

ABSTRACTS FROM INQUIRY
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THOUGHT AND PURPOSE

RICHARD TAYLOR, University of Rochester

The concepts of (i) being, (ii) change, (iii) causation, (iv) action, and (v) purpose are concepts of decreasing generality, in this sense: (a) each can be understood only in terms of its predecessor on the list, and (b) while the first applies to everything, the others, in order, have an increasingly narrow scope. Much Western philosophy has amounted to an attempt to reduce one or more of these to those that precede them, and thus eliminate them as concepts necessary for philosophical understanding, but all such attempts seem to have failed. Hume did not reduce (iii) to (ii), the numberless attempts to reduce (iv) to (iii) seem clearly to have failed, and, what very few seem as yet to have realized, the attempts to reduce (v) to (iv) are unpromising. Not only is agency necessary for understanding human behavior, it seems also necessary to understanding thought, and the same appears true of the concept of purpose.

THE FAÇADE OF EQUALITY IN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY

RICHARD LICHTMAN, University of California, Berkeley

Liberal democratic theory is the ideological expression of capitalism. Its paramount function is to justify the distribution of property and power which permits a minority of men to exploit and dominate the lives of the majority. A crucial device for carrying out this task is the elaboration of a theory of political equality which maintains the economic foundation of capitalism. But as capitalism is itself an evolving system, so the theory which protects its interests passes through important stages. A fundamental change occurs in the transition from classical liberal theory to its contemporary articulation as political science. For Locke and Mill an egalitarian directive is first abstractly posited and then, through specific modification, withdrawn. For Schumpeter, however, what the classical doctrine would have regarded as the perversion of democracy, is itself made integral to the redefinition of the democratic process. The result of the behavioral restatement is the destruction of the tension which separates ideal imperatives from distorted reality and obfuscates the need and possibility of radical political change.

KIERKEGAARD'S CONCEPT OF TRUTHFULNESS

JEREMY WALKER, McGill University

Kierkegaard claims that a certain kind of subjectivity (truthfulness) guarantees objectivity (truth). This paradox diminishes if we allow that he is concerned with the concept of truth involved in self-knowledge: ethical truth. Self-knowledge is an ethical concept, and close to the idea 'commitment to the truth.' Now this is analogous to the idea 'commitment to the Good.' And Kierkegaard claims also that a certain mode of willing guarantees its object's reality. This paradox diminishes if we reflect on the idea of faith. For there is a certain way of life which can be understood only as expressing commitment to the Good. Commitment to the Good is a form of the commitment of true love, *agape*. *Agape* and knowledge are connected. Kierkegaard claims that *agape* 'believes all' but 'is never deceived.' For knowledge is only of possibilities: and so belief is a choice that is up to us. Belief and mistrust are the only fundamental relationships between persons. Of these only belief is a truly ethical commitment. Thus only within 'the ethical' can the ideas of self-knowledge and truthfulness retain their full scope and application.

DISCUSSIONS:

I. 'MINE' AND THE FAMILY OF HUMAN IMAGININGS

JOHN KING-FARLOW, University of Liverpool and University of Alberta

This note attempts first to broaden the investigation of ties expressed by 'my' and 'mine', which was initiated in 'The Concept of "Mine"' (*Inquiry*, Vol. 7, No. 3). Socially accepted

types of *use* ties (active and passive), *worth* ties and other sorts are distinguished from the previously noted ties of ownership, agency, etc. These further distinctions of ties, it is argued, also deserve the attention of philosophers and conceptually oriented social scientists. The analysis of 'mine' is then applied to the much disputed concept of 'imagining'; some major clusters of divergent facts and phenomena called *human imaginings* are mapped and related to 'mine'.

II. INTRODUCTION TO A REAPPRAISAL OF *FEAR AND TREMBLING*

PAUL DIETRICHSON, University of Washington

III. PROFESSOR FRANKENA'S RENDEZVOUS WITH THE ABSOLUTE

A NOTE IN FURTHERANCE OF HIS COUNTER-REFORMATION

MORRIS B. STORER, University of Florida

In his presidential address (American Philosophical Association, Western Division), William Frankena sets himself against the relativist and irrationalist drift of our time in asserting that 'It is of the essence of a normative judgment to claim that it is justified, rational or valid,' and that fully informed men of reason will ultimately agree about value questions. Applauding the return to reason, this note finds a need for further clarification, on the definition of normative terms, the justification of normative judgments, the basis of obligation to be rational, and on the promise of agreement among men of reason in axiology.

IV. STRAWSON ON THE TRADITIONAL LOGIC

ALAN HAUSMAN, Ohio State University

In his *Introduction to Logical Theory*, Strawson argues that Aristotelian logic can be given a successful interpretation into ordinary English, but not into the symbolism of *Principia Mathematica*, on the grounds that Aristotelian logic and ordinary English share something absent in *PM*, namely, the doctrine of presupposition. It is argued that Strawson is mistaken. *PM* does justice to the logical rules of Aristotelian logic and also has a fully articulated doctrine of presupposition.

K. O. APEL: *ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND THE GEISTES-WISSENSCHAFTEN*

V. M. HOPE, University of Edinburgh

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SANTAYANA AND VERIFICATIONISM

TIMOTHY L. S. SPRIGGE, University of Cincinnati and University of Sussex

Santayana's later philosophical writings contain a critique of pragmatism and idealism which still has a little appreciated relevance as a critique of verificationist styles of thought which remain markedly influential. He urged that cognitive thought essentially consists in positing objects the existence of which cannot be verified except by other thoughts which likewise do no more than posit objects, and moreover that in a sense all such posited objects are substances lurking behind their various appearances. Granted that this is a general truth about the objects of thought, one can never discredit the claim to know about objects of any particular type on the grounds that this truth applies to them, nor can it be thought a recommendation of some reductivist account of objects of a certain sort that it saves their existence from being unverifiable, for it will still leave the objects to which they are reduced in the same boat. The continuing relevance of Santayana's insight here is argued for.

WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTEBOOKS, 1914-1916

PAUL WIENPAHL, University of California, Santa Barbara

The thesis of the author's article, 'Wittgenstein and the Naming Relation' (*Inquiry*, Vol. 7 (1964), No. 4), was that Wittgenstein solved some early problems he faced by developing a picture theory of language. This solution assumed that the units of language are words which are

names of simple objects. The present article traces the development of this solution, through the *Notebooks, 1914–1916*. This serves to substantiate another thesis of the earlier article, that Wittgenstein's work from the *Tractatus to The Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* was all of one piece and that there is a continuous line of development from the earliest work through all of the Wittgensteinian material which has been published.

FREE WILL, DETERMINISM, AND THE THEORY OF IMPORTANT CRITERIA

MICHAEL ANTHONY SLOTE, Columbia University

The Theory of Important Criteria is used to argue that the age-old problem of the compatibility of free will and determinism turns on the question of the importance of causal indeterminacy of choice as a criterion of being able to do otherwise. One's answer to this question depends in turn on one's evaluation of certain moral issues and of the force and significance of certain similes, analogies and diagrams in terms of which one can 'depict' a deterministic universe. It is further argued that the problem of free will and determinism is not a pseudo-problem, but a genuine problem that is hard to solve because of the depth and complexity of the evaluative issues on which it hangs.

I. 'STRONG' SELF-DECEPTION

DAVID PUGMIRE, University of London

Even if many instances of reflexive, and even of interpersonal, deception do not involve knowledge or belief of the deceiver to the contrary of the belief he fosters, it is conceivable that some instances could. This is obscured in Stanley Paluch's treatment of self-deception by the dubious contention that one couldn't be self-deceived if one could affirm that one knew (was aware) that *P* and believed not-*P*, and that one couldn't be described as knowing *P* and believing not-*P* unless one could affirm this (*Inquiry*, Vol. 10, 1967). The former claim would actually render the affirmation absurd, which it is not; and if it is not, the latter claim is harmless. Whatever can be said of 'self-deception' involves deviant uses of 'know,' the question remains how '*X* knows *P* and believes not-*P*' could be true given a standard use. The standards of rationality permit one to sustain rival beliefs so long as one does not reflect on all the facts alleged in one of the beliefs. Self-deceit relies on withholding attention not from an unwanted belief as such, as Demos suggests, but from its detailed contents.

II. UNDERSTANDING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES REVISITED

JAMES W. VAN EVRA, University of Waterloo

Rolf Gruner's article (*Inquiry*, Vol. 10, No. 2) on the role of understanding in the social sciences casts rational understanding as the aim of the social sciences. Even though he opts for a noncontroversial methodology for the social sciences, his view still commits the social sciences to seeking the reproduction of reality rather than the explanation of it.

III. THE NOTION OF UNDERSTANDING: REPLIES TO CUNNINGHAM AND VAN EVRA

ROLF GRUNER, St. Mary's University, Halifax, N.S.

It is pointed out against the two critics (a) that an identity or partial identity of meanings and facts is logically impossible, (b) that the logical grammar of 'identify' and 'explain' is different from that of 'understand' and that hence understanding can never be an operation of identifying or explaining, and (c) that rational understanding does not involve a 'reproduction' of the subject matter in any controversial sense.

IV. DOES A GENERALIZED HEISENBERG PRINCIPLE OPERATE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES?

GARRISON SPOSITO, Sonoma State College, California

It is argued that a generalization of Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy is possible in the social sciences. The empirical grounds for this contention lie with interference phenomena induced by transference distortions that may occur when human beings investigate the behavior of one another.

REVIEW DISCUSSION:

SANTAYANA: NEW BOOKS

TIMOTHY L. S. SPRIGGE, University of Cincinnati and University of Sussex

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REASONS AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF

DAVID MICHAEL LEVIN, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

This paper purports a limited study of the concept of reason. It analyzes the claim of religious belief to be reasonable. The context for this analysis is an examination of some evidential (criteriological) connections between reasonable belief and '(good) reasons' for such belief. Consideration of the *typical* sort of evidential connection shows, not surprisingly, that religious belief cannot claim to be reasonable. But it is argued that there is (at least) one other sort of connection, and that it is philosophically plausible to regard this connection as definitive of a quite distinctive *sense* of 'reasonable,' with its own kind and style of criteria, according to which religious belief can be thought reasonable.

ON THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES

ARTHUR B. CODY, University of Alberta, Edmonton

Man's belief in God is often contrasted with man's disbelief, Atheism; but the nature of human belief is contrastable with the nature of the belief of demons. A point of contrast lies in the consequences of the different sort of reasons men and demons must be understood to have. One consequence has to do with the vision of the world, *seeing* the world as God's creation, which men are expected to achieve and demons are not. The logic of the 'seeing as' formula is explored and found wanting even though it seems inescapable in connection with human belief. In the end human belief appears more peculiar than demonic.

CYBERNETICS AND MIND-BODY PROBLEMS

KEITH GUNDERSON, Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science

It is asked to what extent answers to such questions as 'Can machines think?', 'Could robots have feelings?' might be expected to yield insight into traditional mind-body questions. It has sometimes been assumed that answering the first set of questions would be the same as answering the second. Against this approach other philosophers have argued that answering the first set of questions would not help us to answer the second. It is argued that both of these assessments are mistaken. It is then claimed, although not argued in detail, that the following three approaches to the first set of questions are mistaken: (1) machines (and robots) obviously cannot think, feel, create, etc., since they do only what they are programmed to do; (2) on the basis of an analysis of the *meaning* of the words 'machine' ('robot', 'think,' 'feel,' etc.) we can see that *in principle* it would be impossible for machines (or robots) to think, feel, create, etc.; (3) machines (and robots) obviously can (or could) think, feel, etc., since they *do* certain things which, if we were to do them, would require thought, feeling, etc. It is argued that, once, it is seen why approach (2) is mistaken, it becomes desirable to decline 'in principle' approaches to the first set of questions and to favor 'piecemeal investigations' where attention is centered upon what is actually taking place in machine technology, the development of new programming techniques, etc. Some suggestions are made concerning the relevance of current computer simulation studies to traditional mind-body questions. A new set of questions is proposed as a substitute for the first set of questions. It is hoped that attempts to answer these may provide us with new and detailed portraits of the mind-body relationship.

PRIVILEGED ACCESS

JOSEPH AGASSI, Boston University

That everyone has some privileged access to some information is trivially true. The doctrine of privileged access is that I am the authority on all of my own experiences. Possibly this thesis

was attacked by Wittgenstein (the thesis on the nonexistence of private languages). The thesis was refuted by Freud (I know your dreams better than you), Duhem (I know your methods of scientific discovery better than you), Malinowski (I know your customs and habits better than you), and perception theorists (I can make you see things which are not there and describe your perceptions better than you can). The significance of this rejected thesis is that it is the basis of sensationalism and thus of all inductivist and some conventionalist philosophy.

DISCUSSIONS:

I. FEUER ON GUILT AND LOGIC

E. D. WATT, University of Western Australia

II. FEUER, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

WILLIAM LAD SESSIONS

III. THE AUTONOMY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF IDEAS

LEWIS S. FEUER, University of Toronto

IV. THE PRODUCTION OF CHILDREN AS A PROBLEM OF UTILITARIAN ETHICS

It is shown that the basic postulate of utilitarianism does not work when we must decide whether a person should be brought into existence. Utilitarianism must be supplemented by further axioms. Those proposed lead to the consequence that as far as the potential child's utility is concerned, it is morally preferable not to produce children at all. This consequence is accepted. It is still recommended when parents' utility is taken into account.

V. COOPER'S LOGIC OF ORDINARY DISCOURSE

M. J. CRESSWELL, Victoria University of Wellington

REVIEW DISCUSSION:

I. YET ANOTHER HOBBS

(F. S. McNeilly: *The Anatomy of Leviathan*)

DAVID P. GAUTHIER, University of Toronto

II. THE LATER ROYCE AND THE BELOVED COMMUNITY

(Josiah Royce: *The Problem of Christianity*)

NINIAN SMART, University of Lancaster

III. TWO VIEWS OF ATHEISM

(Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur: *The Religious Significance of Atheism*)

ANTONY FLEW, University of Keele