

This agony of awareness of the individual crushed within history was still the context for the appearance of Sartre's 'Marxism and Existentialism' (i.e. *Questions de Méthode*) in a special number of *Tworczosc* in 1957, and for Kolakowski's and Schaff's reactions. 'Everyone can if he wishes interpret himself historically and unearth the determining factors that made him what he is—his past—but he cannot do the same for the self he has not yet become' (176)—that self is an existential choice.

What that period of confused cross-fertilization had 'not yet become' is indicated in the two most recent essays in the collection. 'In Praise of Inconsistency' argues for an acceptance of the humanly necessary gap between belief and behaviour; the alternative is the logical fanaticism of Stalinism or the Final Solution. 'The Priest and the Jester' also eventually asserts the necessity of de-absolutizing allegiances, but in the first part of this essay—perhaps the most striking in the volume—Kolakowski circles back to his pre-1955 preoccupations, not now polemically but with an awareness that the old theological problems (nature/grace; faith/reason; incarnation; revelation; trinity and person) are pre-forms of the real questions engaged with in the intervening years in political-ethical areas. Kolakowski thus finds himself thinking alongside colleagues in Poland (Malewska, Mazowiecki) and Czechoslovakia (Machovec, Prucha) more directly involved in the Christian-Marxist dialogue.

The problem of locating ethical criteria remains (for both). In 'Responsibility and History', one response was to ask for simple

acceptance of the social fact of moral evaluations, as a co-determining factor in current political stance. In 'Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth' (1958) this is explored further in an interesting examination of the epistemological grounds of the 1844 *EPM*. Kolakowski's recent work, particularly his major book *Religious Consciousness and Church Affiliation* (1965), has developed this strand towards a sociology of ideology—and again the parallel with Christian exploration is revealing. While Schaff has also developed from the 1957 breakthrough, with books on existentialism, semantics and language, leading to his explosive *Marxism and the Human Individual* (1965), Kolakowski seems uniquely to fuse both that development and the current movement within Christian theology. George Vass, S.J., commented of the Marienbad Paulusgesellschaft meeting: 'While the progressive Marxist philosophers try to work out the transcendent meaning of human life, Christian theologians are preoccupied in defining the historical role of their beliefs and institutions in an immanent perspective.' Kolakowski's stature is indicated by his deep concern with both.

One hopes that this collection will usher in English publication of his other work (*The Alienation of Reason* is already available in a U.S. edition). Perhaps with the next collection the editors will indicate chronology more adequately: the essays in this volume are best read, not as printed, but in the sequence indicated above, as a developing engagement with different forms of basic human questions. But in whatever order, they should, emphatically, be read. BERNARD SHARRATT

DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY AND A NEW ETHIC, by Erich Neumann, tr. Eugene Rolfe. *Hodder and Stoughton*, London. 1969. 158 pp. 42s.

Neumann conceived this book during World War II. It was first published in German in 1949. By this time mankind was already becoming agonizedly aware of the fact that the shadow of self-obliteration hung more darkly than ever over the whole world. And it was apparent that the old ethics of Christianity, Mohammedanism and other great religions had proved themselves incapable of mastering the destructive forces in man. Neumann, a follower of Jung, finds the only possible solution to the human dilemma in the analytical depth psychology of Jung, whose far-reaching researches into the conscious and unconscious mind of man show him to be essentially a self-creative being, driven by an inner urge to find

his own wholeness. For Jung this entails establishing a relationship with his personal totality, and with Jung's particular image of God. Though no Christian could accept this image, he can still, in his own context, agree with the assertion that the first need of the human soul is for God; and that this need is experienced at every level of the psyche. But this is far from being the only content of the psyche. Man has also to face up to the fact that the world, nature and the human soul are also the scene of a perpetual rebirth of evil. Only if man can accept this side of himself, and endure the tension and the suffering of being crucified between these opposites, can he find his salvation, and avoid being overwhelmed by

his own destructivity. Neumann asserts that the old ethic, in trying to deal with the problem of inherent evil, has evaded the primary conflict between it and the good. Since there was no awareness of depth psychology, attention was concentrated upon the moral attitudes of the conscious mind; and absolute ideals of perfection were developed. These, it was held, could only be achieved by the forcible exclusion of any quality which was deemed incompatible with the established ideals. Such qualities must be entirely repressed. The great contribution of depth psychology to our understanding of ourselves has been the unanswerable demonstration that repressed contents of the mind are not eliminated. They continue to lead a cut-off yet exceedingly active life of their own in the unconscious. Consciousness loses all connexion with them; they are no longer subject to the will. The final outcome, in individuals and in communities, is a complete split between the conscious world of absolute values and that part of the unconscious world which is anti-ethical. The result is ego-inflation leading to an unjustified delusion of being wholly identified with transpersonal values, and to a denial of one's creatureliness.

This situation is well illustrated in the dream told me by a self-righteous and scrupulous youth. He had been made, much against his will, to seek psychotherapeutic help because he was subject to wild outbursts of rage, in which he was a danger to himself and to others. He took no responsibility for these rages, saying that he 'had been born like that', and that in any case it was others, far worse than he, who were the cause of his quite legitimate anger. In his dream he asked a priest why the Mass always began with the *Confiteor*. To which the priest replied: 'Oh, we have to say that we sin, but of course we don't really. Only other people do.' In fact the young man had no feeling of ever being a sinner. Neumann points out that such an absence of a 'sense of sin' is very characteristic of the present age. Man has become cut off from his own evil. Nothing is either good or bad; there are no values and therefore no passion of struggle between opposites. It is perhaps not irrelevant to suggest that this stagnant, non-creative attitude has been fostered by an uninformed adoption of the causalistic concepts of psycho-analysis. They tend to explain away moral and social failure by attributing both to early childhood experiences for which the individual had no responsibility. Though this may be true of the

personal unconscious, into which are repressed unacceptable aspects of one's behaviour, it is by no means true of those deeper levels of the unconscious mind which are innately anti-ethical. It is primarily with these contents that man must for ever live, and somehow come to terms with them. As Neumann says, man must accept the fact that, though he can be moral, though he is in many fields both successful and effective, he is also 'infantile and maladjusted, miserable and ugly, a human animal related to the monkeys, a sexual beast and a creature of the herd'. If he is to survive, he can no longer regard these aspects of himself as 'not-I', and therefore as non-existent or, at most, seen only in projection upon others, and so to be decried. The present results of these attitudes are only too obvious in the world today. Nations are piling up armaments. Each asserts—and believes—that it is truly peace-loving, and is only acting thus in order to protect its own ideals from the destructivity of others. In the same way one race projects its dark side on to others of a different culture or skin colour. Alien minorities in any community become scapegoats for the majority. (As one who has worked for many years with maladjusted youth I venture, at this point, to interpolate the suggestion that there is a further and alarming result of rejection of their own aggression by the conforming. It has to go somewhere. And it falls upon those who, from lack of social opportunity or because they are of rather low intelligence, have never been able to understand the values and the rules of conduct imposed upon them by society. As long as communities were relatively small, they could in part be contained. But with the population explosion and the consequent break-up of the neighbourhood this is no longer possible. They have become submerged in the great, unconscious ocean of unassimilated aggression and destructivity. Football fans smashing up trains, gangs fighting one another for no apparent reason, younger children wantonly destroying property, are forced to live the dark side for which we will not take responsibility.) Neumann insists that, to save himself, man must enter into a subject-object relationship with this side, and effect a reconciliation with it. This does not mean that it is to be permitted to have its own way. What it does mean is that, through increasing recognition of its destructive power, and vigilance over it, individuals and communities achieve greater consciousness. When man knows and endures

his own evil he is the better able to control it, and thus to establish more appropriate ethical attitudes. He writes: 'My own shadow side is a part and a representative of the shadow side of the whole human race . . . my reconciliation with him will involve at the same time my reconciliation with the dark brother of the whole human race. This means that I accept him, and in him, myself. I am therefore accepting in his person the whole component of the human race which—as my shadow—is my neighbour. Here the love of one's neighbour preached by Jesus of Nazareth becomes love of one's neighbour in the form of the (penitent) thief. . . . Psychologically, however, love and acceptance of the shadow is the essential basis for the actual achievement of an ethical attitude to the "Thou" who is outside me.'

In this 'Thou' Neumann includes an image of God. It seems unnecessary and academic to follow him into his discussion of 'the evil in God'. But one must consider his concept that the development of disobedience—'a God-opposing will'—which stems from the shadow, is a necessary step in the growth of a self-reliant and truly moral conscience. Such a proposition has great relevance to the ferment which exists today, not only in the churches, but also in world-wide outbreaks of antagonism to authority, and to legalistic systems of morality. This, indeed, stems from the dark

side of human nature. Nevertheless it has the justification that man is demanding some right of self-determination. Jung equates this with the *felix culpa* of Adam, which lay in eating a fruit that would give him knowledge of good and evil. Without this sin there would have been no creation, no salvation, and thus no growth of consciousness. Under the new ethic man's primary task is seen by Neumann to be that of knowing what the whole of the psyche is doing. He quotes the apocryphal insertion in St Luke's gospel, 'Man, if indeed thou knowest what thou doest, thou art blessed; but if thou knowest not, thou art accursed and a transgressor of the law'. If there is a lack in this very valuable book, it would seem to be that Neumann treats the deep unconscious too much as if its urges are mainly anti-ethical. Jung, and anyone working according to his findings, again and again will see that it can also be highly moral. Side by side with man's creatureliness, which too is created by God, is an innate awareness of the need for a God-head. The image of this differs in different cultures and different ages. But it is always and for ever present. Thus man is beginning to see, and must increasingly accept the fact that, as a human being, he shares, in both these respects, a basic structure of mind. In the light of this knowledge he enters into a universal brotherhood.

EVE LEWIS

ENOCH POWELL ON IMMIGRATION, by Bill Smithies and Peter Fiddick. *Sphere Books. Ltd*, London. 1969. 5s.

SOUL ON ICE, by Eldridge Cleaver, *Jonathan Cape*. 1969. 35s.

The Tory Party is probably unique among the world's political bodies in having retained its name and much of its nature since the seventeenth century. It still provides an alternative for the construction of a British government, whatever may be the party or coalition that it opposes.

From time to time the non-Tory alternative achieves success through a policy that catches the imagination or emotion of the electorate, Reform, Free Trade, the Welfare State; and these policies being implemented the non-Tory party loses its momentum and the Tories appear, almost without a programme, to offer respite to the country. Occasionally, however, the ancient party breeds, or tolerates the presence of, an intellectual within its ranks, a Disraeli, a Joseph Chamberlain, an Enoch Powell, who attempts to ally its public image with an articulate policy. Since the Spring of 1968 Mr Powell has attempted to do this by his

anti-immigrant speeches, an attempt the more spectacular since, when he delivered the first of them, he was a member of the Tory shadow cabinet and he, in any case, a man with a formidable academic record.

It is only incidental to this note to consider his future in the party, whether he will be a success like Disraeli or a failure like Chamberlain, and anyway the elements in this country to which he has become the mouthpiece range from the dockers to the distressed gentry. The question that exercises those who are deeply solicitous for social justice is whether he has so exacerbated colour-prejudice that racial disturbance has become inevitable or whether the present and future coloured population amongst us can become a respected and integral part of the nation. Particular incidents, too, can be forgotten, but it was disingenuous of Mr Powell, in his celebrated television confrontation with Mr Frost, to evade the con-