

of military and diplomatic retreat in the last stages of the war with Turkey out of a desire to free her hands to deal with Pugachev. But Alexander's own evidence does not indicate that *in fact* the revolt affected the outcome of the war and negotiations for the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji. He notes that in order to deal with the serious crisis of the revolt (and the stalemate on the Danube), Catherine brought about changes at court. To rid herself of the Orlov-Chernyshev faction she made G. A. Potemkin her favorite and enlisted the help of Nikita Panin. Although this suggestion is not unwarranted, the evidence available is not conclusive. The empress did, of course, take into account the relative strength of court factions, but I personally do not think that Catherine depended so completely on their support as Alexander tries to prove. In fact, his interpretation rests on his belief that there existed a diarchy of autocrat and nobility and that Catherine's government was the tool or puppet of the gentry. (Alexander also puts much stress on the very doubtful assumption that Panin actively worked for a limitation of the autocracy.) This was hardly the case, and Alexander takes for granted that which has yet to be proven.

The chronicle of the government's concrete reactions to the revolt is interesting, lively, and persuasive. But we are not given a satisfactory picture of the causes that gave rise to the rebellion or of the forces that helped to shape its course and character. Admittedly, such considerations are beyond Alexander's narrow subject. But by failing to give an adequate picture of the background, he raises at times more questions than he realizes. For example, noting the problem of communicating with the peasantry (pp. 95–96), he does not seem aware of the nature of the conceptions of political authority that lay at its root. He follows too uncritically Soviet (and radical) historiography in downgrading Catherine's statesmanship; his own evidence points to a different impression. There are a few minor blemishes: for example, he refers to the Republic of Ragusa as that of Dubrovnik; the reference to the quotation on page 110 is incorrectly cited, and why leave in French a phrase that in the original was italicized to indicate quotation marks?; the use of *ibid.* in the notes is very confusing. Unfortunately, too, Indiana University Press has served Alexander very poorly. Apparently at the Press they believe that students and scholars need not buy books and that libraries may be charged any price—how else are we to explain that a shoddily produced book should be sold at \$8.50?

In its limited purpose of accounting for the concrete responses of the imperial government to the Pugachev revolt, Alexander's book succeeds very well and will be of great value to students. But the dynamic forces behind the peasant and Cossack revolts and their effect on Russian life and culture still need elucidating. The field remains open for the analytically minded with a firm grasp of the conditions and processes underlying Russian reality in the eighteenth century.

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THE BEGINNINGS OF RUSSIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1800–1860. By William L. Blackwell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. ix, 484 pp. \$12.50.

This is a work of intermediate synthesis and as such deserves a warm welcome. It is one of those relatively scarce works that, unlike the monograph, deal with a large topic or time span about which a great many monographs and sources have already been published, and that, unlike the general text or essay, provide full scholarly documentation. Blackwell's book may be considered as virtually a com-

panion to the last sections of Jerome Blum's book on lord and peasant in Russia to 1860 and Alexander Vucinich's book on science in Russian culture to 1860.

Blackwell begins with a short sketch of industrial development before 1800, then proceeds to examine for the period 1800–1860 various aspects of the industrializing process: the role of the state and of private entrepreneurs, the growth of transportation and technology, the development of financial institutions and important branches of industry. He brings together a tremendous amount of data. His subject is one that has interested hundreds of Russian and non-Russian writers before and since the Revolution, and the published primary and secondary literature is vast. Blackwell explains that he was denied access to Soviet archives. But surely for a work of this broad scope that is not the main problem. He had enough to do in making use of already published materials, as is suggested by his bibliography of over four hundred books and articles and by his ample footnotes.

Among the numerous kinds of interesting and valuable information Blackwell presents are biographical sketches of industrial entrepreneurs who emerged from various social strata, including the high nobility, the serfs, the merchant class, the religious outsiders, such as Old Believers and Jews, and the foreign technicians and fortune seekers. He makes many perceptive comments. For instance, in connection with the role of foreigners in Russia he notes that the definition of "foreigner" and "foreign enterprise" poses problems. Andrew Carnegie, though born and reared in Scotland, is not considered a foreigner by historians of our country. Yet historians of Russian industry persist in calling a man like the German-born manufacturer Ludwig Knoop a foreigner, even though he came to Russia before he was twenty, became a Russian citizen (and a baron), and lived on in Russia the rest of his long life. Blackwell's chapters on railroads are especially detailed. His appendixes provide figures on, among other things, the changing population and social composition of Russian cities. (Incidentally, in the right-hand column on page 428 either the heading "percent growth" needs to be changed or all figures in the column need to be multiplied by 100.)

Minor flaws are distractingly numerous. Special Russian terms, when used, are often twisted: *kupichestvo* (repeatedly) instead of *kupechestvo*, *otstal'nost'* instead of *otstalost'*, *potochnyi* instead of *pochetnyi grazhdanin*, and many others. Adjectival endings are confused: *-naia* instead of both *-noe* and *-niia*, *-nii* instead of both *-nyi* and *-noi*, and many others. Place names are distorted: Iuzhovka instead of Iuzovka, Kolomensk instead of Kolomna, Tulich instead of Tul'chin (or Tulchin), and many others. Names of people suffer similarly: Bakrushin instead of Bakhrushin, for example. Soft signs are omitted or included, without system; and there are other inconsistencies in the transliterations. In the footnotes and the bibliography there are many copying errors, and the titles of prerevolutionary books are given in an irregular mixture of old and new orthography. To those irritations are added occasional stylistic awkwardnesses and some needless repetition.

More substantial criticisms may also be made. Blackwell intends to put his study in the framework of the analyses of modernization by Cyril Black and others, but he does not do as much exploring of causes and interrelationships as his introduction suggests he will or as the subject demands. To give brief examples: We encounter a reference to "reducing the Ukraine to a position of colonial dependency," yet we do not find adequate substantiation of this or indeed any satisfactory discussion of the special place of the Ukrainian provinces in the economy as a whole. We encounter repeated references to the stifling effect of government regulation and many specific and telling illustrations of it, but we do not find a full evaluation of its causes and effects. We encounter a reference to the limited protection offered to

patents, but we do not find any explanation of how Russian patent policy differed from that of other countries and how this difference may have affected the flow of inventions. We encounter a few passing references to the severe climate, but we find very little hypothesizing concerning the many and, I assume, profound ways in which the Russian climate affected the process of industrialization and might explain differences between Russia and its Western competitors. The same could be said about other geographical factors which, although mentioned, seem to me to be neglected. We encounter references to such elusive qualities as Russian favoritism, brutality, and corruption as partial explanations for slow progress, but we do not find any systematic examination of their extent in comparison with other societies of the time or any speculation as to why these were special problems in Russia.

In citing such shortcomings I have been doing my duty as the reviewer of a book that aims high and is both scholarly and important. Some of the defects serve to illustrate why so few of us attempt works of intermediate synthesis. Monographs are in certain ways easier to do, and they are more readily accepted as thorough. In contrast, a topic like Blackwell's is so large that no one can digest all of the relevant publications and anticipate all of the significant questions. The author consequently is likely to arouse expectations he cannot fully meet and to expose himself to charges of omission. Yet we must encourage such syntheses, especially on the part of those scholars who work under conditions free from political restraints. We are fortunate that Blackwell has given us such a broad and thoroughly documented study of such an important topic, and we can applaud his intention to treat the next stage of Russian industrialization in another volume.

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THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ALEXANDER I: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND THE CONDUCT OF RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY, 1801-1825.

By *Patricia Kennedy Grimsted*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. xxvi, 367 pp. \$9.50.

No less than eight men served Alexander I in the capacity of foreign minister during his twenty-five year reign, men as varied in their backgrounds and convictions as Rumiantsev, Czartoryski, Nesselrode, and Capodistrias. What distinguished them and made them valuable to the Tsar-Diplomat was that "their attitudes and personal commitments corresponded to his own vague ideas or to specific policies he wanted implemented at a given time." Mrs. Grimsted's heroically researched volume deals with the activities and ideas of each of Alexander's foreign ministers—not only with the relatively lofty processes of diplomacy but also with the more mundane procedures of the foreign office itself.

Based largely upon primary sources (published and unpublished) and drawing heavily upon archival materials in the USSR, Austria, England, France, and Poland, the book clearly demonstrates the personal rather than institutional or ideological nature of Russian diplomacy in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Frequently permitting her eloquent and surprisingly candid principals to speak for themselves, the author reveals the frustrations inherent in the position of a statesman in the imperial service: witness, for example, the experiences of Nesselrode and Capodistrias, each of whom simultaneously sought to channel Russian foreign policy in a different direction and neither of whom fully enjoyed Alexander's confi-