

Unreasonable Faith

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I have only one point to make about the recent Papal Encyclical *Fides et Ratio* in this paper, albeit a complex one.² I want to draw attention to the fact that the apparently simple and self-evident term 'reason' in English is deceptively so, so that when we hear the term 'reason' in the title "Faith and Reason" we hear named a marker for something with a long and difficult history. I do not intend to resolve that history in this paper—which would be much too ambitious a task, but rather to relate its complexity to some of the Encyclical's underlying themes.

I want to begin by commenting on the sheer awfulness of the English translation of *Fides et Ratio*. The English translation is often frankly and mischievously inaccurate. Let me give you just one example (of very many). At §49 the English tells us "The Church has no philosophy of her own nor does she canonize any one particular philosophy in preference to others". The Latin text has "Suam ipsius philosophiam non exhibet Ecclesia, neque quamlibet prælegit peculiarem philosophiam aliarum damno." Those two last words "aliarum damno" emphatically do not mean "in preference to others" but rather "to the condemnation of the others". The sense here is quite different: the English implies that one philosophy could be chosen by the Church from a range of systems: rather like preferring white wine to red for a meal. The implication of the Latin is much sharper: to choose one philosophy would be to pronounce a kind of judgement on the others. A quite different inference.

In contrast to the English, the Latin is complex and nuanced. One of the criticisms advanced in the Anglophone reception of this Encyclical has been that it to a certain extent hypostatizes 'reason' and 'faith' so that they become 'things' over against which I must read myself. I want to show that there is a way of reading what the Pope has said that does not concede these objectifications, and that shows how we can understand a kind of limit to be operating between faith and reason. Hence my title, 'unreasonable faith', which could just as easily have been 'faithless reason'. I want finally to suggest that this limit is not artificial: it is not a 'mechanism' artificially taking for granted what reason 'is' or faith 'is', and operating as a way of reading the text (which would subordinate the meaning of the text to what I 'want' or 'will' to find in it), a

'hermeneutic' or 'methodology', but rather, this limit is of such a special character that in bringing it to light it will become clear how it gives faith to be faith and reason to be reason at all. In other words, *something* (not itself either faith or reason) is the hypostatic possibility of anything like faith or reason occurring at all.

First, let us remind ourselves what *hypostasis* is: it is that not which underlies or stands under, but rather that which is already taken to be underlying, the *inferred* inasmuch as it is already under, already *there*: Latin *substans*, not *sublocans*. That which is *taken* to be underlying is that which can be brought to light, and shown to be in advance of us. Its place, insofar as it must be taken for granted, can always be shown, and always taken for granted. The obscurity of these remarks I hope will become clear towards the end of this paper. Let us, however, keep this question of the *hypostasis* in reserve; as what must be brought to light to prevent us from losing sight of what reason and faith might be, and as what will keep them apart. In this sense, let us look for unreasonable faith, and faithless reason.

The Encyclical rests on a distinction which can foremost be found in St. Thomas Aquinas, between what is known *naturaliter* and what is known *de fide*. You may be more familiar with this as the distinction between natural and revealed theology, but this is a distinction introduced into theology much later, long after Aquinas' demise. Aquinas is aware of a distinction between theology as reflection on Christian faith, and theology as part of the philosophical science of being. He makes this distinction explicitly with a reference to Book VI of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.³ Theology in Aristotle's sense of *prote philosophia* is the highest science of being, and the most theoretical, indeed, it is the science to which the other theoretical or speculative sciences are referred.⁴ Theology of this kind does not belong to faith, but pertains to what is known by contemplation of the things that are: strictly speaking theology in this sense is a kind of philosophy, the first, or highest philosophy.

Where theology is a matter concerning what is *de fide*, what is at issue is the character of theology as a reflection on faith. Indeed, for St. Thomas, theology is *already* that which "has been inspired by an immediate divine light . . . this is the doctrine of theology".⁵ Quoting St. Augustine, he remarks that theology is the knowledge of those things which pertain to human salvation.⁶ Theology of this kind has nothing to do with 'first philosophy', although Aquinas always takes for granted that theology as 'first philosophy' which discloses the being of things *naturaliter* is entirely consonant with theology which is concerned with what is known *de fide* even if one cannot be derived from the other. How

are the things that are known to salvation to be known? Through faith. Theology is in this sense the science of faith. Note that for St. Thomas, (and I would stress for us also), *God* is not the object of theology: the proper object of theology is faith, or, in the case of 'first philosophy', being. *Fides et Ratio* consistently warns against the error of fideism,⁷ but as I intend to show, fideism is an impossibility if the distinction between faith and reason is correctly carried out. Note moreover that on St. Thomas' definition God *cannot* be the object of theology: as will become clear, for very special reasons *that God is* can be known 'naturaliter', naturally, but this knowledge is insufficient for salvation, and moreover, in no way yields *what* or *who* God is. St. Thomas is here most careful to carry out a distinction between the being of God and God's 'quidditas', 'whatness'. Even if God's existence is shown to be the same as God's own 'to be', this yields nothing of what God is. The *scientia divina* of *sacra doctrina* is not any *scientia divina* except insofar as it sheds light on my own *becoming divinised*. To take St. Thomas' definition of theology, the science of the things that pertain to salvation is the science of things that, in being salvific, pertain to me. This science, in a certain sense therefore, has me as its object, and only the things of God insofar as I have taken them up, which means, undergone the way of salvation myself.

In this way we catch a first glimpse of how faith is unreasonable: if faith is the *object* of the science of theology, then faith is not its content, but rather the things that are given *in* faith. In the *scientia theologiae* what is scientific is the 'reflection on', the 'knowing in' so that in no sense is this a *scientia fidei*, a science of faith, but a *scientia de rebus fidei*, a science of the things of faith, or more properly, which pertain to human salvation. These things may be understood through reason, *sapientia*, but they are not given *by* or *in* reason (they are not deduced from reason), because they are given *by* or *in* faith, for wise, and reasoned, reflection. Here Thomas is relying on the ancient tradition that reason pertains to science, but there could be no such thing as a 'reason of faith'. Paradoxically, therefore, theology, *as* a science, is only indirectly concerned with faith.

A further point needs to be made about something that the Encyclical never sufficiently clarifies: it equates reason, *ratio*, with wisdom, *sapientia*, or Greek *sophia*. The document, however, sometimes confuses its own understanding of reason-as-wisdom with the sustained attack that has been mounted by much modern philosophy (especially those schools of philosophy usually lumped under the heading of 'postmodernism' or 'continental philosophy') on reason-as-such. This attack, where it is self-referential enough to know what it is doing, has not been on reason as

sophia, but on reason as the *ratio* of the most universal and over-arching principle of reason, the principle established by Leibniz, *nihil est sine ratio*: nothing is without (a) reason: “Nichts ohne Grund”. When the Encyclical raises questions about the “crisis of rationalism”⁸ and “mistrust of reason”⁹ the distrust it is naming arises out of the crisis of confidence in the Enlightenment, where reason is elevated as a final court of decision over every other discipline, and indeed over God as well. This Enlightenment notion of reason had already supplanted reason-as-wisdom, in order to ground Cartesian subjectivity.

This confusion arises partly because the document takes wisdom to be synonymous with reason, whereas my own argument is that precisely because the understanding of what reason is becomes detached from a notion of wisdom, reason is inevitably announced not as a way of being which I must find my own way into, but rather something which stands over against me and to which I must be conformed. Let me clarify this distinction a little. Wisdom is that kind of reason that grows with experience. Not an empirical experience, as I might have in using a hammer, where making mistakes affects only the health of my thumb (when I hit it by accident and inexperience) and not the health of my moral being as such. Experience in wisdom is the kind of experience where I learn what is best for me, and who I am in the very learning. Mistakes in the order of moral wisdom cannot be afforded so lightly: making a mistake in the need not to harm others by knowing how and in what ways murder is an evil is not of the order of banging my thumb through clumsiness and lack of dexterity. Reason that stands over against me, however, says that it is not ‘reasonable’ to commit a murder, and this is something already known, to which I must conform myself. It does not show me how the injunction against murder is a by-product of a way of being towards others that takes into account their human dignity at the deepest level; rather it simply declares an impersonal imperative, a moral ‘fact’ with no direct reference to myself. In this sense what is ‘reasonable’ is always taken as so self-evident that I need no way into it. I can detach the injunction against murder from the need to discover the meaning of *your* personal dignity. An example of this would be for me to tell you that “this is the way we do things around here, it makes the best sense” without telling you *why*. You just have to take it on trust that what you have been told is ‘rational’. The exact importance of the structure of this example will become clear shortly.

There are two entirely different notions of truth at work here. The correspondence theory, with its little sibling the coherence theory, produces a notion of reason as what lies over against me: either what lies over against me is God as reason as such, or worse, God and I are all

brought under the final court of reason. The relation of truth to wisdom is not so simple. Truth here means that which is given in the highest contemplation, understood by the Greeks as *theoria*. The essential link between *sophia* and *theorein* as the practice of *sophia* is eclipsed in the Enlightenment precisely because reason is always given in advance, as what grounds anything insofar as it *already* is.

Everything has a reason means, everything is already disclosive of what reason is, independently of any reasoning I might undertake. It is the impersonal coldness of this understanding of reason that Postmodernism attacks, both in the form of Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God and in Lyotard's pronouncement of the end of all grand narratives (including the grand narrative of reason itself). To take reason as a unitary term in the way *Fides et Ratio* appears to do is to hypostatize reason as a thing, as its critics have pointed out. However, my contention is that neither St. Thomas nor *Fides et Ratio* ever really does this, though they do not make the distinction between reason and wisdom that each relies on and which I have tried to demonstrate here, sufficiently explicit.

St. Thomas, who to a certain degree codifies and invents the correspondence theory of truth, in one sense lays down the very basis for the principle of sufficient reason. Inasmuch as he argues that the truth of every thing is given by a correspondence between thing and the mind ("truth is the adequation [correspondence] of the thing and [its] intellection")¹⁰ he can do so only because for him everything is *already* perfectly intellected or known by God *before* it can be known by us. To know something to be true, therefore, is to bring my mind *naturaliter* into conformity with the intellect of God. The principle of sufficient reason works in exactly the same way, taking 'reason', the 'ratio', as a synonym for truth. In this sense, although Enlightenment thinkers up to and including Kant continued to work within the framework laid out by their Scholastic forebears, theirs was a one-sided interpretation of the logic they found in Scholasticism. St. Thomas, although he holds this view of truth, has an entirely rounded view of wisdom, *sapientia*, or *sophia*, which he derives from Aristotle. Here wisdom, as the highest of Aristotle's five grades of truth, is synonymous with 'intellectus'—intellection or understanding as such. Now because Aquinas has decided that God already is 'highest', 'best', 'most perfect' of all that is in whatever is insofar as it is (Aquinas explicitly does not think God is *the* highest being, but rather is *highest* being. God is not *a* being for him) then to ascribe the highest truth to God is to ascribe wisdom to God. When Aristotle says that wisdom is the highest or best, *noein*, *intellectus*, St. Thomas takes this to be properly ascribed to God. He notes: "(Aristotle) concludes that wisdom, in declaring the truth about

principles, is understanding; but in knowing the things inferred from the principles, it is science. However, wisdom is distinguished from science, taken in the usual sense, by reason of the eminence which it has among other sciences; it is a kind of perfection of all sciences".¹¹

It becomes possible to see here how Aquinas can reconcile the correspondence theory of truth with wisdom, and how simultaneously the correspondence theory will destroy our access to wisdom. Put simply, wisdom, as Aristotle understands it, requires the one who is wise, to be the one who orders all other kinds of truth into their highest form. This is pure *theoria*, so that even *phronesis* (Aquinas' *prudencia*), when it takes not the prudence of the person, but truth, for its own sake is seen as ordered to *sophia* itself. In the Enlightenment securing of the Subject, however, the Subject is secured by *mechanising* truth, so that truth becomes a method to which anyone following the right method might have access. "The way we do things round here" is the method to be followed, the most rational way of getting what we want and making it happen. Anyone can follow this method—you don't have to be wise to do so. At its most pedestrian it means "follow the instructions". The wise one is not the one who is called to the highest contemplation in *theorein*, but the one who follows the right method, which method is above all rational. Here highest becomes, not what gives order to everything else, but rather, what is most general, most *generalisable*. Moreover, there is nothing special about the one who follows the method: anyone can follow the method, so that the particularity of being myself is dissolved into the general undertaking of method as such. Why is this a problem? Surely there are times when I have to follow the best method to get results? Indeed so, but after the Enlightenment it is only method that can claim to be rational: every particularity is dissolved into generality. You're no better than I am.

Before proceeding, I want to take stock a little. It should now be clear how, at least in a preliminary way, we have secured a separation of faith and reason that at least implies their mutual belonging-together. This is in stark contrast to that understanding of reason which prompted the very writing of *Fides et Ratio*, where faith and reason became detached altogether. I have also indicated that reason is not unitary, adverting to at least two different uses in the tradition, and how an understanding of them might be gained. I have also been at pains to stress the Thomistic underpinning of the document, which although made explicit from time to time is rather taken for granted throughout.

It remains for me to do two things to argue my case. I want to show decisively *why* for St. Thomas there had to be a separation of faith and reason, here taken as wisdom, and *how* he achieved it, and I want to

conclude by referring to the beautiful and lyrical opening section of *Fides et Ratio*. My argument is that if these things are made clear, then the whole structure and argument, and finally the task set by the document, become clear.

The opening sentence of the official translation of *Fides et Ratio* says "Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth."¹² *Animus* here is not properly translated as spirit and certainly neither as its feminine counterpart (*anima*), soul. What is intended here is mind, not as *mens*, but as intellected being. *Animus* is in consequence of *contemplatio*. *Contemplatio* itself relates to *theoria*, which, in Greek, and in a Christian register, at least suggests) some connection with the divine. Contemplation is always that which points towards the things of God. The issue here, therefore, is the means by which the human (intellective) being brings him or herself into the province of the Divine: in two ways, through faith and by means of reason-as-wisdom. The point here, therefore, is that human being is the place of unfolding of faith and reason. The proper *hypostasis* or *locus* of faith and reason is the human intellective being, me, and you. Faith and reason are not things in their own right, they are ways of bring the thing that is my being into the province of the divine.

In the next sentence truth and God are equated: to know the truth is to know God. Flowery as this might sound, it is exactly consonant with that knowledge of God *naturaliter* and *de fide* that we have seen St. Thomas develop in the correspondence theory of truth and through knowing God's appearing in the realm of being, through Christ. The question implicit in these two opening sentences is not, 'how can a natural understanding of truth be defended in the face of a demand for *theosis*, salvation at the highest level?', but rather the other way round: 'what notion of truth can we evince which will exceed *adaequatio* and so bring us to the notion of truth through the action of faith?'

Near the opening of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* we find the following: "There is a twofold mode of truth in what we profess about God. Some truths about God exceed all the ability of the human reason. Such is the truth that God is triune. But there are some truths which the natural reason also is able to reach. Such are that God exists, that he is one, and the like. In fact, such truths about God have been proved demonstratively by the philosophers, guided by the light of natural reason".¹³

Note that here that again truth is being argued as *twofold*. This statement shows clearly that there are some things which can be known *naturaliter* about God: moreover, for St. Thomas, my suggestion would

be they did not require *faith* as such, because faith is always concerned with salvation, and these things which can be known about God are insufficient to be saving. They are what can be known about God *ab extra*, from without. The point, often missed by modern theologians, is that natural knowledge of God is not strictly theological in the modern sense, or under the definition given that theology is the science of the things proper to salvation, but only under the definition of theology as ‘first philosophy’.¹⁴ This latter kind of knowledge can even be undertaken ‘as if’: ‘if God is, God would be like *so and so*’. I take this kind of reasoning, and the obsession with the divine attributes, to be the quagmire into which thinkers like Richard Swinburne have sometimes been tempted, rationally attempting to demonstrate the things which properly pertain to faith and salvation.¹⁵

Elsewhere, St. Thomas explains exactly the significance of all this. St. Thomas’ early disputations during his first term as *Magister* at the University of Paris were written up as the *Quæstiones Disputatæ de Veritate*, to which I have already referred. They take their name from the first question, *On Truth*: there are twenty-nine questions in all. In the course of question ten, *On Mind*, Thomas deals with the question “whether the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason.”¹⁶ Before we proceed to hear how St. Thomas answers this question it is well to note that in the first article of this question St. Thomas says that “the name mind is taken from measuring.”¹⁷ What does the mind measure? The adequation of *intellectus* and thing—the definition of truth. The mind measures truth. However, the measuring and the intellection are one. *Intellectus*, he says is the power or faculty of measuring that the mind itself is.¹⁸ Note how implicitly this connects the capacity of knowing truth that the mind is (*ratio*) with *sapientia*, the highest truth. He says that mind, the power of intellection (i.e. of truth *as* truth), is the highest power of our souls: therefore “in us the divine image is according to that which is highest in us, and so the image will belong to the essence of the soul only insofar as mind is its highest power.”¹⁹ The mind is like to God only because it has the power to know in a finite way what God knows unlimitedly, and that is truth, simultaneously adequation and *sapientia as* highest truth.

What then of natural knowledge of the Trinity (and why am I concerned with it?). In answering this question Aquinas notes that we cannot infer the persons of the Trinity through inference of cause in the light of what that cause effects. This is exactly how we know *that* God is *naturaliter*. In contrast, however, we know the Trinity of persons according to the properties by which the persons are distinguished. Now here is the central point. Note that we know that God is through inference

from cause and effect. This is a relation between God and creature, albeit an inferred one, one that has to be discerned and uncovered. Nevertheless it is uncovered *naturaliter*. The properties of the persons of the divine trinity, however, are also relations, but “through which the persons are related not to creatures, but to each other. Hence we cannot attain to the properties of the persons by natural knowledge”.²⁰ Now how could we know this to be true? By faith alone, and by reflection on faith: by faith and baptism in Christ, which will place us within the divine Trinity itself. Here knowledge and salvation are the same, they belong together: to know what salvation is, is simultaneously to be included in what the knowledge is of, it is to be in the way of salvation. This, through Christ’s saving action, is knowledge of God *ad intra*, because, sealed by the Spirit and living in Christ, we are inscribed into the relations between the persons. The distinction here is of the order of knowing the Trinity and knowing about the Trinity, which would not be the same thing. I can know a lot about you without knowing you. In contrast, I can know you, but might know nothing about you at all.

Now note that there are here two true ways of knowing God: from without, insofar as I am in possession of myself, and from within, insofar as I am possessed by God. In each case, however, I remain myself. Much of what I have teased out in St. Thomas *Fides et Ratio* takes for granted, indeed, takes so much for granted that it introduces a possible confusion into its diagnosis that there is a “crisis of reason”. How can St. Thomas hold in peaceful tension what I argue is taken so much for granted in *Fides et Ratio* that it can be confused? I want to make one brief observation here. The ‘ratio’ in the course of the Enlightenment and the elaboration of subjectivity undertaken in it becomes the ‘court of reason’ which establishes all that is, insofar as it is. *Nihil est, sine ratione*. Here reason is taken as the establishment of the self, as a rational being, and the being who knows what it knows in pure reason. Reason here also establishes God, so that from Descartes to Kant and beyond, God is the ground that reason is—a position itself derived from an interpretation of exactly the argument Aquinas uses to establish the correspondence theory of truth. When this reason is declared dead, above all by Nietzsche, in the proclamation of the death of God, the crisis of rationalism to which the Pope refers emerges (above all exemplified in Postmodernism) and reason itself is put into question. However, this notion of reason is not necessary for the argument the Pope makes. In order to establish the *ratio* as the court of reason, *sapientia*, wisdom, has already been eclipsed and no longer plays a role—certainly not since Descartes and arguably much before.

Sapientia, however, is the real grounding of the human person in

Aristotle. Wisdom, as highest contemplation undertaken by the self for the pure sake of the self, *theoria*, is that which is referred to by the Augustinian and Anselmian maxim, pinched from the temple portal at Delphi and to which the Pope refers as the title of his *Proæmium*: “Nosce te ipsum”, ‘know yourself’. Here ‘you’ refers, yes, to God, but also to what is highest and most holy in and of my neighbour. It also refers to how God knows me: through the person of Christ.

How does *Fides et Ratio* ground truth? It does this early on, in Section I of the document, the section to which I have been calling us back throughout the text. In §2, speaking of the journey in enquiry that philosophy is, the Pope says “The Church is no stranger to this work of discovery, neither could she be. From that moment, when from within the Paschal Mystery she accepts the extreme truth concerning the life of mankind as a gift.”²¹ The English translation uses ‘through the Paschal Mystery’, but the Latin says ‘intra’ which has the force of ‘within’. The difference is fundamental: what the document refers to is the interiorisation of truth that self-inscription into the Paschal Mystery is *through faith*, which leads to the most extreme truth: truth revealed in the most extreme way, through the Crucifixion of the Son of God, and most extreme in the sense of completed, outermost, fulfilled.

I said at the beginning that there was a *hypostasis* that, taken into view, would prevent us from hypostatizing either faith or reason (now understood as wisdom) as entities within themselves. That *hypostasis* is the human person as such, the ‘place’ of truth, the locus of human life, such that a whole human life wisely and faithfully lived is the origin and appearance of truth itself. Such truth is achieved only through constant self-reflection, a practice of truth: not truth as standing over against the person: the truth of faith *given* in the practice, or doing, of *sophia*. In this sense, although truth is two-fold, it is also unitary. United, not in itself as a thing, but in me as the only thing that could underpin it. United not in me, except and insofar as I am on the way to salvation. Being on the way to salvation means *theosis*, my own union with the divine—which is why for Thomas, with a high doctrine of *theosis* (divinization) as the salvation of the human person, all these things remain composite and unitary, and why, in order to understand what *Fides et Ratio* is saying, we too must have a theology, a wisdom, of divine union, and why in the end, faith must be unreasonable, but wise.

- 1 A version of this paper was presented to the Heythrop Association at their annual meeting in October 1999.
- 2 John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio*. Vatican. Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1998. Translated as *Faith and Reason*., London, CTS, 1998.
- 3 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiæ*, I Q. 1, A. 1: Obj. 2; ad 2. “Unde theologia quae ad

sacram doctrinam pertinet. differt secundum genus ab illa theologia quae pars philosophiae ponitur.”

- 4 Cf. Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, VI, I (1026a 15–25); Aquinas, *In Libros Metaphysicorum*. VI, I, 1166–1168.
- 5 In I *Sent.*, Q. 1 resp. 1. “Immediate ex divino lumine inspiratam... haec est doctrina theologiae.”
- 6 In I *Sent.*, Q. 1 resp. 3. “Secundum Augustinum, theologia est scientia de rebus quae ad salutem hominis pertinent.”
- 7 Cf §52; §53; esp. §55. “Neque desunt qui in *fideismum* periculose regrediantur, quippe qui rationalis cognitionis philosophicaeque scientiae pondus ad fidem intellegendam, immo ad ipsam facultatem possidendam in Deum credendi, non agnoscat.” [“They fail who dangerously return to *fideism*, which does not give due weight to philosophical and scientific knowledge for the understanding of faith, indeed for the very possibility of belief in God.”] (Author’s italics).
- 8 §46. “Veluti discriminis rationalismi tandem *nihilismus* crevit.”
- 9 §55 “... radicalis de ratione diffidentia, quam recentes multarum inquisitionum philosopharum explicationes ostendunt.”
- 10 *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, Q. 1 a. 2. “Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus.”
- 11 *Sententia Libri Ethicorum*, Bk. 6, Lect. 5. “(Philosophus) concludit, quod sapientia. inquantum dicit verum circa principia, est intellectus; inquantum autem scit ea quae ex principiis concluduntur, est scientia; distinguitur tamen a scientia communiter sumpta, propter eminentiam quam habet inter alias scientias: est enim virtus quaedam omnium scientiarum.”
- 12 *Fides et Ratio*, § 1. “Fides et Ratio binæ quasi pennæ videntur quibus veritatis ad contemplationem hominis attolitur animus.”
- 13 *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 3. 2. “Est autem in his quae de Deo confitemur duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt de Deo quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est Deum esse. Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi; quae etiam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis.”
- 14 St. Thomas does admit of theology which only pertains to ‘first philosophy’.
- 15 I want to make one aside, for the sake of tidiness. I said earlier that God is not a being for Aquinas. The astute listener will have heard him say here that God is one, and so must be separate, a separate thing, a being of God’s own. However, Thomas is clear that this is not so: in the *Summa Theologiae* he notes “‘one’ does not add any reality to being, but is only a negation of division: ‘one’ means undivided being”. I would add here that ‘undivided’ does not mean ‘infinite’ although some would have it so. This is because infinite being is derived in consequence of geometry, where infinity does not imply everything, because it indicates an infinity of points. Infinite does not mean indeterminable, but *infinitely* determinable: when defined negatively in this way ‘one’ (in contrast) is actually indeterminable.
- 16 *De Veritate*, Q. 10, a.13. “Utrum per naturalem rationem possit cognosci trinitas personarum.
- 17 *De Veritate*, Q. 10, a. 1. resp. “... nomen mentis a mensurando est sumptum.” *Mensurando* comes from *mensurare*, a late verb indeed meaning to measure, itself the corruption of the deponent verb *metri* which means rather that which is *laid out in measuring*, and bears the same passive, negative meaning that *metron* has in Greek. The significance here is that the *metron* is originally that which is measured by something, not the measure itself, hence why in Latin the verb is deponent. Here therefore, the world measures me. I do not measure the things in the world.
- 18 *De Veritate*, Q. 10, a. 1. resp. “... et ideo nomen mentis hoc modo dicitur in anima, sicut et nomen intellectus. Solum enim intellectus accipit cognitionem de rebus

mensurando eas quasi ad sua principia. Intellectus autem, cum dicatur per respectum ad actum, potentiam animæ designat: virtus enim, sive potentia, est medium inter essentiam et operationem ...”

- 19 *De Veritate*, Q. 10. a. 1. resp. “Unde, cum secundum id quod est altissimum in nobis divina imago inveniat in nobis, imago non pertinebit ad essentiam animæ nisi secundum mentem prout nominat altissimam potentiam eius.”
- 20 *De Veritate*, Q. 10 a. 13, resp. “Propria autem personarum sunt relationes, quibus personæ non ad creaturas sed ad invicem referuntur. Unde naturali cognitione in propria personarum devenire non possumus.”
- 21 §2 “Aliena sane non est Ecclesia, neque esse potest, hoc ab inquirendi opere. Ab eo enim tempore, cum intra Paschale Mysterium postremam accepit de hominis vita veritatem uti donum ...”

***Fides et Ratio* and the Twentieth Century Thomistic Revival**

John F. X. Knasas

I want to speak about the place of *Fides et Ratio* within the parameters of the twentieth century Thomistic revival. To do that I must first describe the revival Three strains of Thomistic interpretation characterized the revival before Vatican II: Aristotelian Thomism, Existential Thomism and Transcendental Thomism. The first two were *a posteriori* in their epistemology.¹ The mind abstractly draws its fundamental conceptual content from the human knower’s contact with the self-manifestly real things given in sensation. Among the concepts abstracted are the transcendentals, chief among which is the *ratio entis*, the notion or concept of being. It is an analogical commonality, and so a sameness within difference, whose analogates are absolutely everything, actual and conceivable.²

Aristotelian Thomists and Existential Thomists dispute among themselves about the precise definition of being. The Aristotelian Thomists say that a being basically is a possessor of formal act (*forma*). This thinking derives from their central use of Aristotle’s hylomorphic analysis of changeable sensible substance. What impresses these Thomists is the definiteness and determinateness of sensible things. These aspects are rooted in the substantial form of a thing that is understood to be caused in matter by a moving agent. Ultimately this