

Correspondence

On "Just Revolution"

To the Editors: Paul Ramsey ("The Just Revolution," *Worldview*, October, 1973) argues that "the principles justifying and governing international war or revolutionary war or counterinsurgency are the same." Fair enough. But the application of some of the principles differs, and necessarily so, because of differences in the types of war. Ramsey gets to the edge of this argument, but does not push into it far enough.

Let me illustrate with one example only. A just revolutionary war requires initiative by legitimate political authority. As Richard Neuhaus argued in the book that Ramsey discussed [*Movement and Revolution*], the legitimate authority is located in the people but interpreted by the revolutionary élite. Neuhaus then argues that the crucial question is to hold the revolutionary élite accountable to its ideology, that it "will remain for the people in a way that does not betray the authority it claims from the people."

The problem is that the bond between the revolutionary élite and the people is subject to unilateral interpretation by the revolutionary élite. The ideology itself is promulgated by the revolutionary élite and is thus also subject to its unilateral interpretation. The standard is not independent from the interpreters of the standard.

Legitimate authority in revolutionary war must arise from the process of revolution. Legitimate authority in international war is an issue prior to the outbreak of the war. Legitimate authority in revolutionary war, therefore, is an issue in *jus in bello*, whereas in international war it is an issue in *jus ad bellum*.

Neuhaus may be closer to this line of thinking than Ramsey, as I understand their arguments. But Neuhaus limited his discussion in such a way that he did not get us out of the problem of unilateral interpretation of the justice of revolution by the protorevolutionary (understandable: one can't do everything in an essay!).

One way out is to look beyond the accountability provided by an ideol-

ogy which is subject only to unilateral interpretation to look as well to the actual experience of a people in revolution. How do protorevolutionaries modify their goals and tactics as new comrades join them? How is legitimate authority actually handled within the revolutionary unit, as a training ground or preview to the future revolutionary state? How do revolutionaries respond to larger aggregates of people, through education and through further acceptance of the need to modify their own ideology? The collectivization of the revolution and the democratization of the revolutionary unit are necessary additional tests beyond ideology alone.

The shift of this traditional "just war" criterion from *jus ad bellum* to *jus in bello*, however, may have the effect of reducing the presumption against violence that is an inherent part of the "just war" tradition. Since this is not the only "just war" principle whose *locus* of decision migrates from prewar to during-war, the barriers against violence in the case of revolutionary war could be unacceptably lowered. The only way out—and this is very much a tentative argument—is to require (as both Neuhaus and Ramsey do) that the burden of proof on the revolutionary be at least as great, if not in fact greater, than on the government. This burden of proof, too, may add yet another qualitative difference in the application of "just war" principles in revolutionary war in contrast to international war.

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To Peking Too Briefly

To the Editors: I read *Worldview* with great appreciation but find your brief review of Harrison Salisbury's *To Peking and Beyond* (Briefly Noted, October, 1973) to be far below your usual standard. The reviewer evidently skimmed the book and mistook it for another travelogue out of Mao's China.

In fact, a careful reading will disclose that Salisbury was an excep-

tionally analytical observer. He worked very hard and in my view very creatively on some of the major puzzles that China represents. One of these is the population question, which he rightly assesses is of prime importance. Another is the matter of what makes the new order in China tick. And how is that related to the Cultural Revolution?

Salisbury doesn't give us definitive answers, but he probes harder and more illuminatingly on these and other major questions than the vast majority of China travelers that I have heard from.

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for World Ministries
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Brazil

To the Editors: Ever since I read Robert H. Bolton's quotation of Ivan Illich's statement about Brazil in *The Christian Century* (April 1, 1970), I have had a deep feeling of uneasiness as I work and live here in the city of São Paulo.

Brady Tyson's article, "Brazil: Nine Years of Military Tutelage" (*Worldview*, July, 1973) came as a great relief. Now I know that those odors are just "a smog problem already worse than Chicago's."

Furthermore, on the very day I received the July issue of *Worldview*, our local newspaper, *O Estado de São Paulo*, carried an article to the effect that 68 people died in 680 traffic accidents in *two days* in Greater São Paulo alone (September 18, 1973). From this bit of news I draw the conclusion that in Brazil it is safer to be an active violent revolutionary than to be a bourgeois.

São Paulo, Brazil C. J. Hahn, Jr.

Dear Mr. Hahn: We are pleased that Brady Tyson's article brought relief to your uneasiness. It had the opposite effect on other people, who were made quite uneasy about some of the aspects of modern Brazil which Mr. Tyson discussed. And we would presume that to the dangers which threaten an active revolutionary in São Paulo would be added those which, as you point out, endanger a bourgeois. Sincerely, the Eds.