tribute anything of importance to the understanding of Whitehead, and is too unco-operative with its readers to serve as the 'introduction' it seeks to be.

LAWRENCE MOONAN

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY, by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann. *Allen Lane The Penguin Press*, London, 1967; reprinted 1969. 249 pp. 50s.

Berger and Luckmann have written what they call 'A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge', an introduction to an area and an approach in sociology that has received relatively little attention since the crucial work of Weber on the concepts of 'social action' and 'Verstehen', with the notable exception of Mannheim. The ritual homage that the social sciences have paid to the natural sciences has too long left us trying to cope with the complexities of social interaction in terms of mechanical models that even natural science no longer finds so appropriate. Even now there is a fascination in the 'real' data of statistics that tends to hold spellbound many sociologists, and leave explanation as a non-starter (what does it *mean* to say that 'people moving from working to middle class with increasing affluence show conservative political affiliations'?). Now, the work of a few phenomenologists with interests in the social sciences, particularly Schutz and Merleau-Ponty, has led to a much better appreciation of the value of looking at the intentional frameworks that people use, and the way in which they constitute their perception of the world—indeed, the way in which they construct reality. *The Social Construction of Reality* represents the first introductory text to this basic field.

I suspect that this is one of those many books that fall into the category of 'glorious failures': 'glorious' because it is a book that covers a vast area of relatively 'new' material for most social scientists, and does so in a systematic and coherent way; 'failure' because it is far too ambitious, and tends to slip towards a generality that says nothing. But failure is too strong a word; this is a book that tantalizes, and makes you hope for more. It tends to be written in a slightly 'journalistic' style, much like Peter Berger's earlier, and excellent, *Introduction to Sociology*, but nonetheless makes its points well and opens up a rich vein.

The book is in three main parts, after a historical introduction, and the first of these, on 'The Foundations of Knowledge in Everyday Life', is really excellent in presenting a résumé of the phenomenological approach to social interaction. It obviously owes a great debt to Schutz, whose *Die Strukturen der Lebenswelt* Luckmann is translating, though the interested reader should really look at some of Schutz's own work himself, particularly the theoretical papers in *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, and some of the studies in Vol. II. The second section, on 'Society as Objective Reality', is also good, but at times runs dangerously close to giving too integrated a functional picture of society by focussing on the sharing of symbolic universes, semiotic systems, etc., and ignoring the discontinuities and differentiations that exist. But it is the third section that is the weakest, on society as subjective reality, and here the authors' own fields begin to obtrude, since much of their material is inadequate to the task they attempt. There is a notable lack of reference to recent studies in perception and cognitive frameworks, and even Festinger's work on cognitive dissonance gets only two passing references. Another lack is consideration of the more recent work in linguistics. Indeed, while criticisms are being made, there is one other aspect of this book that is more than a little annoying, and this is the deliberate lack of reference, and the banishment of the impoverished footnotes to the back of the book. Berger and Luckmann inform us that this was done to improve readability—but it simply does not. I fear there is an element of inverted one-upmanship here, and I see no reason why we should want to deny our specialist interests . . . though I suspect that a more crucial factor may have been economics.

However, with these few criticisms made, this is a book that everyone should look at. A little determination will remedy the weaknesses, and I suspect that this is one field we cannot afford to ignore. A good start, and I look forward to further work from this team, as well as to the completion of Luckmann's translation.

PETER SHELDRAKE

GUILT: Theory and Therapy, by Edward V. Stein, *George Allen & Unwin*, London, 1968. 238 pp. 32s.

This is an invaluable book for the Christian psychologist, sociologist and, perhaps above all, for the confessor. Edward Stein sets out, after half a life-time of research, as he himself says, to discuss the origins and dynamics of guilt. Guilt has bedevilled *homo sapiens* since first,

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however dimly, he became aware of himself as a social being, and sensed that he was less than he willed himself to be, whenever he violated the interdependence between himself and his fellow human beings. Yet it is exactly this ability to feel guilt and the anxiety which it occasions that, more than anything else, separates man from the beast. To experience guilt implies the existence of a personal ideal. This ideal is in itself a complex concept, involving an image of oneself as having obligations to others, to oneself as having been created to become as whole as possible, and to God. Anxiety arises when the individual fears that he has fallen short of this self image in any respect. Until he can learn to live with his guilt and, so doing, to raise himself to a higher and more stable level of existence, he will become self-destructive and destructive of others. Man's dilemma lives in the split between his creatureliness, about the workings and the strength of which he is still largely unconscious, and his conscious aspirations. Whether or not he will admit it, these aspirations constantly postulate the existence of a Good which is wholly and for ever external to himself, and yet also inescapably close. In this context the author quotes, almost as the text for his book, Nikos Kazantzakis's dramatization of the split, 'The human being is a centaur; his equine hoofs are planted in the ground, but his body from breast to head is worked and tormented by the merciless Cry. He has been fighting for thousands of eons to draw himself, like a sword, out of his animistic scabbard. He is also fighting—this is his new struggle—to draw himself out of his human scabbard. Man calls in despair, "Where can I go? I have reached the pinnacle, beyond is the abyss." And the Cry answers, "I am beyond. Stand up!".'

In his opening chapters Edward Stein discusses in detail the answers offered by depth psychology to the centaur's despairing appeal. He shows how man, in experiencing guilt, is driven to become more conscious and, in consequence, the better able to understand, to tolerate and to control much in himself which, hitherto, has seem so alien that he has not attempted to relate to it. Rather, hounded by fear, he has hated and fled from it. Now, enduring shortcomings and conflicts through gaining knowledge about them, he gradually becomes able to find value in all that he is—and thus to love himself. Any analyst, working with those who have fallen emotionally ill, knows that the first task facing him is that of establishing in the patient the hope which springs up when he is able to accept instead of hating himself. Without this acceptance and hope no one can begin to obey Christ's behest to love one's neighbour as oneself. In the past, and far, far too often as a result of mistaken religious teaching, man has developed a guilty loathing and fear of his creatureliness. To this attitude the author opposes this finding from his own experience of depth psychology. 'The ego religion of Jesus is one that expresses an inherent sacramentalism; the notion that no aspect of life however humble, sensuous, biological or abstract, is separate from the presence and purpose of God.' The reading and re-reading of chapter 6 on 'Neurotic Guilt' will help all those who are striving to prove this to a sick person. It has particular reference to scrupulosity, one of the most inhibiting and loveless forms of emotional illness, and one which, most sadly, arises from bad religious instruction of young children.

Edward Stein also sees the guilt dynamic as *the* factor in man which first occasioned the emergence and projection of the concept of God. Taking Freud's discussion of the familial triad, he maintains that God initially made himself known to man by creating him as biologically dependent upon the relationships which must arise within the triad. Those trained in the Jungian discipline will, I think, go further and say that, however imperfectly man has down the ages interpreted God's revelations of himself, an inborn religious sense has always made him aware of his relationship with God. To give but one instance, describing the Elgonyi tribesman breathing into his hands and then holding them up to the rising sun, Jung writes, 'The action means, "I offer my living spirit to God". It is a wordless, acted prayer which could equally well be spoken, "Father into thy hands I commend my spirit".' Jung emphasizes the fact that the Elgonyi had no explanation of this daily ritual other than that it was the custom. Edward Stein sees this sense of relationship established and made comprehensible to man in 'the historical event of Christ, the Son faithful to God, the reality who is love'. In his final chapter Stein develops his concept of The Religion of Love. He shows how, out of his experience of guilt and inner disjunction, man may come to know his finite state and his dependence on God. He finds that God accepts and loves him *as he is, indeed, as he was created*. Thenceforth he is increasingly

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able to respond to the Cry which bids him 'stand up'. He is set free to integrate his total personality, to become autonomous and, at the same time, 'a man for others', spontaneous, loving and unhampered in his relationships.

EVE LEWIS

CHILDREN AND PARENTS: Their Problems and Difficulties, by Susan Isaacs. *Routledge & Kegan Paul*, **London. 1968. 236 pp. 14s.**
BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD, by Haim G. Ginott. *Staples Press Ltd*, **London. 163 pp. 30s.**
YOUR CHILD AND YOU, by Rosemary Simon. *Sphere Books Ltd*, **London. 1969. 223 pp. 7s. 6d.**

Susan Isaacs (1885-1948) has been described as 'a real giant' among the thinkers who in the first half of this century brought about a revolution in our understanding of young children. From 1924 to 1927 she ran the Malting House School in Cambridge for children aged two to ten years old. It was partially residential and her published detailed observations of the children were pioneer studies throwing light on their intellectual and social development. She inaugurated the department of Child Development at the Institute of Education in London. From 1929 to 1936 under the pseudonym of Ursula Wise she answered letters from parents and nurses in *The Nursery World*. A collection of these was published in 1948 by Methuen. Paper-back editions of this and her other works are now being republished by Routledge and Kegan Paul.

In publishing these questions and answers on such problems as discipline, tantrums, shyness, jealousy, phobias, destructiveness and sex education, Susan Isaacs aimed to give nurses and parents some idea of the child's normal development and a greatly increased awareness of the intensity of the child's feelings in his various relationships—'how human he is, even as an infant, and how necessary it is to be aware of this if one is to treat him reasonably'. Parents' own childhood problems are relived. . . . 'My great sin has been quick temper through being spoilt, I don't want her to be the same.' The mother who has deceived her little girl is rebuked: 'Intelligent children are extraordinarily quick to sense signs of evasion of the truth in grown-ups.'

Even today, with so much more published work on child development available, many parents do not appreciate the pain—literally heartbreak—often experienced by the first child on the arrival of a brother or sister. Now he must learn to share his parents' affection—and everything else that before was his exclusively. At two his own emotional and intellectual development is at a peak; largely inarticulate, he loves and hates the baby by turns, and is afraid of his own strong feelings. Usually by three he is much more co-ordinated, less dependent, ready for nursery schools or play group and much better able to 'take' a new arrival. 'To ask adults to accommodate themselves to the emotional crises of little children is surely not difficult or unreasonable.'

'What', Mrs Isaacs asks another mother, 'is the use of *our* superior self-control and politeness and reasonableness if we cannot exercise them to help little children over a stile?'

In this small social document of the thirties, it is interesting to find that mothers who employed nannies and maids faced much the same problems as modern parents.

Dr Ginott in the recent U.S. best-seller *Between Parent and Child* tackles the basic problem of communicating with one's children in a way which he hopes will bring new solutions to old problems. Children's messages are often in a code that requires deciphering. For example, on his first visit to an infants' school, Bruce, aged five, asked loudly, 'Who made these ugly pictures?' Mother was embarrassed and answered hastily, 'It's not nice to call the pictures ugly when they are so pretty'. Teacher smiled and said: 'In here you don't have to paint pretty pictures. You can paint nasty pictures if you feel like it.' Bruce settled happily in the class, for now he had the answer to his hidden question, 'What happens to a boy who can't paint very well?'.

Ginott shows that parents can help their children come to terms with their emotions not so much by advice or contradiction as by holding up a mirror for their feelings. When a child tells us 'The teacher spanked me', we do not have to say 'What did you do to deserve it?'. We don't even have to say 'Oh, I'm so sorry'. We need to show him we understand his pain and embarrassment and feelings of revenge. One could say, Ginott suggests, 'It must have made you furious', or 'It was a bad day for you'. After all, adults find that intense feelings lose their sharp edges when the listener accepts them with sympathy and understanding.

The cornerstone of the new approach to discipline is the distinction between wishes and acts. Most discipline problems consist of two parts: angry feelings and angry acts. Each

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