

Incognito Ergo Sum: Political Theology and the Metaphysics of Existence

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*'At times historical materialism has to learn from theology
that there is no redemption, unless it is complete.'*

Rolf Tiedemann *

Introduction

Even if politics and theology are perceived to be fundamentally distinctive areas of enquiry, they share a common problem. Indeed, one could even suggest that thought itself—as a practice among disparate practices—is subject to the formidable difficulty of the formation and subsistence of community. 'The gravest and most painful testimony of the modern world,' suggests Jean-Luc Nancy, 'the one that possibly involves all other testimonies to which this epoch must answer ... is the testimony of the dissolution, the dislocation, or the conflagration of community'.¹ This crisis of community, or its very possibility, is illustrated in a contemporary unwillingness to engage in the hard labour of politics that is part and parcel of either the espousal of individualistic, psychologistic and spiritualistic solutions to the existential problems of subjects and communities or the arrogation of secure and unequivocal identity claims based on nation, race or some other undifferentiated category. Nevertheless, a constant remains in the midst of this confusion. In the western context of modern liberal governance, the possibility of identity, whether individual or national, is predicated on the division of religious and political idioms and practices. There is no room for a tension-filled political/religious nexus which, according to Kierkegaard, produces an 'arousing restlessness'.² In the wake of religion comes a political subjectivity that is marked and re-marked by somnambulance and atomisation. And yet, the division is perceived to be absolutely necessary if intra- and international peace is to be possible.³ The exigencies of this modern settlement produce an ideology that celebrates the emancipation of modern secular politics from the interference of a meddling church which, as an alternative site of power, constitutes a threat to the security of the state.⁴ For example, Thomas Hobbes, in his portrayal of the constitution and status of the peaceful commonwealth, places no restrictions whatsoever on the authority of the sovereign in order that amity

might be guaranteed.⁵ With regard to religion, peaceful living is secured as long as its public manifestation is determined and regulated by the sovereign.⁶ The principle upon which this delimitation of religion is founded is the generalisation and privatisation of faith. The latter becomes a personal, internal matter that is immune from all human jurisdiction⁷ so that politics and religion are controlled and kept in their proper and specific places. This modern configuration of the relationship between politics and religion assumes that the interior life of the individual and the quest for redemption exist in isolation from the achievement of the common good. This vision of the independence of religion and politics marks a radical departure from the classical and medieval models—a good example of which is Plato.

According to Plato, the *polis* is the soul writ large.⁸ The soul (and, therefore, the city) is tripartite in nature and, for Plato, the significance of comprehending the constitution of the soul is that we might then fully understand and appropriately apply justice in the political arena.⁹ The psychological model fashioned by Plato is both rich and disturbing. The image delineated in *The Republic*—and mirrored by Plato's presentation of the soul as a charioteer and two horses in *The Phaedrus*¹⁰—vividly sketches the battle lines of 'a civil war in the soul'¹¹ in which a man, a lion and a volatile and many-headed monster are offered as potential selves who exist in a state of conflict and who may or may not be nurtured. In his delineation of the allegories of the soul in *The Republic* and *The Phaedrus*, Plato offers a vision of a struggle between 'bestial and divine characteristics' in both the individual and the *polis* and advises that divinization can occur in both if the bestial is removed from psychological and political life.¹² Nevertheless, as John Rist reminds us, 'our "bestiality" may always (in this life) elude our control.'¹³ The virtuous life in which public and psychological life might mirror the ideal, requires a difficult struggle in configuring desire to just and transcendent ends.¹⁴

As we begin the third millennium, however, another mutation has occurred in the arrangement that exists between the soul and the *polis* and, consequently, religion and politics. This transformation in the psycho-physical configuration of identities was disclosed on the 1st January 2000 when the British public was offered an uncompromising vision of the place that the soul of current political subjects occupies. This was the official opening of the Millennium Dome, situated on the Prime Meridian at Greenwich. The Dome's aim was to offer an experience of contemporary life and identity that was framed by both the past and possible futures. The most popular 'experience' on offer was one of the fourteen so-called 'zones', the Body Zone. The bulk of this 'experience' was a passage through 'two seven-storey high figures—one male, one female'¹⁵ in which

the viscosity of the body was the dominant motif. 'On our journey through the zone,' the Millennium Experience *Guide* told us, 'we travel inside the embracing bodies and out to Explore, an interactive area at their feet.' What actually happened was that one descended on an escalator (through one of the bodies' legs) to an open area where it was immediately evident that Explore was an area devoted to the major beauty product corporations who were the Body Zone's sponsors—Boots, L'Oréal and Roche. Yet, the most compelling sight was the section of Explore given over to the Human Genome project. What we had there was a reconfiguration of the soul that has been mapped and decoded by contemporary science. The soul no longer resides within the body but is 'out there' juxtaposed with designer bodies and corporate strategies. There is no carnal counterpart to that which is an integral part of identity. Indeed, the soul could be said to be an 'extegral' phenomenon. Even more worrying, however, is the fact that the soul is no longer mine or yours—the state, science, corporations and medicine hold the patent and, of course, the key to political subjectivity - and it cannot be recovered. All that is left in the *polis* is a body that has been hollowed out and drained of its sap, while the soul's properties are reduced to that of its biogenetic value.¹⁷

Despite my negative gloss on the transmutation of the psycho-physical self, a question remains: whether or not such a phenomenal change in the status of identity is to be mourned? This is not an exercise in idle speculation, because the body's 'sap' (as I describe it) could be perceived to be the organic fluid which, as it were, feeds and sustains the social and political repression of freedom and possibility. Or, in Kant's terms, this move is felicitous because the tutelage of both religious and political hegemony has been diminished. Indeed, for a seeker of God without religious belief, such as Charles Baudelaire, the diremption of body and soul unequivocally signifies liberation. In a revelatory text, this acute cultural commentator of the nineteenth century highlights the manner in which the two terms of human existence—body and soul—have become inimical concepts in the quest of modern identity. Put crudely, Baudelaire expounds a remarkable theme: materialism is the principle of the formation of the modern.

The De-animation of Matter

The rejection of a socio-religious system of beliefs and practices—and its transformation into an 'object' of sceptical analysis¹⁸—marks the genesis of a fully liberated, individual identity. Baudelaire's prose poem, 'Perte d'aurole' ('Loss of a Halo') vividly illustrates this point.¹⁹ In the poem, the main character recalls his most recent attempt to cross the boulevard. Due to his fear of 'horses and vehicles', he crosses the street in great haste and,

as he hops over the mud and through the 'moving chaos', his 'halo slips from his head' and into the 'mire of the tarmac'. Admitting a lack of courage in the face of this urban chaos, the protagonist confesses that it was easier to lose the mark of his identity, his distinguishing feature, his insignia than to break his bones. But this misfortune is transformed into a surprising advantage: 'Now I can wander about incognito, perform base acts, indulge in the pleasures of the corrupt, like ordinary mortals.' Baudelaire replays the division of body and soul in a fashion that revels in the independence of an immanent goal—the material. In doing so, he envisions socio-political and religious identity as not simply antithetical to, but a rival of, freedom and it is the latter to which he is disposed. Being free and incognito allows one to observe rather than be observed and this impersonality (of the masses) is synonymous with a release from bondage. Profanity dispels myth and superstition, whether secular or sacred.

This change—or loss—of identification is the mark of the modern. Anything other than the self exists for the self; to be, as it were, consumed for the delight and desire of the subject freed from ties. One of Baudelaire's foremost commentators saw this only too clearly. For it was Walter Benjamin who not only perceived the originality and brilliance of the poet condemned to urban existence, he also realised that this loss of any experience but the shock of the present, which Baudelaire exposes, remarks subjects with the insignia of self-alienation. 'Mankind, which in Homer's time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order.'²⁰ Distance has been transformed into proximity as the sacred has been purged from the realm of the present. The world is transformed: 'It is a world so free that it has become empty.'²¹ There is nothing but materiality and, as a result, 'experience' is impossible because it is not situated in a narrative, geography or metaphysics within which is the condition of its possibility.²² To put it another way, one might conclude that the poet disavows any reflection or commitment to institutionalised social practices and their significance for individual and communal self-reflection. Consequently, the symbolic, cultural world (soul, halo) is commodified and its constitutive role is relinquished. The self is alienated from itself and from others in a revelry that cannot be of Dionysian proportions because there is no longer a cult within which practices make sense.²³ In short, while Plato required the excision of the bestial from both soul and city, Baudelaire demands the elimination of that which exceeds the self so that the bestial might prevail.

A concomitant feature of Baudelaire's poem is that the soul itself is rendered material. As with the human genome project, the soul becomes an

object (or an artefact) that can be manipulated. In Baudelaire's terms it can be used by 'some bad poet' who will 'pick it up and impudently stick it on his head.' The soul is the metaphysical 'stuff' of identity that can be reconstituted as *utile*. The soul serves a politics of a fragmented but thoroughly material order.

Homo Sacer

Now that the material has become everything, the body alone is the 'stuff' of politics and power. This refiguration of the body politic—biopolitics—constitutes, then, 'the decisive event of modernity and signals a radical transformation of the political-philosophical categories of classical thought.'²⁴ The break with the political philosophies of Plato, Aristotle and the *Respublica Christiana* is categorically exposed in our context in which the life of the *polis* is constrained by the removal and reformulation of the soul. But a reflection on the manner in which the nature of contemporary political subjectivity is distinct from classical models may well help us to reflect on the ramifications of the evacuation of the soul from the body. In his account of modern political sovereignty, Giorgio Agamben does just this. He begins with the classical Greek distinction between two forms of life: *zoé*, 'which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings', and *bios*, political life or 'the form or way of life proper to an individual or a group.'²⁵ Life as *zoé*—what Agamben calls 'bare life', which signifies mere reproductive existence—is excluded from the city yet is of necessity included in the constitution of modern sovereign power. Indeed, there is in modernity a gradual coincidence of bare life and the political realm. 'If anything characterises modern democracy as opposed to classical democracy ... it is that modern democracy presents itself from the beginning as a vindication and liberation of *zoé*, and that it is constantly trying to transform its own bare life into a way of life and to find, so to speak, the *bios* of *zoé*.'²⁶ Baudelaire, in his celebration of his new found status—minus the halo—is an excellent example of the 'vindication and liberation' of *zoé*. In the modern period, according to Agamben, bare life has *become* political existence and has effected the blurring of juridico-institutional life and biological existence through the indifferenciation of right and fact and inside and outside.

The protagonist who, as it were, embodies this change in political identity is a rather peculiar subject of archaic Roman law: *homo sacer*. He is the sacred man, who may be killed but not sacrificed: 'The sacred man is the one whom the people have judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide.'²⁷ *Homo sacer* stands outside both human and divine law and as such is the exception whose very exteriority is instantiated within the

law outside of which he stands. However, there is another character that shares this logic of the exception—the sovereign. Taking his lead from Carl Schmitt’s assertion that the sovereign is at the same time inside and outside the juridical order,²⁸ Agamben points to the paradox of sovereign power: ‘the sovereign, having the legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places himself outside the law.’²⁹ The sovereign is the mirror image of *homo sacer*, the exceptional figure. ‘At the two limits of the order, the sovereign and *homo sacer* present two symmetrical figures that have the same structure and are correlative: the sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are *homines sacri*, and *homo sacer* is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns.’³⁰ The supreme power of sovereignty is established by the capacity to constitute ‘oneself and others as life that may be killed but not sacrificed.’³¹ Sovereign power, then, like the figure of *homo sacer*, subsists in an area of indistinction between nature and culture. This is evident in Hobbes’ understanding of sovereign power where the state of nature is the state of exception not as the war of all against all but, ‘more precisely, a condition in which everyone is bare life and a *homo sacer* for everyone else.’³² As the condition of possibility of modern politics, this sacred life is that which is the very subject of (and subject to) sovereign decision. While it might well be rights and free will and social contracts that constitute the political realm for the citizen, for the sovereign it is bare life which is given over to him in return for peaceable living.

Agamben’s analysis of the figure of *homo sacer* and the status of sovereign power from the Roman Empire to the modern period, via conceptions of the ‘ban’ and myths of the werewolf, is a most impressive exercise in the history of the development of political forms of power. His aim, however, is not simply historical. Indeed, the historical material is but the necessary prolegomena to a shocking conclusion – the exception (*homo sacer*) has become the rule. In coming to such a conclusion, Agamben is drawing on the opening lines of the eighth of Walter Benjamin’s so-called ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History.’³³ There Benjamin suggests that ‘The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of exception (*Ausnahmezustand*)” in which we live is not the exception but the rule.’³⁴ The exception as the rule is made evident by the fact that ‘there is no longer any one clear figure of the sacred man’ because ‘we are all virtually *homines sacri*.’³⁵ The outcome of the ubiquity of the exception is that the death camp becomes the *nomos* of the modern. The reason for the paradigmatic status of the camp is because the Jew living under Nazism is

the privileged referent of the new biopolitical sovereignty and is, as such, a flagrant case of a *homo sacer* in the sense of a life that may be killed but not sacrificed. His killing therefore constitutes ... neither capital punishment nor a sacrifice, but simply the actualisation of a mere

“capacity to be killed” inherent in the condition of the Jew as such. The truth – which is difficult for the victims to face, but which we must have the courage not to cover with sacrificial veils—is that the Jews were exterminated not in a mad and giant holocaust but exactly as Hitler had announced, “as lice”, which is to say, as bare life. The dimension in which the extermination took place is neither religion nor law, but biopolitics.

This “capacity to be killed” is the principle of formation of the modern political body of the west. ‘Equality’, claims Hobbes, arises only in one context: with the ability to ‘do the greatest thing (namely kill).’³⁷ This conception of equality is possible only when identity is predicated on natural life and the ‘subject’ is transformed into a ‘citizen’ whose birth (that is, bare natural life) ‘becomes ... the immediate bearer of sovereignty.’³⁸ The epitome of this movement is Nazism which ‘made of natural life the exemplary place of the sovereign decision’: National Socialist ideology is, as such, captured by the syntagm ‘blood and soil’ (*Blut und Boden*).³⁹ This conflation of bare life and juridical rule is now a norm that is rarely revealed. For this reason, Agamben considers the recent fate of refugees, human guinea pigs (*Versuchspersonen*) and the comatose person as figures who reveal—in their status as persons on the threshold—that it is bare life which is the foundation of contemporary juridico-politics. The camp has become the model of contemporary existence.

This may seem a hyperbolic claim, but a brief consideration of modern legal provision in England and Wales might clarify the meaning of Agamben’s thesis. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, the outcome of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure of 1981, regulates police powers in relation to suspicion and arrest.⁴⁰ The Act allows a police officer to bring the law into play when he or she *decides* that it is appropriate to do so—law as *de jure* and *de facto*, right and fact, coincide at this point of arbitrary decision. In other words, political and legal subjectivity is not defined or circumscribed by the struggle that is the rule of law; it resides at the threshold which is marked by a new form of sovereign decision. The citizen is, in legal terms, a biopolitical subject whose relation to the law is based on natural, bare life and whose status is one of bodily subjection. This shift in the constitution of subjectivity renders identity as unacknowledged or unavowed. One is oneself ‘incognito’ in this materialist, biopolitical universe, where identity is constituted outwith sacred and juridical frameworks and becomes an effect of a soul-less voluntarism.

This thesis also accords with the presentation of subjectivity in the Millennium Dome. The hollowed out self is a subordinated subject through which the public sphere passes. The subject is an impersonal channel, stripped of any personality in individual and political terms—an

'anybody'. There is no site within which body and soul confer and, likewise, where body and society overlap. The body is emptied of its determinative factors (in sacred or juridical terms) and the soul becomes a commodity that is held at the threshold of the law. Meanwhile, the body is deracinated as it is reduced to its material constituents, functions as natural life and its redemption is only promised in materialist terms: in the cult of the body, cosmetic surgery and the aestheticisation of identity in 'lifestyle choices,' fashion and the labels of design. The soul, which is measured, codified and awaits its set of patents, serves this biopolitics of order whose mark is bare life.

Conclusion: The Christian Body

This state of affairs is, of course, incompatible with a Christian theology in which the body is both informed by the soul and by the 'material' repetition of, and participation in, the liturgy. Indeed, if Baudelaire and Agamben can teach us anything it is that, even before the intellect is aware, the body is informed by what befalls it in social, juridical and political terms. Nevertheless, the consequence of this dominant materialist paradigm is that theology is always on the run, attempting to respond to a spiritual vacuum in the socio-political sphere when, in many respects, the latter is the very environment that is refused or commodified by biopolitical networks.

This is where theology must re-envision Christian practice and resist the tendency to satisfy itself with a hermetically sealed space where it is safe from, and unscathed by, materialist shrapnel. Such a settlement will result in asphyxiation. But I also want to suggest that Christian thought and practice must withstand the temptation to develop an ideal social programme of resistance based on doctrinal or theological maxims. Instead, I want to consider the possibilities that arise from a reappraisal of the place and significance of Christian gesture-language and how it underpins and constitutes an ecclesial and social body that does not 'belong' as bioproduct or thing.

Gesture is central here for two reasons. First, because the emphasis on interiority in religious, therapeutic and experiential terms has resulted in the thinning out of a gesture-language that is so central to the comportment of a Christian.⁴¹ Second, because being situated in such a gesture-language is akin to an *affirmative* expropriation of identity which problematises the state and status of biopolitics. 'In the final instance' Agamben argues, 'the State can recognize any claim for identity.'⁴² Consequently, Christianity as an alternative form of politics or political theology is safely subsumed into the logic of biopolitics. Belonging is dependent here on the parameters set by the dominant paradigm and Christian belonging cannot take place in its singularity. Alternatively, a Christian gesture-language is one that disrupts

such simple claims to identity (being Communist, Fascist, etc.) and repudiates the ownership of body and soul and the social mechanisms of transmission that are the consequence of the property relations that accompany the emergence of the subject as bare life. Contrary to this biopolitical logic, a Christian gesture-language is predicated on an immeasurable element that renders it invaluable—the Christian cannot be identified as such. One could suggest that this immeasurability situates the Christian as one who belongs ‘without any representable condition of belonging (even in the form of a simple presupposition).’⁴³ There is no peace and security—no measure—that is characteristic of this identity. As the early Heidegger suggested, the peculiar character of Christian life experience is that it is insecure and always restless and, thus, has an ‘enactment character’ that is unique to its promise and its instantiation of the radically Other—the one who is to return.⁴⁴ Christianity, if it dismisses this character and language, will simply become parasitic on biopolitics and revert to its modern status as a socio-economic positivity bound to a body of conceptual categories and presuppositions.

But why does gesture eschew the presupposed and the readily identifiable? Because, as Wittgenstein notes, a gesture does not rest on any prior notion or belief.⁴⁵ Rather, a gesture ‘insinuates’ itself into one’s life.⁴⁶ It is not the result of an ideology, nor of a content that is ascertainable so as to be objectified, but is an expressive movement that is pregnant with meanings and possibilities which are both borne and born in an ecclesial context—the gesturing body resides in the soul. Not least, this is because a Christian gesture-language is, as it were, ‘a crystal of historical memory.’⁴⁷ And, because the crystal that is Christian tradition bears a ‘dangerous memory’ that is futural in character, there is a refusal of the immediate presence of identity, whether ideological or materialist in nature.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, a gesture-language has to be learned and repeated in order that its ‘phrases’ or postures can be recast and recomposed. This reconstitution of the body, an exemplary feature of the Eucharist, occurs in the reception of a loving interlocutor. The performance of hospitality (rather than decision) is an enacted indictment of biopolitics and a celebration of the soul.

* Rolf Tiedemann, ‘Historical Materialism or Political Messianism? An Interpretation of the Theses “On the Concept of History”’ *The Philosophical Forum* 15: 1–2 (1983–4), p. 99.

1 Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community* ed. P. Connor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 1.

2 S. Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers*, Vol 3 trans. Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), p. 100.

3 Indeed, for Kant, the very existence of religious difference threatens the constitution of international peace—thus his desire for ‘religion’ to become

- one. Cf. Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch' *Political Writings* ed. H. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 114n.
- 4 Cf. Niccolò Machiavelli, *Selected Political Writings* trans. & ed. D. Wooton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), p. 36ff.
 - 5 Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 117–121.
 - 6 *Ibid.*, p. 372.
 - 7 *Ibid.*, p. 360.
 - 8 Cf. for example, Plato, *The Republic*, 434D–441C; 588C7 & D3–4. For Plato's discussion of the parallel structures of the soul and the city, cf. 557D 1ff.
 - 9 Cf. Bernard Williams, 'The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato's *Republic*' *Plato's Republic: Critical Essays* ed. Richard Kraut (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 49–59.
 - 10 Cf. Plato, *The Phaedrus*, 246–248.
 - 11 John M. Rist, 'Plato says that we have tripartite souls. If he is right, what can we do about it?' *Man, Soul and Body: Essays in Ancient Thought from Plato to Dionysius* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996), pp. 103–124.
 - 12 *Ibid.*, p. 116. Rist presents a Platonic 'formula' for this divinization: T (god) =H (human) – B (beast).
 - 13 *Ibid.*, p. 121.
 - 14 Cf. especially Socrates' comments on the improbability of such an ideal commonwealth existing 'anywhere' but in the heavens, *The Republic*, 591C–592B.
 - 15 Millennium Experience, *The Guide*, p. 19.
 - 16 *Ibid.*
 - 17 Cf. Sarah Franklin, 'Dolly: A New Form of Transgenic Breedwealth' *Environmental Values* 6:4 (1997), 430. This biogenetic—or quantitative—value practically controverts Aquinas's assertion that 'the soul is not a quantitative whole, neither considered in itself nor *per accidens*.' St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, 76, 8.
 - 18 Cf. Michel de Certeau, *The Writing of History* trans. T. Conley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 149.
 - 19 Charles Baudelaire, 'Perte d'auréole' *Petit Poèmes en prose (Le Spleen de Paris)* (Paris: Éditions Gamier Frères, 1980), pp. 203–4
 - 20 Walter Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' *Illuminations* trans. H. Zohn (London: Fontana, 1973), p. 235.
 - 21 Rodolphe Gasché, 'Objective Diversions: On Some Kantian Themes in Benjamin's "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction"' *Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience* eds A. Benjamin and P. Osborne (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 201.
 - 22 For a thorough discussion and elaboration of Benjamin's understanding of the loss of experience cf. Giorgio Agamben, *Infancy and History: the Destruction of Experience* trans. Liz Heron (London: Verso, 1993).
 - 23 Hegel's reflection on religion is significant here, particularly his attempt to bring together nature and *Geist* under the rubric of religion. 'Spirit is thus posited in the third element, in universal self-consciousness; it is its community.' G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* trans. A.V. Miller

- (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 473. Baudelaire signifies the failure of Hegel's (modern) unifying project.
- 24 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* trans. D. Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 4.
- 25 Ibid., p. 1.
- 26 Ibid p. 9.
- 27 Ibid., p. 71.
- 28 Cf. Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* trans. G. Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), p. 19.
- 29 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p. 15.
- 30 Ibid., p. 84.
- 31 Ibid., p. 101.
- 32 Ibid p. 106.
- 34 Walter Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' *Illuminations*, pp. 248–249. Although Zohn translates *Ausnahmezustand* as 'state of emergency', I will use the term 'state of exception' as it is the more common translation used by students of both Benjamin and Carl Schmitt. Cf. the original in Walter Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften* Vol.1, Pt.2 ed.R.Tiedemann &H. Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), p. 697.
- 34 Ibid p. 248.
- 35 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p. 115.
- 36 Ibid., p. 114.
- 37 Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive: The English Version* ed. H. Warrender (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), Ch. IX, VII, p. 124.
- 38 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p. 128.
- 39 Ibid., p. 129.
- 40 I am grateful to Dr Ian Bryan for discussing PACE with me at length.
- 41 Indeed, Marcel Gauchet calls Christianity the 'religion of the exit from religion' because of its over-development of interiority. While there is some truth in this claim, it can be argued that this is most obvious in the context of the early modern period and beyond. Cf. M. Gauchet, *Le désenchantement du monde: Une histoire politique de la religion* (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), p. 12.
- 42 Giorgio Agamben, *The Coming Community* trans. M.Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p.85.
- 43 Ibid.
- 44 Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* II. Band 60, *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens* (Frankfurt, a.M.: Klostermann, 1995), p. 342.
- 45 Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough* ed. Rush Rhees (Doncaster: Brynmill Press, 1979), pp. 3e & 10e.
- 46 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value* ed. G.H. von Wright, trans. P. Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 73e.
- 47 Giorgio Agamben, 'Kommerell, or On Gesture' *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy* ed. & trans. D. Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 83.
- 48 Cf. Johann Baptist Metz, *Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology* trans. D. Smith (London: Burns & Oates, 1980), pp. 200–4