

it means to be an Individual' with 'That Individual' (written twelve years later, and included with *The Point of View*), he will readily see how far was Kierkegaard in 1847 from the attainment of his full stature.

How rapidly he attained it is witnessed by the *Christian Discourses*, mostly of 1848 and 1849. In these plain, simple, unadorned meditations, the 'genius' is fully at the service of the 'apostle,' even in spite of himself. At first their content may seem charming indeed, sometimes severe; but it is only by degrees that we realise that S.K. has condensed in them, in a manner which can be understood of the multitude, the richest fruits of his thought and experience. It may seem ungenerous to complain of the handsome book which the Oxford University Press has made out of them; yet we are forced to regret that so many eggs have been gathered into a basket beyond the access of the ordinary people for whom such moving and illuminating addresses as those on 'The Great High Priest' and 'The Woman who was a Sinner' were intended. May we hope that some of these at least may be made available in inexpensive paper-backs—for English readers as they already are for French?

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THE INNUMERABLE INSTINCTS OF MAN. By Claude A. Claremont, B.Sc., A.C.G.I. (Eyre and Spottiswoode; 6s.)

The nature and number of 'instincts' whether in animals or man, and the contrast between instinctive and intelligent behaviour has for a long time been a subject of controversy among biologists and psychologists alike. The revision of current theories on this topic which Mr. Claremont sets forth in this book is, therefore, welcome in so far as it is based upon the scientific observation of both animal and human behaviour and throws fresh light on the complexity of what is generally termed, though vaguely, 'instinct.'

That both animals and man possess 'instinct' and act instinctively, though with a difference, is an old doctrine, but all the philosophers were content with ascribing to animals a certain estimative sense, by the aid of which they could perceive and, as it were, judge of the suitability of things required to meet their instinctive needs and purposes. Man being by nature a rational animal, his reason influences to a certain extent his instinct, giving to his instinctive behaviour a greater variety and plasticity. This sense was known as the 'cognitive sense.' These terms we still believe suffice to cover all that

to-day usually goes by the name of instinct or instinctive behaviour. Hence when the term intelligence is introduced, and a comparison sought between instinctive and intelligent behaviour, we need a clearer notion of the meaning of intelligence than is here proposed. 'Instinct,' we are told, 'does the right thing without knowing why.'

Analysing the instinctive behaviour of certain forms of animal life, such as wasps, spiders, and such like, it is shown that their actions, directed indeed to a certain end, must follow one another in a fixed order, and always must each one be complete before the next is begun. No departure from the routine is possible. These actions represent fixed points and are characteristic for any given species. Between these fixed points various departures are possible. The animal's behaviour, therefore, cannot be represented by a row of dots; a wavy and fluctuating line is better; for here, *i.e.*, between the fixed points, the animal is left free.

The departure from the fixed routine is ascribed to 'intelligence.' 'In between his fixed instinctive goals every creature is intelligent. These are intelligent actions because the creature foresees their end, and desires them accordingly, relating them to that end. The difference between the intelligent creature and the instinctive creature therefore becomes clear. There is no intrinsic difference. Both work for instinctive ends by intelligent means.'

Elsewhere the author states that the difference between instinct and intelligence lies in the fact that instinct has no correlative 'organ,' whilst intelligence is always correlated with a highly developed brain. In that case, how does the insect act intelligently?

Would it not make for clarity if we maintain that instinct as represented by the estimative sense in animals and the cogitative sense in man is an anticipation of intelligence rather than intelligence in its stricter meaning as implying the use of the rational faculty with which man is endowed, and by which he is not only essentially differentiated from the animals, but is able consciously to control and modify his instinctive tendencies?

In calling attention to what appears ambiguous in Mr. Claremont's treatment of intelligence we have no wish to detract from what is an interesting and penetrating study of the problem of instinct in man. The main conclusion that man possesses innumerable instincts is fully justified, if we hold that his 'cogitative sense' can find innumerable ways of expression.

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