sociological surveys to illustrate the prevalence of inequalities in Brazil along regional and racial lines. She particularly highlights the historical role of the country's discriminatory education policy in perpetuating the low literacy levels of the poor population.

Schwarcz likewise addresses Brazil's extensive inequalities when tackling the country's extreme levels of violence. As she notes, Brazil has not only one of the highest homicide rates in the hemisphere but also one of the most violent police forces in the world (p. 139). Importantly, cases of violent crime and death vary significantly across states, regions, age, and race. Schwarcz focuses on the multifaceted violence employed against Indigenous communities in Brazil. She highlights both cultural representations that have historically portrayed them as uncivilized and contemporary state policies that have encroached on their land in favor of agricultural and mining developments. Discrimination and violence against women, Afro-Brazilians, and LGBTQ people—"a favorite target of authoritarian politicians" (p. 178)—are discussed in the final chapters of the book. Schwarcz again traces the foundations of femicide, sexual violence, and hate crimes in Brazil to its colonial and slavery systems, which controlled bodies and sexualities. As she notes in the final chapter and conclusion of the book, Brazil's deeply seated authoritarian practices debunk its perceived image as a "paradise of tolerance" that has fostered social and racial inclusion (p. 186).

Throughout the book, Schwarcz moves back and forth between Brazil's historical and contemporary periods to demonstrate its enduring patterns of authoritarianism, prejudice, and discrimination. As she explains in the insightful afterword (newly added to the English edition), this nonlinear approach helps to show how "processes of the present are determined and recognized via structures of the past" (pp. 231–32). In some chapters, however, the links between the past and present could have been emphasized better. The chapter on race and gender, for example, is heavily focused on Brazil's contemporary period. Discussing the role that reproductive control policies or racial doctrines played in the country's nation-building process could have illuminated the continuities of race- and gender-based exclusion practices in modern Brazil. Dedicating more attention to episodes in which Brazil's dominant authoritarian structures were contested could have also enhanced the book's analytical framework. Schwarcz mentions a few times throughout the book the significant achievements (and eventual limitations) of Brazil's 1988 constitution, considered one of the most progressive charters in the world. But there is minimal discussion of the developments leading to this milestone. Looking into the opposition movement to the 1964–85 dictatorship, the 1980s economic instabilities and extensive worker strikes, the massive 1983–84 social protest that brought millions to the streets in demand of democracy, and ultimately the critical work of the nation's constituent assembly (1987–88) would have elucidated how Brazil's lasting authoritarian tendencies were (and could be?) confronted successfully.

Finally, the new English edition would have benefited from additional citations. The book draws on an impressive range of primary and secondary sources, from newspaper articles to visual art pieces. Schwarcz avoided using notes in the book's Brazilian edition to facilitate quick and accessible publication in the months after Bolsonaro's election. The process of translation allowed Schwarcz more time to add a preface, methodological afterword, and valuable bibliography. It would have been useful to add a number of citations in the body of the text as well, particularly when referring to significant primary sources (for example, slavery manuals on pp. 36–37) or when including direct quotes (for example, a quote by the dictatorship's president Ernesto Geisel on p. 92).

On the whole, *Brazilian Authoritarianism* provides a compelling overview of the authoritarian components embedded within Brazil's history. It is particularly perceptive in illustrating why the conversation about *bolsonarismo* must consider the nation's long histories and legacies of slavery and social-racial exclusion. The book will appeal to scholars in various disciplines—from history, to political science, and to anthropology and sociology—who are interested in a historical overview that sheds light on Brazil's recent democratic challenges. The book will also be very useful to scholars of authoritarianism and those interested in the entangled relationships between temporalities, chronologies, and narratives of the past and present.

The Revolutionary City: Urbanization and the Global Transformation of Rebellion. By Mark R. Beissinger. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022. 592p. $99.95 cloth, $35.00 paper.

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Revolutions are a perennial preoccupation of the social sciences, and this state of affairs is unlikely to change. The character of revolutionary movements has evolved since the end of the Cold War, however. They now demand regime change and civil liberties instead of pursuing the broad social transformations wrought by the French, Russian, or Chinese revolutions. Mark R. Beissinger argues that this evolution is due to a relocation of revolutionary movements from the countryside to the city. Urban civic revolutions like Ukraine's Orange Revolution seek to mobilize as many people as possible in central urban spaces, draw on coalitions of diverse interests, are predominantly nonviolent, and generally press for democratizing reform. Such revolutions are increasingly frequent and salient, comprising around 40% of global revolutionary episodes since 1985. They will be of deep interest to political scientists, economists, sociologists, and other social scientists for the foreseeable future—as will Beissinger's book.

Revolutions' relocation from the countryside to cities demands a spatial explanation. All revolutionary movements face a "proximity dilemma" (p. 39). The closer they move to urban centers, the greater their ability to mobilize large numbers of supporters, and the greater their potential to disrupt political and economic activity. Proximity to city centers simultaneously brings revolutionaries closer to the nexus of state power and repressive capacity, however. Revolutionaries must navigate this trade-off. They might choose to remain in major cities, as German Social Democrats did in the late nineteenth century, only to be easily targeted and expelled from their homes under the repressive Antisocialist Laws of the 1870s. Sensing this danger, revolutionaries might relocate to rural areas to avoid government crackdowns. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) followed this strategy in the early 1930s after violent repression at the hands of the Kuomintang. But by doing so, they sacrificed direct influence on the incumbent regime.

Beissinger argues that "[o]ver the past century … concentration of people, power, and wealth in cities has altered the repression-disruption function" (p. 43). The trade-off between proximity to power and the danger of repression has shifted in favor of urban revolutionaries. Essentially, the marginal increase in repression associated with a move closer to urban centers has declined. Revolutionaries can still hide from government forces in rural or mountainous areas. The CCP did so in the remote Jiangxi-Fujian Soviet from 1931 until their encirclement by Kuomintang forces and escape on the Long March in 1934. But rural–urban migration has rendered this strategy less advantageous—or less necessary—than it was in the past, when Social Democrats held secret meetings in forests outside Berlin to avoid police spies in the nineteenth century.

On Beissinger's account, the exact mechanisms driving the shift in the repression-disruption function are diverse. They range from the physical characteristics of cities and their communications networks, through the types of social networks and organizations that exist in cities, to the repressive tactics available to governments in cities, and others. Urban civic revolutions are distinctive in their large size, short duration, broad coalitions, and high frequency of success. As Beissinger argues, these features all result from the shift from rural to urban mobilization.

Alongside this theoretical intervention, Beissinger makes major empirical contributions. The most significant are based on an original global dataset of 345 revolutionary episodes from 1900–2014. Analogous to Tilly's "revolutionary situations," these episodes are "instances in which demands for regime displacement become the basis for a mass siege of government" (p. 46). These new data are fruitfully explored in analyses spread across five chapters. It is impossible to summarize the numerous important findings here, but they include the frequency of revolution growing steadily since 1900 and more quickly since 1990, especially urban civic revolution; that urban civic revolutions' causes are more political than those of social revolutions; that urban revolutions are significantly more likely to lead to regime change; and that revolutions have become less lethal since the mid-twentieth century. Beissinger's empirical analyses do not end there. Further chapters explore the role of contingency in urban revolution; how the physical space of cities can be a significant enabler of revolution; and an analysis of individual participants in urban civic revolutions in Ukraine, Tunisia, and Egypt.

The Revolutionary City is an impressive and important book. Urbanization is one of the most important contemporary trends having profound effects on global politics. This transformation has not escaped the attention of political scientists. Jeremy Wallace has drawn attention to how the Chinese regime managed the growth of cities to maintain social order, for example through restrictions on internal migration and food subsidies (*Cities and Stability: Urbanization, Redistribution, and Regime Survival in China*, 2014). Noah Nathan has explored how ethnic competition and clientelism persist in rapidly growing African cities (*Electoral Politics and Africa's Urban Transition: Class and Ethnicity in Ghana*, 2019). Novel empirical evidence suggests that urban political violence and contention have accompanied city population growth globally since 1960 (see Thomson et al., "Urban Social Disorder 3.0: A Global, City-Level Event Dataset of Political Mobilization and Disorder," *Journal of Peace Research* 60 [2022]: 521–31).

Fourth-generation revolutionary theory emerged after the end of the Cold War (see Jack Goldstone, "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 [2001]: 139–87). It is eclectic, incorporating a mix of explanatory factors at the individual, domestic, and international levels. It is best known for a greater emphasis on agency over its predecessor's structural causes, however. Beissinger's work to reintegrate structural transformations like global urbanization into the core of fourth-generation revolutionary scholarship is very welcome. We are likely to see many elaborations and expansions of his path-breaking study in the future.

One especially promising avenue for further research is to explore how urbanization is shaping authoritarian regimes' coercive institution design and strategies of repression. As Beissinger notes, the repression-disruption function is not only shaped by opportunities and constraints facing revolutionaries. Technologies of surveillance and repression also determine the marginal cost of proximity to urban centers of state power. Moreover, the rise of urban civic revolutions—which are far larger and more likely to be successful than revolutions of the past—has not gone unnoticed by regimes determined to prevent social disorder and political instability. Authoritarian governments will learn from their counterparts' successes and failures in preventing and combating urban civic revolutions when designing their own repressive apparatus. For example, since the Tiananmen Square massacre the Chinese government has rapidly expanded the People's Armed Police (PAP), a paramilitary force first established in the early 1980s. When urban protests broke out against the government's COVID-19 policies in late 2022, they were rapidly suppressed by PAP and regular police units—a response that was not possible in 1989. This kind of learning and adaptation by repressive regimes will have important effects on the shape of urban contention in the future.

Social scientists' interest in revolution is unlikely to ebb in the foreseeable future. In *The Revolutionary City*, Mark R. Beissinger points us to a major transformation in the location and nature of revolutionary movements that is likely to increase in salience in the coming decades. Scholars would do well to take note, and focus their attention on the distinct dynamics of urban revolutions.

The Political Science of the Middle East: Theory and Research since the Arab Uprisings.

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With twelve chapters authored by forty-seven of the field's leading scholars *The Political Science of the Middle East: Theory and Research since the Arab Uprisings (PSME)*, edited by Marc Lynch, Jillian Schwedler, and Sean Yom, offers the most comprehensive and nuanced balance-sheet to date on how MENA politics researchers have fared in responding to salient questions brought to the fore by the Arab Uprisings. Far from a self-congratulatory display of the field's accomplishments, the book is full of critical insights regarding various research programs' contributions and where each of them could improve and grow.

Ten of *PSME*'s chapters trace the evolution of research production across a range of topics, including authoritarianism (Chapter 2), protests (Chapter 3), international relations (Chapter 4), militaries and political violence (Chapter 5), political economy and development (Chapter 6), Islam and Islamism (Chapter 7), identity and sectarianism (Chapter 8), public opinion (Chapter 9), migration and displacement (Chapter 10), and local politics (Chapter 11). Coauthored by a generationally diverse group of three to six scholars, each chapter takes stock of decades worth of literature, assesses recent research trends, and identifies promising lines of inquiry for future research. The chapters also describe pressing methodological, theoretical, ethical, or logistical challenges confronting researchers across the said fields. An introductory chapter by coeditor Marc Lynch sets the context for these contributions by overviewing the evolution of Middle East political science before and after the Arab Uprisings, noting the field's sometimes-fraught relationship with the rest of the discipline. A final chapter by Lisa Anderson situates the book's cross-cutting themes vis-à-vis the ethical and professional difficulties MENA political scientists face, whether in their fieldwork or in managing their tense relationship with centers of powers.

The book brings to light a wealth of empirical trends inviting further study. Chapter 2, authored by André Bank et al., notes the rising prevalence of personalist authoritarianism (p. 41), as well as the growing involvement of regional powers in propping up authoritarian regimes outside their own borders (pp. 51-2). Variation in military establishments' responses to the Arab Uprisings in different countries, Holger Albrecht et al. postulate in Chapter 5, reflect divergences in both experiences of state formation and modes of economic development (p. 114). Since the Uprisings, according to May Darwich and the coauthors of Chapter 4, the foreign policies of small states, the dynamics of proxy wars, and alliance formation patterns in the Middle East have been at odds with a host of international relations theories (pp. 96-7).

One distinguishing feature of *PSME* is a commitment to rethinking the conceptual foundations of existing research approaches, often in ways that speak to political science communities outside of Middle East Studies.

In Chapter 8, Fanar Haddad and his coauthors provide an incisive critique of the common practice of treating sectarian identity as an all-encompassing static trait with an exaggerated explanatory power (p. 183). Such an approach, they argue, tends to say less about the empirical realities on the ground and more about a given project's misguided (and dangerously essentialist) assumptions about the allegedly limitless power of sectarian cleavages (p. 197). These rigid conceptions of sectarianism, moreover, preclude important lines of inquiry, including how sectarian affinities form, evolve, and decline across time (pp. 198-9).

In a similar vein, Janine Clark et al. push against conceptualizing local politics as a constellation of "subnational" units whose primary purpose is to provide controlled comparisons for testing and developing theories about the workings of national-level politics (Chapter 11). Instead, local politics must be viewed as a site of political contestation worthy of study on its own terms and not reduced to a petri dish of insights for understanding national politics (p. 258).

Echoing increasing calls in the field for more inclusive (and non-Westcentric) conceptions of "security," Darwich et al. challenge international relations scholars to tackle a critical question the field has largely ignored: "security for (and according to) whom" (pp. 98-100)?