

tions and comments. Besides, I learned from one of my colleagues who used this book in his third-semester Russian course (thus, "fairly elementary") that neither he nor his students have met any difficulties in using this book.

I should like to point out, moreover, that the problem of "difficulty" may also represent a controversial issue, since it depends largely upon methods of teaching rather than on texts selected.

The reviewer's criticism of the arrangement of explanatory material (notes, idioms, vocabulary) is far from convincing. The student does not have to resort to "endless and tiresome turning of pages," since the simple use of a bookmark or of a finger would do the trick. In this connection, I should like to add a more important point. It has been my experience that readers which offer the vocabulary concurrently with the text, although facilitating classwork, discourage students from independent learning of new words, and lead to unsatisfactory results in the final test.

It is a pity that the reviewer did not notice a very important point: the *Oxford Russian Readers* series, in which Birkett and Struve's selection is included, are the first books of the kind to give English-speaking students, apart from excellent notes and idiom selection, a faultless and scientifically arranged vocabulary. I am referring especially to the "six symbols system" as a guide to the shift of stress in the declension of nouns.

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Dear Sir:

Your reviewer, Professor John P. Dawson, does not seem to care for my book on Greece (*American Dilemma and Opportunity*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952). He finds it "highly colored"; he states that it adds "neither information nor fresh appraisal"; and he concludes that it is "a completely unsafe guide" to present-day Greece. Others (including all the Communist reviewers) have been equally negative while some have been just as positive. Each reviewer has the privilege of drawing his own conclusions, but does he not also have the responsibility of presenting supporting evidence for at least some of his conclusions? Not one bit of specific data or proof can I find in the review—only generalizations and blanket charges such as "extreme bias," "almost complete whitewash," and "it might have been expected that post-war events and disclosures would have brought a different view." I will admit that this is quite an effective procedure. What answer can one give except to plead innocent and refer the reader to the book itself?

There is no point in answering generalities with generalities, so I shall turn to two important events, my treatment of which Professor Dawson specifically criticizes. One is the Battle of Athens of 1944-45, a major turning point in contemporary Greek history. My reconstruction of this event is based upon two documentary collections, the EAM White Book and the British White Paper, and upon all the available accounts by participants and observers, both British and Greek. On the basis of this evidence I presented a step-by-step account of what happened between the liberation of Greece in October, 1944, and the outbreak of hostilities two months later. In doing so I could find no support for Churchill's insistence that the

EAM had "a fairly well organized plot or plan" to seize Athens. So I concluded that "the real causes of the Athens tragedy were Papandreou's policy, the provocations of the Greek rightists, and the intervention of the British" (p. 136). Professor Dawson thinks otherwise. He states that "tragic errors there were indeed, but on both sides." I presume that he read and weighed the evidence before reaching the conclusion that I am in error. I request him, therefore, to point out, with supporting data, precisely where I erred. I also request him to confine himself to this issue of the immediate origins of the Battle of Athens. Background factors were naturally involved, including the conduct and policies of all sides during the occupation, as well as traditional British and Russian policy in the Balkans during preceding centuries. An analysis of all these circumstances is not feasible in the circumstances. But we do have here a clear-cut issue which involves the events of two months and on which Professor Dawson has taken a position and passed judgment. I ask him for his evidence.

I also request Professor Dawson to support his statement that my ". . . story of intrigue, weakness, and self-seeking in the Greek exiled 'Government' in Cairo . . . is, to say the least, stream-lined. . . ." This story is based almost entirely on the accounts of Tsouderos, who was the Premier of this government, and of Pyromaglou, who was the representative of the nationalist EDES and the opponent of the EAM. I assume that Professor Dawson has read their testimony, has weighed it against other evidence that he apparently possesses, has found the latter more convincing, and thus has reached his negative conclusion. I request him, therefore, to point out specific examples of what he considers to be "stream-lining" and to present the evidence which apparently supersedes the testimony of Pyromaglou and Tsouderos as well as my own conclusion.

I have selected these two particular events for discussion because readers who do not have access to a copy of the book may find my articles dealing with these events in the December, 1949, and December, 1950, issues of this *Review*. It is rather odd, incidentally, that whereas the reviewer states flatly that my book adds no new information, the editors of professional historical journals have seen fit to publish six articles consisting of material presented in this book.

It is also instructive to note Professor Dawson's parenthetical remark, "Overpopulation ceases to be a 'myth' in the later chapters." This is sheer distortion of the text. I have made it clear throughout that overpopulation does exist at present, but that it is relative to resource utilization and that more efficient exploitation of existing resources would raise substantially the living standards and eliminate what is at present a state of overpopulation. Even a casual reading of the text reveals that I label as a myth not the fact that overpopulation prevails at present but rather the notion that "poor resources and high birth rate mean poverty for Greece, inevitably and perpetually" (p. 13).

As for current developments in Greece, Professor Dawson states that I do not offer "a program for immediate action by the United States." I do not know quite what he expects in a short and general study. Certainly there is no dearth of "programs" for Greece. That country has been visited and investigated and reported upon *ad nauseum* by United States and U.N. commissions and committees. The necessary economic measures and administrative reforms have been set forth repeatedly and are well known, as I

explain in my book. The trick is to find a government that will do the job.

But when I make suggestions as to the most promising type of government, the reviewer complains that I am "impatient" with British and American policy and that I do not appreciate the difficulty of giving "material aid" and "unsolicited advice" to a "proud and independent people." No one will deny that it is necessary to be tactful and diplomatic in day-to-day contacts with the Greek people, whose temperament I believe is as familiar to me as to the reviewer. But surely more is at issue here than a problem in public relations. The fact of the matter is that, because of her geographic position and small size, Greece has never been free in modern times to make her own history. When Churchill feared that a Communist-dominated regime would be established in Greece after liberation, he did not hesitate to intervene with armed force. For the same reason we enunciated the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and intervened with arms and dollars and missions. Whether we like it or not, what happens in Greece today depends to a very great degree upon decisions in Washington. The question, therefore, is not whether we should intervene, but rather, what should be the aim of our intervention? I point out in my book that this is a most difficult question to answer. Far from being "impatient," I analyze at length (pp. 226-29) the dilemma we face. In fact, one reviewer commented that the word "opportunity" should be deleted from the subtitle *American Dilemma and Opportunity*. Nevertheless, I do reach a conclusion which Professor Dawson chose to ignore completely. I urge support of the Center as against a Left that is Communist-dominated and a Right that I believe cannot cope with the country's basic ills.

The unpleasant truth is that we run a risk regardless of the policy we adopt. The weakness of the center is obvious and serious. But barring a sudden revolution in our relations with Russia, the only alternative is the right. It is very doubtful that it could stay in office for any length of time without establishing an authoritarian regime disguised as a "strong-man government" to curb the Communists. And if we should waver in our support of such a government, it would soon be replaced by an equally authoritarian regime disguised as a "peoples' democracy" (p. 229).

Future events will demonstrate whether or not this is a "completely unsafe guide" to what is going on in Greece.

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Dear Sir:

In your issue for October 1953 you published a paper by Mr. Harold Orel entitled "The Forgotten Ambassadors: Russian Fiction in Victorian England." One of the statements he makes will no doubt shock many lovers and students of Russian literature in England, and perhaps in this country. I have in mind his reference to the late Maurice Baring. He writes: "Men who were not primarily poets or novelists in their own right served as sponsors and mediated between English and Russian cultures. These individuals—W. R. S. Ralston, C. E. Turner, W. R. Morfill, the Maudes, Constance Garnett, and Maurice Baring—responded to the Russian novel in