MILITARY AND SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA

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THE MILITARY IN SOUTH AMERICAN POLITICS. By GEORGE PHILIP. (London, Sydney, and Dover, N.H.: Croom Helm, 1985. Pp. 394. $37.50.)

EL ESTADO MILITAR EN AMERICA LATINA. By ALAIN ROUQUIE. (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1984. Pp. 433.)

SENTINELS OF EMPIRE: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICAN MILITARISM. By JAN KNIPPERS BLACK. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986. Pp. 240. $35.00.)

MILITARY RULE IN CHILE: DICTATORSHIP AND OPPOSITIONS. Edited by J. SAMUEL VALENZUELA and ARTURO VALENZUELA. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Pp. 331. $35.00.)

ONGANIA, LEVINGSTON, LANUSSE: LOS MILITARES EN LA POLITICA ARGENTINA. By RUBEN M. PERINA. (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1983. Pp. 267.)

EL PROYECTO POLITICO MILITAR. By AUGUSTO VARAS and FELIPE AGÜERO. (Santiago: FLACSO, 1984. Pp. 279.)

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LATIN AMERICAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES: CASE STUDIES OF VENEZUELA AND ARGENTINA. By ROBERT E. LOONEY. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath, 1986. Pp. 325. $39.00.)

MILITARIZATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS RACE IN LATIN AMERICA. By AUGUSTO VARAS. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. Pp. 160. $28.00.)

THE LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTION. Edited by ROBERT WESSON. (New York: Praeger, 1986. Pp. 234. $37.95.)

TORTURE IN BRAZIL: A SHOCKING REPORT ON THE PERVASIVE USE OF TORTURE BY BRAZILIAN MILITARY GOVERNMENTS, 1964–1979, SECRETLY PREPARED BY THE ARCHDIOCESE OF SÃO PAULO. Edited by JOAN DASSIN. Translated by JAIME WRIGHT. (New York: Random House, 1986. Pp. 238. $10.95.)

With the passing of most of the authoritarian regimes once dominant in South America has come a rethinking of bureaucratic authoritarianism, the theoretical perspective developed to explain the rise of

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those regimes. For students of Latin American politics, the near future promises less devotion to grand theories and more attention to structures of political influence, to the behavior of particular political actors, and to the nature of policy-making processes. Latin Americanists seem predisposed to global explanations, so we may have trouble accepting the theoretical anarchy accompanying a diversity of research efforts, but our general understanding of politics will probably benefit if scholars feel less constrained by the need to fit their results into some framework that is soon to be jettisoned.

The study of the military's involvement in politics has long been a major regional preoccupation. This concern will continue because the recent decline in authoritarian regimes surely does not spell the end of militarism as a potent force in Latin American politics. The ten books reviewed here, a recent sampling of Latin Americanist research on the military and society, are too diverse in scope and method for a purely thematic discussion. Three are historical syntheses covering Latin America as a whole; three are country studies with varying degrees of topical concentration; and four focus on selected aspects of militarism, including expenditures on the armed forces, the arms race, the military institution as a profession, and the repressive record of the Brazilian regime. Together, they raise intriguing questions and add significantly to our grasp of the military phenomenon.

Three Historical Syntheses

George Philip's *The Military in South American Politics* has a particularly unpromising, even amateurish appearance. Printed in badly spaced manuscript type, with so little ink that it is barely readable, the book's high price makes it a candidate for early remaindering. Such a fate would be a shame because Philip offers a lucid and rewarding discussion of the full range of military involvement in political life. Employing comparative analysis of secondary sources rather than primary research, he has produced a thorough and persuasive book.

Philip begins by showing the inadequacy of four general theories of Latin American military behavior. Liberalism (also known as modernization theory), which argued that militarism would decrease with economic development, foundered on the wave of military takeovers in the most economically developed nations. Neorealism, which suggested that the military's interest in growth could make it progressive, was weakened by cross-national studies showing that military regimes were no more successful than civilians in promoting economic change. Theories of praetorian society (by Samuel Huntington and others) erred in positing constant relationships among economic growth, mass mobilization, and social polarization. Instead, mobilization took place with

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little polarization (Venezuela after 1958); polarization occurred with little mobilization (Peru in 1931); and economic growth even led to lower tensions (postwar Ecuador). Finally, theories stressing the middle-class ties of military officers sought to explain why professionalization failed to reduce the frequency of military intervention, but such theories typically defined class vaguely, ignored the caste quality of military recruitment, and failed to distinguish between the professional and class motivations of military behavior.

Philip then shows the ambitious system-building of the 1970s—system-building that produced dependency theory and bureaucratic authoritarianism—to be equally inadequate. Empirical predictions often proved wrong, and anti-institutional biases left little room for explorations of the internal dynamics of military bureaucracies, explorations that were sorely needed as the military regimes of the Southern Cone unraveled.

According to Philip, the military should be understood as an institution with a particular viewpoint and behavior. In most South American countries (but generally not in Central America) the military has developed a "political professionalism" characterized by autonomous organization and a distinctive political outlook. Political professionalism creates a generally conservative military that dislikes civilian politicians and accepts popular mobilization only when the high command is not threatened. The professional military is not isolated in its barracks—indeed, it maintains contacts with civilian advisors, technocrats, the U.S. embassy, and the press—but it resists total integration into patterns of civilian stratification.

After presenting a series of case studies that includes extended treatments of recent military regimes in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile plus shorter treatments of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Uruguay, Philip establishes the underlying logic of military involvement. Stratification is important: In South America, cleavages are based on class, not on religion or ethnicity, and the South American military is united by its class basis. Size is important: Most South American countries are populous and wealthy enough to maintain professional military establishments, and professionalism permits military rule without an undermining of military discipline. Interests are important: The military uses its access to power to enrich itself and supply its institutional needs.

At the same time, however, the actual mechanisms through which the military exercises power—direct rule, blackmail, or behind-the-scenes influence—follow no general pattern, and military rule leads to a variety of economic policies. Generalizations therefore become impossible because a military that puts maintaining the institution first is unlikely to retain any coalition partner or policy that threatens it as an institution.

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Another approach to the grand synthesis is taken by Alain Rouquié in *El estado militar en América Latina*. Rouquié is interested not in the causes of military intervention but in mechanisms of militarization and processes of military domination. He virtually ignores such macrotheories as bureaucratic authoritarianism in favor of a case-by-case emphasis on the conduct of the protagonists and the political and social structures conditioning military behavior.

Rouquié begins by discussing the growth of the armed forces as a political factor and the relations between the birth of the armed forces and the construction of Latin American states. He next focuses on the soldierly profession *qua* profession, then treats the political activities of the new military institutions of the 1920s and 1930s, the effects of U.S. domination, and the dependence of Latin America's militaries on the United States.

In the second part, Rouquié explores the varieties of Latin American military power. Separate chapters are devoted to "archaic patrimonial dictatorships" (such as Nicaragua under the Somozas), constitutional governments with civilian supremacy (such as Costa Rica), transitions from apparently stable democratic governments to military dictatorships (such as Chile), praetorian republics and military factions (such as Brazil), and temporarily progressive military phases (such as Peru). Rouquié is drawn by the uniqueness of each case. Why was Velasco a progressive in Peru? The Peruvian armed forces defended the oligarchy for fifty years before 1968, so no explanation can be based on the social origins of the officers. Social isolation as an explanation fares no better because the right-wing Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean militaries were equally alone. Peru's antiguerrilla struggle may have been traumatic, but similar efforts elsewhere had less dramatic effects on the officer corps. Finally, the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM) cannot be the source of leftist influence because many of the 1968 revolutionaries (including Velasco) never passed through CAEM.

Emphasizing the uniqueness of each case helps more in disproving extant theories than in constructing new ones. Rouquié, however, is so little interested in revealing an underlying logic behind military behavior that he is content to discuss each case in isolation from the others. In the end, his deliberately atheoretical style becomes slightly maddening. Rouquié does not lack hypotheses or questions, but to ask, for example, whether the armed forces are politically monolithic is to answer the question. Also, of what value is a hypothesis that asks whether soldiers and civilians are always in separate and hostile camps?

A more popular attempt at historical synthesis is found in Jan Knippers Black's *Sentinels of Empire*. With a clarity of prose likely to

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make her work accessible to most students, Black begins with a useful introduction to Latin American society. Substantive chapters then deal with the expansion of the role of the military in the 1960s, military rule and public policy, military withdrawal in the late 1970s, Central America, and the Carter and Reagan administrations.

In Black's view, coups in countries like Brazil are basically middle-class phenomena: "A large, unproductive middle class with acquired tastes, wholly dependent upon the government itself, can swiftly turn reactionary when the economic pie begins to shrink" (p. 55). What is meant here by the term *middle class*? The bourgeoisie is not middle-class, but in Brazil it was the bourgeoisie rather than the middle class that mobilized for a coup years before the event itself. Why is the Brazilian middle class "unproductive"? With whom is it being compared—the North American middle class? Finally, what are "acquired tastes"? Why should the tastes of an essentially European population differ from those of North Americans? Should Brazilians be buying woven baskets and hammocks?

Black's emphasis on the social origins of military intervention leads to a devaluation of internal political processes. In the Brazilian case, for example, her treatment of the 1964 coup misses the breakdown of party alignments in the pre-1964 congress that led to a legislative stalemate and a presidential-congressional deadlock. In discussing the Bolivian regime in the late 1950s under the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), Black suggests that organized labor's opposition to the government's stabilization plan, a plan largely imposed by the United States and the International Monetary Fund, led the MNR leadership to cultivate the military as a counterweight to the armed militias (p. 47). But did not the enormous deficits run up by the populist administrations of Paz Estensorro and Siles Suazo make some sort of austerity inevitable? Even without outside intervention, the middle-class leaders of the MNR would have turned to the military for protection when they abandoned their lower-class supporters. Similarly, Black's claim that "Argentina, and, particularly, Chile followed policies of deindustrialization that nullified several decades of economic development" misses the crucial difference between the cases (p. 65). Neoliberalism was never accepted in Argentina as it was in Chile because the Argentine military was so heavily involved in the economy that it would permit neither Chilean-style tariff reduction nor Chilean levels of working-class unemployment. The U.S. government and the "Chicago Boys" bear a substantial share of the guilt for the disasters in the Southern Cone, but Black's view of politics is too conspiratorial and, in the end, too simple.

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Country Studies

The edited volume by J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, *Military Rule in Chile,* is certainly one of the best works currently available on the regime of General Augusto Pinochet. Because the book seeks to cover the entire spectrum of economic, political, and social change in Chile since 1973 and because the armed forces stayed aloof from Chicago-dominated economic policy, most of the articles perforce say little or nothing about the military. Only Genaro Arriagada Herrera's "The Legal and Institutional Framework of the Armed Forces in Chile" deals explicitly with the armed forces.

How was Pinochet able to control the Chilean Army? Arriagada leaves aside questions of pay, institutional interests (such as acquiring weapons), and the ideological affinity between the army and Pinochet to focus on the legal mechanisms that guaranteed the president's ascendance. His fusion of the positions of head of state and army chief of staff gave the president power over all technical military decisions and helped him establish a new line of command running from members of the junta to the president. Pinochet's repeal of the old-age retirement rules politicized promotions and reinforced his own circle. His army officers dominated DINA, the centralized intelligence agency responsible for repression, even though it was intended to be subordinate to the junta and staffed by all the military branches.

These measures resulted (particularly since 1979) in a domination by the Chilean Army that has restored a version of its long tradition of professionalism, a tradition that had begun to erode in 1969 with General Roberto Viaux's "Tacnazo" rebellion and had finally collapsed in 1973. Arriagada thus views Pinochet as "recomposing" a distorted version of the old tradition, a "tarnished professionalism" (*profesionalismo desvirtuado*). To paraphrase George Philip, the Chilean Army has become Central Americanized.

Arriagada's methodology is essentially legalistic, and he relies on official sources. The persuasiveness of the argument is a tribute to his scholarship, but in the end, a legalistic approach leaves unanswered a key question: Why did the Chilean Army accept Pinochet's domination so calmly?

Onganía, Levingston, Lanusse: los militares en la política argentina is a translation of Rubén Perina's dissertation for the University of Pennsylvania. Although Perina focuses on a period that scholars have often categorized as a failed attempt to install a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, he does not address this question. Instead, Perina envisions Argentina as a long-term failure of political institutionalization and a case of "Huntingtonian" political decay. In the dissertation tradition, Perina seeks to test a specific set of hypotheses: Is economic develop-

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ment associated with military regimes? Is the military more effective than civilian leadership in promoting and managing economic development? Do military regimes serve the immediate interests of the conservative middle class, or do they promote national, rather than class, interests? Are they more stable politically than civilian regimes?

For Perina, Argentina before 1966 was a praetorian society. Social forces acted "nakedly" without mediation by political institutions that could moderate and refine conflict. Political opposition was fragmented and disloyal, and the Peronistas were uncooperative. The Illía administration could contain neither labor nor business; elections provided little legitimacy; the presidency became powerful but overloaded; and the president himself was perceived as immobile and ineffective. As the cohesion and organization of the armed forces increased, the military believed that it alone could lead the country to prosperity and stability.

Would the military lead Argentina from the morass? At the start, inflation declined, tax revenues rose, reserves climbed, and the deficit shrank. Then, in 1969, came the "Cordobazo," and with that social explosion in the city of Córdoba, the economy began to deteriorate. For Perina, "The decline . . . is essentially the result of the loss of legitimacy and authority on the part of the Onganía government" (p. 122). "Political decay," in the form of the Cordobazo, triggered the decline in economic confidence.

The Cordobazo certainly was no boon to Argentina's economic growth, but its responsibility for the ensuing debacle remains unclear. The Cordobazo was essentially a local problem linked to the automobile industry and the deteriorating working conditions of autoworkers. Foreign investors may have been scared away by the Cordobazo, but similar events elsewhere (such as the recent rebellions of Brazilian sugar workers) have been met more equanimously by investors, particularly when governments have attempted mediation. Moreover, the Cordobazo was no exogenous shock, no act of God. It began as a reaction to the inevitable hardships of Adalberto Krieger Vasena's economic policy.

Perina's explanation for the military's failure follows a Huntingtonian line: Onganía's exclusion of the majority from any sort of participation led to a decline in prosperity, a loss of legitimacy, and instability. Alone, an ideologically fragmented military could not institutionalize its own rule. Military officials viewed politics with distaste, and once in power their discipline and cohesiveness vanished. In the end, the regime faced decision-overload. Argentina was too politicized and too differentiated for such a narrowly based government.

If any society in Latin America could fit the praetorian model, it would be Argentina. But when a model's predictions have been falsified cross-nationally, they can no longer serve as explanations for individual cases. Although Huntington classified Chile and Uruguay as non-

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praetorian societies, it is now clear that coups can occur in the most "civic" of polities. Likewise, it is evident that mass participation can exist in the absence of social polarization or decay.

Without question, military regimes in the more prosperous Latin countries have been unable to institutionalize themselves, but a decay argument is a short-run explanation—that is, it should reveal specifically why Onganía's administration was such a failure. Decay can be only a partial explanation at best because Onganía's errors in economic policy were at least as important a cause of decay as they were its consequence.

Clearly, analysts need to understand the military mind. Toward this end, Augusto Varas and Felipe Agüero's *El proyecto político militar* seeks to illuminate the Byzantine thinking of Chile's military over the whole course of the twentieth century. The authors' substantial theoretical introduction is followed by excerpts from articles published in military periodicals between 1901 and 1977. These documents are grouped by themes: armed forces and society, state and economy, politics, hemispheric defense, and national security.

Is there a core military ideology? Varas and Agüero believe there is, and their documents support them. At the center of military thinking lies an organic conception of the state that begins with the idea of a human mass occupying a territory. According to this view, the state includes a vital nucleus (or "heartland"), a "hinterland" that nourishes the nucleus, frontiers, and a communications or nervous system. States go through cycles of birth, development, and death. The concept of *sovereignty* denotes independence from other states, the capacity of the state to transform itself without losing its identity. *Power* is defined as the organization of the population to dominate the space and inhabitants of a state in order to carry out the state's will. The state thus becomes a "biogeographic" phenomenon.

Chilean military thinking stresses the "internal front," a conception involving various aspects of society: geography, natural resources, education, quality of government, and industrial capacity. "National security" becomes the "vision of the permanent goals of every sovereign country and the coordination of civilian activities with the armed forces in order to safeguard independence and national integrity" (p. xxv). The military's concept of "total war" requires the involvement of the entire population and the marshaling of resources to fight on four fronts: invasion, internal subversion, international pressure, and economic growth. The armed forces become, within the organicist model and the doctrine of national security, the skeleton of society.

Perhaps the foregoing sounds a bit crazy, but Varas and Agüero argue persuasively that such ideas were the result of early German training coupled with Cold War ideology.[1] Still, why did some sense not

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penetrate military thinking? According to Varas and Agüero, the isolation of the Chilean military after the end of the Ibáñez administration in the 1930s led to the development of a "segregationist" model. Social isolation left the military without political direction—it became, in a sense, an "orphan." The military was not forced to develop a real political project until it became the government and had to deal with civilian groups, but at that point military ideology made it impossible for the armed forces to articulate class interests. In the future, the overidentification between the military's institutional and governmental orientations could lead to exhaustion. Varas and Agüero believe the military will reject national security doctrines only when it is reintegrated under civil direction. One suspects that the authors do not regard the "tarnished professionalism" of the Pinochet regime as the right solution.

Aspects of Militarism

Robert Looney's *Political Economy of Latin American Defense Expenditures* is unabashedly empirical. Looney asks why some countries spend more on the military than others, what consequences military spending has on economic growth, and what sorts of trade-offs exist between military spending and other government programs. Although he reviews previous findings on each of these topics, Looney relies on econometric analysis rather than theory. This approach represents something of a novelty to Latin Americanists, but within the general sphere of political science, Looney would be considered an old-fashioned data cruncher.

Military spending in Latin America turns out to be determined differently in richer and poorer countries. In poorer countries, the military is financed by external borrowing and domestic public deficits; in more affluent countries, it is financed by budgetary and balance-of-payments surpluses. Thus for poorer countries, military spending represents a much greater financial drain.

Looney makes an important contribution in distinguishing between countries with and without domestic arms production. In countries producing their own arms, increased military expenditures affect overall economic growth positively. In countries constrained by limitations on foreign exchange and lacking domestic arms production, bigger military expenditures lessen growth. For countries like Argentina and Brazil, this finding provides a rationale for military spending. Expenditures on the armed forces create jobs yet produce nothing consumable, but if armaments can be sold abroad, military spending is effectively exchanged for consumables.[2] Whether arms exports are the kind of industry that one wants to stimulate is another question.

What sort of trade-offs exist between spending on the military

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and spending on other government programs? Looney examines thirteen Latin American countries between 1977 and 1983. Focusing on the relationship between the share of the central government budget going to the military and the share going to social programs, he identifies countries whose military-social trade-off is positive and countries whose trade-off is negative. No serious explanation is offered for the distinction, although Looney presents another scholar's classification of Latin American countries in the 1970s by ideologies and levels of state intervention (p. 98). This typology labels Uruguay, Bolivia, and Peru "non-Marxist but socialist"—not a very helpful distinction.

Trade-offs between military spending and other governmental programs are a venerable topic in comparative politics. Looney's measurement of trade-offs separately in each country has an inherent and crippling drawback: the runs of data are so short that additional independent variables cannot be evaluated. With these mini-regressions, one cannot even distinguish military regimes from civilian regimes. Unless the countries are pooled, no political explanation of trade-offs is possible.

Recognizing the limitations of his comparative analyses, Looney then undertakes two case studies of military spending. Examining post-1961 Argentina, he finds that regime type helps explain military expenditures. Military regimes spent the most, and the Peronists (between 1973 and 1975) spent the least. Moreover, military regimes shifted resources both to economic development and to the military, while civilians shifted resources to social services. Looney found no relation between administration (such as Acción Democrática) and military spending in post-1950 Venezuela. Although technical errors weaken Looney's results, these analyses raise suggestive questions. Are there trade-offs between the military and social programs that vary by administration? Are there *intra*-administration changes affecting trade-offs? Looney does not carry his analysis that far, but the direction is clear.

In spite of its errors, *The Political Economy of Latin American Defense Expenditures* is important. Econometric analysis of military expenditures enhances knowledge of the forces driving the military budget, while delineating intergovernmental trade-offs helps identify the coalition partners of military and civilian regimes. As reliable data become available for longer periods of time, quantitative analyses should prove even more revealing.[3]

Augusto Varas's *Militarization and the International Arms Race in Latin America* is as much about militarism in general as about the spread of weapons in Latin America, and it repeats much of the ideological discussion of Varas and Agüero's study of Chile. Unique to this book, however, is the contention that Latin America is playing host to a generalized arms race: "Militarization can be defined as an overemphasis

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on the importance of armed forces, and one of its manifestations is the ongoing buildup of arms" (p. 27). One cause of the arms race is the rising importance of financial sectors. "Financial technocrats argue the benefits of abundant monetary resources, allocated to military expenditures and to investment in domestic industry. They tend to promote reductions in all expenditures except military investment and to demand balanced budgets" (p. 30). Varas's reasoning seems confused. It is true that neoliberalism in the Southern Cone elevated the financial sectors, but neoliberals were rarely interested in investing in domestic industry. Moreover, technocrats like Argentina's José Martínez de Hoz considered the military and its economic interests to be a major obstacle to their plans to shrink the state.

Is there an arms race in Latin America? Varas's own data show that Brazilian military expenditures peaked in 1973. Military expenditures in Colombia did not begin to rise until after guerrilla and drug threats in 1982. Military spending in Ecuador and Peru declined steadily after 1977, and Venezuelan military expenditures peaked in 1975. According to Looney, all these countries produce arms, and thus their economic growth should benefit from military spending. Why did it decline?

Varas assumes a unanimity of views among governing coalitions dominated by the military and financial technocrats. This portrayal may accurately describe post-1973 Chile, but it is less applicable elsewhere. In most Latin American countries, the military's budget share has declined since World War II. Spending on the military competes with demands for spending on other programs. Unless the military dominates the government or can persuade civil society that subversion is imminent, the armed forces are weak budgetary competitors. It would be surprising if the Chicago Boys were happy with Chile's sharp increases in military spending because Chilean arms production is much smaller (relative to overall military expenditures) than arms production in Brazil or Argentina and the industry is not a major exporter.[4]

If Varas's argument for the existence of an arms race is somewhat exaggerated, his call for the reintegration of the military into civil society hits the mark. National security doctrines have enormously damaged Latin America, and although the intellectual isolation of the armed forces is only one contributor to the development of military doctrines, it is a source that civilian leadership should move to change. Varas argues persuasively for civilian participation in the formulation of defense policy and for military participation in civilian institutions. Concrete steps might include integrating military schools with civilian schools and universalizing the military draft.

A useful complement to Varas's focus on Chile is the volume edited by Robert Wesson, *The Latin American Military Institution*. Institu-

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tional aspects of the military in nine important countries are considered by Wesson and his contributors (Gene Bigler, David Fleischer, Anthony Gray, Richard Millett, David Scott Palmer, Steve Ropp, Paul Sigmund, and Stephen Wager). Because each contributor wrote country sections of topical chapters rather than separate country chapters, the coverage is more complete than in most edited volumes, with chapters on the lower ranks, the origins and training of officers, career patterns, foreign influences, interservice relations, ideology and doctrine, and political roles. Useful information abounds.[5] One learns, for example, that in Peru forty-seven of fifty-two army officers went to public high schools, while in Brazil 90 percent of the 1960s generation of officers had entered the military academic system by age twelve. As a result, the Brazilian armed forces are highly inbred. Wesson's volume thus reinforces Varas's conception of the military as a separate and ingrown institution that remains distant from civil society.

Conclusion

The books reviewed here are diverse in scope, focus, and method. They tell a lot about specific military administrations, particular determinants of military behavior, and important aspects of the military as an institution. Do we now know enough about some aspects of the military but too little about others? Should Latin Americanists begin to concentrate on critical lacunae?

One lesson of these books is that the military cannot be understood—whether in power or out—without analyzing nonmilitary political actors. In the authoritarian regimes of the Southern Cone, crucial roles were played by financial technocrats and civilian politicians. If we seek to explore the relationship between military spending and economic growth, we need to grasp the macroeconomic models implicit in the minds of economic policymakers. If we wonder about the military's efforts to legitimize itself, especially in countries like Brazil, we need to comprehend the behavior of civilian politicians who link the generals to local electorates.

Consider the question of trade-offs between military spending and other government programs. Analyzing country by country, Looney found varying trade-off patterns. My own research goes further, uncovering multiple patterns even among military regimes themselves. Such findings imply that the military chooses different partners at different times. Explaining the development of these coalitions requires as much analysis of nonmilitary actors as of military leaders.

These books offer a second lesson: Serious empirical research has no substitute. It is frustrating to find doctoral theses relying on secondary analysis. Research on the military is usually difficult, occasionally

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even dangerous. Still, the decline of authoritarian regimes should produce a spate of documents and memoirs, and the rise of competitive regimes may once again allow research based on interviews.

Many other avenues for further work are potentially profitable, from replicating the documentary analysis of Varas and Agüero to assessing the military's reactions to its own failures in economic management. But perhaps the best advice is to do whatever seems interesting. We seem now to be without a dominant theoretical paradigm, and because there are no aspects of the military on which closure has been reached, the coming years should be a period of exploration and experimentation in studies of Latin militaries.

Finally, one more book: *Torture in Brazil*, an English version of *Brasil: Nunca Mais*. This work reminds us that the questions discussed in this essay are not merely academic. Ably edited and introduced by Joan Dassin, *Torture in Brazil* is a translation of an abridged set of documents from seven hundred complete military trials of more than seven thousand prisoners between 1964 and 1979. Lawyers associated with the Catholic Church copied more than one million pages of official records, and thirty-five researchers spent over five years analyzing the material. Their report shows that although repression affected fewer people in Brazil than in Argentina or Chile, it was every bit as brutal and repulsive. Moreover, Brazil's torturers are protected by an amnesty legislated by the Figueiredo administration. *Torture in Brazil* asks the right question: Should the torturers also be granted moral amnesty? I would go further: Can society be truly demilitarized as long as the armed forces are immune from legal and moral judgment?

NOTES

1. For a comparably curious expression of Brazilian military thinking, see Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Planejamento Estratégico* (Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1981).
2. Defense apologists often argue that increases in defense spending produce increases in GNP, but their models assume that money not spent on the military will not be spent at all, that the government will not spend it somewhere else. But if one believes that legislators and executives pursue some target unemployment or growth rates and that fiscal policy is an instrument for achieving those rates, then money not spent on the military will be spent on domestic programs that produce jobs and goods.
3. It must be pointed out that I am a contributor to this debate. See my *Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).
4. In fact, Varas points out that the neoliberals do not support the national security ideology of the armed forces.
5. There are exceptions. Some of the discussion on Argentina consists of descriptions of official procedure and unhelpful remarks such as "The curricula are designed to promote character, honor, and pride appropriate for an officer and gentleman" (Anthony Gray, retired U.S. Naval Commander, in *The Latin American Military Institution*, 45).

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