refreshing to read an account of the *Syllabus* which adequately distinguishes its intention from Dupanloup's interpretation. The political and historical discussions are the most satisfactory elements in this work, whereas one might be less happy, for example, about the treatment of modernism or a claim that Newman's 'bias would have been against the vernacular' (p. 165). Indeed, this last opinion could be contrasted with Hilda Graef's remarks on page 118.

Even in the historical and political sphere, some points of criticism should be made. Hollis seems to have overlooked certain letters and remarks which would have balanced his account of Newman's attitude towards Ireland. Newman once remarked that had he been an Irishman, he would have been a rebel at heart; he realized, before Gladstone, that the problems were not simply land or property but the union and the nation; the Irish who refused to support Gladstone were not cowards as the prime minister seemed to suggest, but patriots (Ward, *Newman*, II, pp. 517-9, 527).

Newman's was a deeply spiritual life exemplifying the early proverb 'Holiness rather than peace'; his teaching shows an intense awareness of God and the 'unseen world'; his works are saturated with a spirituality based on biblical and patristic sources which embraces the whole man and penetrates the whole of human life. In Newman's own life and ideas, spirituality could not be departmentalized but rested on his firm conviction of the unity of truth whether spiritual, doctrinal, scientific or historical. His spirituality was integrated with his life as a whole and with his teaching. Education, for example, was a profoundly religious activity involving the spiritual as well as the intellectual formation of man.

Somewhat like Pascal and Kierkegaard, Newman came to learn of God through conscience, having an existential experience of a personal relation with God, hence the famous remark about the 'two only absolute and luminously self-evident beings'. Consequently Graef emphasizes the personal element in Newman's spirituality while appreciating that it was more than the merely personal. By basing the spiritual life and Christian belief on the evidence of conscience and by using the personal approach as the means to truth, Newman's 'illative sense' is seen as an excellent explanation of contemplative prayer, and the intensity of his spirituality impressively evident in the contrast between the 'real' and 'notional' assent to the religious doctrines of faith.

The author also appreciates Newman's conviction of divine providence (which again was personal and not simply general), and his consciousness of the reality of the 'invisible world', natural causes being the visible instruments of invisible powers. In view of this, it is surprising that she does not equally emphasize the importance of his understanding of the sacramental principle—the historically human could at the same time be doctrinally divine, an understanding which is at once critical, theological and spiritual. Newman's ready acceptance of the theory of evolution or the pagan parallels to the Old Testament did not interfere with his recognition of divine creation or revelation.

An extensive study of the printed and manuscript sources has gone into the writing of this account of Newman's spirituality. Different aspects are competently handled and Newman himself is frequently quoted, sometimes extensively. Incidentally, 1835 on page 101 should presumably read 1845. Developments in Newman's ideas are traced, particularly in the case of his attitude to sin and sinners, and his stress on the love and holiness of God. The author is occasionally critical and not always fairly, but many will be grateful for her remarks about the impossibility of forcing great Doctors of the Church through the straitjacket of the modern canonization process. Something is wrong when it becomes easier to canonize a foundress of one of the innumerable congregations, whose life was strictly circumscribed, than an original, far-seeing thinker whose writings are of the greatest value to the Church, and whose life was completely given to the service of God and his neighbour.

J. DEREK HOLMES

EDUCATION, CULTURE AND THE EMOTIONS, by G. H. Bantock, *Faber and Faber*, 1967. 202 pp. 30s.

Professor Bantock sportingly quotes a critic's description of himself as 'acquiring outmoded social attitudes along with unspecified quantities of Madeira and nuts'. Such is indeed his 'image' and he repudiates it, declaring himself to be a revolutionary. There is a good deal of support in this book for such a claim, if to be a revolutionary is to raise a completely different range of questions from those discussed with monotonous unanimity by most contemporary writers on education.

Professor Bantock's central concern is with 'conventions, forms, patterns, models', all the 'structures, social, emotional and intellectual' which the individual inherits from his culture. He insists on the defence of these noting that in education, as elsewhere, they are under general attack, 'concepts of a more rigid nature . . . such as teaching, instruction, learning, training give way to concepts which introduce a note of greater flexibility such as experience, growth, discovery, experimentation'. The contemporary mind seems to desire to get at and release some kind of primitive spontaneous 'life' which these cultural structures overlay. It values highly the provisional thinking 'model' which can be quickly discarded. In Piagetan terms it always prefers accommodation to assimilation. Consequently, education tends to play down forms of all kinds as it tends to want to dispense with the tradition of rootedness and authority represented by authors like Arnold, Newman, Eliot, Jacques Barzun. Professor Bantock has already defended this tradition at length; now he is concerned to defend forms, seeing them as liberating as well as restricting. The 'free play of the mind' urged by the 'creativity' school he would see as possible only after formal education. Free play requires forms. Without them, the mind blunders blindly about.

With views such as these one might suppose Professor Bantock to be an old-fashioned academic concerned to recommend to schools the rigorous acquisition of abstract knowledge. This is not so. Like D. H. Lawrence he is much concerned about the education of the emotions where he considers that similar problems of indiscriminate stimulation and formlessness are provoked without solution. Indeed, he thinks the contemporary curriculum to be over-academic and is alarmed at the ambiguous effects of a universal bookish education. But he does view askance the continual pushing outwards of the frontiers of the responsibilities of schooling—universal literacy, culture, awareness, mental health, all to be achieved by bigger and better schooling. Like D. H. Lawrence again he wishes the objectives of school education to be kept within reasonably modest bounds, the 'induction of young people into certain important areas of understanding, some refined modes of feeling and some reasonably complex practical skills'.

This is Professor Bantock's central ground. From here he continues to turn his glass on various aspects of contemporary educational thought and practice. In his early chapters he discusses the influence of Freud in education. He is concerned to resist the merging of the roles of teacher and psychotherapist which he considers to involve a dangerous over-emphasis on abnormality and to impose an impossible burden on both teaching and teacher training. Moreover he thinks the moral coarsening implicit in Freud's very limited view of 'reality' to be a damaging influence on moral and emotional education. He is in sympathy with the desire to take more seriously the education of the emotions, but his analysis of emotion stresses its cognitive, 'revelatory' aspect and for him its education would consist in its refinement through literary articulation.

In another chapter Professor Bantock discusses the disintegration of myth which 'offers a framework for some of man's deepest hopes and fears', under the impact of analytic thought. The many 'rhetorics of popular culture' offer unsatisfactory mythological substitutes which serve only to confuse and divert children's search for an identity. He is opposed to the increasing informality in education and to attacks on the few remaining ceremonies in school such as prizegivings and religious worship which offer at least vestigial possibilities of participation in something deeper than simply the 'distribution of life's chances'.

Professor Bantock reprints here his inaugural lecture, 'The Implications of Literacy'. Here he analyses the profound and subtle changes which a universal compulsory book culture has brought about in our sensitivity and awareness. It offers numerous possible but relative models for identification. It expands self-consciouness, the 'inner dialogue' at the expense of communal life. With all its possibilities for the development of personal life, it imposes a great strain, risking role-confusion and psychic rootlessness. In our present cultural situation, Professor Bantock does not see the way ahead as lying in an increase of the volume of literary culture. Nor does he accept the merely defensive view of mass civilization and minority culture. His remedies involve education for an increase of standards and discrimination in the mass media themselves.

I have tried to summarize ludicrously briefly some of Professor Bantock's main lines of thought. It is fifteen years now since he published 'Freedom and Authority in Education'. He seems increasingly able to make most contemporary writers on education look superficial and cliché-ridden. Though many of the things he says will raise howls of indignation he must be recognized now as the most serious writer on education of the times.

KEVIN NICHOLS

REQUIEM MUSIC OF MOURNING AND CONSOLATION, by Alec Robertson. *Cassell*, 63s.

It is extraordinarily difficult to write about music for the general reader without resorting to bewildering technicalese. Alec Robertson has the knack. *Requiem Music of Mourning and Consolation* is not merely a history of the Requiem Mass but a study of the entire repertory of music associated with death. Since Mozart the *Requiem Mass* has had a great mystique among the public and many commemorative choral works have been entitled a *Requiem* when they are very far removed from any denominational funeral liturgy, e.g. Delius's great setting of Nietzsche's *Also sprach Zarathustra* (which Mr Robertson reveals to us was originally called a *Pagan Requiem*). Mr Robertson wisely selects the important Requiems from the one thousand that have been composed, and narrates the gradual evolution of the form. He makes what might have been a depressing subject one with such interest that one can barely put the book down. I only cavil at the (small) space given to Fould's pretentious *World Requiem* and wish it had been given to Bruneau's lovely, forgotten work. Mr Robertson himself says of Fould's vast work, which had an enormous vogue after the First World War due to public feeling rather than any intrinsic quality: 'What is lacking is any sign of a distinctive style, of any genuine melodic gift, of any awareness of banality' A case might be made also for Liszt's *Requiem* to be included—but then the candidates for inclusion are innumerable.

'The general reader's knowledge of Requiem Mass settings . . . may well begin with Mozart and end with Fauré', and Mr Robertson appropriately amplifies our knowledge without needing to resort to obscurism. After Mozart two contemplative *Requiems* were written by Cherubini, a composer whose other works have been justly criticized for their dryness and lack of lyrical warmth. Following a French tradition, which we learn actually derived from Morales, a Spanish composer who lived in Rome, Cherubini and Fauré included a *Pie Jesu* movement textually derived from the *Dies Irae*. As in Fauré's *Requiem*, the *Pie Jesu* gradually ousted the *Benedictus*. Gounod never set the *Benedictus* in a *Requiem* with a *Pie Jesu*. Composers were often muddled, misled or even cavalier about setting the Requiem text. In Cherubini's *Requiem* of 1836 different stanzas from the *Dies Irae* poem are heard simultaneously. This discredited device in Mass-settings was last used in Hauptmann's *Messe* Op. 30 of 1842, but in Requiems similar textural peculiarities abounded. Berlioz's arrangement of the text is at times ingenious but at times meaningless and surely the result of his meeting a deadline. Berlioz's idiosyncrasies were adopted by Bruneau who, as a friend of Zola, was quite unfamiliar with the authentic liturgical text.

Mr Robertson's style is scholarly in an unobtrusive way, urbane and, happily in a book on such a serious subject, occasionally humorous. Of the eight priests who sang in the choral foundation of the Convent of the Barefoot Nuns of St Clare, Madrid, Mr Robertson comments: 'They were to take their meals separately and each was to have his own servant (a very wise provision!).' (Needless to say the nuns and priests were segregated by a grille!) Mr Robertson's research is quietly integrated into his narrative. How many of us knew, I wonder, that Elgar's inscription on the manuscript of *The Dream of Gerontius*, 'This is the best of me', etc., was not original but a quotation from Ruskin's *Sesame and Lilies*? My only query is on Mr Robertson's statement, also expressed in an August *Radio Times*, 'It seems to me extraordinary that no real research seems to have been undertaken about Süssmayr's competence as a composer of sacred music.' (Süssmayr completed Mozart's *Requiem*.) Walter Wlcek in a Viennese dissertation of 1953 *F. X. Süssmayr als kirchenkomponist* tells of two authentic Requiems in German by Süssmayr. This is a beautiful book, and some measure of the author's breadth of vision may be gained from his repudiation of Verdi as a 'good Catholic':