

HOUSING POLICY, URBAN POVERTY, AND THE STATE:

The *Favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, 1972–1976

Alejandro Portes
Duke University

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to review the evolution of public policy toward the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro since 1972–73. I choose these years because they are the ones at which available published accounts on the topic cease. One of my objectives is to re-actualize existing information on that subject. At the same time, I wish to bring forth some considerations on the relationships between civil society, especially its most deprived classes, and the particular form of authoritarian state now dominant in Brazil.

The theory of the authoritarian state, at least in Latin America, has been rapidly evolving in response to events in political reality, and has emerged as a consequence of the appearance of forms of government not anticipated by previous political theories. Authoritarian regimes have tended to develop more rapidly than scholarly attempts to understand them. The result is that present theory can only imperfectly explain events in the recent past and is incapable of predicting with certainty those in the future. Attempts to introduce order in this field by developing ideal types of “the neocorporatist state” (see Schmitter 1974) or “the Iberic tradition” (Wiarda 1973) now appear premature. These ideal-types are not based on extensive appraisal of recent political forms in Latin America, but on the writings of European corporatists or on cultural stereotypes dating back to the Spanish empire.

The crucial point is that scholarly discussion about the nature and trends of the contemporary authoritarian state is nowhere near closure. An important way to further understanding of this form of government is a detailed analysis of the evolution of its policies toward different sectors of civil society. The urban lower classes, especially those grouped in the spatially distinct units formed by *favelas*, *barriadas*, and the like, are particularly important in this regard.

Perhaps, the most current and useful contribution to theory in this area is the notion of the bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) state, developed by Guillermo O’Donnell (1975). Based largely on the recent experiences of Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, the concept of the BA state summarizes a series of central features, generally accepted as characteristic of this form of government. Among them are: the effort to weaken or eliminate working-class organizations or other in-

struments of popular demand-making; the transformation of popular needs into administrative matters outside the political realm; the containment of inflation at the expense of popular consumption; the attempt to generate "confidence" among international capital investors by guaranteeing a stable environment economically (through the control of inflation and debt payment) and politically (through destruction of working-class unions and popular parties); the formation of a state-supporting alliance composed of multinational corporations, autonomous state enterprises, and the national bourgeoisie; the priority given to the goals of "security," understood as the elimination of subversion and growth of military power, and "development," understood as rapid industrialization and economic growth; and the progressive concentration of income in the upper classes, justified by the need to increase savings and the eventual "trickling down" effects of development.

O'Donnell's characterization is not, however, perfectly generalizable to all authoritarian regimes existing at present in Latin America. While they share many of the above features, several distinct types can be recognized; at a minimum, three can be identified, distinguished by the particular orientation and relationship of the state to civil society. For the first type, which can be labelled "populist civilian," ultimate reliance on coercion is tempered by the willingness to adapt to civil society and the perceived need to maintain open channels of popular expression. This is a single-party regime, exemplified by the case of Mexico.

For the "populist military" type, the popular masses are to be actively incorporated in the effort toward national development. Civil society is mobilized to take a hand in its own reorganization and to partake of the fruits of development. "Development" is conceived as having a strong social component, which involves both redistribution of income and the active incorporation of the lower classes into the new organization of society. This type, more common in the sixties and early seventies than at present, is exemplified by the first phase of the "Peruvian revolution" under General Velasco Alvarado (Lowenthal 1974).

Last is the "military oligarchy," in which the distance between state and society is at a maximum. The military elite's orientation toward the civil population is not as coparticipant in the process of national development but as a subject of it. In this model, channels of communication from below are restricted because the interest of government does not lie in active support but in popular quiescence. The fundamental preoccupation is the creation of "order" in all sectors so as to guarantee national security and accelerate the process of economic development. Thus it is civil society that must adapt to the requirements of the state rather than the opposite. Military oligarchies are the type that best fit O'Donnell's characterization of the BA state. By their very nature, these are the regimes for which reliance on coercion is most central and transparent. Since the military coup in 1964, Brazil has become the best-known example of a military oligarchy in Latin America. It has sustained a policy of rapid industrialization on the basis of foreign capital and technology and it has sponsored an equally rapid policy of income concentration (Bacha 1976). Until recently, it had also effectively suppressed all serious political opposition and all organized popular protest.

Recent literature on the favelas—the squatter settlements of Rio de Janeiro and, by extension, of other Brazilian cities—fits with great consistency the description of the military oligarchic state. The more recent evolution of this policy, roughly from 1972 to the present, also has an important theoretical significance for what it suggests about the evolution, dilemmas, and contradictions of this type of regime. While its broadest contours correspond to the above characterization of the military oligarchy, the picture at closer range becomes less certain. The fundamental issue is the limitation of coercion as an instrument of government and the consequent need for the regime to “explain” itself both domestically and internationally. The size and complexity of Brazilian society, its insertion in and dependence on the world capitalist system, and the very forces unleashed by economic development limit the extent to which rulers, no matter how authoritarian, can rely on force alone.

The ideological apparatus of the state has already produced a doctrine of legitimation based on the long-run beneficial effects of economic growth for the mass of the population. But this is not enough. To sustain internal quiescence and external tolerance, the regime must show some concrete evidence of concern with basic welfare needs. To be successful in this regard, it must demonstrate that through the imposition of “order” it can provide for these needs more efficiently than previous democratic governments. In the case of Brazil, this is the basic rationale behind massive investments in the areas of public health and social security—through the National Institute of Social Welfare (INPS)—and in that of publicly subsidized housing—through the National Housing Bank (BNH).

The point to be set forth below is that while the need for legitimation is real and while considerable investments have been made in “social” programs designed to attain it, such programs are frequently defeated by the very configuration of class interests they are designed to legitimize. The most numerous and the most deprived end up by being neglected in favor of a more reputable middle-class clientele, though welfare agencies are careful to maintain their popular-concern rhetoric. These new structures of privilege then reproduce the very inequalities they were designed to counteract.

PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD THE FAVELAS, 1962–1972

The decade of the sixties and the emergence of the military regime brought forth a novel approach to deal with the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and, later, of other cities in the country. This was the policy of massive eradication of the *favelados* from their existing dwellings and their removal to “embryo-houses” and apartments in the periphery of the city. The idea was to eliminate the physical existence of favelas by taking advantage of the cheaper prices of suburban land. Not always did the federal and state governments see eye-to-eye on the benefits of this policy but, with ups and downs, they both adopted it as their way of handling the favela “problem” during the decade.

There is already an abundant literature on Brazilian housing policy during that period and on the causes, implementation, and consequences of the favela removal program (see Leeds 1972, Parrisé 1969, Salmen 1969, Perlman

1976, Gardner 1973, Valladares 1976, Bolaffi 1975; Potengy Grabois 1973, *Jornal do Brasil* 1977). This section tries to summarize the major common strands in these different histories of favela eradication as a necessary background for understanding the more recent events. The task is aided by the consistency of the conclusions of different researchers. The reader is forewarned, however, that only the broadest outline can be offered here of a process rich in nuances and ambiguities.

The evolution of public policy toward Rio's favelas has involved two sets of agencies or institutional actors: those at the federal level and those at the level of the state of Guanabara. In the federal realm, the problem of favelas was defined from the start as one of housing. Its solution was thus equated with converting the favelados into proprietors of normal houses in the city. For this reason, the problem was assigned within the federal bureaucracy to the National Housing Bank (BNH). Other state and federal agencies will be described below as they become relevant to the narrative. BNH deserves separate attention, however, given its overriding importance for the broader policies of the government in this area.

The BNH was created in 1964 to serve as executive agent of the Housing Finance System (SFH) whose goal was "to promote the construction and acquisition of homes, especially by the lower income classes" (Law 4380 of 21 Aug. 1964). The bank is the guarantor and ultimate repository of voluntary savings generated through the Brazilian Savings and Loan System (SBPE). The system has been successful in concentrating a large proportion of popular savings by periodically increasing deposits to adjust for inflation ("indexing") and adding to this a substantial interest rate (BNH 1975). In 1967, the BNH acquired access to a vast pool of compulsory savings through the creation of the Guaranteed Employment Fund (FGTS). The fund has the ostensive purpose of creating a patrimony for the worker and his family and is formed by employers' contributions totalling 8 percent of their payroll. Deposits in FGTS are also indexed and receive annual interest of up to 6 percent. BNH acts both as recipient and manager of the fund (BNH 1975).

The size of the liquid assets that BNH receives through the voluntary and compulsory savings systems now exceeds the total budgets of several federal ministries (Bolaffi 1975). By 1973, they represented close to 6 percent of the gross domestic product. These resources are also impressive in absolute terms: in 1973, BNH had control over approximately \$5.7 billion (Perلمان 1976), by the end of 1975 the figure had grown to over \$16 billion. Of the latter figure, 41 percent corresponded to voluntary savings (FGTS), and 28 percent to resources already accumulated by the bank and the SBPE plus other minor funds (BNH 1975).

The fact that BNH has become an economic giant is not casual, for it is the instrument of the national state to achieve a complex array of goals. The bank is the prime agent of the government in two fundamental "social" areas: housing and the generation of popular employment. The bank's initial mandate was to meet a national housing deficit estimated at eight million units and growing at five thousand units per year (Gardner 1973). It was charged, in the words of a

former president of the republic, to “propitiate greater security, comfort, and well-being to the families of most scarce resources and contribute to a better distribution of income and a reduction of regional income inequalities” (Garrastazu Medici 1973). To meet this goal, BNH organized a house construction program in “the social interest” area. By 1975, 615,900 dwellings of “social interest” had been completed (BNH 1975).

Simultaneously, however, the bank was charged with the task of stimulating employment among the urban unskilled and semiskilled workers. The two-pronged social strategy by BNH was neatly summarized by former Finance Minister Roberto Campos:

Favoring home ownership by the less favored classes while stimulating simultaneously the absorption of unskilled manpower by the civil construction industry, the housing policy contributes to the achievement of two basic objectives of the government program: To insure . . . opportunities for productive employment to the continuously increasing manpower flowing into the labor market; to alleviate regional and sectoral economic inequalities and the tensions created by social disequilibrium through improvements in the human condition. (Campos 1965, p. 20)

The ultimate motive of these social objectives was well understood by both Campos and Mario Trindade, one of the earlier and most forceful presidents of BNH: to reduce the dangers of “social tension” among the urban masses and those arising from the exchange between the urban and rural mass (Trindade 1969).

Objectives of the BNH were not limited however, to the social area. The bank also acted and acts as an important agent in fulfilling goals within the state’s economic development strategy. The first and most immediate is to stimulate the construction industry, a goal related—within the capitalist economy promoted by the government—to the generation of employment. In Trindade’s words: “The most important problem at the start was not housing, it was the opening of employment opportunities to absorb the masses of unskilled and semiskilled workers, opportunities for mobilizing the engineering, planning, project, and architectural offices, to give work to the civil construction firms and to the industry of housing materials, paralyzed forces in the Brazilian economy” (Trindade 1971, p. 22). A more fundamental, though less obvious, economic objective of the bank is associated with the monetarist policies pursued by Minister Campos and his successors. BNH stimulates and absorbs substantial amounts of popular savings and channels them into long-term investment, thus helping combat inflation (Potengy Grabois 1973).

Given the importance and scope of objectives vested in it, it is not surprising that BNH has received consistent protection and support at the highest levels of government. For the purposes of the present study, two final and key features of this institution must be noted: first, the bank has consistently rejected direct involvement in the construction of housing or its administration. In its “social interest” area, it acts through intermediaries which are usually other public agencies at the state and municipal levels. BNH loans are thus not made

directly to favelados or other “less favored” classes, but to local government organizations charged with housing welfare. Second, BNH is a *bank*. As such it operates within the norms dominant in the capitalist private sector, namely the avoidance of loss and assurance of a margin of profit. The subsidy granted to “social interest” housing does not consist of a direct transfer of assets for land and construction costs, but of a reduction in the normal market interest rates. State and municipal housing companies that receive BNH loans are required to repay them in time and with full “indexing” for inflation. While interests charged are small, state and local governments must, in turn, extract timely payment from individual beneficiaries or else cover them out of their general revenues. BNH loses a certain amount in “social interest” housing since it is required to pay a higher interest to FGTS, the compulsory savings fund. However, this deficit is flexible, since the bank is the fund’s administrator. In addition, the deficit is more than compensated by BNH’s many other activities outside the “social interest” areas.

Government involvement in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro has a history that dates back for several decades. Since detailed accounts exist for the earlier period (see Parisse 1969), we begin our narrative with events in 1962. This is the year in which the first Housing Company (COHAB) was created in the state of Guanabara, of which Rio is the capital. Prior to that time, the most active public organization in the favelas was the Reclaiming Service for Favelas and Similar Housing (SERFHA). With the support of the then secretary of social services of Guanabara, José Arturo Rios, SERFHA engaged in a policy of organization of the favelas as a way of facilitating their united action and their access to political authorities. The organization of most residents’ associations in Rio’s favelas dates from this period (Leeds and Leeds 1971).

With a vision remarkable for its time, SERFHA rejected the image of favelados as objects of charity or contempt, and dealt with them as rational individuals capable of solidary action. By promoting community organizations, the agency attempted to give favelas greater power in demand-making vis-à-vis the state and, hence, free them from the mediation and exploitation of traditional politicians. In 1962, Rios was publicly denounced by the governor of the state, Carlos Lacerda, thus effectively ending the period of SERFHA’s activities. The creation of COHAB represented a reaction by Lacerda and his political group to the policies that SERFHA promoted. Ostensibly organized for studying the problems of housing in Rio de Janeiro and planning the most appropriate solutions, COHAB promptly became an instrument for the destruction of existing favelas and the removal of favelados to places in the urban periphery.

Initially, on the basis of loans negotiated directly with USAID and then with direct support of BNH, COHAB proceeded to eradicate many favelas and resettle their population in newly built *conjuntos* in the northern and western suburbs of the city. From 1962 to 1965, COHAB had built a total of 9,650 houses and apartments, concentrated in the large conjuntos of Vila Aliança (2,181) and Vila Kennedy (4,751). Other housing projects completed or initiated during the period included Vila Esperança, Pio XII, Dona Castorina, Santo Amaro, Marques de São Vicente, and Cidade de Deus (CEHAB 1976). The largest favelas

eradicated during the period were Esqueleto (3,931 dwellings) in the inner-central region, Morro do Pasmado (911) in the South Zone, and Maria Angu (503) in the North Zone (COHAB 1969). As table 1 shows, favela eradication during this first period did not concentrate on the wealthy South Zone, but rather on the Tijuca-Meier region. The objective was to make way for the auto transit system in this area. The removal of Esqueleto, near the stadium of Maracana, allowed construction of the State University of Guanabara (Potengy Grabois 1973).

Vocal protest and resistance by the favelados to the forced removal program were constant features during this period. Despite this, eradications continued throughout the Lacerda years. The defeat of his successor-designate, Flexa Ribeiro, at the polls in 1965 was largely accomplished by the votes of working-class districts including favelas and relocated favelados (Perlman 1976). They showed with the vote how they felt about the housing “solutions” that COHAB had given them. The election of Negrão de Lima as governor of Guanabara (1966–71) marks the removal from power of those groups associated with favela eradication and the return to a moderate populism, albeit constrained by the military regime. Partly because of critiques made of Lacerda’s favela policy during the electoral campaign, the Negrão de Lima government displayed much less enthusiasm for the construction of new conjunto housing and the eradication of favelas. COHAB was reoriented to attend to the more urgent needs of the favela population and improve conditions in already existing conjuntos. Thus, the agency attended victims of the floods of January 1966, moving affected families to temporary wooden housing. It built a community center for the large Cidade de Deus conjunto and expanded and improved that of Marques de São Vicente. There was also a substantial drop in new public housing starts. From 1966 to 1968, COHAB built a total of 3,023 new houses or less than those completed in 1964 alone. All of these houses were located in Cidade de Deus, a conjunto already planned and initiated before the beginning of the new state government (CEHAB 1976, Potengy Grabois 1973).

Oscillations between populist and antipopulist orientations toward squatter settlements tend to correspond fairly closely with plans for in situ improvement of the settlements versus plans for their eradication. While the correlation is not perfect, populist periods tend to produce attempts by the government to build on what already exists. The Negrão de Lima government in Rio saw a partial return to the populism of the time of SERFHA. This return was associated with the creation of yet another agency, the Company for Community Development (CODESCO). Created in 1968 by the State of Guanabara, CODESCO was originally charged with using USAID resources earmarked for “innovative work on slum clearance and urban planning” (Perlman 1976). Staffed by a young group of architects and social scientists, the agency promptly became oriented toward “urbanization”—the improvement of existing favelas with the collaboration of the residents. Since the available resources did not permit a massive urbanization program, CODESCO settled for demonstration projects in three favelas selected as representative of different types in metropolitan Rio: Mata Machado, Bras de Pina, and Morro União.

T A B L E 1 *Dwellings Removed by COHAB in Rio de Janeiro by Zone and Favela, 1963–66*

South Zone (Upper- and Middle-Class Residential Area)	North Zone (Industry and Working-Class Dwellings)	Outer Central Zone (Government, Com- merce, Working- and Lower Middle-Class Dwellings)	Inner Central Zone Tijuca and Meier (Working- and Middle-Class Housing)	Northern and Western Periphery
<i>Favelas</i>				
Alvaro Ramos (25)*	Vila da Penha (180)	Morro dos Prazeres (10)	Esqueleto (3931)	
Pasmado (911)	P. Caju (30)		São Carlos (253)	
Getulio Vargas (113)	C. C.P.L. (104)		Turano (35)	
Macedo Sobrinho (14)	Moreninha (35)		24 de Maio (36)	
Marques de São Vicente (111)	Av. Brasil (14)		Morro do Quiteo (197)	
Praia do Pinto (81)	Maria Angu (503) Del Castilho (17) Bras de Pina (366)			
<i>Subtotals</i>				
1199 (17.6%)	1214 (17.2%)	10 (0.2%)	4452 (65%)	0 (0)
<i>Total Removed: 6875</i>				

Source: Adapted from Potengy Grabois 1973, p. 65.

*Numbers in parentheses refer to the *barracos*, or shacks, removed from each favela.

The CODESCO urbanization program involved securing legal title to the land; developing an infrastructure of services such as water, sewage, and electricity; assisting housing construction by the favelados through technical support and low-interest loans for materials; and constructing several social services such as a park, a school, and a community center (Gardner 1973). Eventually, CODESCO came to receive 80 percent of its financing from BNH. Of the three areas on which it was initially targeted, Bras de Pina was the one that came closest to completion. A great deal has already been written on the Bras de Pina project and details need not be repeated here. The essential outcome was that CODESCO was able to show that, through close cooperation with the favelados themselves, solutions could be reached that were both more humane and less costly than the previous eradications. Like SERFHA a decade before, CODESCO operated with a philosophy of trust in the abilities and rationality of the poor. Given the political limitations of the time, it did not attempt to organize favelas for demand-making, but to facilitate their self-help community efforts with some external economic and technical assistance.

The fundamental question posed at the time was the extent to which the policies of the Negrão de Lima government were compatible with those of the federal government. De-emphasis on eradication and the decrease in conjunto building had been reactions to the policies of the previous state government. It remained to be seen whether the new mild form of populism was compatible

with the authoritarian regime dominant in the capital. The response came in the form of creation of another public agency: the Coordination of Social Interest Housing of the Rio Metropolitan Area (CHISAM). Created at the federal level a few months after CODESCO, CHISAM was subordinated to the Ministry of Interior and the BNH. In theory, the task of CHISAM was to coordinate the many institutions involved in public housing in the metropolitan area. As its justification, the agency put forth the following statement:

It was found absolutely necessary that the housing problem be attacked with one guiding policy for the federal government and the state governments of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro. No less than 110 public and private organs were engaged in housing, each of them with different policies, ideas, and practices. . . . It was decided that the best way of reaching the desired objectives would be through a guiding agency with standard norms to coordinate the agencies of the federal government, the two state governments, and private organizations with credentials to do the task. (Cited by Gardner 1973, p. 176)

In practice, CHISAM became a potent advocate of a new wave of favela eradications. Eventually, it became apparent that its creation represented a reaction of the groups that had commanded the earlier eradication program in Guanabara and which were closely allied to BNH and its objectives. In fact, CHISAM represented the instrument that the hierarchy of BNH and the Ministry of Interior used to intervene politically in the state of Guanabara (Potengy Grabois 1973). Thus, the creation of this agency immediately brought forth two latent types of conflict:

First, it gave institutional form to the opposition between those who advocated in situ improvement of the favelas and those who defended eradication. While in theory, CODESCO and CHISAM were to have complementary functions—the former being subordinated to the latter—in practice, the drastically different orientations of the two agencies toward the favelas set them in opposition to each other. CHISAM justified its eradication policy by recourse to the traditional stereotypes about squatter settlements: their pathological character, their unimprovability, and the need for external guidance to “free” their inhabitants from cultural and physical disintegration. This view was put forth forcefully and was accompanied by a refusal to accept all other evidence supporting different conclusions.¹

Second, the creation of CHISAM represented the direct intervention of the federal government in an area that had previously been the exclusive domain of state authorities—the administration of housing and welfare programs for the favela population. Thus, regardless of the orientation that state agencies embraced at the time, they were united in their resistance to a superordinate federal entity created to “coordinate” them. This conflict became apparent not only between the ideologically conflicting CODESCO and CHISAM, but also between the latter and COHAB, the agency that had led the initial eradication program and now found itself limited to the role of a construction company (Potengy Grabois 1973).

There is a tendency in the present literature on favelas to impute differences between the urbanization program of CODESCO and the eradication program of CHISAM to their conflicting ideological orientations. If this were the case, the massive removal programs that CHISAM eventually conducted and the errors committed in the process would be the consequence of the ideological and intellectual shortcomings of its leadership. This interpretation suggests that the outcome was conjunctural and could have been different had the managers of the agency come from a different ideological quarter. There is reason to believe, however, that the stereotypes of the favelados espoused by CHISAM were not cause, but ideological justification for a process that had more profound structural roots.

CHISAM intervened in the state of Guanabara at a time when state government policies, no matter how acceptable to the favelados, were running against the broader economic objectives vested in the BNH. The virtual paralysis of the eradication program and incipient attempt to urbanize existing favelas had, from the point of view of the bank, five negative consequences: first, it perpetuated the occupation by the poor of valuable land in the city's residential South Zone; second, land occupation by favelas in the South Zone and their physical presence retarded new housing starts for higher-income groups, thus running contrary to the objective of reviving the construction industry; third, the absence of new conjunto building in the city's periphery also eliminated another incentive for private construction firms through government contracts; fourth, the illegal occupation of land in wealthy areas of the city ran contrary to the scheme of urban spatial "order," involving isolation of upper-class areas and the peripheralization of the lower class; and fifth, the concentration of favelas in Rio de Janeiro—the largest favelado population in the country—required more energetic action in "appropriate" directions to serve as an example to other Brazilian cities.

For all these reasons, it is not surprising that CHISAM never deviated from its eradication course. The explicit objective of Program CHISAM, under which 7,289 new conjunto units were subcontracted to the private sector, was "to build the maximum of units, in the minimum of time, and at costs low enough to permit purchase by the favelados." Although started by CHISAM, coordination of the construction of these units passed to COHAB. The eventual division of labor between the two agencies saw CHISAM become the favela removal organ and COHAB limit itself to conjunto building and administration. In 1969, COHAB launched the Sete de Setembro Program aimed at constructing 16,900 new housing units. This new program represented in part an attempt by the state government to show that it had the capacity to handle the housing problem without federal intervention (Potengy Grabois 1973).

As seen in table 2, the period from 1969 to 1971, after the creation of CHISAM, witnessed a rapid increase in public housing construction. In 1968, only 761 new housing units had been completed. By 1969, the figure had jumped to 5,803 and in 1970 to 22,925, the highest ever. The largest conjuntos built during the period were D. Jaime B. Camara (7,000 units), Cidade de Deus (5,898), Pedro I (3,280), Quitungo and Santa Cruz (1,920 each), and Engenho da

Rainha (1,760) (CEHAB 1976). The removal of favelas during these years followed a parallel course. As seen in table 3, 16,647 *barracos* (shacks) were destroyed between 1968 and 1972, the years of CHISAM activities. This represented more than twice the number removed in the preceding five years (1963–67). The largest favelas removed after 1968 were Praia do Pinto (3,600 dwellings), Catacumba (2,071), Fazenda Areal (1,688), Macedo Sobrinho (1,279), and Fazenda Botafogo (1,162) (Potengy Grabois 1973).

TABLE 2 *The Public Housing Construction Program in Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro, 1962–75*

Year	No. of Houses Built	No. of Apartments Built	Total
1962	499	—	499
1963	4,115	—	4,115
1964	3,815	—	3,815
1965	120	1,101	1,267
1966	1,560	—	1,560
1967	1,014	—	1,014
1968	767	—	767
1969	2,566	3,237	5,803
1970	673	22,252	22,925
1971	366	8,000	8,366
1972	1,057	—	1,057
1973	1,446	800	2,246
1974	99	380	479
1975	2,288	144	2,432
Total	20,385	35,914	56,299

Source: CEHAB 1976.

The logic of the removal program is apparent from the data in table 3. The bulk of conjuntos were built in the remote northern and western periphery of the city; the bulk of favelas were removed from the South Zone. One hundred percent of eradications in 1968–69 were in this area of the city. From 1970 to 1972, South Zone eradications were still predominant, with a second area of concentration in the suburbs. The purpose of the latter was to clear land for the construction of industrial parks that formed part of a planned “industrial growth pole” in the urban periphery. The reorganization of space planned and accomplished during these years freed land from occupation by the most deprived classes and placed it at the disposal of the construction industry. The program aimed at stimulating upper- and middle-class residential construction by clearing the most desirable areas of the city of the presence of the poor. Other sites were cleared to serve the needs of industry. Finally, construction firms were given an additional boost by receiving government contracts to build public housing projects. Figures on favela removals and new housing projects appeared later on in

BNH publications as evidence of its concern with “less favored” families and the effectiveness of its social interest programs.

TABLE 3 *Favela Dwellings (Barracos) Destroyed in Rio de Janeiro after the Creation of CHISAM, 1968–72*

	City Area*					Total
	South Zone	North Zone	Outer Central Zone	Inner Central Zone	Northern and Western Periphery	
Number	9,789	2,646	—	902	3,130	16,467
%	59.5	16.0	0	5.5	19.0	100

Source: Adapted from Potengy Grabois 1973, p. 70.

*See explanatory headings in table 1.

By mid-1972, CHISAM was effectively deprived of most of its functions and in 1973 its technical staff was disbanded. The agency, created to confront a conjunctural situation at the state level, disappeared when the original situation was altered. The nature of CHISAM is perhaps best revealed by the three events that coincided with its disappearance. First, the elected government of Negrão de Lima was substituted at this time by one appointed by the federal government. Second, the large area along Barra da Tijuca beach was urbanized and opened for luxury constructions in Rio. Third, the removal of favelas in the South Zone was effectively completed. While two large favelas, Rocinha and Dona Marta, plus a few small ones still remained, the “core” South Zone—along the Rodrigo de Freitas Lagoon—was by then completely clear of favelas. The first event guaranteed closer understanding, from this point onwards, between state authorities and BNH and other federal agencies. The other two insured an abundant supply of land for speculation and upper-class housing and the effective isolation of these areas from the dwellings of the poor.

The appointment of the new state government also marked the end of CODESCO. Though the agency had achieved some notable successes in Bras de Pina and Morro União, its orientations toward favelas did not curry favor with the new authorities. By 1973, the original director and staff had been replaced by a much less active group (Perlman 1976). The Mata Machado project was subsequently dropped and in 1975 the agency was disbanded, part of its staff and materials passing to COHAB. The disappearance of CHISAM and CODESCO eliminated the once all-important controversy between urbanization and eradication in Rio de Janeiro. A new period began that, though qualitatively distinct, marked the maturation of trends already present in the earlier years.

THE RETURN TO CONVENTIONAL HOUSING POLICY, 1973–1976

The change in state government and the disappearance of CODESCO and CHISAM permitted the ascendance of COHAB as the sole agency involved in

public housing policy in Rio de Janeiro. During the last four years, COHAB—whose name was changed in 1975 to State Company of Housing (CEHAB)—has evolved out of the role of a mere construction company to become the “chosen instrument” of BNH’s policies in Rio. Major events during these four years have been the virtual paralysis of the favela eradication program and the return of CEHAB to a conventional housing policy based on individual inscriptions. Both decisions are clearly interrelated and can be discussed simultaneously.

As seen above, the more apparent reason for the end of the favela removal program was that it had accomplished its purpose: land in the South Zone had been cleared of the “eyesores” and the construction industry had been given a vigorous start. Yet, the program was by no means complete by the time CHISAM disappeared. Some favelas, including the largest one—Rocinha—remained in the South Zone and others occupied portions of Tijuca, Meier, São Cristovão, Engenho Novo and other central and northern sections of the city. Though their eradication was certainly less pressing than that of “core” South Zone favelas, it would have been necessary to fully achieve the goals of reorganizing urban space and freeing high-priced land from illegal occupation. Finally, CEHAB had a tradition of eradications dating back to the early sixties that would have made it natural to continue the program that CHISAM had started.

The favela eradication program became paralyzed in 1973 not because of its early accomplishments, but because of its progressive financial strangulation. In essence, the BNH-designed, CHISAM-executed policy placed the final costs of reorganization of urban space on the favelados. Not only were they victimized by the destruction of their old dwellings, they were required to pay for the new ones. Such a policy, designed by government planners and imposed on the population, did not take into account two serious barriers: the resistance to the program by those whom it was supposed to benefit; and a distribution of income that did not permit the poor to assume the economic burden placed on them.

As Leeds (1972), Perlman (1976), and others have noted, reasons why favelados resisted removal to new conjuntos were four-fold. First, the new housing was located far away from places of work in the central city; distance to work from the favelas tended to be small, while the time and cost of transportation for those removed to conjuntos became a heavy burden. Second, the geographic isolation of conjuntos prevented the search for odd-jobs (*biscate*) that supplemented family income. Third, removal to the conjuntos destroyed the informal networks of assistance that formed the core social structure of favelas; new dwellings were assigned on the basis of family income, thus eliminating the diversity in occupational and income situations that stimulated complementary exchanges. Fourth, conjunto dwellers were required to pay for their housing. Though, in principle, no more than 25 percent of family income (later reduced to 18 percent) was to be used for this purpose, additional payments for water, gas, electricity, and “condominium” services in apartments were also required. To this must be added the heavy cost of daily transportation to work in the city. Monthly payments were periodically adjusted for inflation; this meant, in practice, that the “principal” to be paid for the house or apartment kept increasing in

nominal terms, which discouraged potential buyers. Mortgage payment "indexing" for inflation ran ahead of salary adjustments, thus taking a progressively larger share of family income. All of this contrasted with the barracos of the favela, which were rent-free or acquired for a moderate initial payment.

The response of the favelados toward this situation was both simple and effective. Asked to honor mortgage payments against their will and above their means, they simply defaulted in mass. Entire conjuntos were behind payments by the end of the sixties. A study in 1966 reported that 60 percent of dwellers in Vila Kennedy were behind payments (Salmen 1969). By 1970, the figure had increased to 74 percent. BNH data for eight conjuntos showed an average default rate of 77 percent. In another study, the average for five conjuntos was 74 percent (Perlman 1976). These figures underestimate the rate of default among removed favelados since they include conjunto dwellers who had acquired their units through personal connections and who generally came from higher-income strata, more able and willing to pay. It is no exaggeration to say that the vast majority of former favelados did not comply with the financial demands forced on them by the government.

The full importance of this phenomenon can not be appreciated without understanding the system through which the government's housing program operates. This system is copied from the private banking sector and involves loans, interest, and monetary indexing. Only the interest is lower. Like any private bank, BNH's primary objectives are its own corporate growth and the avoidance of bankruptcy. Thus, its "social interest" programs have never amounted to any substantial transfer of income. The bank merely takes resources extracted from the majority of the population and channels them into loans guaranteed by state and municipal governments. "Social interest" programs are supposed to be self-financed so that the loan repayment schedules of BNH can be met.

Local housing agencies like CEHAB thus receive loans, not grants. The financial strangulation of the eradication program occurred when CEHAB was caught between demands to meet payments from above and the inability to extract them from the "benefited" population below. BNH's loan terms had to be met; thus, the state was forced to cover the large deficits out of general revenues. Faced with mass default in the conjuntos, CEHAB and state authorities confronted the dilemma of accepting the situation as a *fait accompli* or engaging in wholesale expulsion of the inhabitants. The first alternative would encourage similar occurrences in the future; the second would recreate a population of favelados, leave the conjuntos empty, and make apparent the unpopularity of the program.

The favelados' resistance to removal took a second and almost equally disruptive form. It quickly became apparent that conjunto housing, though completely inadequate for the needs and possibilities of the poor, was still desirable to individuals from the lower-middle class. The growing housing scarcity in Rio and the almost exclusive orientation of private construction firms toward lucrative upper-income housing had priced this class out of the conventional housing market. Many of these families, who lived in rented quarters, found in

public housing about the only way to become proprietors and escape high rents. The system of informal exchange, so characteristic of the favelas, quickly adapted to the new situation: before the actual removal, favelados sold or bartered their barracos to families “from the city” who were then duly registered by CHISAM and given a conjunto unit when the favela was eradicated.

Within the conjuntos themselves, a brisk informal market flourished. In Padre Miguel, each house has changed hands on the average of three times since the conjunto was inaugurated. In Cidade de Deus, the rights to occupy a house or apartment sold for 40,000 to 80,000 cruzeiros (roughly \$3,200 to \$6,500) in 1976, depending on the size and location of the unit (interview with BNH official). A CEHAB functionnaire flatly stated that the majority of conjunto dwellings destined for favelados are not occupied by their original inhabitants. They were sold or traded to persons of higher income (personal interview).²

Some former favelados used the money from the “sale” of their units to buy a plot of land or a small business; some returned to their places of origin to set up businesses; others simply invested in Rio and moved to another favela (Valladares 1974). Ironically, payments received to give up their homes is the only real form of income transfer to the favelados in the entire eradication process. It is, to be sure, a transfer to the poor from the less poor, but it still represents an increase in the assets of many destitute individuals and families. Unwittingly, then, the government created conditions that benefited at least some favelados. It did so not through its housing “solutions” but by giving the favelados an opportunity to speculate in the housing market, like members of the middle and upper classes.

For CEHAB, the situation created by these informal transfers amounted to administrative chaos. In many conjuntos the agency lost complete control of the identity of occupants and the use made of dwellings. The informal sale of units turned the official eradication program upside down: former favelados moved to new favelas and middle-class families, already living in the city, moved into the conjuntos. The logic of a profit-oriented economic system completely subverted the original welfare housing program: it made homeowners not of the poor, but of the lower-middle class, and it benefited the former only by giving them a subsidized and unsuspected entry into housing speculation.

The final paralysis of favela eradications by 1974 can be seen as an attempt by official agencies to regain control of the situation. The state government could not afford the continuous drain of resources that the theoretically “self-financed” removal program entailed. CEHAB needed time to evolve out of the financial dilemma in which the program had placed it—to regularize the situation of middle-class families who had moved in, to work out repayment schedules for those in arrears, and to expel quietly and gradually those who could not pay.³ Officials also needed time to put informal transfers under control. This was done by regularizing most of the earlier ones, cancelling others, and preventing new unauthorized ones. By the end of 1976, the situation had changed sufficiently for CEHAB to be able to deter informal transfers with the threat of nonrecognition. The agency could also boast by then of a much higher rate of repayment. While this was officially attributed to more flexible individual

payment schedules and the linking of adjustments for inflation to salary adjustments, in reality it resulted from the changed class composition of conjunto inhabitants. CEHAB's clientele by 1976 had indeed changed to one which could more easily pay; it was, however, entirely different from the favela population for which public housing was originally designed.

After a period of consolidation and reorganization of existing conjuntos during 1973–74, CEHAB opened public inscription for new houses and apartments. From August to December of 1976, 36,000 new applications were filed, and by the end of 1976, the total number approached 100,000. Inscription was closed at that time, since available and projected housing could not possibly keep up with the demand. Applicants were divided according to income and assigned to waiting lists for units of different quality (interview with CEHAB official). As seen in table 2, public housing construction, which had fallen to practically nothing in 1974, experienced a moderate increase in 1975, reaching 2,432 units. The reasons for the return to conventional housing policy and abandonment of both favela removal and urbanization are closely related to those that led to the paralysis of the eradication program in the first place. In situ urbanization of the favelas was convenient for the favelados, but failed to realize those objectives of the housing program linked to reorganization of urban space and stimulation of the construction industry. Removals fulfilled these objectives, but placed the intervening state agencies in an untenable financial and administrative position.

The program of public housing through individual inscriptions represents an attempt by these agencies to preserve the rhetoric of public welfare and "social interest," while de facto abandoning the urban lower class to its own devices for shelter. The program resolves the dilemma of housing policy in Rio de Janeiro for the past six years: meeting the needs of the poor versus meeting the obligations to an entrepreneurially oriented finance system. CEHAB has now become a more respectable agency, meeting its payments to BNH on time without recourse to state funds, and insuring the solvency of its clientele. An unpublished survey among CEHAB applicants in 1976 showed that very few came from favelas; the vast majority lived in rented apartments and rooms in the city. The income bracket that CEHAB is supposed to serve was expanded from 1-3 to 1-5 minimum salaries in an attempt to incorporate a higher-income clientele.⁴ A series of administrative devices also contributes to this purpose: for example, either spouse may apply for a CEHAB house or apartment; it is immaterial whether their combined family income is above 5 minimum salaries or whether one of them earns more than this figure—the one that earns less is still eligible (interview with a CEHAB official).

The incorporation of higher-income brackets into the CEHAB public housing program has accompanied increases in the cost of its units. In theory, CEHAB is mandated to attend the needs of families earning from 1 to 5 minimum salaries, but the cheapest dwelling it builds requires 2-5 minimum salaries of income. At present, it is estimated that 65 percent of workers in Rio de Janeiro earn 2 minimum salaries or less (Baer 1975). Families at the new "low" end of the hierarchy are still at a disadvantage since relatively more dwellings are built

for higher-income groups. In 1975, CEHAB completed less than three thousand new units; the optimistic estimate is that construction will stabilize at around seven thousand units per year. At this rate, and assuming that no discrimination against the lower-income groups took place, a family earning 2 minimum salaries and applying to CEHAB at the end of 1976 would receive its house in approximately twenty years (interview with CEHAB and BNH officials).

Given the experience of the eradication years, current neglect of the favelas by the government is not an unwelcome event. The new situation means relief for many endangered favelas. Though the threat of new expulsions remains and though the South Zone is now off-limits, former favelados and new migrants have begun to build new favelas in Rio's northern and western suburbs and, across Guanabara Bay, in Niterói. According to a recent study by the Rio security department, there are now 273 favelas in the metropolitan area, with the greatest concentration in the North Zone. According to the Leão XIII Foundation, 55 percent of the favelados live in the core northern sections of Santa Teresa, São Cristovão, Ramos, Meier, and Engenho Novo. Still, the fastest growth of new favelas takes place in the more distant northern suburbs—Irajá, Madureira, Bangú, Campo Grande, and Anchieta. In total, an estimated 20 percent of Rio's population of five million lives in favelas (*Jornal do Brasil* 1977). In absolute and relative terms, the figure is larger than that at the time the CHISAM eradication programs began in 1968.

The full meaning of the current housing policy in Rio de Janeiro is best understood in the context of the changing character of the BNH. As seen above, BNH was entrusted with a wide array of social and economic objectives, but its ultimate responsibility remained the development of an extensive program of low-income housing. In the context in which it was created—the aftermath of the 1964 military coup—BNH was seen as the major instrument to show that the government did care about the welfare of the poor and that it could respond to their needs more effectively than the democratic government it had deposed. The first president of BNH, Sandra Cavalcanti, noted in a letter to the president of the republic that “the masses were hurt and orphaned” and that solution of their shelter needs “would act as a balsam for their wounds” (quoted in Gama de Andrade 1976, p. 120).

By the end of 1975, BNH had applied a total of 66.7 billion cruzeiros (over \$10 billion) to its different programs. However, the “social interest” area—which embodied the ultimate mandate of the bank—had received only a third—34.5 percent. Until 1975, BNH had invested 27.2 percent of its resources in supporting middle- and upper-income housing through the Brazilian Savings and Loan System (SBPE); another 14 percent went to credits for purchase of construction materials (RECON), which served essentially the same purpose. Finally, the private construction materials industry was subsidized through the FIMACO program, which received 6.4 percent of resources (BNH 1975).

The third of BNH funds going to the social interest area is, in turn, an inflated figure when compared with what was actually spent on low-income housing. “Social interest” is a euphemism used by the bank to encompass both popular and lower middle-class housing. A total of 15.8 billion cruzeiros, or fully

68 percent of BNH's "social interest" budget until 1975, was spent in financing the housing programs of private middle-class cooperatives, private social security institutes, and military mortgage funds (BNH 1975). Resources actually applied to "low-income" housing programs, defined as those covering the population between 1 and 5 minimum salaries, were 5.8 billion cruzeiros. This represented only 25 percent of the "third" reserved for social interest programs and only 9 percent of total BNH investment (BNH 1975).

The relative number of low-income units built with these funds has also decreased in time. During BNH's initial period, 1965–67, popular housing comprised 66.5 percent of the total number of units financed by the bank. In 1974, the figure had fallen to 18.6 percent (Gama de Andrade 1976). In 1975, the amount allocated to "popular" or low-income housing was 533 million; this represented only 3 percent of BNH's total investment budget for the year (BNH 1975). The universe that this 3 percent is supposed to serve are all Brazilian workers whose income is below 5 minimum salaries, or approximately 80 percent on the population (Baer 1975).⁵

Where does this 3 percent of popular housing funds go? It is channelled through the different COHABs and CEHABs—state and municipal organs—since BNH does not assume responsibility for individual transactions. Rio de Janeiro, having the largest concentration of favelas in the country and being the second largest city, is a natural major recipient. What happens to BNH funds channelled through CEHAB has already been described above. It should be stressed, however, that the preference of CEHAB and similar local-level organs for a higher-income clientele does not necessarily stem from cultural stereotypes against the poor. It is rather the outcome of a pragmatic, entrepreneurial decision to insure the smooth operation and solvency of the agency. In this manner, even the minimal percentage of BNH's budget earmarked for low-income housing is rechannelled to solve the needs of the urban lower middle-class.

Federal and state agencies, which together form the national housing welfare system, thus support each other in developing norms of operation that become the more simple and predictable, the more they are divorced from their original "problem" clientele. Such a smooth *modus operandi* promotes exactly the opposite objectives to those for which the system was created: by subsidizing home ownership for the middle-classes, they help perpetuate and expand the gap between these groups and the marginalized and impoverished mass of the population.

CONCLUSION

The authoritarian state, currently the dominant political system in Latin America, without doubt possesses a series of common features present in its different subtypes. Crucial among them are the ultimate reliance on coercion and the effort to manage political tension through administrative measures. Still, a certain correlation exists between the leadership composition of the different types and the manner in which they approach popular needs and demands. While the correlation is based on past experience and, hence, is not predictive of future

political forms, it is important for showing the potential range of options available to this form of government.

The political leadership of the “civil-populist,” single-party state handles popular demands by reacting to those that give rise to sufficient political mobilization. It responds to demands from below on a particularistic basis, with an eye to reducing political tension and increasing the legitimacy of the regime. This leadership is fundamentally pragmatic and, hence, uninterested in “integrating” the popular masses in line with one or another ideological blueprint. On the other hand, the reformist officers that control the “military-populist” state attempt to instill in the masses a fervor for the task of nation-building and to integrate it into a dialogue where sacrifices are voluntarily accepted and the fruits of development shared. This leadership deals with the poor universalistically, as a social category, and attempts to promote their organization. The exchange between government and popular organization is, however, constrained by the perennial clash between the long-term goals of the leaders and the immediate consumption interests of the masses.

Both types of populist-authoritarian regimes—the civil and the military—have approached the problem of urban squatter settlements in a similar manner. With characteristic nuances, the fundamental orientation has been toward in situ improvement of existing settlements. This “urbanization” policy takes the form of legalization of land titles, credit for construction materials, and extension of urban services. Rarely is the population of a settlement eradicated by force; when removal occurs it is usually at the request of the inhabitants themselves. In the civil single-party state, aid for the squatter settlements is deliberately erratic and granted on a case-by-case basis. Reformist military regimes attempt, on the other hand, to give their urban policy a certain internal coherence.⁶

The “military oligarchic” state regards demand-making from below as, in principle, subversive. Popular masses are not politically manipulated or integrated but reorganized according to government blueprints. Directives determining their situation and conduct are issued from above and supported by the liberal use of coercion. Since no prior dialogue occurs and since even limited forms of protest are forbidden, the government receives little or no feedback on the social impact of its policies. The orientation of military oligarchies toward urban squatter settlements has oscillated between abandonment and attempts to involve them in large-scale reorganizations of urban space. When the latter occurs, as in Brazil in the sixties, it takes the form of massive removals of the settlements toward remote areas of the urban periphery. The idea of “order” in the city is ultimately translated into the physical segregation of the different classes and the preservation of the most desirable areas for exclusive use of the middle and upper class. Yet, because of their nature, military oligarchies are the type of authoritarian regime in greatest need of legitimation. Pressures from the outside and the domestic instability resulting from the continuous use of coercion create the need for popular programs that alleviate political tension and improve the government’s image. However, the forms that these legitimacy-seeking programs take tend to parallel the normal structures and modes of

operation of the state. Directives are issued without prior discussion with the relevant populations and frequently on the basis of stereotypes about their needs and behavior. Funds are channelled through state enterprises, modelled ultimately after the successful private corporation.

The preceding sections have attempted to describe some of the processes by which such legitimacy-seeking programs can become perverted. Institutions created for welfare tend to be organized along entrepreneurial lines and thus become oriented toward self-preservation. The state-capitalist model requires that they become self-supporting; this, by itself, determines the outcome, for there are precious few ways of extracting support from a population in the lowest echelons of poverty. No matter how urgent, desirable, or necessary, welfare programs cannot operate in such a context without a significant transfer of income. This possibility is resisted by the very logic of capitalist-based development planning. However, what distinguishes the military oligarchy from nonauthoritarian regimes and from other authoritarian subtypes is its commitment to the elimination of viable channels for the expression of popular grievances. The systematic use of coercion leaves the lower classes defenseless and inarticulate and, hence, allows the perpetration of endless abuses. This is the heart of the vicious circle in which housing and other welfare programs sponsored by this political system become entangled: they are originally established to alter the image of a regime based on force; in turn, widespread use of force makes possible the perversion of their original goals for the benefit of intervening bureaucracies and their new chosen clientele. The obligatory silence of the poor, the disarticulation of their organization, permits the existence of these "welfare" programs and their justification in terms of endless social-justice rhetoric.

The operation of this cycle explains the puzzling gap between a multi-billion dollar program created to solve the housing problem in Brazil and the neglect and rapid increase of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. The condition of their inhabitants has not improved; it has, in fact, deteriorated in many respects during the years of the Brazilian "miracle." The logic of the dominant politico-economic system imprisons them in an unenviable role that no welfare programs and no melioristic measures within the existing order of things are likely to alter. Serious improvements in their situation must await major changes in the composition and ideological orientations of those groups in control of the state.

NOTES

1. The "know-nothing" attitude of the agency was exemplified by statements like the following: "We ran into some problems rising from ideas, hypotheses, and theories about the favelas and its people . . . we were sure we would get a reaction from those who believed that the slum should be urbanized or improved, keeping the favelas where they were . . . the opinions we heard and the books we read did not help much . . . we chose the hard but fruitful cause of eradicating the slum" (CHISAM 1971, cited in Gardner 1973, pp. 180–81).
2. The same point was recently made by the president of the reconstituted Federation of

- Favela Residents' Associations (FAFEGH). In his view, "the majority of favelados removed to CEHAB housing returned to live in favelas, near their places of work, building new barracos with the sale money from their apartments" (*Jornal do Brasil* 1977).
3. The agency is currently engaged in this financial restructuring operation. It consists of interviewing conjunto occupants who have defaulted. Loan repayment schedules are worked out with those who can afford them; those who cannot are quietly expelled. Vacated units are opened to higher-income families entering the CEHAB program through individual inscription (interview with CEHAB official).
 4. The minimum salary in 1977 was 1,107 cruzeiros, or 74 dollars.
 5. However, BNH has explicitly ruled out all individuals and families whose income is less than 1 minimum salary. They represent an estimated 50 percent of the population (Gama de Andrade 1976).
 6. These descriptions are transparently based on the ideal-types represented by Mexico and Peru. Other nations, however, have come to approach one or another model. On the case of Mexico, see Cornelius (1975) and Eckstein (1977); on Peru, see Collier (1976).

REFERENCES

- BACHA, EDMAR
 1976 *Os Mitos de Uma Decada: Ensaio de Economia Brasileira*. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Paz e Terra.
- BAER, WERNER
 1975 "La reciente experiencia Brasileña: una interpretación," *Revista Paraguaya de Sociología* 34 (Sept.–Dec.):7–39.
- BNH
 1974 *Relatório 1974*. Rio de Janeiro: Secretaria de Divulgação do BNH.
 1975 *Relatório 1975*. Rio de Janeiro: Secretaria de Divulgação do BNH.
- BOLAFFI, GABRIEL
 1975 "Habitação e Urbanismo," *Ensaio de Opinião* 2:73–83.
- CAMPOS, ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA
 1965 "O Problemas da Habitação no Brasil," *Digesto Economico* 181 (Jan.–Feb.). Cited in Potengy Grabois 1973, p. 39.
- CEHAB
 1976 "COHAB-GB—COHAB-RJ. Quadro Unidades Construídas 1962–75." Rio de Janeiro: CEHAB document.
- COHAB
 1969 "Relatorios da COHAB-GB." Rio de Janeiro: COHAB document.
- COLLIER, DAVID
 1976 *Squatters and Oligarchs: Authoritarian Rule and Policy Change in Peru*. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- CORNELIUS, WAYNE
 1975 *Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- ECKSTEIN, SUSAN
 1977 *The Poverty of Revolution*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- GAMA DE ANDRADE, LUIS AURELIANO
 1976 "Política Urbana no Brasil: O Paradigma, a Organização e a Política," *Estudos CEBRAP* 18 (Oct.–Dec.):119–47.
- GARDNER, JAMES A.
 1973 "Urbanization in Brazil," International Urbanization Survey Report. New York: The Ford Foundation. Mimeographed.
- GARRASTAZU MEDICI, EMILIO
 1973 "Discurso de Lançamento," in *Plano Nacional da Habitação Popular*. Rio de Janeiro: Secretaria de Divulgação do BNH.

Jornal do Brasil

- 1977 "Favela—Universo em Expansão," Special Edition (22 May).
- LEEDS, ANTHONY AND ELIZABETH
1971 "Brazil in the 1960s: Favela and Polity, the Continuity of the Structure of Social Control." Austin: University of Texas. Mimeographed.
- LEEDS, ELIZABETH
1972 *Forms of 'Squatment' Political Organization: The Politics of Control in Brazil*. M.A. Thesis, University of Texas at Austin.
- LOWENTHAL, ABRAHAM F.
1974 "Peru's Ambiguous Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 52 (July):799–817.
- MANOILESCO, MIHAIL
1936 *Le Siècle du Corporatism*. Paris.
- O'DONNELL, GUILLERMO
1975 "Reflexiones sobre las tendencias generales de cambio en el estado burocrático-autoritario," *Revista Paraguaya de Sociología* 12 (May–Aug.):11–58.
- PARISSE, LUCIEN
1969 "Las favelas en la expansión urbana de Rio de Janeiro: estudio geográfico," *América Latina* 12 (July–Sept.):7–43.
- PERLMAN, JANICE E.
1976 *The Myth of Marginality, Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
- POTENGY GRABOIS, GISELIA
1973 *Em Busca da Integração: A Política de Remoção de Favelas no Rio de Janeiro*. M.A. Thesis, National Museum of Rio de Janeiro.
- SALMEN, LAWRENCE F.
1969 "A Perspective on the Resettlement of Squatters in Brazil," *América Latina* 12 (Jan.–Mar.):73–93.
- SCHMITTER, PHILIPPE
1974 "Still the Century of Corporatism?" In Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Strich, eds. *The New Corporatism* pp. 85–131. Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press.
- TRINDADE, MARIO
1969 "Lecture at the Superior War School," Rio de Janeiro: 28 July. Cited in Gardner 1973, p. 130.
1971 *Habitação e Desenvolvimento*. Petropolis: Vozes
- VALLADARES, LICIA
1974 *Opération de Relogement et Réponse Social: Le Cas des Residents des Favelas a Rio de Janeiro*. Third Cycle Doctoral Dissertation, University of Toulouse.
1976 "Favela, Política e Conjunto Residencial," *Dados* 12:74–85.
- WIARDA, HOWARD
1973 "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition," *World Politics* 25 (Jan.):206–35.