

of religious (including Dominicans) have been appointed, which indicates a lack of confidence in the diocesan clergy and the favour enjoyed by the charismatic movement. Cardinal Jean-Marie-Lustiger, Archbishop of Paris, has played a key role in the appointment of bishops and in the reshaping of seminary life: future priests no longer study at the Institut Catholique in Paris but in the French Seminary in Rome or the new St Paul's Seminary at Louvain-la-Neuve. The media in France are increasingly dominated by the Groupe Ampère, presided over by Rémy Montagne, linked with the Michelin family, which produces videos on *Mother Theresa*, *Padre Pio*, *The Rosary with John Paul II*, and from October 1988 a regular series called *The Catechesis of John Paul II*.

But such reportage, however interesting, is not the point of the book. The main question raised by the authors—mostly historians and social scientists—is whether the 'second evangelisation' of Europe which the policy of restoration is designed to serve has the slightest chance of success. Paul Blanquart and Jean Delumeau typify the scepticism of all the authors gathered here. The grounds of scepticism are that it is difficult to see how 'modernity' can be converted if one begins by systematically vilifying it and claiming that Europe's agnostic political pluralism is preparing another Auschwitz, another Gulag.

The contrary position is well put by Hervé Legrand O.P. who, though he does not contribute, is more than once quoted. One text is worth pondering: 'In order to be able to hand on the faith, Christians must have a positive appreciation of what is happening in Western Europe. ... If our societies have solved the problems of hunger and illness and created solid democratic traditions, it is thanks to their own efforts and not just at the expense of the rest of the world. I think that as Christians, we have to appreciate and love our society for that. If we don't love it, we will bring nothing to it.'

In 1987 the same editors produced *Le Retour des certitudes, Événements et orthodoxie depuis Vatican II*. In both books they are critical of the policies of the present pontificate. It is difficult to think of an earlier pontificate in which Catholic writers were so overtly critical. One hopes they will not be reduced to *samizdat* publication. Whatever may be said about Europe, there can be no theological orthodoxy about it.

PETER HEBBLETHWAITE

RESPONSIBILITY AND ATONEMENT by Richard Swinburne, Clarendon Press, 1989, pp. v + 213. £9.95.

This book has two parts. Part 1 is mainly ethical and Part 2 mainly theological. In Part 1 Swinburne deals with some matters (such as the nature of moral goodness) that, although they are crucial for moral philosophy and have religious implications, I must pass over. I shall concentrate on four topics that are especially relevant to part 2. First, Swinburne affirms that we possess free will in the normal sense of a capacity to choose between good and evil, and that this is a condition of moral responsibility (see especially pp 51 and 63). Secondly, he affirms the substance of belief in original sin by claiming that we have a 'proneness to wrongdoing' which is genetically transmitted and is reinforced by

environmental pressures (chapter 7). Thirdly, Swinburne stresses that forgiveness requires that the wrongdoer makes atonement which includes repentance, apology, reparation, and penance; but he also says that an apology may be enough and that forgiveness excludes punishment (see especially pp 81–7). Fourthly, he accepts the contrast between obligatory acts and acts of supererogation; and he adds that the latter confer merit on their agents (pp 18–24 and 70).

Swinburne's main theses in Part 2 are these. (The numbering is my own). (1) In a religious context 'acts which otherwise would be supererogatorily good or not good at all become obligations' (p 125). Yet the contrast between the two kinds of acts remains. Here Swinburne recalls the medieval distinction between 'precepts' and 'counsels of perfection' (p 132). (2) Swinburne rejects the Augustinian view that sin originated in Adam's fall, mainly on the grounds that it is incompatible with the facts of evolution (pp 141–44). (3) Swinburne interprets Christ's redemptive work through the idea of sacrifice that he further interprets through his previous definition of atonement. Christ's life and death constituted 'an offering made available to us men to offer as our reparation and penance'; the offering is 'our substitute reparation and penance'; we ask God to 'take its perfection instead of our imperfection' (pp 154–5). (4) Although it is possible to envisage people who, through a combination of wrong choices and self-deception, have become so far corrupted that they have lost all moral sensitivity, we must assume that at the end God will simply annihilate them, not consign them to the everlasting torments of hell that 'would be a punishment beyond the deserts of any human who has sinned for a finite time on earth' (p 181). (5) Swinburne rejects the Augustinian doctrine of predestination which he takes to mean that God 'intends as their destiny' the salvation of all men (pp 192–4). (6) On purgatory Swinburne holds that the moral condition of many people at death makes some sort of intermediate state 'highly appropriate' (pp 197–8). (7) On the question whether we can merit entrance to heaven Swinburne, while maintaining that it would be good for God to reward the merit acquired by supererogatory acts, adds these two qualifications. First, God is not obliged to reward it. This, therefore, is a case of *meritum de congruo*, not *meritum de condigno*. And it is the first kind of merit that he had in mind earlier when he dealt with the reward merited supererogatorily within purely human relationships. Secondly, no one could merit a reward as great as the eternal life of heaven, which is an unmerited gift (pp 186–7 and 208).

Swinburne (to adopt a contrast he draws in his Introduction) has argued, convincingly in my opinion, for a 'liberal' as against a 'hard' position on the theological topics he discusses. But I have two queries. The first concerns the distinction between obligatory and supererogatory acts. Although we make this distinction, in fact if not in name, in ordinary usage, Swinburne's admission that for theists, and *a fortiori* for Christians, many acts that would otherwise be supererogatory become obligatory weakens the force of the distinction in a way that has two dangers. The first is that we reduce the moral demands of the Gospel. Thus I feel uneasy about Swinburne's claim that we are not obliged 'to do those acts which most directly forward our salvation' (p 131) although of course we are not all obliged to do these if they are identified (disputably) with monastic vows.

The second danger is that we engage in an unacceptable form of casuistry, especially if, following a suggestion of Swinburne's on p 133, we attempt to classify biblical imperatives according to the two types of act. However, Swinburne notes that Protestants have rejected the doctrine of supererogation, and that Catholic statements of it are 'far from uniform or always clear' (p 130).

My chief query concerns Swinburne's account of Christ's redemptive work. In particular I wish to raise some questions of consistency with regard to Swinburne's view that Christ offered substitutionary atonement (in his sense of the noun). On p 149 he endorses the statement that 'no man can atone for the sins of another' but only 'help another to make the necessary atonement'. How, then, can Christ thus be our substitute? Again on p 161 he affirms that we must join our atonement to the one offered by Christ and even that repeated and sincere repentance suffices for God's forgiveness. Yet again, although Swinburne says that Christ's sacrifice is a perfect reparation and penance he does not say that it includes the other elements in atonement (repentance and apology). Does Christ's sacrifice then have the all-sufficiency that has been traditionally ascribed to it? Furthermore Swinburne criticizes (rightly in my view) the theory of penal substitution on the grounds that it is too 'mechanical' and is not explicitly in the New Testament (p 152). Do not the same criticisms apply to Swinburne's own theory? Finally, even if his theory is both consistent and true it would surely cover only one aspect of Christ's redemptive work and so only one element in the doctrine of the Atonement.

Nevertheless, this book has the qualities that we have come to expect from its author. It is lucid, closely reasoned, and reaches firm conclusions. Like Swinburne's earlier books, it clearly merits (*de congruo* if not *de condigno*) the attention of both philosophical and doctrinal theologians.

H.P. OWEN

WHAT IS IDENTITY? by C.J.F. Williams. *Clarendon Press, 1989.*
Pp. xx + 207.

The nutshell answer to the title is: identity is what is *shown* in the pattern 'X is F is X and G' by the repetition of 'X'. If identity were a relation, what would it relate? Objects? But there is only one of them. Synonymous expressions? But they are synonymous, not identical. Wittgenstein denied that it is a relation and that a formalism able to bring out logical structure needs a sign for it; use only one sign for any given object, and identity is shown by repetition of sign. Williams agrees that identity is not a relation, but is a matter of one thing's satisfying both of two predicables (e.g. being both my sister and my secretary) and that it can always be shown, but he disagrees that we need no sign for it. It is an essential moment in some thoughts (e.g. the identity of what is thought old with what is thought wise in 'Catherine is old and wise' or the identity of voter and candidate in 'Smith voted for himself'). Essentially the argument that we need a sign is that we need it in connection with A's reports of what B says or thinks. If A says that B thinks that one the same thing is F and not-F, we need to know whether the identifying of the F thing with the not-F belongs to A's