epistemology and another to the will. This would save the cognitive part of "*esse intentionale*" which both Geach and Kenny suggest to be one of Aquinas's main contributions to western philosophy of mind.

One learns ever so much from this text. It is highly recommended for any student of Aquinas—and, a fortiori, of Aristotle—who would like to see a different spin placed upon the terribly difficult set of concepts which go to make up Aquinas's action theory. This book is one to read and ponder. It certainly is a thoughtful addition to the wealth of literature on Aristotle and Aquinas dealing with moral theory which has followed MacIntyre's "recovery" of virtue ethics.

ANTHONY J. LISSKA

HEIDEGGER AND CHRISTIANITY: THE HENSLEY HENSON LECTURES 1993–94 by John Macquarrie *SCM Press*, **1994, viii + 135 pp, £9.95 pbk.**

As is well known, English Heidegger studies are forever indebted to Professor John Macquarrie. It was while he was working on his doctoral thesis about Rudolf Bultmann that his supervisor suggested the necessity of understanding the philosopher in order to understand the theologian. Martin Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (1927) fascinated, and on finishing his thesis Macquarrie began a translation that he completed with his American co-translator Edward S. Robinson and published in 1962. Since then Macquarrie has complemented his initial work with a series of lucid essays on Heidegger's thought, of which the present volume is the most recent. As expected it is a wonderfully clear exposition of a body of work renowned for its density and difficulty. The first-time reader of Heidegger who wants to know a little of what he said about being and time, thinking and theology, technology and art, language and poetry, may happily start here. However, those wanting something more than an introduction will be disappointed, especially those wanting to know if Heidegger is of any real interest to theology.

In the preface Macquarrie announces that he has used the opportunity of the Hensley Henson lectures to consider the 'general question of the status of time and history in relation to Christian thought' by way of Heidegger's philosophy. Indeed he has; but in a *very* general way. Furthermore his irenic composure leads him to avoid making judgements about Heidegger's meaning wherever possible. On Macquarrie's reading, Heidegger is a deeply ambiguous writer, especially when it comes to the question of God, but Macquarrie does not seek to question the reason for this ambiguity. His is a very amiable reading of Heidegger. While he acknowledges John Caputo's suggestion of three 'turns' in Heidegger's thought—from Catholicism to Protestantism, from Christianity to nihilism, and from nihilism to the mythopoesis of earth and sky, the mortals and the gods—he presents Heidegger's development as more of a meditative journey that takes him away from and returns him to the Catholic faith of his birth—though again this 'return' is shrouded in ambiguity.

While there is much that is ambiguous in Macquarrie's Heidegger, there is little that is truly dark: nothing that is disingenuous or dishonest, nothing demented or demonic. One might think of it as an Anglicized

Heidegger's Heidegger; a sanitized Heidegger. While Hugo Ott's political life of Heidegger is listed in the bibliography, it seems to have made little impact on Macquarrie's understanding of the philosopher. Ott's work seeks to show that Heidegger's championing of National Socialism was more than a passing aberration, and suggests that it was intimate to his philosophical concerns. This last point has been more extensively explored in John Caputo's *Demythologizing Heidegger* (1993). It is barely considered in Macquarrie's book. Caputo argues that Heidegger's mature philosophy—in its three turns, but increasingly in its later manifestations—depends upon a profound exclusion: the denial of the Hebraic and Christian in order to reveal the Greco-Germanic destiny of Being itself—Heidegger's ambiguous God-surrogate. In a similar way, Macquarrie marginalizes the question of Heidegger's Nazism.

While Macquarrie admits that the question of Heidegger's Nazism is 'too important to be ignored', he excludes it from the main body of his text as an unwanted interruption (p.10). It is relegated to a last chapter of 'loose ends', where he argues that we should separate Heidegger's politics from his philosophy. First Macquarrie focuses on Heidegger's rectoral address to the University of Freiburg, so that the issue is confined to the 'lapse of 1933' (p.113), thus obscuring Heidegger's prolonged involvement with National Socialism before and after this date. Then he suggests that many Germans, having little experience of 'democratic responsibility', 'drifted along with the Party', and that Heidegger was simply not a 'man of affairs' (p.116–17). Heidegger was certainly naive in thinking the Party might have any real interest in his philosophy, but he did more than drift along with it, he embraced it and publicly eulogised the Führer, he who 'alone *is* the German reality, present and future, and its law' (Heidegger quoted in Ott, *Martin Heidegger: A Political Life*, p.164). Finally Macquarrie suggests that the politics belong to the past (but might not the same be said of the philosophy?); that it is only 'mediocre journalists and frustrated academics' who perversely delight in debunking the 'great'; and that we should judge the man not by his weaknesses but by his achievements (p.117). Indeed; but it is precisely the achievements that are in question.

Heidegger believed that his was the philosophy of National Socialism; an intensely nationalistic political philosophy that stressed greatness, strength and conflict. In the Nazi movement, above all in its Führer, Being itself was speaking, and Heidegger, the Führer-rector, was its prophet. The point is simple enough: Heidegger did not separate his philosophy from his politics, his politics was his philosophy in action (see the testimony of Karl Löwith quoted in Ott pp.133–39).

Macquarrie allows that it might be said that a person of Heidegger's 'superior intelligence' should have known better (p.117). But might it not also be said that a person who some claim as the greatest philosopher of the twentieth-century, should have had something more to offer Europe in its darkness than a demented nationalism? There were those who did; but did Heidegger? After 1934 Heidegger began to lose faith in National Socialism as it was practised. It did not recognise its own 'inner truth and greatness' (Heidegger quoted in Macquarrie, p.115), and Heidegger was always more interested in that 'inner truth' than was the Party, whose

'truth' was indeed otherwise. But, as Hugo Ott suggests, there is no evidence that Heidegger ever recanted of that 'inner truth and greatness'. The Party might betray it but he would not, for it was the core of his philosophy (see Ott p.135). What was this 'truth', and what does it have to do with the truth of Christian faith?

Many theologians have been fascinated by Heidegger's work: Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Rahner by the philosophy of the 1920s and 30s (Karl Barth saw more clearly), and others—such as Heinrich Ott—by Heidegger's later philosophy in the 50s and 60s. Why were they so fascinated? One such, William J. Richardson, replies: 'Because there is truth in Heidegger and wherever there is truth, there is God ... Perhaps it is only a philosophical truth: the ontological difference as such.... Perhaps there is in him a theological truth'. This passage is quoted by Macquarrie (pp.114–15), and it would seem to sum up his own answer to the question of Heidegger's fascination for theology: perhaps there is a theological truth in Heidegger. Macquarrie, concluding his discussion of Heidegger's post-war remark that 'only a god can save us', muses if we might not understand this god as the ultimate, ineffable God of Christian mysticism (p.108). At the end of his life Heidegger looks for the second coming of the god who first came at the Greek beginning and was then forgotten, first by metaphysics and then by technological thinking. This, Macquarrie suggests, may 'yield important insights into the faith' (p.108). Perhaps and may be. It is all rather ambiguous. Perhaps there is a simpler explanation.

John Caputo has persuasively argued that when the theologians looked into late Heidegger they were fascinated by their own reflections. Heidegger had simply transferred Hebraic/Christian ideas of *metanoia*, *kairos* and *parousia* onto the early Greeks—where they have no business—while at the same time expunging their provenance. It is all fancy dress and a bit of a sham. The god who waits is nothing other than Being itself. It didn't make it with National Socialism, but it is still waiting, and Germany is still the place where it is to be known and lived. For Caputo Heidegger is quite simply imagining a 'rival *Heilsgeschichte*' to the Christian story, a myth of 'Hellas and *Germania*' (Caputo, p.181).

In his discussion of Heidegger's later philosophy—in a chapter on thinking, language and poetry which hardly mentions Heidegger's *misreading* of poets like Hölderlin and Trakl (as discussed by Paul de Man, Veronique Foti and John Caputo)—Macquarrie mildly notes Heidegger's suggestion that 'German and Greek are the only possible languages for any worthwhile philosophy' (p.88—ancient Greek of course). Heidegger's suggestion—which is no doubt true if philosophy is what Heidegger called 'thinking'—recalls us to his exclusion of the Hebraic and Christian from his myth of Being itself, on which we must wait for our salvation. Our salvation? Whose salvation?

After reflecting on what John Macquarrie's mild manner leads him to *not* say about Heidegger and Christianity, one may wonder if this is indeed a book to recommend to first-time readers of Heidegger. The philosophy *is* fascinating, but as much in its reception as in itself. There is a story of Heidegger and Christianity still waiting to be told.

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