

THE GAME OF DISARMAMENT: HOW THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA RUN THE ARMS RACE. By *Alva Myrdal*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1976. xxvi, 397 pp. \$15.00.

THE DYNAMICS OF DÉTENTE: HOW TO END THE ARMS RACE. By *Arthur Macy Cox*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1976. 256 pp. \$8.95.

Alva Myrdal has devoted much time in the past two decades to problems of disarmament. For twelve years she was Sweden's representative to the Geneva Disarmament Committee, rapidly becoming one of the most influential leaders of the neutralist bloc in the Geneva negotiations. Mrs. Myrdal has been a tireless proponent of disarmament and arms regulation, and *The Game of Disarmament* is her assessment of what causes the global arms race and what can be done to reverse the militarization of world politics.

Seeing the title of Myrdal's book, a political scientist might anticipate an analysis of disarmament using the various models of game theory. Many theorists have employed the games of "chicken" and "prisoners' dilemma" to illustrate the pressures for cooperation and conflict in the nuclear age. But Mrs. Myrdal has a very different type of game in mind. To her, the arms race is a vicious and cynical game played by the United States and the Soviet Union against the rest of the world. The two superpowers have conspired to institutionalize the arms race, to blunt meaningful progress toward disarmament by adopting half-measures and palliatives which give the illusion of progress but actually serve to sustain arms competition and diminish international security.

Mrs. Myrdal relates a tale of unrelieved U.S.-Soviet perfidy. Her solution to this sorry state of affairs is an "activated agenda for disarmament," the specifics of which comprise the latter two-thirds of her book. The nonaligned nations of the world bear a particular responsibility to create pressure for disarmament in the Geneva Disarmament Committee and the United Nations General Assembly, thereby forcing action by the hitherto intransigent superpowers.

Mrs. Myrdal is a true believer in the rectitude of disarmament, and her diagnosis and prescription admit of no doubt or uncertainty. There are no dilemmas, no paradoxes, no quandaries to trouble right-thinking individuals. Armaments cost money, raise the risk of war, and create a weapons culture with tremendous social costs. Disarmament is the only answer, the sole route to sane and peaceful human existence. This attitude gives Mrs. Myrdal's book a certain theological elegance, but it leaves her defenseless against the charge that the world is a much more complicated place than she makes it out to be.

Armaments themselves are not an unmitigated evil, and disarmament is no panacea for the problems confronting our fragile planet. There are inconsistencies and paradoxes to be found even in the traditional objectives of arms control. Reducing the risk of war, for example, may conflict with the goal of reducing the amount of destruction if war should occur. Would we prefer an infinitesimal probability of catastrophic destruction or a greater probability of tolerable destruction? This is the sort of choice policymakers must confront in the real world. Mrs. Myrdal's desire for no prospect of any destruction at all is noble, but hardly practical.

Many American readers will be annoyed by Mrs. Myrdal's tendency to blame the United States at least as much as the Soviet Union for sustaining the arms race. She minimizes the differences between the two societies, virtually setting aside the profound contrast between Russian secrecy and American candor, a difference which delimits perhaps more than anything else the amount of real arms limitation that can be expected between the two countries. By emphasizing the shortcomings in the American record, Mrs. Myrdal pays an implicit compliment to the United States: she expects more from

Washington than from Moscow, and she expects her book to be influential in the United States but not in the Soviet Union.

There is one theme in Mrs. Myrdal's book which deserves special emphasis—the role which she sees for the nonaligned nations in the global dialogue on disarmament. For too long nonaligned governments have deferred to the nuclear superpowers on questions of arms control and disarmament. One does not have to agree entirely with Mrs. Myrdal's analysis to acknowledge that there is a much larger and more vigorous responsibility for the nonaligned nations to assume on issues which affect their security as much as that of the superpowers.

Arthur Cox's book, *The Dynamics of Détente*, hardly deserves mention in the same review with Alva Myrdal's work. Cox has written a period piece, an extended essay on the domestic debate in the United States about détente circa summer 1976. According to Cox, there is simply no reason not to end the arms race and live in peace and harmony forever. Cox trivializes the concerns and arguments of Senator Jackson, former Defense Secretary Schlesinger, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. None of these men is as ludicrous, paranoiac, and cynical as Cox would have us believe. This book does a double disservice: to hawks, by misrepresenting their case; to doves, by refusing to confront and respond to legitimate questions that their critics raise about security in the nuclear age.

These two books share one perceptual flaw which is all too common in the literature of arms control and disarmament. They portray the arms debate as a struggle between the forces of light, those who support arms control, and forces of darkness, those who support the arms race. This is a false dichotomy. Defense strategy is a combination of arms control and arms deployment, of simultaneous cooperation and competition between potential adversaries. Recognizing this fundamental fact of international life is the first step to a meaningful and productive debate about international security.

JOSEPH J. KRUZEL
Duke University

INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL: ISSUES AND AGREEMENTS. By
Stanford Arms Control Group. Edited by John H. Barton and Lawrence D. Weiler.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976. xii, 444 pp. \$18.50, cloth. \$12.95, paper.

As the time approaches when a treaty to replace the SALT I Interim Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union is accepted by the two governments and the ratification process begins, this book should prove useful both to undergraduates, for whom it was intended, and to concerned citizens, who will be attempting to follow the inevitable debate over the treaty. The text, an interdisciplinary effort by the Stanford Arms Control Group, is based on lectures given by members of the group and by various visitors. Specific credits are provided for some of the chapters, but, after acknowledging Lawrence Weiler's contribution in the preface, John H. Barton notes that in editing the final draft he has not hesitated to revise individual contributions, and he also accepts responsibility for emphasis, opinions, and factual errors.

The book offers a discussion of the cultural context and motivations for arms control, a brief history of disarmament efforts before World War II, and concentrates on developments since the advent of nuclear weapons. The utility of the text is enhanced by appendixes which include a glossary of abbreviations associated with arms control, an annotated chronological listing of past and current arms control forums, the texts of major arms control agreements, a list of discussion questions, and suggested further readings keyed to each chapter.