees and Peter also plagiarized. To retain the parallel treatment implicit in the format, the editor might have done better to replace the *Instruction* with excerpts from Catherine's decrees on such subjects as monopolies, local government, town planning, colonization, nobles' rights, and schools.

Nevertheless, Professor Dmytryshyn's anthology, for its length and purpose is superior to many, and his conscientious effort to make interesting and worthwhile material on eighteenth-century Russia easily accessible to the students and teachers in European survey courses is most welcome.

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RUSSIA IN WAR AND PEACE. By *Alan Palmer*. New York: Macmillan, 1972. 224 pp. Illus. \$10.00.

This handsomely illustrated book seems designed for the coffee table. The author aims "to place the events of these momentous years from 1805 to 1814 in their historical context, providing not a commentary on Tolstoy's masterpiece but an introductory survey of the Russia in which he set his greatest work" (p. 9). A topical survey roughly from late Muscovy to the nineteenth century runs for over half the book before arriving at the period of the great novel.

Readers of Mr. Palmer's *Napoleon in Russia* will find the familiar lively and lucid style, but many more illustrations from all possible sources—medals, coins, coats of arms, printed handkerchiefs, portraits, landscapes, caricatures, blockprints, city plans, and the Soviet film version of *War and Peace*. The list of acknowledgments shows the energy and care with which the author assembled these visual aids. Only occasionally are the captions unhelpful, as when a painting from the Mansell collection showing peasants in a barn in various postures of idling is called a typical Russian factory.

The maps are inferior to those in his earlier book on this period: a map on the battle of Austerlitz does not show Lambach, Anstetten, Melk, the Inn River, Hollabrunn, Schöngraben, Wischau or Olmütz—all cited in the text. "Semenouskoe" appears three times in the text. The map for Borodino does not show the positions of the Shevardino redoubt or Barclay's army. There are a number of

strange statements: the Cossacks are descended from the horsemen of the Mongol steppes (p. 110); by the end of the wars in Europe (1815) "it had become clear that the one luxury the Russian nobility could not afford was the stagnant institution of serfdom" (p. 99). (Clear to whom besides the handful of Decembrists?) The famous cadet corpus is called the "Shlyakhterly" (p. 113). Napoleon at Erfurt "confirmed his willingness to see . . . the Danubian Principalities incorporated into Russia" (p. 146). (True, but only on the unacceptable condition that the French empire annex Silesia as compensation.) Kutuzov is portrayed as the pupil of Suvorov (p. 118) in military tactics. (But can one imagine Suvorov letting Napoleon escape the trap at Berezina?)

The text is drawn largely upon British memoirs—Ter Porter, the Wilmots, General Sir John Wilson, Lyall and J. A. Carr. It is clear from the exposition, however, that the author has read a great deal besides the quoted memoirs and items of his select bibliography. The background chapters show a skill in concise and vivid statement which will be appreciated by lecturers who must try to cover a millennium in the first semester.

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THE LION OF TASHKENT: THE CAREER OF GENERAL M. G. CHERNIAEV. By *David MacKenzie*. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1974. xx, 267 pp. \$11.00.

In recent years a growing number of Western scholars have become engaged in the study of nineteenth-century Russian conservatism. Some have focused their attention upon the careers and impact of major conservative figures and have produced important biographies—of the statesman K. P. Pobedonostsev, the publicists M. N. Katkov and K. N. Leontev, the biologists/philosophers N. I. Danilevskii and N. N. Strakhov, as well as a number of Slavophiles including A. S. Khomiakov, I. S. Aksakov, and I. Kireevskii. Others have been busy translating and editing the writings of these and similar exponents of conservative thought, while still others (such as Robert Byrnes, Edward Thaden, Hans Rogger, and Richard Pipes) have sought to come to grips with the broader dimensions and problems of Russian conservatism. To this welcome development in Western historiography of nineteenth-century Russia can now be added David MacKenzie's newly published biography of General M. G. Cherniaev, one of the premier military figures of the last century, whose career coincided with the reigns of Nicholas I, Alexander II, and Alexander III.

About Cherniaev's conservatism there can be no doubt. Here was a man who more than anyone else was responsible for extending Russian imperialism in Central Asia during the 1860s; who was the hero of the Pan-Slavic movement by virtue of his active support of Serbian liberation from the Ottoman Empire and his vociferous demand for South Slav unification with Russia; and who spoke out repeatedly against the reforms of Alexander II and his liberal advisors. His actions and views made him the darling of Russian conservatives and the *bête noire* of the liberals. To the former "he was a patriot and hero unfairly vilified and persecuted by the military establishment, bureaucrats, foreigners, and radicals." To the latter "he was a reactionary intriguing against overdue reforms, a soldier-adventurer threatening to involve Russia in needless conflicts" (p. xviii). Perhaps more sig-