

ESSAYS ON RUSSIAN LIBERALISM. Edited by *Charles E. Timberlake*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1972. xii, 192 pp. \$9.00.

This collection of nine essays represents the fruits of the Bi-State (Kansas-Missouri) Slavic Conference held in Columbia, Missouri, in November 1969. Seven of them, of very unequal merit and interest, deal either with prominent persons or general topics. The editor writes on Ivan Petrunkevich, and Kermit E. McKenzie on Fedor Rodichev. Both essays are competent summaries of the careers of two important radical Kadet activists about whom nothing is available in English. The essay on Struve consists of the bulk of chapter 1 of Richard Pipes's splendid biography. Torn out of its context it will scarcely serve as an introduction to the most significant figure in Russian twentieth-century politics, if that is the editor's intention in reprinting it. Nor is it improved by the printers' garbling on pages 63-64. David A. Davies's slight sketch on V. A. Maklakov scarcely scratches the surface of the problem of this controversial figure, whose writings in exile have influenced a number of our most important historians of Russian liberalism. Perhaps someone someday will go back to the Duma debates in order to discover whether Maklakov the politician held the same views as Maklakov the memoirist. William R. Copeland's contribution on relations between the Finnish resistance movement and the Russian liberals between 1899 and 1904 is a critical and meticulous study, based on archival material, of a subject which is very marginal to Russian liberalism. Judith E. Zimmerman and William G. Rosenberg contribute two general studies on Kadet policy between 1905 and 1907 and between 1905 and 1917 respectively, which get somewhat nearer to an analytical examination of the subject, and one which puts in doubt the question whether the Kadets can conceivably be classified as "liberals" in any meaningful sense. As Rosenberg rightly says, "the Russian context demanded either . . . tactics designed to press mass partisan demands . . . [or a] decision to work for change only after having become part of the established bureaucratic order. However reasonable the derivation of their ambivalence, Kadet politics did not advance the party's goals" (p. 163).

Indeed, it was the great merit of Victor Leontovitsch's *Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland* (1957) that it provided a powerfully argued case for the view that *all* liberalism, in Russia as elsewhere, consists of the gradual advancement of freedom by building on existing foundations and not by sweeping the whole order aside. The editor in his introductory essay neither accepts this view (indeed his references to Leontovitsch leave the strong impression that he has failed to understand it) nor replaces it by any other valid criterion of liberalism. The result is that this book is a hodgepodge which puts a liberal conservative like Struve in the same category as say Rodichev, who was virtually a revolutionary: the only slender justification for calling the Kadets "liberals" is that they occasionally applied this label to themselves when dealing with foreigners (not in Russia). Although the editor discusses, in the most valuable part of his introductory essay, the use of the term "liberalism" by Russians, he seems to be unaware that the distinction between genuine liberalism, in Leontovitsch's sense, and "street liberalism" (as Chicherin called it in an article published in 1862) was well established in Russian usage. Writing in 1793, Karamzin contrasted "liberalism" (*liberal'nost'*) and "our libertarians" (*liberalisty*), meaning those whom he regarded as virtual revolutionaries. Of course, it may be, as Theodore H. Von Laue argues in his concluding essay, that *liberal'nost'* was doomed from the start in Russia. But this

offers little excuse for applying the term to *liberalisty* like Rodichev, Miliukov, and Petrunkevich, or even the young Struve.

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OSTATNIE LATA ROSJI CARSKIEJ: RZĄDY STOŁYPINA. By *Ludwik Bazyłow*. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1972. 507 pp. 80 zł.

Ludwik Bazyłow's many publications have established his reputation as one of Poland's leading experts on nineteenth-century Russian history, and his most recent monographs have assured him this position for the early twentieth century as well. Although there have been many contributions from Western and Soviet sources on the Stolypin period, Bazyłow's new book easily stands out as the most impressive, detailed, erudite, researched, and, in total effect, significant contribution to the subject. The bibliography is impressive and most comprehensive. Archival material dealing heavily with police and provincial reports has been consulted but, perhaps surprisingly, throws little new light on the critical problems of the era. On the other hand, the printed material, primary and secondary, in all major languages, has been used to an extent unequalled until now. The Benedictine research and erudition of the author make this book indispensable to any scholar interested in the Stolypin years. The greatest value of the work is in the painstaking detail and straightforward narrative, mostly devoted to political and administrative affairs, admittedly at the expense of social and economic aspects.

The temptation to compare the contributions of Western and Soviet scholars naturally presents itself. The crudest Soviet simplifications and aprioristic pre-suppositions are avoided in the body of the book. However, this makes both the introductory and concluding sections rather colorless and bland and inhibits the author from making more of the general judgments and speculations that his research efforts should surely elicit.

In a sense, the author follows the current party line. Lenin is quoted, though infrequently, for his supposedly informed observations on the workings of the higher echelons of the imperial government. The author contends that class motivations and assumptions dictated the inevitable failure of both oppositional and governmental policies. The viability of any kind of constitutional solution is not taken into consideration as a serious possibility. Bazyłow writes of the "negative manifestations" of the years following the suppression of the revolution of 1905—manifestations, however, which, though they indirectly strengthened the government, were all "ephemeral," since "tsardom did not have long to live." Specifically, Stolypin had no "social forces" to support him on the Right or the Left, while none of the bourgeois parties had a "tie with the masses." On the other hand, Bazyłow does not follow the Soviet line that all political groups to the Right of the Kadets were flatly reactionary or more than eager to reach a humiliating accommodation with the ruling forces. He asserts that, whatever the political composition of any of the Dumas, any opposition to the existing regime would mean the annihilation of the Duma as such. Still, he explains in detail the varying programs and actions of the different political groupings in the sense of why the political parties were, in his opinion, hopeless. The views of the parties