

tism. In the post-1918 period the same patriotism bordered on treason. The reorientation of external linkages of the Volksdeutsche to new institutions did not proceed rapidly or smoothly. Paikert painstakingly traces the behavior of the group, paying greater attention to the expressions of external form than their psychological attitudinal behavior. It is not at all strange that the Volksdeutsche considered Trianon Hungary only a temporary arrangement. The kingdom without a king, the persistent Hungarian claims to Transylvania, and the frequent plans for boundary adjustments evidenced a lack of stability and worked in favor of the Volksdeutsche—to prepare for the time when the 1919 arrangement would be modified.

The events of World War II placed the Swabians in the center of German plans for territorial and political expansion to Southeastern Europe. The presence of Hitler's Germany in the area legitimized their actions and gave them responsibilities which they had been waiting for, though they paid dearly for them at the end of the war. The author narrates the sequence of events in considerable detail, giving the impression that the Swabians only reluctantly followed Nazi policies. This reviewer tends to disagree with the implication that the majority of Germans had no close affiliation with the VDU (Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn), and equally rejects the comment that links the anti-German reaction of the Magyars with the presence of the Soviet troops. The elements of resistance and opposition to Germans were present long before, although the massive reaction appeared only with the arrival of the Soviets; the mass killing, expulsion, and evacuation of the 1944–48 period was intertwined in one massive process of eliminating Germans from Hungarian and Yugoslav soil, and it is still difficult to identify the individual trends. The settlement in West Germany, for those who survived, has been so far the last stop, considered either as a return home or as a temporary station on their way to new destinations. The author presents only a short summary of their final settlement.

The book offers a dispassionate narration of the fate of the Swabians and an integrated account of the historical events and social and psychological motivations which accompanied the settling, establishment, growth, and the disappearance of the Swabian ethnic group. The study is worth reading either for the information it provides or for the thoughtful reasoning of the author, more prone to justify than to condemn. The book, nevertheless, portrays the Hungarians as the "good guys," the Swabians as the victims, and the Reich Nazis as the "bad guys." In reality, the distinction has never been so simple and clear.

JOSEPH VELIKONJA
University of Washington

JOSEPH PIŁSUDSKI: A EUROPEAN FEDERALIST, 1918–1922. By M. K. *Dziewanowski*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969. xvi, 379 pp. \$8.70.

Piłsudski's eastern policy, from his assumption of power as head of the new Polish state in November 1918 to the final incorporation of the Wilno area in March 1922, forms the subject of Professor *Dziewanowski's* study. This was the period when Piłsudski and his colleagues, mostly former comrades from the Polish Socialist Party, strove to build some sort of federation of borderland peoples to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the tsarist empire. These efforts have received very diverse interpretations; in fact, Piłsudski's federalism is one of the most controversial aspects of his career. It has evoked enthusiasm—and fierce antagonism as well. Soviet historians depict Piłsudski as bent on a restoration of the *ancien régime* throughout the borderlands. "White" Russian polemicists, from their side,

have been equally hostile. Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian nationalists brand Piłsudski's schemes as an attempt to reassert Polish hegemony over the ethnically non-Polish lands which had formerly belonged to the *Rzeczpospolita*. In Poland recently, a talented young historian, Józef Lewandowski, in a couple of studies devoted to Piłsudskiite federalism, concludes that the federalist ideology, for all its democratic phrases, was merely a smoke screen to cover up the fact that the Polish "feudal" landowning class was maintaining its politico-economic supremacy throughout the territories involved. On the other hand, Piłsudski's political rivals, the National Democrats, saw his eastern program as the result of sinister influences, Jewish and freemasonic, on a still leftist-minded politician.

For Dziewanowski, federalism illustrates Piłsudski's statesmanship, vision, and genuinely democratic sympathies. While not neglecting Polish *raison d'état*, the Polish leader sought to integrate this with the wider interests of the whole area. He was, in fact, a pioneer in working for a supranational order in Eastern Europe, and, like many pioneers, for being ahead of his time he paid the penalty of failure. Unenlightened chauvinism on the part of borderland nationalists and Polish rightists alike was responsible for the defeat of federalism. Both Poland and the small nations to the East were later to suffer for this narrowness of view; as a result of their consequent weakness vis-à-vis the two big neighbors, Russia and Germany, they were gobbled up by them in the course of time. Dziewanowski develops this thesis with cogency, and on the basis of a wide array of printed sources as well as of archives available in the Piłsudski Institute in New York. In successive chapters he presents a detailed account of Piłsudski's efforts first to bring about a Polish-Lithuanian federation, which however always bogged down over the question of Wilno, and then to back an independent Ukraine under the leadership of Petlura.

The author is aware of many of Piłsudski's shortcomings and critical of his policies in some respects. Yet he draws an overidealized picture. Indeed it remains unclear if Piłsudski really had any clear-cut federalist policy beyond the romantic notions he imbibed as a member of the prewar Polish Socialist Party. In any case, a revival of the "Jagiellonian idea" appears anachronistic in view of the almost unanimous rejection of federation by the non-Polish—and predominantly peasant—peoples of the borderlands, except when their politicians were driven into a tight corner. The illiberal attitude of the local Polish community is not brought out sufficiently; this attitude did not augur well for federalism's success. Nonetheless, Dziewanowski is correct in arguing that Piłsudski was not a crude imperialist, as he has frequently been presented in Western historical writing. The book, although by no means the last word on the subject, represents a valuable contribution to a continuing debate.

PETER BROCK
University of Toronto

BOHEMIA: JAHRBUCH DES COLLEGIUM CAROLINUM, vol. 8. Munich: Verlag Robert Lerche, 1967. 485 pp. DM 45.

As often in the remarkable series of *Bohemia*, the problems of Czech and German play a very important role. This is true of the introduction, "Change and Tradition in the German and Czech View of History," by the editor, Professor Karl Bosl. He is, in a way, rather optimistic: the catastrophic events that led first to Czechoslovakia's temporary destruction and then, largely as a consequence, to the expulsion of the vast majority of the Sudeten German population, have by now made it pos-