

# Inclusion and Exclusion in the Ethos of Von Balthasar's Theo-drama

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## 1. Post-Christendom—Post-Christian Culture—Post-modern Society

Hans Urs von Balthasar's *Theo-Drama* is about the good. Its conception of Christian moral life is set 'after Christendom' and directed to a 'post-Christian' culture. If the *Theo-Drama* becomes central to the way that Christians live in the post-modern world, what will their ethos be like?

'Christendom' is Christianity as an achieved political strategy: at the end of the game, the board should look like Aquinas' *On Princely Government*. Aquinas's natural law theory is embedded in Aristotle's idea of the city as directed to a common good by its ruler. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and his *Politics* are authoritative for him. Von Balthasar has very little to say about Christendom.<sup>1</sup> The ethics of the *Theo-Drama* does not hinge on an idea of natural law.

According to von Balthasar, *pre-Christian* cultures found the sacred in the *cosmos*. With the Incarnation, he says, the sacred is relocated to the person of Christ. Mediaeval Christendom assimilated cosmic religiosity into a Biblical framework. But the footprints of God in the *cosmos* did not lead all the way to Golgotha. Luther was not in error when he brought this "crisis to consciousness".<sup>2</sup> Von Balthasar claims that *post-Christian* culture is desecralised: Great Pan is dead, and the Piper at the gates of dawn cannot now be invoked even by Van Morrison. Post-Christian man has to make a choice: either the physicist's universe and a technocratic state or the *person* of Christ.<sup>3</sup> This is not a matter of cultural progression or regression: after the Incarnation, God makes himself less clearly present in nature. Perhaps there is an analogy between the sacred as found in the *cosmos* and moral law as found in what was ambiguously called 'nature'.

*Classical* thought is marked by '*In-sided-ness*'. *Modern* philosophical *ethics* seeks universal norms from the *outside*. Kant's ethics is 'outsided.' Stanley Hauerwas said that, for Kant, "Anybody, regardless of education or family background can be just as moral as any other person—provided that that person acts on the basis of some general, universally applicable notion of what is right."<sup>4</sup> Jonathan Sacks notes that the Enlightenment "sought to dissolve" the "communities and traditions" by which 'in-sided' people had preserved their ethos.<sup>5</sup> The theoretical postmodernist denies the universal ethic. Empirically, postmodernism means that people don't have very much in common. Hauerwas claims that Christian ethics occurs through membership of a community which is shaped by stories like the Sermon on the Mount. Sacks and Hauerwas recover in-sided-ness through tradition. They believe their stories are *true*: They are not post-modernists.<sup>6</sup> But they are writing for an empirically post-modern society.

## 2. The Good in the Theo-Drama

Von Balthasar sets out at the beginning of *The Glory of the Lord*, that the beautiful is splendour and form. It is easy to move on to the *Theo-Drama*, and assume that he must have defined the good. He tells us that the good has to do with action, but not much more, if we are looking for standard philosophical ethics. The *Theo-Drama* is complex and not very wieldy. The good is inside the supernatural; nature is wrapped up within grace. Here, theatre sets the human condition on stage.

Pre-Christian theatre projects 'solutions' to the classical human dilemmas: should I kill my father and sleep with my mother? Should I sacrifice my daughter to Artemis so that the fleet can sail for Troy? Should I avenge my Father's murder by axe-murdering my Mother? In the Greek theatre moral obligation is inseparable from the gods. If our ethics is placed within the analogy of theatre, we are aligning the good with ritual.<sup>7</sup> Theatre impels us to identify with imagined values. Christian theatre gives us "post-figurations" of Christ—Christ-like lives. Cordelia's representation of forgiveness demands our real assent to this moral quality. To *participate*, as an audience, in Cordelia's self-sacrifice, is not to *examine* the virtue of charity. In using this analogy, von Balthasar is not referring to an universal *rationality*. To find the good in the theatre gives ethics a *religious* context. Bypassing the *Nicomachean Ethics*, von Balthasar turns to Aristotle's *Poetics*. The *Poetics* has a conception of the good which is truly transcendental, because wider than political "justice".<sup>8</sup>

One reason why we may forget that we might be looking for a *definition* of the *good* is that von Balthasar assures us that what we are supposed to be looking for is the *source of the uniqueness of the self*. Here is a contradiction worthy of Pascal: the human person is defined down to its spinal cord by its public role, and yet each person *is* unique. We are not told how we know of this uniqueness: it is not something 'we' know, but something 'I' know, an experiential knot too basic to be untied. What gives the 'I' its uniqueness? It is not 'human nature', a species quite important to traditional Catholic ethics. It is not simply a good which all human natures desire in common. The Pascalian resolution is clear: the 'I' can only gain its uniqueness from the singular call of God.<sup>9</sup> Anthropology asks the question: but only the procession of the persons of the Trinity can answer it.<sup>10</sup> The actor-self is defined by what he does and says to other actors, and how they respond to him. Christ takes on his identity as 'Son' because the Father names him as Son. This 'naming' is his procession from the Father. It is what he is: being Son is his task within the immanent Trinity, and in his historical mission on earth. Von Balthasar pictures the Trinity as an eternal act of self-surrender. The Father's begetting of the Son is an act of "kenotic" love. The Son responds with an eternal act of self-giving which is made visible on the Cross.<sup>11</sup> Human or finite freedom is offered a choice. It can be free *within* the infinite freedom of God. The human being who chooses this is called and given a unique mission. Or it can be autonomous, within its own immanent, self-centred orbit. Von Balthasar defines sin as Augustine did, when he said that Adam's sin consisted in "abandon[ing] the basis on which the mind should be firmly fixed, and becom[ing]...based on itself."<sup>13</sup>

The *Theo-Drama* sets out von Balthasar's interpretation of history. He is not interested in the history of civilisations. He is explaining why there is such a thing as *one* human history, in the moral sense; or, why there is to be a Last

Judgement rather than countless million private judgements on individual lives.<sup>14</sup> The innumerable little dramas of human lives is a “play”, whose acts and scenes can be “integrated into a single and final” form.<sup>15</sup> Human history is the enactment of the drama of Christ; human history is within the body of Christ.<sup>16</sup> Von Balthasar defines the human in terms of its “*solidarity*” with two ‘principles’ of which we may learn solely through the Bible: Adam and Christ. Adam is the origin of the nature which we inherit, and which Christ assumed.<sup>17</sup>

In contemporary usage, “solidarity” has an ethical connotation. It makes us imagine an embattled community, or labour union, like *Solidarnosc*, which one joins in order to fight for justice. With his imagery of two fields of force, the Adam field and the Christ field, St. Paul gave it a mystical meaning. Discussion of “solidarity” with the Christ principle is von Balthasar’s way of talking about the good. Christ is the common measure of the good. Christ is the concrete universal, the total *gestalt* by which all human action is given shape and meaning.

Adam gives us human nature: but the field of force of fallen Adam does not gravitate toward God. Fallen Adam does not give us freedom for *transcendence* or unique, theological personhood.<sup>18</sup> It is Christ who makes us *persons*; the only sphere in which we may freely be good is ‘*en Christo*’. “In the acting area opened up by Christ, created conscious subjects can become persons of theological relevance, co-actors in theo-drama.” ‘Theo-drama’ is the historical conflict between two cities, the city of Adamic man, built on autonomous power, and the communion of Christ.<sup>19</sup> One gets a role to perform in the dramatic conflict between good and evil by being named as a ‘theological person’ by God. Thus the good is acted, or done. A theological ‘person’ is an actor in the theo-drama. ‘Person’ here means ‘persona’, actor, not, for example, person in the sense of an absolute value, which Kantian and personalist philosophies have given it.

We know ourselves by allowing God to name us. Being allotted a role by God is the only way we have of “grasping that most intimate idea” of our “own self—which otherwise would remain undiscoverable.” The immediate contexts for initiation and continuation in this ‘person’-making are baptism and Eucharist. Von Balthasar says “...every individual who has been personalised in Christ has within him a sphere of community in virtue of his mission ... The sacraments, primarily baptism ...and the Eucharist...not only give us personhood: they also fashion us into a community.”<sup>20</sup>

Can we only take on a unique good ‘person’-making role within the baptismal community? We read that “this communion” is not “restricted to the realm of the visible Church: it reaches as far as Christ’s merits extend.”<sup>21</sup> That means to everyone. But von Balthasar does not tell us *how*. He notes that people are given missions apart from conscious participation in the body of Christ.<sup>22</sup> But this has nothing to do with the natural outworking of any non-Christian religious system as a system.<sup>23</sup> As a contingent empirical fact, missions are given outside of Christianity. But we have no way of knowing who is a ‘person’ outside of the baptismal and eucharistic communion. This is close to saying that one can be anonymously ‘*en Christo*’—although no-one but God will know. As Augustine said, some seem to be in the city of God and are not, and others seem to be in the city of man, and are not.<sup>24</sup> Von Balthasar cites him: “Augustine saw his two *civitates* ... wrestling together so tightly that it was not always possible to tell which limb belonged to which wrestler.”<sup>25</sup>

If von Balthasar defines personhood by immanent, Christological criteria, is his idea of the good non-foundational, and accessible only to a 'Christian rationality'? The ethics of the *Theo-Drama* would then be exclusivist. What does von Balthasar make of Thomas' dictum that *human nature* desires the good? C.S Lewis explained natural law as the *dharma* and the *tao*, the roads and paths built into nature, toward which we have an inbuilt map and motor. If we let our natural affinity for the good take its course, the map and the motor and the roads will carry us there. St. Thomas was more literal: 'laws' are rules enforced by Kings.<sup>24</sup> One thought picture behind this theory is God as the King. St. Thomas defines law as "...a rational ordering of things which concern the common good; promulgated by whoever is charged with care of the community."<sup>27</sup> Thomas also equates law with rational action. Law is "a rule or measure of action in virtue of which one is led to perform certain actions...."<sup>28</sup> The 'measure' is reason. Our desire to "know the truth" gives us a "natural inclination" to the good.<sup>29</sup> The "eternal law" shines within God's mind. A second thought picture is the cosmos as the mirror of the Creator. Just as the "light of natural reason" by which we know good and evil is the "impression of the divine light in us", so the "natural law is..the participation of the eternal law in rational creatures."<sup>30</sup>

The picture-analogy behind von Balthasar's 'natural' ethic is not the Aristotelian-Thomistic *polis* but the mother with her child.<sup>31</sup> Thomas defined human nature in terms of its *rationality*, something which all human beings have in common.<sup>32</sup> Von Balthasar says that Aquinas could not quite pin down the individuality of the self. Von Balthasar takes three runs at explaining why human consciousness inclines toward being named as a theological person. Each time, he bases his search for the unique-communal self in a three-stage "*primal experience*." He claims, first, that in our 'fundamental' "self-awareness", we experience *both* our own "incommunicable", *absolute* individuality *and* the unbounded "communicability of being". Communication is someone telling us something. I can't hear without knowing that 'I' am doing so. I have to open myself to hear. The experience of being myself, a lonely 'I' and the experience of hearing 'everything' are inseparable.<sup>33</sup> Secondly, the "cogito/sum" has its eyes opened by the "radiance" of reality, in its truth and goodness. It knows that it is *someone*, an 'I', because people call it 'you' (or "thou"). People speak to it: the bodily and intellectual languages of "word, gesture, smile" come at it from all sides. They don't *have* to speak to me: the fact that others give me my self-consciousness, is a "*gift*". The existence of others is *freely* given to me.<sup>34</sup> Thirdly, "Everything begins with the child's being addressed by a Thou." One intuits that one 'owes one's existence' to another. Someone, first one's mother, is choosing to hold one in existence. What one experiences is the hand or the arms. In and through those motherly hands one is gripped in existence by God, "infinite freedom". In order to know myself, I expand to hear and include "countless other subjects". This address by the free person of God is a call to a task.<sup>35</sup> Von Balthasar's interpretations of the basic human experience give a phenomenology of moral experience. They show *how* the divine mind touches the human mind.

This is thoroughly *modern*. Von Balthasar has taken us back to the *experience* of the ontological difference; he has moved to *Augustine's* territory of the innermost self. In Augustine's ethics, the city of men love themselves and

manipulate each other; the heavenly city loves God and neighbour.<sup>36</sup> In von Balthasar's theology, the good is a Thou, not an It. If I perceive something as good, I don't seek to master it and twist it into what I want to hear, but 'let it be' itself. To recognise its apartness is to acknowledge its *freedom*. I only experience myself when I let reality touch me. This is freedom, or self-possession. I am only free when I am allowing personal reality to be free. When you and I, two free selves, know one another, I have to be open to hearing your secrets, and you have to want to tell. Von Balthasar says that "This social interchange in which freedoms mutually enrich each other in 'selflessness' gives us a crucial insight: a relation between finite and infinite freedom must involve self-disclosure on the part of infinite freedom."<sup>38</sup> Human nature does have what St. Thomas calls a natural desire for the good. But the good is personal. So there must be a break between the span of human desire for the good and God's free "summons". Human yearning is fulfilled by God's *free* decision to disclose himself in the crucified Word.<sup>39</sup> There is an analogy between being human and being a theological person. But the conscious subject of the primal experience is not the same as the theological person. The good achieved by the theological person is only commensurable with Christ. Von Balthasar's definition of the human is framed by the Biblical image: God freely calls Abraham, and Abraham may freely respond.<sup>40</sup> This is not a postmodernism. It is an ethic for a post-modern society, in which the idea of a common rationality is threadbare, but in which the experience of being loved is not unknown.

### 3. Exclusivism in von Balthasar's Moral Theology

The good in history is given to theological persons, not to secular societies or to the church of Church History. Von Balthasar notes that the Church is only visible in the saints. "No national messianism has any theological significance"<sup>41</sup> We can forget about Catholic Poland or Ireland. Von Balthasar did not happen to have a temperamental disinclination for liberation theology. The conviction that the mystical body of Christ and the State, the city of God and the city of man, are two distinct entities is bound up with the whole pattern of his thought. St. Augustine said that political order in the earthly city is maintained through a compromise between "interests". The heavenly city uses this compromise in order to maintain worldly peace.<sup>42</sup> Von Balthasar understands politics as the *balancing of powers*. He also states, "...all ethical conduct is rooted in religion."<sup>43</sup> The *State's* ethical conduct is rooted in religion. When St. Louis asked St. Thomas Aquinas for political advice and got it, Christianity was part of the power game. The "precarious" nature of this alliance becomes clear with the "emancipation of the modern state from the compact between state and religion." After the loss of the sacred cosmos, the separation of religion and politics is "irreversible."<sup>44</sup> People still try to build just communities. Von Balthasar says that these communities *ought* to be powerless, that is, a-political. He states "Our age is characterised by the opposition between state politics that seeks to balance interests and a disinterested 'humanism' that, while it owes its existence ...to Christianity, extends ..beyond the Church. It proves most fruitful where this 'humanism' refuses to acquire power in order to assert itself..."<sup>45</sup> Von Balthasar tells us that the modern state is a power machine. He also says that persons enacting the good are, like the Trinity, entering into powerlessness. He *must* argue that the two have little to say to each other.<sup>46</sup> The way of Christ is the way of the cross, the way of victory

through non-violence; the necessary way of the State is the use of force to constrain violence.<sup>47</sup>

In *Resident Aliens*, Hauerwas argues that Christianity has its own integral ethics. The church carries out the eschatological summons of the Sermon on the Mount, and thereby lets us see what the good is. Hauerwas claims that the church is an "alternative polis",<sup>48</sup> which has its own politics. By comparison, von Balthasar never calls the mystical body of Christ a 'polis'. He does not use political language to describe the Christian communion. The church does *not* have its own *politics*, in the *Theo-Drama*: it has to struggle against the Adamic politics of the state. This is the source of the dramatic tension between church and state. Von Balthasar says: "...there is the order of the old aeon with its severe laws.. and Christians still live within this old order, which, self-enclosed ..as it is, cannot..be 'theologized'. The Christian politician...must have a realism that comes from a sober assessment of earthly power relationships."<sup>49</sup> Von Balthasar excludes the systematic involvement of Christianity in the state; he does not exclude isolated inroads.<sup>50</sup>

Von Balthasar seemed to say that the contribution of Christian communities ought to be social and not political. But he also proposes a very limited political theology for a post-Christian culture. The same tension can be found in Book 19 of *The City of God*. Augustine argues that the Heavenly City does not despise the earthly balance of interests: "...we also make use of the peace of Babylon."<sup>51</sup> But he goes on to claim that there is only a 'real' commonwealth where there is justice, and there is only justice where the true God is worshipped.<sup>52</sup> That makes the heavenly city the only real city.

We may think how much more *inclusive* was the church when it was contiguous with the nation, when one was a Catholic by being an Italian, or when the Anglican vicar had charge of every soul in his parish. When von Balthasar quietly but firmly disparages infant baptism, he excluded any such idea.<sup>53</sup> This is the logic of authenticity of the Second Vatican Council. The notion of a Christian nation to which individuals belong without choosing to do so may have always been something of a fairy tale.

Jonathan Sacks' *One People? Tradition, Modernity and Jewish Unity* is a sort of Jewish answer to Ronald Knox's *Enthusiasm*—von Balthasar was unenthusiastic about Knox.<sup>54</sup> Sacks argues that the central value of Judaism, the "subject of the covenant promises" is *being one people, keneset yisrael*.<sup>55</sup> To be Jewish was not a matter of piety but of birth. Jewry acted out its collective singularity by keeping the Torah. Jewish law, *halakah*, was easily practicable. This worked, Sacks says, because the Torah created a micro-Jewish state. This held good until the eighteenth century. Emancipation brought it to an end: from here on, the "concept of the Jewish people as one entity, standing before God was problematic."<sup>56</sup> Neo-Orthodoxy responded to modernity by retrenching within enthusiastic communities. For Sacks, the *yeshiva*, often headed by a charismatic rabbi, is paradigmatic of such self-isolated communities. Such communities enabled Judaism to survive into the modern world. And yet, as Sacks says, they militate against the basic Jewish perception that all Jews, sinners and devout, constitute *one people*.<sup>57</sup> Von Balthasar claims that "It is impossible ... for post-Christian man to return to the comfortable security of being part of a chosen people (as in Judaism) or of an all-embracing, divine world of nature (as in paganism)."<sup>58</sup> Do his ethics make for an *empirically* united Church?

#### 4. Inclusivism in von Balthasar's Theology

Do we mean something *empirical* when we speak of Christian community? When they were packed off into it with nowhere else to go, mentally handicapped people found, not communities but families leading private lives inside their houses. The word 'community' makes me think of the scenes in the 1960s musical *Oliver!* in which two dozen shop-keepers, all miraculously kitted up in identical aprons, emerge from their shops and do a dance routine which they all miraculously know. After a decade of celebrating life after-Christendom, Hauerwas took a honeymoon in the Irish village of Sneem. He was impressed by the emergence of little boys and girls dressed in white, to go to Mass on Ascension day.<sup>59</sup> The church, he says, is not etherial, but empirical. It is the "body of Israel."<sup>60</sup>

Von Balthasar does not encourage us to create a literal Christian milieu. He does insist on our universal responsibility. Eating the Eucharist bonds Christians with the human nature of Christ and thus with every human being. The person in Christ is "...in solidarity with each of the Lord's least brothers and ...has an inescapable responsibility for the conditions under which they live. In this... responsibility, which is rooted in Christ's solidarity with every last sinner and poor man, there can be...no closed Church."<sup>61</sup> Von Balthasar is being down to earth in founding Christian community on a miracle. Moral obligation flows along the arteries of the body of Christ. It is nothing empirical but the *mystical body of Christ* which includes every human being. Christ "is the living framework within which every human destiny is acted out; every human destiny is judged by his perfection and saved by his redeeming meaning."<sup>62</sup> Every human destiny?

Karl Rahner claimed that death entails *increased* bodiliness. It frees us to enter a "*deeper*" relationship to the cosmos.<sup>63</sup> The human soul, Thomas said, is 'in some way everything', '*quodammodo omnia*'. When it leaves its body, it experiences this openness as unity with all creation. Human beings will experience death as "integration into the world" because Christ in his death "established an open, real-ontological relationship to the world in its oneness."<sup>64</sup> Rahner's idea of the afterlife appeals to the imagination. People become stars, and stars take a turn as wise old magicians, in children's books such as C.S. Lewis' Narnia series, and Madeleine L'Engle's *A Wrinkle in Time*.

Gabriel Marcel might respond that we do not hope that some one we love could be blended with nature. He claimed that we hope that this one existentially particular face is eternal "'To love a being..is to say you, you in particular will never die.'" It would be a "betrayal" of the one we love to allow her to disappear into oblivion.<sup>65</sup> Von Balthasar refers many times to this. I become a person through the act of love in which I "step out of enclosedness toward the Thou".<sup>66</sup> This act must extend to every individual—and never let go of his tail. Von Balthasar says that, if we take the soul's '*quodammodo omnia*' in a "more intensive sense" than it had for St. Thomas, it means that the human self is open to all other selves, in love.<sup>67</sup> Such love presses toward "... a universal communion outside which it cannot be satisfied."<sup>68</sup> Rahner's after-life is more cosmic than von Balthasar's, but perhaps more faceless. Von Balthasar's image makes one think of the circle of faces in Fra Angelico's heaven. He believes that we may hope that the church is universal, really includes every single human being. But it will be fully rounded in heaven, in the eternal city.

## 5. Loss and Gain

Catholic theology will always be undergirded by some form of the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. The question is how best to re-think it in a post-Christian culture. When put into political practice, the older Thomism was tainted by utilitarianism; when promoted as a panacea for the ills of modernity, it is just a utopian ideology. Rahner built his house in modernity, as defined by Kant. His 'extensive' Thomism may not wear very well in the cultural disparity of postmodern societies. Von Balthasar's theology is most apposite to a social world in which people do not experience cosmic social bonding. Whether or not, like St. Augustine, we are at the end of an age, it is right to begin in the experience of persons. We need an 'intensive Thomism.' That gain may entail that we lose certain things. What sort of community can you picture practising the ethos of the *Theo-Drama*? Are we likely to find von Balthasar's ethos in a charismatic lay movement? What sort of relations will such communities have with the baptised and bad, most Christians? The ethos of von Balthasar's *Theo-Drama* is an existential communalism. It says: if we focus on the one, we get the many. Christians are most likely to achieve Sobornost if they forget that they are a community and go out to meet the individual. That would satisfy the Augustinian von Balthasar.

- 1 Von Balthasar, *Glory I*, pp. 90–94, 463. But he does not rule out in principle the interpenetration of state 'beauty' and theological 'glory': see *Glory VI*, pp. 122–123. I will cite *The Glory of the Lord: a Theological Aesthetics (I–VII)* (Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1982–1987).
- 2 *Glory IV*, p. 320.
- 3 Cf. *Theo-Drama II*, p. 417; *Theo-Drama III*, p. 25; *Theo-Drama IV*, pp. 64–65; *Glory IV*, p. 319. I will cite *Theo-Drama (I–IV)*, translated by Graham Harrison (Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1988–1998).
- 4 Stanley Hauerwas, *Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony*, (Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1989), p. 98.
- 5 Jonathan Sacks, *The Persistence of Faith: Religion, Morality and Society in a Secular Age*, (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1991) p. 15.
- 6 Hauerwas, *Resident Aliens*, pp. 77–78 & p. 101.
- 7 *Theo-Drama I*, pp. 76, 432; *Theo-Drama II*, p. 46.
- 8 *Theo-Drama I*, pp. 455–456.
- 9 *Ibid.*, pp. 636–645.
- 10 *Theo-Drama III*, p. 201.
- 11 *Theo-Drama IV*, pp. 324–327.
- 12 *Ibid.*, pp. 151, 163; on original sin, p. 189–190, 200–201.
- 13 St. Augustine, *Concerning the City of God against the Pagans*, translated by Henry Bettinson (Penguin, 1972, 1980), Book XIV, 13. (p. 571–572).
- 14 *Man in History: A Theological Study*, (Sheed and Ward, London, 1968), p. 107.
- 15 *Theo-Drama I*, p. 256.
- 16 *Theo-Drama II*, pp. 83–87.
- 17 *Theo-Drama IV*, pp. 187–188.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 477.
- 19 *ibid.*, pp. 67 & 210.
- 20 *Theo-Drama III*, pp. 263 & 281.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 282.
- 22 *Theo-Drama III*, pp. 417–418.
- 23 *Theo-Drama IV*, pp. 221–229.
- 24 Augustine, *City of God*, Book I, 35 (p. 45); Book XVIII 47 (Were there any citizens of the Heavenly City outside the race of Israel before the Christian era?) (yes, p. 829).

- 25 *Theo-Drama IV*, p. 67.
- 26 *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Qu. 96, Art 5: "Law..has two essential characteristics: the first, that of a rule directive of human action; the second, that of power to compel."
- 27 *Ibid.*, Qu. 90, Art 4.
- 28 *Ibid.*, Qu. 90, Art 1.
- 29 *Ibid.*, Qu. 94, Art 2.
- 30 *Ibid.*, Qu. 91, Art 2.
- 31 Von Balthasar engages with Hegel's idea of the theatre as requiring a public and political medium. So his ethic is not entirely unpolitical. *Theo-Drama I*, p. 75 & *Theo-Drama II*, p. 392.
- 32 *Theo-Drama I*, 550–551.
- 33 *Theo-Drama II*, 207–210.
- 34 *Ibid.*, pp. 388–389.
- 35 *Theo-Drama III*, pp. 457–459.
- 36 Augustine, *City of God*, Book XIV, 28, (p. 593).
- 37 *Theo-Drama II*, p. 240.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 228.
- 39 *Theo-Drama IV*, pp. 116 and 142.
- 40 The 'three stages' in relation to Abraham: "Nine Propositions on Christian Ethics", *Principles of Christian Morality*, by Heinz Schürmann, Joseph Ratzinger and Hans Urs von Balthasar (Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1986), pp. 89–91.
- 41 *Theo-Drama III*, p. 422.
- 42 Augustine, *City of God*, Book XIX, 17 (pp. 877–878).
- 43 *Theo-Drama IV*, p. 151.
- 44 *Ibid.*, pp. 154 & 155.
- 45 *Ibid.*
- 46 *Theo-Drama II*, p. 366; *Theo-Drama IV*, p. 482.
- 47 *Theo-Drama IV*, p. 484–485.
- 48 *Ibid.*, pp. p. 86, 91 & 46.
- 49 *Theo-Drama IV*, p. 485.
- 50 The scourge of *Gaudium et Spes* encourages us to be pessimistic about the success of these initiatives: *Ibid.*, pp. 442, 481–482.
- 51 *City of God*, Book XIX, Chapter 17 & 27.
- 52 *Ibid*, Chapters 21 and 24.
- 53 Infant baptism turns this sacrament into a "quasi-natural", or cosmic "fact": *Glory I*, pp. 579–580.
- 54 *Ibid*, p. 494.
- 55 Jonathan Sacks, *One People? Tradition, Modernity and Jewish Unity*, (Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1993), p. 31.
- 56 *Ibid.*, p. 210, quoting Michael Wyschogrod, *The Body of Faith*, p. 239.
- 57 *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 92, 101–104, 215.
- 58 *Theo-Drama IV*, p. 125.
- 59 Stanley Hauerwas, *In Good Company: The Church as Polis* (Notre Dame University Press, 1995), pp. 19–20.
- 60 *Ibid.*, p. 31.
- 61 *Theo-Drama II*, p. 409 and *Theo-Drama I*, p. 39.
- 62 *Theo-Drama II*, p. 87.
- 63 Karl Rahner, *On the Theology of Death*, (Herder & Herder, New York, 1961) p. 27.
- 64 *Ibid.*, pp. 71–72.
- 65 Gabriel Marcel, *Homo Viator: An Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope*, translated by Emma Craufurd (Peter Smith, Gloucester, Mass. 1978) p. 147.
- 66 Von Balthasar, *Dare We Hope 'That All men be Saved?: with a short discourse on hell*, translated by David Kipp & Lothar Krauth (Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1987), pp. 81–82.
- 67 *Theo-Drama III*, p. 272.
- 68 *Ibid.*, p. 152