

When Greek meets Greek: Alexius Comnenus and Bohemond in 1097-98

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To his father, Robert Guiscard, Bohemond appeared larger than life even in boyhood.¹ Partly from real feats of war and conquest and partly from adroit self-advertisement, he became a legend in his own lifetime,² and even in death he continues to draw the attention of art historians to his mausoleum, which is juxtaposed to the south transept of the cathedral at Canosa, Apulia. The mausoleum's 'Oriental' or 'Byzantine' features mark it out from other buildings in the region, while the date and design of the cathedral itself evoke controversy.³ My aim here is neither

1. Bohemond's baptismal name was Mark. Guiscard is said by Orderic Vitalis jokingly to have called him 'Bohemond' upon hearing at dinner of a legendary giant of that name: *Historia Aecclesiastica*, XI, 12, ed. & trs. M. Chibnall, VI (Oxford 1978) 70-1; V. von Falkenhausen, 'Olympias, eine normannische prinzeßin in Konstantinopel', *Bisanzio e l'Italia. Raccolta di Studi in Memoria di Agostino Peruzzi* (Milan 1982) 72.

2. For Bohemond's skill in exploiting his fame in France and in manipulating a call for a fresh Crusade to serve his own ends in 1106, see J.G. Rowe, 'Paschal II, Bohemond of Antioch and the Byzantine empire', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 49 (1966) 182-7, 195, 199-201. Frankish nobles are said to have offered to him their children 'to whom he willingly stood godfather, even bestowing his own name on them': Orderic Vitalis, *Historia Aecclesiastica*, XI, 12, ed. Chibnall 70-1. Children in the Latin East, too, were named after him: *ibid.*, p.70, n.2. Bohemond's ability to make propagandistic capital even out of the terms of his agreement with Alexius at Dyrrachium was demonstrated by G. Rösch, 'Der "Krezzug" Bohemunds gegen Dyrrachion 1107/1108 in der Lateinischen Tradition des 12. Jahrhunderts', *Römische Historische Mitteilungen* 26 (1984) 187-8, 190.

3. A. Gadolin, 'Prince Bohemund's death and apotheosis in the church of San Sabino, Canosa di Puglia', *B* 52 (1982) 136-41; A.W. Epstein, 'The date and significance of the cathedral of Canosa in Apulia, South Italy', *DOP* 37 (1983) 83-6, 88; M.F. Castelfranchi, 'Contributo alla conoscenza dell' edilizia religiosa nella Longobardia meridionale: I, Canosa Langobarda', *Quaderni dell' Istituto di Archeologia e Storia Antica*, Università degli Studi 'G. D'Annunzio' Chieti, 3 (1982-3) 232-7, 244-6.

to attempt a general assessment of Bohemond's career nor to offer a survey of Alexius I Comnenus' handling of the First Crusade. I shall merely focus on Alexius' dealings with Bohemond during the earlier stages of the Crusade, and argue that Anna Comnena offers a rather misleading picture of their relationship. Far from Alexius being wise to Bohemond's every trick, with Bohemond 'playing the Cretan with the Cretan',⁴ Alexius was in my opinion led to suppose that he had bought Bohemond, at least for the duration of the Franks' expedition to the East, a supposition that was ill-founded.

It must be admitted that Alexius' trust in Bohemond was probably never absolute and his treatment of the Crusading leaders bears the hallmark of the 'divide-and-rule' tactics which he had successfully applied to the Pechenegs and Cumans a few years earlier. Nonetheless, one can legitimately speak of a 'special relationship' developing between him and Bohemond during the latter's stay at Constantinople in 1097. It was a relationship from which Alexius drew real advantages. For he had reason to feel apprehensive about the Normans from Southern Italy paying a second visit to Byzantium in little over ten years, and to seek out an effective collaborator and apologist from among them. Conversely, Bohemond sought close ties with Alexius in order to gain greater prominence and influence among the Crusading leaders than his own forces and resources seem to have warranted, and to assure for himself a position in the East, whatever the outcome of the great expedition.

The arrangement worked to the benefit of both parties so long as the Crusading host was in the vicinity of Constantinople, where the host was at once a potential threat to Alexius and in acute need of his assistance in the form of provisions, guides and information about the Turks. But the arrangement faltered once

4. *Al. X*, 11, p.234; Sew., 329. (Translations of this and other works are my own, taking account of those translations which are cited). For earlier bibliography on Anna and recognition that for all her disclaimers she was writing an encomium of her father, see H. Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner*, I (Munich 1978) 404, 406-09. At the same time Anna did have some access to documents emanating from imperial archives: *ibid.*, 406. See also J. Chrysostomides, 'A Byzantine historian: Anna Comnena', *Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds*, ed. D.O. Morgan (London 1982) 32-3.

Alexius ceased to supply substantial aid or to offer the semblance of leadership. This became the case as the Crusaders' siege of Antioch wore on. Alexius would seem, judging by the actions of his representative Taticius, to have been more trusting of Bohemond than of any other Western leader at that time. To Bohemond, on the other hand, a 'Byzantine connexion' was becoming redundant and even embarrassing, and he began deftly to unravel it, in the opening days of February 1098. At that time he did *not* sever the connexion outright. The Crusaders' position before the walls of Antioch was parlous, and no potential source of aid or supplies could be dismissed absolutely. In fact, Bohemond is likely to have been impatient for supplies from Byzantium. But no substantial supplies or aid from the emperor arrived, and by the spring Bohemond was making arrangements of his own for the seizure of Antioch. Some time in May he proposed to the other commanders on the Crusade that the city should belong to whoever managed to take it.⁵ His proposal flouted the rights to the city of Alexius Comnenus, and it probably marks the point when Bohemond came out publicly as a willing adversary of the emperor.⁶ It is in any case no accident that our earliest extant swingeing condemnation of Alexius' treatment of the Crusaders comes in a postscript added by Bohemond to a letter addressed to Pope Urban II and dated on September 11 1098. The main text of the letter (which on occasion mentions Bohemond in the first person singular) recounts the feats and sufferings of the Crusaders to date, and invites the pope to come to Antioch and complete with them the journey to Jerusalem, liberating the Holy Sepulchre.⁷ A postscript, written in the first person singular and almost certainly composed by Bohemond himself, rebukes the pope for letting some who have vowed to go on 'the sacred journey' stay behind in the West. It peremptorily calls on him not to 'wreck the good work which you have begun', but rather to strengthen the Crusaders through his own

5. *Gesta*, VIII,20, pp.44-5; Peter Tudebode, *Historia de Hierosolymitano itinere*, IX,3, *RHO* III, pp.54-5; Peter Tudebode, trs. J.H. Hill & L.L. Hill (Philadelphia 1974) 61-2 (henceforth: Hill & Hill); Yewdale 65-6; Runciman 231.

6. See below 273.

7. Hagenmeyer no.16,pp.161-5.

arrival and through bringing as many reinforcements as possible. The postscript ends: 'You, most pious father, must separate us your sons obeying you in all things from the unjust emperor, who promised us many good things, but did very little. For all the bad things and whatever hindrances he was able to contrive, these he inflicted upon us'.⁸ Obviously Bohemond, as claimant to authority over Antioch, had particular reasons for emphasizing the emperor's breach of faith: the need to justify his own flouting of such undertakings as he had made towards the emperor, and the need to establish that the other Crusaders' undertakings had also been voided by the perfidious conduct of the emperor. He could thereby debar the likes of Count Raymond of Toulouse from invoking their oaths to Alexius in justification of their denial of his claim to the city.⁹ But in my opinion a further consideration, less obvious to us, lay behind the vehemence of Bohemond's denunciation of 'the unjust emperor' and behind his protestation of obedience to Urban II (sarcastic and hectoring as is his expression of amazement at Urban's failure to hold some Crusaders to their vows). Bohemond had had a close — in fact, the closest — relationship with Alexius during the Crusaders' sojourn at Constantinople. By blackguarding Alexius and denouncing his bad faith, he might hope to meet the charge that he had too readily collaborated with him, and that he had obliged the other Crusading leaders to cooperate with, and swear oaths to, Alexius. For he could retort that he more than anyone had been cruelly deceived by Alexius' promises of ample assistance. And by the sheer vividness and virulence of his denunciation of Alexius, he might hope to cover his own tracks, which had, for the best part of a year, moved quite closely in step with those of the emperor and his special representative, Taticius.

8. Hagenmeyer no.16,p.165; cf. pp.95-6,356.

9. The pope's presence and formal annulment of the Crusaders' sworn undertakings would, it seems, merely have formalized a lifting of their obligations which, according to Bohemond at least, Alexius' breach of faith had already brought about. See below n.305.

I

There is a fundamental inconsistency in Anna Comnena's picture of her father's dealings with Bohemond in 1097-98. It is upon this inconsistency that our investigation will focus. Flaws in Anna's representation of the scene at Constantinople have been picked out by J. France. He points out that it is coloured by her anxiety to defend her father from the charge of maltreatment, deception and desertion of the Crusaders; her denigration of Bohemond and fulsome praise for Count Raymond of Toulouse ('Isangeles') should be viewed in the light of hindsight, in that the two men did eventually emerge as, respectively, outstanding foe and friend of the emperor. In addition, argues France, Anna deliberately builds up the character of Bohemond as arch-villain and oath-breaker, making him the catalyst for the perfidious tendencies of the other Western leaders; this build-up is to some extent a literary device, enabling Anna to blame the Latins, and especially Bohemond, for all that had gone wrong.¹⁰ France also drew attention to the goings-on between Bohemond and Alexius' representative, Taticius, at Antioch in 1098, offering a reconstruction of events which rightly accentuates the tension between Count Raymond of Toulouse and Taticius.¹¹ However, France has not fully probed or explained the self-contradiction which, in my view,

10. J. France, 'Anna Comnena, the *Alexiad* and the First Crusade', *Reading Medieval Studies* 9 (1984) 21-2, 24-6.

11. J. France, 'The departure of Taticios from the Crusader army', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 44 (1971) 137-47. France also supposed that Taticius was instructed by Alexius to counterbalance Bohemond with Raymond of Toulouse, pursuing a policy of 'divide-and-rule' (*ibid.*, 144). This, and other aspects of France's reconstruction, were criticized by R.-J. Lillie, *Byzanz und die Kreuzfahrerstaaten* (Munich 1981) n.156 on pp.354-5. Lillie also points out the contradiction between Anna's depiction of Alexius' attitude towards Bohemond at Constantinople and her story that Taticius heeded Bohemond's warning at Antioch. He argues (*ibid.*, 31) that if one believes the latter story one must accept the former, too, — and thus endorse an absurdity. However, Anna's briefer anecdotes and asides are often less polished and more revealing than her grand literary set-pieces which are designed to establish principal themes and of which her account of the Crusaders' arrival at Constantinople is an example. Harmonization on Anna's part of all the elements in her sprawling materials should not be expected. Even in her account of Alexius' reception of Bohemond, a literary *tour de force*, there are, most probably, authentic anecdotes and vignettes, as Lillie himself recognizes: *ibid.*, n.47 on p.337. And even in this literary *tour de force* there are inconsistencies or at least anomalies: below, 191, 247-8, 257.

the *Alexiad's* narrative perpetrates, and some of the evidence and arguments which he adduces can support a more drastic reappraisal of the scene which Anna sets at Constantinople in the spring of 1097.

Anna Comnena emphasizes that her father had taken Bohemond's measure and harboured no illusions about him, as he approached Constantinople in April 1097. According to Anna, Bohemond was anxious to win Alexius' good will, because he was conscious that he was not of noble stock, and did not have many troops under his command, or much money.¹² Accordingly he raced ahead of most of the other groups of Crusaders with just a few companions, and proceeded to ingratiate himself with Alexius, concealing his hostile designs on him and the empire. Alexius is represented as 'knowing his machinations and understanding his false and deceitful character from of old'.¹³ However, he greeted Bohemond with a smile and had a long conversation with him, trying indirectly to sound out his state of mind. Alexius is depicted as being principally concerned to extract from Bohemond 'a solemn oath' (*horkia pista*), and to hasten his passage across the Bosphorus, where he would be safely out of the way when the other commanders arrived at Constantinople, and unable to 'overturn their opinions' — presumably, to dissuade them from swearing oaths to Alexius. Alexius, the shrewd judge of character and expert in psychology, allays Bohemond's suspicions that he might be poisoned by offering him raw meat and, after Bohemond has sworn the oath, he lavishes valuable presents on him. Bohemond, mercurial as all Latins are, is at first overjoyed, then indignant and then — seemingly, finally — overjoyed again.¹⁴ Alexius is aware of Bohemond's pressing need for money and also knows that his real objective is not Jerusalem but 'to gain power for himself and better still, if it should prove possible, to lay hold of the Roman empire itself'.¹⁵ However, Alexius feigns ignorance of Bohemond's 'secret plans' and pretends to be taken in, while

12. *Al. X*, 11, pp. 230, 232; *Sew.*, 326, 328.

13. *Al. X*, 11, pp. 230-1; *Sew.*, 326.

14. *Al. X*, 11, p. 233; *Sew.*, 328-9.

15. *Al. X*, 11, p. 234; *Sew.*, 329.

'cleverly' removing whatever might contribute towards the realization of them. He thus neatly heads off Bohemond's request that he be appointed to 'the Domestic of the East' by 'flattering him with fair hopes' and answering: 'The time for this is not yet at hand, but even this will come about before long, through your actions and reputation, but also through your fidelity'.¹⁶

It is perhaps slightly surprising that Alexius should have overlooked his reported original intention of shunting Bohemond across the Bosphorus as fast as possible, and thus isolating him from the other commanders ('counts'). Instead, he summoned 'Bohemond himself together with all the (other) counts' for an audience, at which he instructed them on Turkish tactics and on the aptest countermeasures, before urging them to cross the Bosphorus. But this anomaly is somewhat palliated by the statement that Alexius' gifts and advice did much to soften their ferocious nature. He had, moreover, taken a great liking to one of the Crusade leaders, Raymond of Toulouse, on account of his pure mode of living, spotless reputation and utter integrity; Raymond 'stood out from all the Latins in all respects, as does the sun from the stars'.¹⁷ He therefore kept Raymond with him after the other leaders had crossed the straits and told him frankly of his apprehensions concerning the other Latins' intentions. Alexius is described as, in effect, making Raymond his watchdog and right-hand-man, telling him to be ever vigilant in the case of Bohemond, 'so that if he sought to break faith, he should thwart him from his enterprise and put paid to his schemes by every available means'.¹⁸ Raymond responded that it would be a miracle if Bohemond kept 'the oaths which he had sworn (*ta omomosmena*)', but gave an undertaking to do all that he could 'always to carry out your command (*to prostachthen*)'. Alexius thus secured a trusty collaborator against Bohemond, while stringing the arch-villain along. He feigned sympathetic consideration of Bohemond's request for a top military command and — if

16. *Al. X*, 11, p. 234; *Sew.*, 329. I translate *hypolepseos* as 'reputation', following the reading of the *Epitome* of the *Alexiad*, a work compiled at an early date, possibly with Anna's consent: *Leib*, I, clxxiv.

17. *Al. X*, 11, p. 235; *Sew.*, 330.

18. *Al. X*, 11, p. 235; *Sew.*, 330.

one supposes there to be method in the inconsistency between his reported original intention and his actual treatment of Bohemond — he allowed him to stay on for a while at Constantinople, and did not overtly discriminate between him and ‘all the (other) counts’.

These scenes are colourfully painted and gain in plausibility from the background to Alexius’ meeting with Bohemond. How could he fail to be sceptical about the newly-found piety of a man who, little more than ten years previously, had commanded a massive assault on Byzantium together with his father, Robert Guiscard? According to Anna, Alexius reminded Bohemond of his exploits at Dyrrachium and Larissa when he first greeted him in the palace, while Bohemond himself feared lest Alexius try to settle old scores by having him poisoned.¹⁹ And undoubtedly Anna’s reconstruction of her father’s encounter with Bohemond contains some authentic information.²⁰ Nonetheless, it clashes with Anna’s account of events at Antioch during the siege early in 1098. She explains why Taticius, Alexius’ representative, who was accompanying the Crusaders with a force of perhaps some 2,000 men,²¹ abruptly withdrew and sailed away to Cyprus. He had been tipped off by one of the Crusade commanders about a plot on the part of the other leaders to kill him and also, presumably, his men; these leaders had themselves heard a rumour that Alexius had persuaded ‘the sultan’ to launch an attack on them; they believed it and were now intent on doing away with Taticius.²² Who was this commander who so thoughtfully warned Taticius to flee before it was too late? It was not Alexius’ special favourite, Count Raymond, who is presumably to be

19. *Al.* X,11,pp.231,232; *Sew.*,327,328.

20. Below 241, 246-8.

21. No figure is provided by Anna for the size of the Byzantine contingent that journeyed with the Crusaders as far as Antioch. But it may be that it was more or less identical with the ‘force of brave peltasts, two thousand in all’ whom Alexius had placed under the command of Taticius and Tzitas for the assault on Nicaea: *Al.* XI,2,3,pp.12,17; *Sew.*, 336-7,341. A figure of 3,000 soldiers making up the Byzantine contingent is given by Gislebert of Mons, *Chronicon Hanoniense, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores*, XXI (Hanover 1869) 504. Taticius is described as Alexius’ ‘seneschal’ by Gislebert. See also Lilie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaen*, n.212 on pp.364-5.

22. *Al.* XI,4,p.20; *Sew.*,343. The ‘sultan’ in question would have been the Sultan of Rum.

grouped with the other plotters. Nor was it other satisfied beneficiaries of Alexius' largesse such as Count Stephen of Blois and Chartres. It was none other than that most trustworthy of Crusade commanders, Bohemond!

Some historians have accepted the essentials of the story, without really addressing the question of how Taticius could have allowed himself to be bamboozled so easily by Bohemond, 'the arch mischief-maker'.²³ Others have dismissed it as fictitious, emphasizing the errors in the sequence and chronology of Anna's account. She places the duping of Taticius on the eve of the arrival of Turkish hosts under the command of Kerbogha. In reality, Kerbogha arrived in June 1098 whereas Taticius' withdrawal is dateable to early February, shortly before the arrival of a quite separate Turkish relief force, led by Ridwan of Aleppo.²⁴ Un-

23. *Al. X*, 11, p. 233; *Sew.*, 329. See, e.g., F. Chalandon, *Histoire de la première Croisade* (Paris 1925) 193-4; Runciman, 224; France, *Tatikios* 145; *idem*, *Anna Comnena* 27. These scholars give equal or greater weight to Taticius' alleged calculation that the famine-stricken Crusaders anyway had no hope of taking Antioch. But they do not fully address the problem posed by Anna's account of her father's appraisal of Bohemond at Constantinople: 'the arch mischief-maker' should have been the last person to be heeded by Taticius. R. Manselli ('Normanni d'Italia alla prima Crociata: Boemondo d'Altavilla', *Iapigia* 11 (1940) (50) argues that Bohemond, having allied himself whole-heartedly with Alexius, gave Taticius *bona fide* advice to go to Alexius in quest of aid.

24. Ridwan's relief army was routed by the Crusaders on February 9 1098: H. Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie de la première Croisade* (Paris 1902) 124-6. Anna's story is rejected by, e.g. Yewdale, 59-63; J.H. Hill & L.L. Hill, *Raymond IV de Saint-Gilles* (Toulouse 1959) 65. To Lilie (*Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 32, 47-8) the story has the ring of 'trash, with Bohemond in the villain's role', and serves both to justify Taticius' withdrawal and to shift the blame for it onto Bohemond. Lilie thinks the tale is a 'propaganda device' of Anna, designed to rebut the arguments of Bohemond, which made great play of Taticius' 'flight'. If, however, this were an essentially fictitious, deliberate 'propaganda device', it would surely have been purveyed as the *sole* explanation for Taticius' departure and would have been invoked repeatedly and prominently elsewhere in the *Alexiad*. Yet this does not happen. And if Anna were consciously spinning a yarn so as to blame Bohemond for Taticius' withdrawal, even she might be expected to have noticed that her tale of the false tip-off jarred with her earlier emphasis on Alexius' awareness of Bohemond's villainy. If, on the other hand, the tale was not her brainchild and was inserted merely as one of the reasons for Taticius' departure which she had gleaned from her sources, its inconsistency with the tableau in Book X could the more easily have been overlooked by Anna. Assuming that the tale is rooted in reality, Bohemond's denunciation of Taticius' abandonment of the Crusaders showed brazenness. Such would not, however, have been out of character: above, n.2; below, n.37.

doubtedly Anna condenses and also transposes the events at Antioch, and her account of them turns on Bohemond's feats of valour and cunning there: he induced 'a certain Armenian' to agree to let the Crusaders into the city, and then inveigled the other commanders into agreeing that 'the guardianship (*phylake*) of this city' should go to whoever first gained access into the city.²⁵ But these illustrations of Bohemond's qualities and key role at Antioch are rooted in actuality.²⁶ One should therefore hesitate to suppose that Anna invented the story so as to blame Taticius' withdrawal on the conveniently notorious figure of Bohemond. Anna's supplementary explanation for Taticius' withdrawal is also worthy of serious attention, being compatible with the Latin sources' accounts. Anna depicts Taticius as realizing the severity of the famine afflicting the Crusaders and as already despairing of the capture of the city. She specifies that an ox's head was selling for 3 *nomismata*, a detail which she is unlikely to have invented out of thin air, and which is not a literary cliché. In fact, Taticius is said by the *Gesta Francorum* to have excused his withdrawal with the pledge that he would send provisions in 'many ships' and thus relieve the famine.²⁷ This corroboration of Anna's statement that Taticius was concerned about the famine does not, admittedly, prove that the tale of the tip-off is authentic, and it could be held to render the tale redundant as an explanation for Taticius' withdrawal.²⁸ However, the tale gains some indirect corroboration from a statement of Raymond of Aguilers, a partisan of Count Raymond of Toulouse and an acerbic critic of the Byzantines. Raymond of Aguilers states that

25. *Al.* XI,4,pp.19-21; *Sew.*,343-5. The deal between Bohemond and the Armenian was most probably struck in May 1098. Anna is therefore wrong to set it before Bohemond's deception of Taticius. Even so, the essence of her account of Bohemond's dealings with Firuz and with his fellow commanders resembles that of the Western sources: below 254-5, 273.

26. See, e.g., Yewdale 59.

27. *Al.* XI,4,p.20; *Sew.*,343; *Gesta*, VI,16,p.34; Tudebode, VI,5,p.41; Hill & Hill 49. Guibert reckons Taticius to have been moved by fear of famine as well as by fear of the Turks: IV,10,p.175.

28. However, the circumstances posited by Anna's tale would explain why Taticius' departure was abrupt and seems to have taken the Crusaders by surprise. The fact that he left 'all his possessions' in the Crusader camp may reflect his zeal to withdraw, as well as being ostensibly his guarantee that he would return: *Gesta*, VI,16,pp.35-6; Tudebode, VI,5,pp.41-2; Hill & Hill 50.

Taticius, before departing, 'granted (*concessit*) to Bohemond two or three cities, Tarsus, Mamistra, Adana'.²⁹ Taticius purported to be going to join the army of Alexius which, according to Raymond, he falsely made out to be approaching. He is thus represented as departing under the pretext of fetching aid for the Crusaders — essentially the same story as the *Gesta* tells. His shameful flight is said to have been carried out 'at very great expense', a phrase which seems to foreshadow the mention of his grant to Bohemond. Raymond of Aguilers had little more sympathy for Bohemond than he did for the Byzantines, but no compelling reasons for doubting the authenticity of this detail have been adduced.³⁰ For such a grant of cities to have been made there must have been some relationship of trust between Taticius and Bohemond. The only other Westerner to whom Taticius is known to have assigned a town is Peter of Alifa. This Italian Norman had fought for Guiscard and for Bohemond himself during their invasion of the Balkans in the early 1080s. However, by 1097 Peter was a trusted employee of the emperor and it was presumably essentially in this capacity that he received from Taticius the town of Comana (Placentia) during the great expedition's crossing of Asia Minor.³¹ Bohemond's status was rather different, in that he was not formally in the employ of Alexius.

29. Raym. ch.7, p.246; trs. J.H.Hill & L.L.Hill, *Raymond D'Aguilers* (Philadelphia 1968) 37 (henceforth: Hill & Hill).

30. On the political and strategic implications of the grant, see below, 270-1. Hill & Hill (*Raymond IV* 66) regard the grant as an example of the 'contradictory rumors' which flew around the camp after Taticius' departure. Lillie supposes (*Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 29) Bohemond to have 'claimed' that the Cilician cities were entrusted to him and avers that they would 'scarcely' have been left to Bohemond alone among the Crusaders. The significance of the congruence of the evidence of Anna and Raymond of Aguilers was emphasized by Chalandon, *Première Croisade* 192-3.

31. *Gesta*, IV, 11, pp.25-6; Tudebode, IV, 4, p.32; Hill & Hill 41. Peter of Alifa is said by Anna to have been 'of constant and unswerving loyalty to the emperor', in the context of 1107-08: *Al.* XIII, 4, p.101; Sew., 406. Anna notes his earlier participation in the Normans' campaigns against her father: *Al.* IV, 6, p.161; Sew., 148; *Al.* V, 5, 7, pp.22, 32; Sew., 166, 173. Peter of Alifa's receipt of Comana is also recounted by Orderic Vitalis, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, IX, 8, ed. & trs. M. Chibnall, V (Oxford 1975) 66-9. Significantly, mention of the emperor is omitted altogether by Orderic and other later writers directly or indirectly dependent on the *Gesta*: Chibnall, *ibid.*, p.68, n.1. See also Marquis de la Force, 'Les conseillers latins du basileus Alexis Comnène', *B* 11 (1936) 158-9; D.M. Nicol, 'Symbiosis and integration. Some Greco-Latin families in Byzantium in the 11th to 13th centuries', *BF* 7 (1979) 131.

Nonetheless, the grant to him of three key Cilician cities presupposes some particular ties between him and the emperor. There may also be some faint significance in the intimation from Anna herself that Bohemond, even while persuading the other commanders to recognize as ‘guardian’ whoever was instrumental in reducing Antioch, still explicitly reserved authority over the city for the emperor.³² Anna recounts this modest-seeming proposal by way of illustrating Bohemond’s boundless capacity for guile and dissimulation, and it is very unlikely indeed that Bohemond was still invoking of his own accord imperial rights on the eve of the seizure of Antioch. Nonetheless, this detail would be comprehensible if for some time during the siege Bohemond had been publicly maintaining that Alexius had a claim to Antioch.³³ This tallies with Raymond of Aguilers’ information, and also with Anna’s own account of Bohemond’s solicitous-seeming tip-off to Taticius.

The likeliest source of Anna’s information about Taticius’ dilemma at Antioch is the man himself. Anna shows detailed knowledge of his movements and tactical calculations elsewhere in the *Alexiad*.³⁴ Taticius for his part would hardly have invented this story — or any story involving his credulousness *vis-à-vis* Bohemond — in order to justify his withdrawal. He could have justified his withdrawal simply on the grounds of the famine and the apparent hopelessness of the Crusaders’ prospects, con-

32. *Al.* XI,4,p.21; Sew.,344.

33. Bohemond’s speech, as reported by Anna, provides for the gainer of the city to have ‘the guardianship of this city, say, until the arrival from the emperor of him who is to take over from us’: *Al.* XI,4,p.21; Sew.,344. This would have been in accord with the terms of the Crusaders’ oath, as reported by Anna in the case of Godfrey: *Al.* X,9,p.226; Sew.,323. No further mention of this proviso is made by Anna and she subsequently represents the commanders as granting ‘full power’ over Antioch to Bohemond without any reference to the emperor’s rights (*Al.* XI,6,p.32; Sew.,352) and without ever recording their actual despatch of an embassy to Alexius in July 1098. In fact these commanders were then not willing to settle for less than the arrival of Alexius in person with an army, judging by the *Gesta*, VIII,20,p.45; Tudebode, IX,3,p.55; Hill & Hill 62. (Below, n.304). Anna’s reports of speeches to a considerable extent represent her own interpretation of a character or a situation, especially when firsthand accounts are not available to her. But that she should make Bohemond expressly reserve Alexius’ rights remains intriguing, if inconclusive.

34. E.g., *Al.* VI,10,14,pp.68-70, 83-6; Sew.,pp.202-03, 213-15; cf. G.Buckler *Anna Comnena* (Oxford 1929), p.231,n.8; France, *Tatikios* 139.

siderations which the *Alexiad* attributes to him.³⁵ He had no need to concoct a tale which cast him as a fool and which carried the unflattering implication that the Crusaders were acutely distrustful of Alexius and the Byzantines. So, if Taticius really received the secret tip-off, why should he have believed Bohemond, of all people? Taticius' record does not suggest that he was naïve or gullible. He had long been in Alexius' service, had considerable experience of commanding Western mercenaries and was, according to Anna, 'wise of word and strong in deed'.³⁶ Moreover, his career was not blighted by his belief in Bohemond's warning.³⁷ In fact, soon after returning from Antioch he was made Byzantine commander of the fleet sent to expel a large Pisan fleet from the Aegean, a key post which would not have been entrusted to a man who had just fallen for an obvious ruse.³⁸ Taticius' one other known gaffe was the purely social one of falling off his horse and onto Alexius while practising at polo with him well over a decade after the First Crusade.³⁹ This incident itself suggests that Taticius remained on familiar terms with the emperor.

So here is the nub of the problem. Taticius seems to have acted directly upon Bohemond's warning that the other Crusade commanders were plotting to kill him. Yet according to Anna, Alexius had spotted Bohemond as the black sheep from the outset, and directed much effort towards disarming him — humouring him

35. *Al.* XI,4,p.20; *Sew.*,343.

36. *Al.* IV,4,p.151; IX,9,p.182; VI,10,pp.67-8; VII,7,p.109; *Sew.*,141,288,201-02,232; cf. France, *Tatikios* 141.

37. The disastrous impression made on the Crusaders by Taticius' departure and (most importantly) his failure to return or to send supplies may only have dawned on Alexius gradually. For, as noted below, the Crusaders' chances of taking Antioch looked slim throughout the first half of 1098. It may well have been Taticius' report of the 'conspiracy' against him which compounded Alexius' mistrust of the 'changeable' character of the Franks *en masse* and made him very hesitant to proceed to their relief: he might have to reckon with Frankish as well as Turkish hostility: *Al.* XI,6,p.28; *Sew.*,p.349. But the damaging implications of Taticius' withdrawal, and of his own failure to aid the Crusaders, cannot long have been unknown to Alexius. Taticius' withdrawal formed a key part of Bohemond's charges against Alexius' conduct by 1103 at the latest: *Al.* XI,9,pp.39-40; *Sew.*,p.358. See Lilie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 41,47,49. Above, n.24.

38. *Al.* XI,10,p.42; *Sew.*,360; cf. France, *Tatikios* 147.

39. *Al.* XIV,4,p.160; *Sew.*,449.

so as to extract from him a 'solemn oath' and to secure his good behaviour at Constantinople; dangling before him the prospect of a top military command; and charging Raymond of Toulouse with the task of watching him, thwarting him from any attempt to break his oath and putting 'paid to his schemes by every available means'.⁴⁰ The outstanding form of oath-breaking envisaged by Alexius would presumably have been the seizure and retention of lands and cities rightfully belonging to Byzantium. However, if we accept Anna's tableau of Alexius, Bohemond and Raymond at Constantinople in the spring of 1097, Taticius, as Alexius' faithful servant, cannot some months later have trusted Bohemond over and above Raymond, who 'stood out from all the Latins . . . as does the sun from the stars'. Raymond was presumably among those commanders who were, according to Bohemond's warning, plotting to kill Taticius!

So something has to give. Anna's brief outline of the tip-off is irreconcilable with her very lengthy, elaborate and emphatic description of her father's contrasting attitudes towards Bohemond and Raymond during their stay at Constantinople. It is, I think, the latter description that must go, even though it is a literary *tour de force* and achieves a fairly high degree of internal consistency. Its basic flaw is that it is contradicted by several Latin sources of earlier date, as will be seen below. I suggest that Alexius believed that he had bought Bohemond, attaching Bohemond's interests to his own through a web of oaths, presents, favour and career prospects. I further suggest that he regarded him as *relatively* trustworthy from around April 1097 until the spring or early summer of the following year. The word 'relatively' must be underlined, since Alexius is highly unlikely to have fully trusted any non-Orthodox 'barbarian' — or, indeed, any Orthodox 'Roman', for Anna herself avows that he had as much, or more, to fear from 'the rebellious spirit of his own subjects' as he did from foreigners.⁴¹ At any rate, Alexius relied on Bohemond more than on any other Crusading leader during that

40. Above 191.

41. *Al.* XIV,4,7, pp.161,172; Sew.,449-50,458. On the multiplicity of plots against Alexius see B. Leib, 'Complots à Byzance contre Alexis I Comnène', *BS* 23 (1962) 251-66,274.

period and instructed Taticius to do likewise. Taticius' conduct and apparent credulousness would have been in accordance with these instructions, and therefore did not incur Alexius' disfavour.

II

These suggestions rest to a large extent on Bohemond's recorded conduct at Byzantium in the spring and early summer of 1097, and it is to this conduct that we must now turn. For in my opinion his behaviour then gave Alexius reason to suppose that he had thrown in his lot with the emperor, showing himself willing, even zealous, to discipline his own troops and other Crusading leaders on Alexius' behalf. It is very difficult to define what Bohemond was really thinking or intending at that time. The towering frame and fine physique of this man accommodated an astute and agile mind, at once audacious and carefully calculating. Bohemond's discernible actions, the suspicions of certain contemporaries and his own mausoleum's inscriptions suggest that the East — however vaguely defined — did exert a special attraction upon him and that his standing ambition was to gain there power and possessions, as extensive and lofty as circumstances would allow.⁴² If his ultimate objective remained

42. The suspicions which Anna, blessed with hindsight, ascribes to Alexius were harboured by Geoffrey Malaterra, writing in or before 1100. He refers to 'Bohemond, who had previously invaded Romania with his father Guiscard and was ever desirous of subjugating it (*semper eam sibi subjugare cupiens erat*): Malaterra, IV, 24, p. 102. On Malaterra, see *Repertorium Fontium Historiae Medii Aevi*, IV (Rome 1976) 643-4; O. Capitani, 'Specific motivations and continuing themes in the Norman chronicles of Southern Italy: eleventh and twelfth centuries', *The Normans in Sicily and Southern Italy*, preface by C.N.L. Brooke (Oxford 1977) 7-10. Malaterra's work was commissioned by Count Roger of Sicily. His evident bias in favour of Roger and against Bohemond does not necessarily invalidate his judgement on the latter. Bohemond's zeal to liberate the Holy Sepulchre, while not necessarily utterly fraudulent, was fitful and never far removed from his own self-seeking. His call to the pope to come to Antioch and to berate those who had not fulfilled their Crusading vows was at least partly inspired by a need for reinforcements who would have no sworn obligations to Alexius; the pope was also formally to annul the Crusaders' oaths sworn to Alexius: below, n.305. In the event, Bohemond's anxiety to secure for himself Antioch detained him from completing 'the sacred journey' until well after the fall of Jerusalem: Yewdale 165. That Normans in the milieu of Robert Guiscard aspired to widespread dominion and, specifically, to the conquest of Byzantium is indicated by Aimé of Monte Cassino, *Storia de' Normanni*, V, 3, ed. V. de Bartholomaeis (Rome

open-ended, his choice of means towards achieving it was correspondingly wide. Participation in the Crusade, cooperation with Alexius and tenure of a senior command in the emperor's name were all acceptable vehicles on Bohemond's path to wealth, power and glory. Conveniently for him, these three vehicles were, at least in the shorter term, compatible with one another. For without Alexius' cooperation the Crusade would not be able to proceed further eastwards.⁴³ Above all, the outlook for the Crusaders in the spring and summer of 1097 was exceedingly uncertain. Bohemond, for all his shrewdness, had no better means than anybody else of knowing whether the Crusading hosts would manage to cross Asia Minor. In fact, his strategic expertise and experience of siege warfare in the Balkans would have made him all the more keenly aware of the difficulties that lay ahead, notably the problems of provisioning and of reducing the virtually impregnable Antioch⁴⁴ and other cities in Syria and Palestine

1935) 223-4; cf. L. Boehm, 'Nomen gentis Normannorum: der Aufstieg der Normannen im Spiegel der normannischen Historiographie', *Settimane di Studio del centro italiano di studi sull' alto medioevo* 16 (1969) 657-8. Anna's supposition that Bohemond inherited from Guiscard designs on the Byzantine empire was thus not absurd, although it exaggerates the specificity of his goals in 1096-7: *Al.* X, 11, p. 234; *Sew.*, p. 329. A lucid formulation of Bohemond's position at that time is offered by Yewdale, 43-4. It should be noted that the inscriptions beneath the cornice of the cupola and on the bronze doors of his mausoleum make much of his feats in Syria and 'Greece four times conquered': H. W. Schulz, *Denkmäler der Kunst des Mittelalters in Unteritalien*, I (Dresden 1860) 60, 61; Epstein, *Cathedral of Canosa* 86-7. The inscriptions are coeval with the tomb and may well express that for which Bohemond wished to be remembered, at any rate at the close of his days.

43. Fairly dispassionate writers such as Fulcher of Chartres recognized as much: *Historia Hierosolymitana*, I, 9, *RHO*, III, 332; trs. F. R. Ryan & H. S. Fink, *History of the expedition to Jerusalem* (New York 1973) 80. Bohemond's awareness of the continuing power of Byzantium and his estimate of the benefits he would reap from imperial favour are portrayed graphically and concisely by Runciman, 158. Although Runciman notes (163-4, 178, 182) the subsequent occasions when Bohemond appeared to be enjoying imperial favour and to be taking Alexius' part, he does so only in passing. He basically follows Anna's interpretation of Alexius' policy, i.e. that Alexius saw through Bohemond's schemes and that Alexius and Raymond forged an alliance against the Norman in April 1097. Anna's failure to mention any alteration between her father and Raymond is scantily considered: Runciman, p. 164, n. 1.

44. In 969 Antioch's walls had succumbed to the Byzantines only after a lengthy blockade and a stealthy scaling with specially-built ladders at midnight: Leo the Deacon, *Historiae Libri Decem*, V, 4, ed. C. B. Hase (Bonn 1828) 81-2. The city was sacked, then rebuilt: *Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites*, ed. R. Stillwell et al.

without benefit of a sizeable siege train. Bohemond was not to know, in the spring and summer of 1097, that the emperor would neither come to the Crusaders' aid in person nor send adequate supplies and equipment. By a show of conspicuous deference towards Alexius he could hope to assuage any thirst for revenge that Alexius might harbour,⁴⁵ raise his own influence over the other Crusading commanders, perhaps be formally set over them by Alexius and anyway assure himself an alternative career at Byzantium in the event of the collapse of the great expedition. To that extent, but *only* to that extent, Bohemond in 1097 was Alexius' man. Once a close association with the emperor ceased to serve his interests or threatened to become an encumbrance, he would disencumber himself without compunction, distancing himself from Alexius or denouncing him outright, as expediency might dictate. Bohemond's ruthless and relentless pursuit of his own advancement thus warrants many of the pejorative epithets which Anna Comnena piles upon him. But Anna wrote with hindsight, doubtless mirroring her father's mature reflexions. During the earlier stages of the Crusade Alexius seems to have believed that Bohemond's character and appetites could be manipulated and harnessed to the empire's interests, and he made the mistake of instructing Taticius that Bohemond was to be heeded more than any of the other Crusading leaders.

Alexius' optimism is understandable. From the outset of his expedition Bohemond tried to keep his men in order. According to the *Gesta*, he warned them 'all to be humble and good, and to refrain from plundering that land, which belonged to Christians, and he said that no one should take more than he needed for his food'.⁴⁶ The author of these words was most probably a member of Bohemond's contingent and was sympathetic towards his conduct in the earlier stages of the eastern expedition,⁴⁷ but other writers — derivative from, but not ex-

(Princeton 1976) 62-3; *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, ed. J.R.Strayer, I (New York 1982) 326. The formidable nature of Antioch's defences is emphasized by Raym. ch.5,p.242; trs. Hill & Hill 31.

45. According to Anna, Bohemond feared that Alexius would settle old scores by poisoning him: *Al.* X,11,p.232; Sew.,328.

46. *Gesta*, I,4,p.8.

47. He was, however, far from uncritical, disapproving of Bohemond's appropri-

clusively dependent on, the *Gesta* — paint the same picture of a responsible Bohemond, urging his men to show solicitude for the local population as he led them through the Balkans.⁴⁸ In so doing, Bohemond was, consciously or unconsciously, providing for one of Alexius' most pressing concerns: that the commanders of contingents should prevent their men from plundering the districts through which they passed. Already in November 1096 Alexius was requesting Godfrey of Bouillon to restrain his men and he seems to have made another such request that December, after pillaging had gone on for several days.⁴⁹ We find Alexius making the same request of Bohemond a couple of months later, after Bohemond had already begun to show his willingness to keep his troops in good order. There is no reason to doubt that the gist of a letter of Alexius to Bohemond has been preserved in the version offered by William of Tyre. We should not, of course, take at face value Alexius' claim in this letter that 'we have always held you dear and welcome', while his pressing invitation to come 'as fast as possible' to Constantinople was not solely due to 'our heart's yen to love and honour you'.⁵⁰ Nor was it solely due to Alexius' desire, expressed in the letter, that Bohemond should discipline his troops.⁵¹ Alexius was evidently trying to separate Bohemond from his men, as he had already done with Hugh of Vermandois, and as he would later do in the case of Raymond of Toulouse.⁵² Bohemond in effect declined the invitation to hurry ahead of his troops: the Normans were still in the vicinity of the river Vardar, during whose crossing they

tion of Antioch and he parted company with Bohemond at that time. For the section of his work relating events after Bohemond's appropriation of Antioch, he very seldom uses words of praise for Bohemond: see R.Hill's preface to *Gesta*, p.x,n.3,p.xiii; Yewdale, 61; E.A.Hanawalt, 'Norman views of Eastern Christendom: from the First Crusade to the Principality of Antioch', *The Meeting of Two Worlds. Cultural Exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades*, ed. V.P.Goss (Kalamazoo, Michigan 1986) p.117 & n.3 on pp.120-1.

48. Guibert, III,2,p.152; *HBS*,ch.8,p.177.

49. Albert, II,7,9,pp.304,305; F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des Oströmischen Reiches*, I,pt.2 (Munich 1925) nos.1187,1188,p.44.

50. Will. Tyre, II,14,col.263; Dölger no.1197,pp.45-6, where the case is put for regarding the content, if not exact form, as that of an authentic letter of Alexius.

51. Will. Tyre. II,14,col.264.

52. *Al.* X,7,p.214; Sew.,315; Raym.ch.2,p.237; Hill & Hill 22.

were attacked by imperial troops, and at this distance from Constantinople they would have been quite unable to come rapidly to Bohemond's assistance. But he continued to impress upon his troops the need for self-restraint. He furiously opposed the design of his nephew Tancred and 'all the others' to sack a well-stocked town, and the grateful citizens are said to have come out to him, carrying crosses in their hands. Subsequently he promised imperial officials that all the livestock seized by his men would be handed back.⁵³ And, several weeks later, when he had reached Roussa (modern Keshan), some 120 miles from Constantinople, he did respond to another invitation from Alexius. He set forth with only a few knights, ahead of the rest of the army.⁵⁴ None of the Latin writers convincingly belies Anna's assertion that Bohemond showed himself willing to swear an oath to Alexius. He did so 'very enthusiastically', says Anna, because his forces were 'modest' in size — but also, allegedly, 'because he was a born perjurer'.⁵⁵ A suggestive detail in corroboration of Anna's indication of his willingness comes in the form of chronology. Only a few days can have passed between Bohemond's arrival at Constantinople and his swearing of an oath.⁵⁶ An early writer

53. *Gesta*, II,5,p.10; Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie*, 59-60; Yewdale 40-1; Runciman 156-7.

54. *Gesta*, II,5,p.11; *Al.* X,11,p.230; Sew.,326; Dölger,no.1199,p.46.

55. *Al.* X,11,p.232; Sew.,328. Albert (II,18,p.312) claims that Bohemond initially refused to have an audience with the emperor but was eventually won round by Godfrey of Bouillon's persistent persuasion. Albert was relying on a source favourable to Godfrey and his account of the Crusaders' stay at Constantinople greatly exaggerates Godfrey's importance at that stage of the expedition. His claim is therefore highly suspect, and in other respects his account of Bohemond's position at that time is open to doubt: see below, 244. Albert's allegation (II,14,p.309) that Bohemond proposed to Godfrey that together they should mount a joint-attack on Alexius, only to be rebuffed by Godfrey, lacks corroborative evidence. Admittedly, an argument from silence is blunted by the fact that Bohemond would have kept his proposal confidential, as Lillie (*Kreuzfahrerstaaten*, 4-5) points out. However, it is most probable that Bohemond was too well aware of the difficulties which a siege of Constantinople would have posed for the Crusaders to have proposed an attack: see above, 200.

56. Anna may have compressed events in representing Bohemond as going straight to Alexius and as swearing his oath on the day after his first audience with him (*Al.* X,11,pp.231-2; Sew.,327-8). However, the interval between Bohemond's arrival and his oath-taking is not likely to have exceeded four or five days: Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie* 64-5; Dölger no.1200,p.46. Only after extracting an oath from Bohemond would Alexius have been likely to have invited Count Raymond to Constantinople.

sympathetic to Bohemond's nephew, Tancred, rhetorically bewails that Bohemond was 'intoxicated' by the honeyed words of Alexius' emissaries and deceived by 'the proffered riches of Constantinople'; 'he rejoices to be granted so easily what his lengthy assault on the Greeks had not gained for him'.⁵⁷ Without doubt Alexius showered gifts of gold, silver and vestments upon Bohemond at the time of his oath-taking.⁵⁸ The two men behaved courteously towards one another. Bohemond had proved himself more assiduous, and probably more effective, than any other commander in restraining his troops from plundering, and he had not jibbed at taking an oath, as several other leaders, such as Godfrey of Bouillon, had done. These facets of Bohemond's behaviour cannot have escaped Alexius' attention, and they may well have served to allay his distrust.

I will, for the moment, sidestep the hoary question of precisely what were the formal, and less formal, undertakings which Bohemond and Alexius made to one another in April 1097. There was time for many conversations and the bandying of many informal suggestions and proposals, as well as for oath-taking, during the quite lengthy period for which Bohemond 'lingered in the palace', in the words of William of Tyre.⁵⁹ The palace in which Alexius received Bohemond and the other Crusading leaders was apparently that of Blachernae, which had been grandiosely rebuilt only a few years earlier.⁶⁰ The glittering new complex of buildings can hardly have failed to impress upon Westerners the abiding wealth and power of the emperor.

Whatever words may have passed between Alexius and Bohemond in the palace, Bohemond's role in the ensuing weeks was a very prominent one. On two occasions, at least, he played

57. Ralph, ch.10, p.612.

58. *Al.* X, 11, p.233; Sew., 328; John Zonaras, *Epitome Historiarum*, XVIII, 25, ed. T. Büttner-Wobst, III (Bonn 1897) 749; Ralph, ch.10, p.612. Bohemond is one of the very few Crusading leaders expressly said to have received vestments, as well as silver and gold. The choice of gifts may possibly reflect a taste on Bohemond's part for Byzantine trappings and attire, as well as Alexius' awareness of this. However, Stephen of Blois and Robert of Normandy were also offered 'as many *nomismata* and silken garments as they pleased': Fulcher, I, 9, p.332; trs. Ryan & Fink 80.

59. Will. Tyre, II, 15, col.265. Below, 210.

60. W. Müller-Wiener, *Bildlexikon zur topographie Istanbuls* (Tübingen 1977) 223.

the part of Alexius' lieutenant and acted, in effect, as Alexius' 'heavy', leaning on other Crusaders to make them swear an oath to the emperor. This active and pivotal role seems to have been unique to Bohemond. Other Crusading leaders were encouraged by Alexius to persuade their fellows to swear,⁶¹ but only Bohemond threatened his fellows with violence.

The most eminent object of Bohemond's attentions was Count Raymond of Toulouse. Anna is totally silent about this episode, as well she might be, seeing that it would mar her scenario of her father's wholly cordial relations with the clean-living Raymond, who stood out like 'the sun from the stars'. For in fact Raymond was on worse terms with Alexius than virtually any other Crusade leader for much, if not all, of his stay at Constantinople. Members of his large host had repeatedly come to blows with their imperial Pecheneg escorts and had engaged in plundering during their journey across the Balkans. Raymond accepted an invitation from Alexius to hurry ahead of his army, weaponless and with only a few followers.⁶² Raymond was appalled when at Constantinople he heard that the troops whom he had left behind had been attacked, routed and some of them slain by Byzantine forces. He felt betrayed and through high-ranking intermediaries he solemnly charged Alexius with an act of treachery.⁶³ Alexius' response was to deny that his forces had actually attacked Raymond's men, but to promise to give him satisfaction by means of arbitration. The precise form or legal status of the arbitration procedure is not indicated by our sources, principal among whom is Raymond of Aguilers. But we are told that Alexius put forward 'a surety of satisfaction' (*obsidem satisfactionis*), presumably to guarantee that he would make such amends as the arbitrators might award. The man selected to be his pledge was presumably someone in whom he had confidence, and for whose well-being he was publicly supposed to care. The

61. *Al.* X,9,10,pp.221,225,228; Sew.,319,322,325.

62. *Raym.* ch.2,p.237; Hill & Hill 22; Dölger no.1201,p.46. The invitation was brought by Raymond's own envoys, who further reported that 'Bohemond, the duke of Lorraine [Godfrey of Bouillon] and the count of Flanders [Robert], and other leaders, were urging this', *Raym. ibid.*

63. *Raym.* ch.2,p.238; Hill & Hill 23; Tudebode, II,7,p.21; Hill & Hill 29.

name of this pledge was Bohemond. The arbitration took place and the arbitrators, whoever they may have been, found against Raymond. Raymond had to release Bohemond, without having gained reparation.⁶⁴ Raymond remained bitter and, as his large army closed on Constantinople, he seriously considered taking vengeance on Alexius for the ignominy and hurt which he and his men had suffered. At the same time, Alexius renewed his efforts to induce Raymond to 'do the same homage as the other princes'. And these other princes themselves urged Raymond not to fight fellow-Christians (i.e. the Byzantines) when the Turks were at hand. But Bohemond went further still. He is said to have 'declared that he would be the emperor's helper [or officer: *adjutorem*], should the count contrive anything against him, or if he put off homage and the oaths any longer'.⁶⁵ The writer of these words was Raymond of Aguilers, who describes himself as a chaplain of the count of Toulouse, in the context of the siege of Antioch.⁶⁶ His account is highly critical of the Byzantine authorities' treatment of Count Raymond's host from the moment it entered Byzantine territory. But there is no reason to suppose that he is exaggerating the bitterness of Count Raymond's resentment towards Alexius, or that he is falsely and maliciously pinning the role of 'helper' or 'officer' of the emperor onto Bohemond. For the role is clearly implied by writers broadly sympathetic towards Bohemond, notably the author of the *Gesta*. The latter makes Bohemond threaten that if Count Raymond did anything 'unjust' to the emperor, or refused him fealty, 'he himself would take the emperor's part'.⁶⁷ Bohemond was acting, or posing, as the emperor's right-hand-man, pressing other Crusading leaders to make solemn undertakings to Alexius and

64. Raym. ch.2,p.238; Hill & Hill 24; Tudebode, II,7,p.21; Hill & Hill 29. Yewdale (p.45) is one of the very few scholars to remark upon the apparent oddness of Alexius' choice of pledge.

65. Raym. ch.2,p.238; Hill & Hill 24; cf.France, *Anna Comnena* 22.

66. Raym. ch.11,p.257; Hill & Hill 54. On Raymond of Aguilers, see *ibid.*, 6-7; Hill & Hill, *Raymond IV* 30; Riley-Smith 79.

67. *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 13; Tudebode, II, 7, p. 21; Hill & Hill 30; Ralph ch. 12, p. 613; Guibert, III, 5, p. 155. The key role of Bohemond was underlined by Count Raymond when in autumn 1098 he repeated 'the words and the oath which he had sworn to the emperor on Bohemond's advice', *Gesta*, X, 31, p. 75; Tudebode, XII, 6, p. 87; Hill & Hill 95; below, n. 305.

threatening those such as Raymond, who were contemplating military action against him.

Bohemond was making his stand at a time when Raymond's host, probably the largest of all the Crusading contingents, was at, or very near, Constantinople.⁶⁸ Yet he was doing so without benefit of troops of his own — and thus was presumably proposing to lead Byzantine soldiers against Raymond and his men. For he had left his nephew Tancred in charge of the South Italian Normans. Tancred at once departed from his uncle's policy and, almost certainly, from his instructions. For he led his contingent off the main highway to a 'certain valley full of all kinds of things which are good to eat'.⁶⁹ Our Latin sources do not expressly

68. On the size of Raymond's host, see Runciman 337. Raymond of Aguilers' indication that the count's army had arrived at Constantinople when he considered taking vengeance on Alexius is inherently probable. The count would hardly have publicly contemplated violence unless his army was in the offing, for he had travelled ahead unarmed, with only a few companions. Raymond of Aguilers is liable to confuse matters of chronology, but his account of the situation at Constantinople in April 1097 is circumstantial and deserves trust in the one detail where it differs significantly from the *Gesta*: Raym. ch. 2, p. 238; Hill & Hill 24; *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 13. Tudebode's sequence coincides with or echoes Raymond's: Tudebode, II, 7, p. 21; Hill & Hill 29. Hagenmeyer (*Chronologie* 68-9), followed by most modern scholars, gives preference to the *Gesta*'s sequence and places the army's arrival just *after* the confrontation with Bohemond and Raymond's oath-swearing. (See, however, Chalandon, *Première Croisade* 147; Hill & Hill, *Raymond IV* 41). Hagenmeyer's date for the arrival of the Provençals — 'towards April 27' — is unexceptionable, but his dating of Raymond's oath-swearing to April 26 is probably a day or two too early. For given that Raymond had arrived in Constantinople 'towards April 21' (Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie* 67), he is likely to have spent six or seven days in visiting Alexius, learning of his army's plight, complaining to Alexius, submitting to arbitration, rebuffing further repeated requests for homage and contemplating hostilities against Alexius: Raym. ch. 2, p. 238; Hill & Hill 23-4. Ralph of Caen even supposes (ch. 12, p. 613) that Tancred with the South Italian Normans had already crossed to Asia Minor by the time that Raymond was finally induced to swear an oath. Albert's statement (II, 20, p. 314) that Raymond 'having become agreeable and beloved to the emperor, tarried fifteen days in Constantinople, . . . having become under faith (*fide*) and oath his man' is not strictly accurate. For homage is just what Raymond refused to Alexius, 'on peril of his life'. He was only willing to swear to respect the life and possessions of Alexius: Raym. ch. 2, p. 238; Hill & Hill 24; cf. J.H. Hill & L.L. Hill, 'The convention of Alexius Comnenus and Raymond of Saint-Gilles', *American Historical Review* 58 (1953) p. 324 & n. 11, pp. 325-6; *idem*, *Raymond IV* 41-2. Albert's chronological indication as to the length of Raymond's stay after his oath-swearing may also be erroneous, albeit only by one or two days. Hagenmeyer's dating of his departure from Constantinople to 'towards May 10' (*Chronologie* 71) is well-grounded. See also Lillie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 9 & nn. 53, 55, 56 on pp. 337, 338-9.

69. *Gesta*, II, 5, p. 11.

state how they gained access to the produce of this valley, but pillaging was the obvious method. Tancred had allegedly already spurned the offer of gifts from Alexius, and his withdrawal to the fertile valley was probably made in preparation for his next move. He resumed the march eastwards but, instead of paying a visit to Alexius and swearing the oath which was required of him, he slipped across the Bosphorus together with ‘nearly all Bohemond’s host’.⁷⁰ Tancred is said to have been disguised as a common infantryman⁷¹ and other leading Normans from Italy, such as Richard of Salerno, Tancred’s cousin, crossed with him. Thus they, too, avoided taking an oath to the emperor. Alexius was displeased, but let the matter drop until after the Crusaders had helped him to regain Nicaea. After Nicaea had fallen, Alexius summoned all the leading Crusaders to an audience with him, partly in order to reward them for what he considered to be their service and partly to extract oaths and homage from those who had still not rendered them to him. That Alexius should still have been insisting on this when the Crusaders were some way from his capital and plainly intent on continuing their journey eastwards, indicates the high expectations which he had of the binding force of these rites. For Alexius they were not merely a device to debar the Crusade leaders from attacking him in Constantinople, but a positive means of committing them to hand over such former imperial possessions as they might capture. Alexius must have been aware that the odds against the Crusaders’ capture of any major fortress were long. For he is said to have assessed as nil their chances of taking Nicaea by themselves, and he had supplied them with siege engines there.⁷² Their prospects of traversing Anatolia and the Tauros range and then of capturing fortresses further afield cannot have looked bright, but Alexius was determined to profit from such successes as they might enjoy.⁷³ He could feel that the Crusaders were doubly bounden

70. *Gesta*, II, 7, p. 13.

71. Ralph ch. 12, p. 613.

72. *Al.* XI, 2, p.11; Sew. pp.335-6.

73. As Anna all but acknowledges in a moment of candor: *Al.* XIV, 2, p. 146; Sew, 439. Anna’s phrasing of Alexius’ instructions to Taticius — that he should take over ‘the cities that they captured, if indeed (*ei ge*) God were to grant (them) this favour’

to him, legally by their sworn undertakings and practically by their lack of siege equipment of their own.

It was, according to Anna, Bohemond who 'first of all [the Crusader leaders] . . . was persuaded immediately' by Alexius' offer of gifts. He 'counselled them all to go back to the emperor'. Anna explains Bohemond's eagerness banally, as being due to his habitual overwhelming greed for lucre, rather than by any hint of a special relationship between him and Alexius.⁷⁴ But she does recognize Bohemond's key role in getting Tancred to swear 'the oath', after the other recalcitrants had done so. Other leaders besides Bohemond had been encouraging their fellows to swear, and the emperor's relatives tried to put pressure on Tancred. Tancred's response was to agree to swear, in return for the emperor's gigantic tent 'filled with money!'⁷⁵ When one of Alexius' commanders, George Palaeologos, jostled him for this impertinence, he sprang at him. It was Bohemond who restrained Tancred and urged him to show respect for a kinsman of the emperor and to swear the oath. Ralph of Caen, an admirer and former follower of Bohemond,⁷⁶ as well as the encomiast of Tancred, shows embarrassment at Bohemond's role in obliging Tancred to go back to the emperor and swear. He claims that Bohemond was himself acting under duress; for when Alexius had learnt of Tancred's secret crossing of the Bosphorus, he had suspected the other Crusading leaders of trickery and of abetting Tancred: 'Principally at Bohemond was cast his gaze which anger made malevolent'. With eyes flashing and 'throat thunder-

— may faithfully reflect Alexius' doubts as to the likelihood of such a contingency: *Al. XI*, 3, p. 17; Sew., 341.

74. *Al. XI*, 3, p. 16; Sew., 340.

75. Anna's account of this episode is basically compatible with that of Ralph, ch. 18-19, pp. 619-20. (*Al. XI*, 3, p. 17; Sew., 340-1). Ralph's prime aim was to eulogize Tancred, whom he had joined in the Levant. His partisanship, exaggeration of Tancred's feats and penchant for long, invented, speeches are blatant, but these qualities do not rob him of significance as a guide to the course of events. His principal informant was Tancred himself, whom he describes as looking to him to record 'the victories of the army of Christ': Ralph, preface, 603; J.-C. Payen, 'Les "Gesta Tancredi" de Raoul de Caen', *La chanson de geste et le mythe carolingien. Mélanges René Louis*, II (Mayenne 1982) 1052-3; L. Boehm, 'Die "Gesta Tancredi" des Radulf von Caen', *Historisches Jahrbuch* 75 (1956) 50-1, 59-60, 66-7 (on Ralph's view of the emperor); Hanawalt, *Norman views* 118.

76. Ralph, preface, 603; Payen, "Gesta Tancredi" 1052; below, n. 151.

ing threats', Alexius forced Bohemond 'willy-nilly' to swear that he would hand over Tancred to do homage. Bohemond is subsequently depicted as carrying out this task.⁷⁷ Ralph represents him as in a wretched position, having succumbed to Alexius' gifts and being unable to gainsay Alexius' commands. Ralph is at once holding Bohemond responsible for the fact that Tancred had to swear any oath to Alexius, and seeking to account for Bohemond's behaviour. His various explanations,⁷⁸ including his claim that Bohemond swore a special, supplementary, oath to bring Tancred to heel, are very questionable. Even so, Ralph's account does corroborate Anna's evidence that Bohemond was instrumental in getting Tancred to make the same undertakings, while using the same ritual, as the other leaders had done.⁷⁹

One other feature of Bohemond's actions in the spring of 1097 may be noted — or rather, his apparent *inaction*. Bohemond stayed on longer at Constantinople itself than any other leader is known to have done. He arrived there around April 10 and left it to join the main Crusading host at Nicaea early in May, perhaps around May 7.⁸⁰ He thus passed the best part of a month in the vicinity of the emperor.⁸¹ He had not rejoined his

77. Ralph, ch. 12, pp.613-4; ch. 17, p.618; below, 231. Ralph omits the detail, reported by Anna, that Bohemond physically restrained Tancred from violence in the presence of Alexius and stresses that Tancred came to terms with Alexius only very reluctantly and that he made the *foedus* conditional upon Alexius' aid to the Crusaders. But he does not deny that their right hands were joined or that 'the ritual was celebrated which princes observe for these *foedera*' (chs. 17-18, pp. 618-19). He thus acknowledges that Bohemond fulfilled his mission to make Tancred do homage. Fealty is not mentioned by Ralph explicitly, but if Tancred did homage he could scarcely have refused Alexius fealty. See F.-L. Ganshof, 'Recherches sur le lien juridique qui unissait les chefs de la première Croisade à l'empereur byzantin'. *Mélanges offerts à Paul-Edmond Martin* (Geneva 1961) 56, 60, 61, n. 2; M. Bloch, *Feudal Society*, trs. L.A. Manyon, I (London 1965) 146-7.

78. Bohemond's 'somnia' and even 'inexperience' are cited by Ralph ch. 13, pp. 613, 614.

79. Ralph ch. 18, p. 619; *Al.* XI, 3, p. 17; Sew., 341.

80. The date of his arrival at Constantinople has been fairly firmly established by Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie* 64-5. He conducted supplies to the Crusaders at Nicaea, long enough after their arrival there (on May 6) for them to run short of food, but in time for them to be able to begin their attack on the city on May 14, presumably having been reinvigorated by the foresaid supplies. If Bohemond arrived around May 11 and if (as the *Gesta*, II, 7, p. 14 perhaps suggests) he had made part of the journey by sea, he would have left Constantinople around May 7.

81. Bohemond was put up at the monastery of Sts Cosmas and Damian, near which

men outside the City walls after swearing his oath, as Godfrey of Bouillon had done, and his continuous stay at Constantinople was lengthier than that of such other leaders as Godfrey, Robert of Normandy, Stephen of Blois or Robert of Flanders.⁸² Raymond of Toulouse did, it is true, stay for about nineteen days. But, as has been noted above, six or seven days are likely to have been consumed in altercations with Alexius concerning the attack on his army⁸³; and, after the battered army arrived around April 27, it must have needed several days to recuperate, while the crossing of the Bosphorus had also to be organized. This organization would have taken all the longer, in that Raymond's army was probably the largest of all the Crusading contingents.⁸⁴ So there were straightforward logistical reasons

other Crusaders had encamped earlier: *Al. X*, 9, 10, pp. 220, 228, 231; *Sew.*, 319, 325, 327. There is no evidence that Bohemond subsequently took up residence in the nearby Blachernae palace, as did Stephen of Blois: see n. 82. But Alexius' designation of him as pledge in response to Raymond's demand for requital indicates that he kept in close contact with the palace. On the location of 'the Cosmidion', a complex which encompassed the monastery of Sts Cosmas and Damian, see R. Janin, *Constantinople byzantine* (Paris 1964) 461-2; *idem*, *La géographie ecclésiastique de l'empire byzantin*, I, tome 3 (Paris 1969²) 287, 289.

82. Godfrey, with most of his commanders (though not his brother Baldwin) seems to have visited the palace and to have sworn his oath on January 20. He seems to have rejoined his men on the western shore of the Bosphoros and subsequently, at Alexius' request, crossed with them to the Asian shore. Albert's chronological data concerning the movements of Godfrey, the hero of his (hypothetical) source, is most probably reliable: Albert, II, 15-17, pp. 310-12; Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie* 53-4; Dölger no. 1196, p. 45; France, *Anna Comnena*, p. 24 & n. 38 on p. 35. Godfrey paid frequent visits to Alexius' palace but his purpose was to complain about the scarcity of provisions, not amicable hobnobbing: Albert, II, 17, p. 312. Relations between Byzantines and Crusaders may have been even more fraught than Albert makes out. For it is possible that the clash with the Latins ascribed by Anna to Maundy Thursday (April 2) may really have been triggered off by disputes over provisioning, quite unconnected with the oath which Godfrey had already sworn: *Al. X*, 9, pp. 221-2; *Sew.*, 320. Robert of Normandy spent, with his forces, fourteen days encamped before Constantinople: Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie* 71-2. Robert's travelling companion, Stephen of Blois, spent ten of those days with Alexius in his palace, a statistic which enhances his claim to have received special consideration from the emperor: Hagenmeyer no. 4, p. 139. Robert of Flanders seems to have arrived at Constantinople after Bohemond (Albert, II, 19, p. 313) and formed part of the host which reached Nicaea on May 6: Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie* 70.

83. Above, n. 68.

84. Hill & Hill, *Raymond IV* 43; above, n. 68. According to Guibert, III, 5, p. 155, Raymond, after swearing his oath 'chose to rest inactive for a while together with

for Raymond's staying on at Constantinople after Godfrey of Bouillon and most of the other leaders had set forth towards Nicaea, and there is no firm evidence that Raymond's relations with the emperor were particularly close or cordial at that time.⁸⁵ Bohemond, in contrast, had no liabilities of his own to detain him in Constantinople for, as we have seen, 'nearly all Bohemond's host' had accompanied Tancred across the Bosporus. From there it joined up with the other contingents making for Nicaea, fired by zeal to fight the Turks. Such, at least, is the impression conveyed by Ralph of Caen. Ralph also sounds what is probably an authentic note of impatience on the part of Tancred, and not merely a literary or propagandistic device to heighten the contrast between his free-spirited, bellicose, hero and a Bohemond disastrously compromised by 'somnia' or greed. Tancred is said to have sent back two knights, whose names are given, to 'rebuke' Bohemond for his 'delays' at Constantinople and to warn him that unless he hurried, he would, in effect, miss out on the action for 'the enemy would have been defeated without him'.⁸⁶ Bohemond is credited with a little more energy and sense of purpose by the *Gesta*. He is said to have stayed behind in order to consult with the emperor as to how provisions could be conveyed to the forces advancing on Nicaea. Some days after they

his forces' on the outskirts of Constantinople. Bohemond, in contrast, is represented as closeted with the emperor.

85. Raym. (ch. 2, p. 238; Hill & Hill 24) states that because Count Raymond refused homage to Alexius, 'the emperor dispensed little to him'. For all the chaplain's bitter antipathy towards Alexius (which caused him to belittle Alexius' distribution of gifts after the capture of Nicaea), his circumstantial account of Raymond's confrontation with Alexius and Bohemond elucidates the briefer references to the episode in the *Gesta* and deserves priority over the sources which are silent on this score. These sources are Anna (*Al.* X, II, p. 235; Sew., 330), Albert (II, 20, p. 314) and Will. Tyre (II, 21, col. 272). Both Anna and Albert (followed, I think, by Will. Tyre) were most probably influenced by hindsight tinged, in Anna's case, by affection for the man who became her father's staunch ally. Albert's erroneous assertion that Raymond became 'under faith and oath (Alexius') man' casts doubt on his general sketch of Raymond's dealings with Alexius, a topic of secondary interest to him: above, n. 68. Anyway, Alexius did bestow *some* gifts on Raymond and thus a reconciliation of sorts was effected. This presumably involved a visit by Raymond to the palace and a distribution of gifts to his large host on a corresponding scale. Some reminiscence of this reconciliation and distribution could have reached Albert. See also Lilie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 9.

86. Ralph ch. 13, p. 614.

had actually reached Nicaea, and were desperately short of bread, Bohemond arrived. He directed that 'a very great quantity of merchandise be brought to us by sea',⁸⁷ and abruptly created an abundance of food. Goods poured in by land as well as by sea and we hear of no further provisioning problems for the remainder of the siege of Nicaea. This was a singular achievement since, as we have seen⁸⁸ 'nearly all Bohemond's host' had accompanied Tancred across the Bosphorus and Bohemond had, in a sense, been left high and dry. The 'very great quantity of merchandise' and the ships bringing it must have been supplied by the emperor, as the *Gesta* itself implies in mentioning Bohemond's 'consultation' with him concerning the provisioning.⁸⁹ For the task of bringing up supplies Bohemond was wholly dependent on Byzantine assistance and was in effect acting as liaison officer and quartermaster between Alexius and the entire company of Crusaders. He presumably retained this role throughout the siege. His qualities of leadership and force of personality may perhaps suffice to account for his prominent role in the siege. He took up a position 'on the prime side of the city' (in fact, the northern side, beside Lake Ascanios), according to the *Gesta*, and Tancred was stationed next to him.⁹⁰ But his standing and influence can hardly have suffered from his acting as quartermaster to the Crusade.

Other leading Crusaders had been cosseted and flattered by Alexius at the time when he sought an oath from them and, in some cases, subsequently. For example, Hugh of Vermandois was given 'plenty of money' and received with full honours. This reception seems to have more than made up for the fact that he had initially been kept in close confinement. For we find him subse-

87. *Gesta*, II, 7, p. 14.

88. Above 208.

89. *Gesta*, II, 7, p. 13; cf. *HBS*, ch. 19, p. 180; Robert of Rheims, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, III, 1, *RHO*, III, p. 755; Guibert, III, 5, p. 155. Stephen of Blois' first letter, written at Nicaea in June 1097, alludes to the ships of 'the pious emperor' shuttling 'night and day' between Constantinople and a port nearby to Nicaea, bearing food: Hagenmeyer no. 4, p. 138.

90. *Gesta*, II, 8, p. 16. Supplementary topographical information in Tudebode, II, 9, p. 22; Hill & Hill 31; *HBS*, ch. 21, p. 181; Raym. ch. 3, p. 239; Hill & Hill 25. Characteristically, and fallaciously, Albert promotes Godfrey to the prime position in the siege: II, 22, p. 315.

quently portrayed as urging Godfrey of Bouillon to swear the oath which he himself had sworn.⁹¹ The very obduracy of Godfrey in refusing to swear, as well as the formidable size of his forces, earned him a lavish reception and sumptuous presents when at last he did agree to visit Alexius in his palace. According to Albert of Aix, Godfrey ‘not only gave himself over to him [Alexius] to be his son, as is the custom of the land, but also, with hands joined, to be his vassal’.⁹² Albert’s allegation that some kind of formal adoption ceremony occurred gains some support from Stephen of Blois’ contemporary account of his reception at the palace: ‘the emperor has received me worthily and honourably and most solicitously, as if I were his own son . . . and there is no duke, count or other magnate in all our army of God whom he trusts or favours more than he does me’.⁹³ No formal ceremony of adoption is mentioned, but Alexius’ profession of fatherly feelings for Stephen probably was voiced aloud. It was in keeping with his repeated urgings that Stephen should entrust one of his own sons to his charge, and with his entertaining of Stephen in the palace for ten days.⁹⁴ Stephen of Blois was one of the wealthiest as well as one of the stupidest of the leaders and Alexius seems to have been at pains to flatter and captivate him. He sought to harness his resources to the empire’s interests even at a time when most of the Crusaders were encamped before Nicaea, and no longer posed any threat to the capital. He was thus seeking to forge longer-term relationships with some leaders, besides having ‘used the more sensible ones as intermediaries with the more recalcitrant ones.’⁹⁵ Anna shows a fair knowledge of the background and resources of several leading Crusaders — the facts that Hugh was brother of the king of France, and that Godfrey of Bouillon and a certain ‘Raoul’ (who has not been firmly identified) were at the head of large armies.⁹⁶ Her knowledge presumably reflects assessments made by Alexius at

91. *Al. X*, 7, 9, pp. 215, 225; *Sew.*, 315, 322.

92. Albert, II, 16, pp. 310-11; Ganshof, *Recherches* 57-8.

93. Hagenmeyer no. 4, p. 138; cf. p. 139.

94. Hagenmeyer no. 4, pp. 138, 139. These details are too specific to have been invented by Stephen.

95. *Al. X*, 10, p. 228; *Sew.*, 325.

96. *Al. X*, 7, 9, 10, pp. 213, 220, 226; *Sew.*, 313, 318, 323.

the time, in his quest for collaborators. So was there really anything 'special' in the relationship between Alexius and Bohemond? For, after all, we find not only Hugh of Vermandois but also, in later April, Godfrey and Count Robert of Flanders urging others to come to terms with Alexius.⁹⁷

The question can be answered affirmatively on the basis of the scraps of evidence already cited. Bohemond received largesse from Alexius, and was perhaps reckoned among his 'sons'.⁹⁸ But he was also assigned active roles and responsibilities by the emperor, standing as his pledge during the first dispute with Raymond of Toulouse and as, in effect, his quartermaster for the Crusaders before Nicaea: judging by Stephen of Blois' letter to his wife, supplies continued to be ferried to the Crusaders throughout the siege, and this was presumably done under Bohemond's general superintendence.⁹⁹ No other leader is mentioned as having performed such duties, nor is any other leader known to have spent so long in close proximity to Alexius. Bohemond's readiness to take Alexius' side against Count Raymond might be explained simply by his appreciation of the size of Raymond's forces and resources and a sense of rivalry with Raymond for ascendancy over the other Western leaders: his own standing would be impaired if Raymond successfully defied efforts to place him under ties of obligation towards the emperor, whose 'helper' or 'officer' Bohemond was. This consideration may, indeed, have strengthened Bohemond's resolve to whip Raymond into line.¹⁰⁰ But he showed similar determination in obliging Tancred to journey back by sea to the *levée* which Alexius held after the capture of Nicaea and, as has already been noted, he had pressed

97. They pressed Raymond of Toulouse not to fight against fellow Christians, i.e. the Byzantines: *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 13; Raym. ch. 2, p. 238; Hill & Hill 24.

98. Ralph (ch. 9, p. 611; cf. ch. 11, p. 612) purports to cite a letter of Alexius to Bohemond in which Alexius promises to indulge him as a son, if he will show a son's loyalty and good-will. This letter may merely be a heavily embroidered version of the one also known to Will. Tyre (II, 14, cols. 263-4; above, n. 50), but Ralph may, through Tancred or Bohemond himself, have heard that Bohemond was addressed by Alexius as a 'son': see Dölger, no. 1197, p. 46; Ganshof, *Recherches* 58.

99. Hagenmeyer no. 4, pp. 138-9, 226. See above 213.

100. Runciman (p. 163) lays emphasis on Bohemond's rivalry with Raymond, and suggests that he still hoped for a formal command under Alexius: he was 'eager to please the emperor'. Runciman does not raise the question of how far he succeeded.

all the other commanders to attend it.¹⁰¹ He cannot then have been motivated by personal rivalry with particular individuals.¹⁰² He may well have been instrumental in getting other, unnamed commanders to swear: it was only the stubborn stand of a powerful leader such as Count Raymond that gained the attention of the chroniclers.¹⁰³ There may, in fact, be sense in the statement which Robert of Rheims attributes to Count Raymond at Antioch: the city could not be made over to Bohemond 'because of the oaths which, through Bohemond, they had made to the Constantinopolitan emperor'.¹⁰⁴ This declaration was probably developed by Robert out of a statement which the *Gesta* attributes to Count Raymond in the same context.¹⁰⁵ Nonetheless, Robert, for all his derivativeness and rhetorical flourishes, was not ill-inspired in pinpointing Bohemond as the key intermediary between Alexius and the other Crusade commanders and as having been especially responsible for their taking of the oath. Moreover, the evidence garnered from other Latin sources and from the *Alexiad* suggests that Bohemond was performing this role consistently through April, May and June, and not merely at one or two sporadic moments of crisis. It was, after all, only Bohemond who, upon arriving at Constantinople, was summoned by the emperor 'that he should come to talk secretly with him'.¹⁰⁶ No other leader is described as having 'secretly' conferred with Alexius or, indeed, as having 'talked' with him.¹⁰⁷ Only

101. See above 209. Ralph's indication that Tancred made his reluctant journey by sea tallies with Stephen of Blois' indication that the commanders were received by Alexius on an island: Ralph ch. 17, p. 618; Hagenmeyer no. 4, pp. 140, 235-6.

102. Bohemond seems to have regained control over most of the South Italian Normans from Tancred during the siege of Nicaea and thus had no pressing personal need to cut down his nephew to size: see below 260.

103. And even then, it is only from Raym. (ch. 2, p. 238; Hill & Hill 24) and from Tudebode (II, 7, p. 21; Hill & Hill 29) that we learn of Bohemond's role as imperial pledge. Whether or not Tudebode represents a source independent of Raym. is an open question: below, n. 132. Significantly, the sole Latin source to recount Bohemond's pressure on Tancred is that penned by Tancred's admirer, Ralph. Other commanders may have been overawed by Bohemond without the benefit of an eulogist to record their sentiments or plight.

104. Robert of Rheims, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, VIII, 2, *RHO*, III, p. 843.

105. *Gesta*, X, 31, p. 75; cf. Tudebode, XII, 6, p. 87; Hill & Hill 95.

106. 'ut veniret loqui simul secreto secum', *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 11, ll.16-17; cf. II.5-6; Tudebode, II, 2, p. 18; Hill & Hill 27.

107. The translation by R. Hill of the *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 11, ll.17-18 — 'Tunc illuc venit

of Bohemond is it said that he 'took counsel' with Alexius concerning provisioning and, as we have seen, after the capture of Nicaea it was Bohemond who 'first of all . . . was persuaded immediately' to return to see the emperor and who urged all the other commanders to go, too.

One may well object that if Bohemond was openly and consistently performing the function of 'helper' or 'officer' (*adjutor*) of Alexius, this role would have been described more explicitly and precisely in our sources. However, the Latin accounts composed within a generation of the Crusade pay, for the most part, only cursory attention to the Crusaders' dealings with Alexius and to the city of Constantinople itself. They are far more concerned with the combat against the Turks, the siege of Antioch and the progress through the Levant to Jerusalem. And these Latin accounts rest on a narrow range of sources which are themselves, in so far as they are extant and identifiable, far from objective.¹⁰⁸ Raymond of Aguilers, Ralph of Caen and the author of the *Gesta* focus on their respective heroes (or, in the *Gesta*'s case, sympathetic figures) and pay quite scant attention to other leaders, save when they crossed their heroes. Moreover, all our extant Latin narrative accounts were penned after Bohemond had become the arch-enemy of Alexius and none of their authors can have been present at the first, 'secret', meeting of Bohemond and Alexius or can have listened in on their converse at such other encounters *à deux* as may have ensued. The actions and words of spring 1097 have thus had to travel through a whole series of prisms in order to reach us.

It is therefore intriguing that both Anna Comnena and the Latin source most notably sympathetic towards Bohemond should single him out as having received special treatment from the moment of his arrival. Anna gives an exceptionally detailed description

dux Godefridus cum fratre suo' — is misleading. *Tunc* followed by the perfect in the *Gesta* means 'subsequently', i.e. Godfrey and Baldwin went (back) to the City after Bohemond's 'secret' discussions with Alexius. For other such instances of *tunc* = 'subsequently, thereupon', see, e.g. *Gesta*, I, 4, p.8, ll.9, 14; II, 6, p.13, l.15; VI, 14, p. 32, l.4 from bottom; IX, 21, p. 51, l.7 from bottom; IX, 24, p.58, l.2 from bottom; X, 39, p. 92, l.13.

108. See above, n. 103.

of his reception and says that her father, while not immediately acceding to his request for 'the Domestic of the East', played him along with 'fair hopes' that 'even this will come about before long' provided that Bohemond's actions, repute and general 'fidelity' warranted it.¹⁰⁹ The *Gesta*, for its part, claims that Alexius made a special offer to Bohemond of 'lands beyond Antioch (*ab Antiochia retro*), fifteen days' journey in length and eight in width, provided that he would swear to him with free consent. And he (Alexius) swore to him that if he (Bohemond) kept faithfully that oath, he would never break his own'.¹¹⁰ It is, at the very least, a curious coincidence that two wholly independent sources should mention a deal whose essence is comparable, even though they differ as to who initiated it and as to what it entailed (office or territory). They both represent Alexius as avowedly contemplating a special concession for Bohemond upon certain conditions — his swearing (and observance) of 'that oath', according to the *Gesta*; his general behaviour and 'fidelity', according to Anna, who presumably understands by this his observance of the oath mentioned a page or so earlier, and subsequently.¹¹¹ It is worth noting that the *Gesta* does not unambiguously represent Alexius as *swearing* to grant 'lands beyond Antioch' to Bohemond. He merely 'said' (*dixit*) that if Bohemond would 'swear . . . with free consent' he would 'give' them. And he swore to observe 'his own' oath so long as Bohemond kept 'that oath', i.e. the oath which he had earlier vainly sought from 'all the leaders' and which he now sought from Bohemond.¹¹² The emperor's own oath is not defined but it seems to refer forwards to his oath to all the Crusaders delineated three sentences later: to keep good faith, to accompany them with an army and a navy, to provision them and to make good their losses. The *Gesta*'s style is at once staccato and cumbersome and it would be very hazardous to deduce much from its use of *dixit* rather than a term specifically meaning 'swore'. But the fact re-

109. *Al. X*, 11, p. 234; *Sew.*, 329. See above 191.

110. *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 12.

111. *Al. X*, 11, pp. 232-3, 235; *Sew.*, 328, 330.

112. *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 11, 1.2 from bottom; cf. p. 12, 1.2. There is no indication in the *Gesta* that the oath required of Bohemond was any different from that sought of 'all the leaders'.

mains that the *Gesta* does not unambiguously state that a grant was formally conferred under oath on Bohemond. It could as well be taken to mean that Alexius made an undertaking, unsworn, to reward Bohemond with lands in return for his taking the oath: an undertaking that he was morally but not, strictly speaking, legally bound to honour once Bohemond had sworn his oath and, presumably, so long as he kept it. Interpreted thus, this passage of the *Gesta* conveys a scene not so discordant with that in the *Alexiad* — of the emperor dangling before Bohemond the prospect of lands or a high command respectively.¹¹³

III

This apparent concordance between the *Alexiad* and the *Gesta* brings us to the question of whether the passage mentioning the offer of 'lands beyond Antioch' originally formed part of the *Gesta*. A.C. Krey argued that it did not: it was interpolated into the original text on the eve of Bohemond's recruiting drive in Northern France in 1105-06; the purpose of the interpolation was to vilify Alexius as the breaker of his promise to Bohemond in particular as well as to the Crusaders in general and thereby to justify Bohemond's expedition against him.¹¹⁴ Krey's thesis is

113. The assumption that 'the Domestic of the East' really was the subject of conversations between Alexius and Bohemond is open to the objection that Anna is elsewhere rather free with her use of 'Domestic': she makes her father 'Great Domestic of the eastern and western armies' when he was probably only Domestic of the West (*Al.* VII, 2, p. 91; *Sew.*, 219; R. Guillard, 'Le Grand Domestique', repr. in Guillard's *Recherches sur les institutions byzantines*, I (Berlin 1967) 406), and she describes Philaretus as 'raised to the title of Domestic' around 1070, when he seems merely to have been a *doux* bearing the title of *magistros*, as indicated on one type of his seals: *Al.* VI, 9, p. 64; *Sew.*, 198; C.H. Yarnley, 'Philaretos: Armenian bandit or Byzantine general?', *Revue des études arméniennes* 9 (1972) 335; V.S. Shandrovskaya, 'Ermitazhnye pechati Filareta Vrakhamiya', *Vestnik Obschestvennykh Nauk, Akademiya Nauk Armyanskoy S.S.S.R.*, Erevan 3 (387) (1975) 37, 39, 47. But assuming that Bohemond and Alexius did discuss 'the Domestic of the East', this would have encompassed the area of Antioch, the region where Bohemond was, according to the *Gesta*, encouraged to hope for lands. However, the *Gesta*'s version of Alexius' offer seems to denote lands *beyond* Antioch, rather than the city itself, and anyway probably merely echoes a rumour circulating among the Crusaders: below 227. At the time of the Crusade Adrian Comnenos was Grand Domestic of the West: Guillard, *Grand Domestique* 407.

114. A.C. Krey, 'A neglected passage in the *Gesta* and its bearing on the literature

well-crafted and has gained widespread acceptance.¹¹⁵ Krey notes the awkwardness of the passage, which is interposed between laments and queries as to why the Crusade leaders should have had to ‘humble themselves willy-nilly’ before the emperor. Krey, taking the passage to mean that the city of Antioch itself was made over, points out that this jars with the *Gesta*’s subsequent portrayal of the leaders’ invitation to Alexius to take possession of Antioch, an invitation in which Bohemond seems — however reluctantly — to have acquiesced. Krey draws attention to the postscript added by Bohemond to the Crusading leaders’ letter of September 11, 1098, where Bohemond emphasizes Alexius’ breach of his general undertakings towards the Crusaders and, in effect though not in words, seeks Urban II’s sanction for his own possession of Antioch.¹¹⁶ Krey argues that Bohemond, while implying that the Crusaders’ own undertakings were now voided by Alexius’ breach of his pledges, tacitly recognizes that Antioch had been covered by their agreement with the emperor. He maintains that Bohemond would not have failed at some stage to cite Alexius’ promise to him of Antioch, however vague, unwritten and insincere, had such a promise ever been made.¹¹⁷

Our suggestions about Bohemond’s relationship with Alexius do not turn on the passage in question,¹¹⁸ and so no exhaustive examination of Krey’s thesis will be attempted here. Such an examination would have to weigh Krey’s statement that nearly all the important early reworkings of the *Gesta* were carried out

of the First Crusade’, *The Crusades and other historical essays presented to D.C. Munro*, ed. L.J. Paetow (New York 1928) 58-60, 75-6. Those responsible for the interpolation are taken to have been involved in Bohemond’s recruiting drive.

115. E.g. by Runciman, p. 159, n.1; D.C. Douglas, *The Norman achievement* (London 1969) n. 57 on pp. 233-4 (with reservations); Lilie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 8. France (*Anna Comnena* 25, n. 46 on pp. 35-6) regards Krey’s thesis as ‘possible’ but also thinks that the negotiations mentioned by Anna may have formed the basis of the *Gesta*’s story. The Hills (*Tudebode* 9) claim to have ‘found further evidence to bolster Krey’s argument’, but that which they cite is far from conclusive. Krey’s thesis is also accepted by J.H. Pryor, ‘The oaths of the leaders of the First Crusade to Emperor Alexius I Comnenus: fealty, homage — *pistis, douleia*’, *Parergon* 2 (1984) n. 19 on p. 135.

116. *Gesta*, VIII, 20, p. 45; X, 30, p.72; Hagenmeyer no. 16, p. 165. See above 188; Krey, *Neglected passage* 59, 61-2 & n. 10.

117. Krey, *Neglected passage* 63-5.

118. The passage runs from ‘fortissimo autem viro Boamundo’ to ‘iste suum nunquam preteriret’: *Gesta*, II, 6, p.12; Krey, *Neglected passage* 58.

in France and that nearly all the extant manuscripts of the *Gesta* come from there: France was the target area for Bohemond's recruiting drive in 1106.¹¹⁹ It would also have to consider carefully the relationship between the *Gesta* and Peter Tudebode's work, which Krey describes as 'almost a verbatim copy of the *Gesta*'. For it has been contended by J. Hill and L. Hill that Tudebode and the *Gesta*'s author drew on an important common source or sources, now lost, which Raymond of Aguilers also used.¹²⁰ And particular scrutiny would be needed of Krey's belief that the *libellus* which Ekkehard of Aura purports to have seen at Jerusalem in 1101 and to have used as his source for the Crusade of 1096-9 was in fact a copy of the *Gesta*. For it underpins his claim that Ekkehard's version of the agreement between Alexius and the Crusading leaders represents the original text of the *Gesta*, excised in, probably, 1105 and replaced by the passage relating Alexius' offer of Antioch found in surviving manuscripts of the *Gesta*.¹²¹

Without thoroughly exploring all these avenues, one may nonetheless regard Krey's thesis as, at best, unproven and in need of serious modification, in the light of the following considerations. Firstly, an interpolation seeking to establish Bohemond's title to Antioch might surely be expected to have portrayed Alexius as *swearing* rather than merely promising to make a grant, and to have specified that the *city* of Antioch formed part of the grant. As it is, 'lands beyond Antioch' is an equivocal expression and although some have assumed or insisted that it must denote the city,¹²² that is not the obvious, or necessary, meaning. Such

119. Krey, *Neglected passage* 71.

120. Krey, *Neglected passage* 74; Hill & Hill *Tudebode* 10-12; see also Riley-Smith 60-1.

121. Krey, *Neglected passage* 59-60, 75; Ekkehard of Aura, *Chronica*, ed. F.-J. Schmale & I. Schmale-Ott, *Ausgewählte Quellen zur deutschen Geschichte des Mittelalters*, XV (Darmstadt 1972) 148-9. Objections to the identification of the *libellus* with the *Gesta* were raised by I. Schmale-Ott, 'Untersuchungen zu Ekkehard von Aura und zur Kaiserchronik', *Zeitschrift für Bayerische Landesgeschichte* 34 (1971) Heft 2, 421 & n. 39; Hill & Hill *Tudebode* 11.

122. Krey, *Neglected passage* 59. Lilie dismisses the alternative interpretation — of lands but not the city. He argues that Antioch is mentioned as the starting-point from which the distances could be measured out, and that a division between the city and the hinterland would have been 'an artificial construction without future prospects' as well as being a departure from Byzantium's previous organization of the area:

loose phrasing on an interpolator's part is bizarre, even granted that he was too pressed for time to alter subsequent passages in the *Gesta*, where Alexius' title to Antioch is at least implicitly recognized. Secondly, the fact that by September 11 1098 and, very probably, earlier, Bohemond was not exploiting the offer of 'lands' to him (as presented in the *Gesta*) is none too conclusive. If by then Bohemond's line was to blackguard Alexius for breach of his sworn undertakings to help the Crusaders and to imply that the Crusaders' undertakings to Alexius were thereby voided, he would hardly have wanted to draw attention to his own erstwhile privileged treatment at the hands of Alexius, or to acknowledge that Antioch was in Alexius' gift. To do so would have been politically inept, seeing that he was trying to foment Alexius' unpopularity and to exploit it.¹²³ Thirdly, Tudebode represents Alexius as making two successive grants: one at the time of his first, 'secret' meeting, when he 'granted to Bohemond lands of Romania fifteen days' journey in length and eight in width' and received an oath of *fiducia* from Bohemond; and a second of 'lands beyond Antioch' of the same dimensions, in return for an oath.¹²⁴ Tudebode's delineation of the second grant is couched in almost identical terms to those used in the *Gesta* and is set after his account of the extraction of an oath from Raymond of Toulouse. Tudebode's narrative is self-contradictory and muddled, seeing that Bohemond has already

Kreuzfahrerstaaten, n. 45 on pp. 336-7. Such an arrangement would not, however, have been absurd from Alexius' point of view in 1097: Bohemond's lands would have stretched towards the Euphrates and his task of defending them from Turkish counter-attacks might well have obliged him to look to Antioch as a secure rear-base in friendly hands rather than as a target for attack. Antioch was, after all, virtually impregnable. See the remarks of E. Jamison, 'Some notes on the *Anonymi Gesta Francorum*, with special reference to the Norman contingent from South Italy and Sicily in the First Crusade', *Studies in French language and medieval literature presented to Professor Mildred K. Pope* . . . (Manchester 1939) 193-5. In any case, the ambivalence of the phrasing ill becomes a forgery intended to establish Bohemond's right to the city and, as will be seen below, Antioch is not named in all versions of the alleged offer by Alexius.

123. A point adumbrated by R. Hill in her edition of the *Gesta*, p. 12, n. 2.

124. Tudebode, II, 2, 8, pp. 18, 22; Hill & Hill 30. The mention of the first grant is omitted by the Hills in their translation, which follows one of the three 12th-century manuscripts of Tudebode, Codex Paris Bibl. Nationale no. 5135A. See *ibid.* 5-6; 30, n.55.

been depicted as swearing an oath, and as having done so in the same manner as ‘the other princes’.¹²⁵ And the two grants, while differing in nomenclature of the lands involved, are identical in dimensions. Whatever the interrelationship of the *Gesta*, Tudebode and Raymond of Aguilers may be at this point,¹²⁶ one can reasonably suppose Tudebode to have drawn on two different sources mentioning an offer or grant of lands to Bohemond, and rather crassly to have supposed them to be referring to two successive grants. One of these sources, naming ‘Antioch’, must have been the *Gesta* or the hypothetical source common to Tudebode and the *Gesta*. The other, naming ‘Romania’, is unknown, and might have been information given to Tudebode by word of mouth. It is just conceivable that this information mentioning ‘Romania’ did not really emanate from an independent source at all, but was merely a garbled variant of the account related in the *Gesta* (in its interpolated form). For ‘lands beyond Antioch’ might, in the West at least, have been regarded as tantamount to ‘lands of Romania’. However, this would presuppose that the interpolation inserted into the *Gesta* in, supposedly, 1105 had rapidly become distorted and that the key point of the interpolation — Bohemond’s title to the city of Antioch — had become obscured within five or six years.¹²⁷ It is much more probable that the mention of ‘lands of Romania’ *does* stem from a source wholly independent of, or chronologically prior to, the *Gesta* in its allegedly interpolated form. Such a source need have had no particular connexion with Bohemond’s recruiting drive of 1105-06. This probability is strengthened by the fact that a grant to Bohemond of ‘Romania’, fifteen days’ riding distance by eight in area, is also mentioned by Ralph of Caen, who does not other-

125. Tudebode, II, 2, 6, pp. 18, 20; Hill & Hill 29.

126. The terms of Bohemond’s oath of *fiducia* in Tudebode are strikingly similar to those credited to Count Raymond by Raymond of Aguilers, ch. 2, p. 238; Hill & Hill 24. The obvious conclusion is that this incongruous detail was borrowed from Raymond by Tudebode to amplify his account of Bohemond’s first oath-taking, and that Tudebode’s general depiction of Count Raymond’s dealings with Alexius at Constantinople is likewise indebted to Raymond of Aguilers. See, however, Hill & Hill, *Tudebode* 30, n. 55; below, n.132.

127. Tudebode is thought to have completed his work before 1111: Hill & Hill, *Raymond D’Aguilers* 4; Riley-Smith 61.

wise show signs of having used the *Gesta* as a source.¹²⁸ In other words, the notion that some kind of special offer was put to Bohemond by Alexius is not simply the product of Bohemond's later propaganda. And the mention of a special offer in the *Gesta* need not necessarily represent an interpolation.

The author of the *Gesta* cannot have been present at the first, 'secret' meeting between Bohemond and Alexius. Admittedly, he does not, in the manner of Tudebode, expressly make their first meeting the occasion of a special offer from Alexius, but it is inherently improbable that any wheeling and dealing would have been carried out before an audience. So, if the tale of the offer of 'lands beyond Antioch' has not been interpolated, it must either emanate from Bohemond himself or be merely a rumour which circulated among the Crusaders, presumably in either case dateable to the time of the Crusaders' stay at Constantinople or soon afterwards. The former contingency is rather remote, since it is hard to see how the leaking of such an offer would have benefited Bohemond at that time. It would have sullied his reputation for devotion to 'the sacred journey', while gaining for him only a very conditional right to a quite limited and exposed portion of territory far to the east. The alternative origin postulated for the tale is much more likely: a rumour, perhaps one of many which Bohemond's protracted sojourn at Constantinople and his evident familiarity with Alexius is likely to have spawned.

Ralph of Caen relays various scraps of speculation about Bohemond's 'delays' and apparent cooperation with Alexius, highlighting the contrast between Bohemond's susceptibility to Greek gifts and deceit and Tancred's imperviousness.¹²⁹ Comparable speculation and rumour may well underlie the story of Alexius' offer of 'lands beyond Antioch'. As has been noted

128. Ralph, ch. 10, p. 612. See nn. 75, 151-2. Bohemond was one of Ralph's informants. But had he been Ralph's source for the grant, he would surely have emphasized that Antioch had been granted, and not an unspecified portion of 'Romania'. Ralph, writing in the Levant, would not have regarded Antioch and 'Romania' as interchangeable terms.

129. See above, 204, 209-10. Ralph's miscellany of explanations for Bohemond's behaviour could reflect the fact that he was fed on material from Bohemond as well as from Tancred. The latter may have regaled him with, among other things, rumours originating in 1097, while the former may have wilfully distorted the situation. See below, n. 151; p.240.

above,¹³⁰ the offer occurs in both the *Gesta* and Tudebode. If the *Gesta's* author and Tudebode really were drawing on a common source, as the Hills maintain, Krey's thesis would lose one of its important planks — the obstrusiveness of the passage relating the offer in the *Gesta*, sandwiched as it is between general laments about the Crusade leaders' oathtaking. For the lamentations are missing from Tudebode: Alexis' offer of 'lands beyond Antioch' in return for an oath is made after Bohemond has played a key part in obliging Count Raymond to swear an oath, and at the end of the assembling of the Crusaders at Constantinople.¹³¹ Should Tudebode have derived this information from the important lost source postulated by the Hills, we would have no firm knowledge as to where it was situated in that source, and thus Krey's allegation concerning the obstrusiveness of the passage in the *Gesta* would lose its force. But if in fact the *Gesta* is the prime source of Tudebode,¹³² Krey's allegation is still none too conclusive, as a glance at the *Gesta's* text will show.

In the *Gesta*, the laments and the grant are set in a general description of the Crusaders' oathtaking.¹³³ Bohemond, Godfrey and Raymond converge on Constantinople. The anxious and angry emperor schemes against the 'knights of Christ'. 'By God's grace' he failed to harm them, but then 'all the elders'

130. See above 222.

131. Tudebode, II, 8, p.22; Hill & Hill 30.

132. This remains a prepossessing explanation of their interrelationship. For given that Tudebode summarized portions of Raymond of Aguilers (as the Hills themselves acknowledge: Tudebode 27, n.40), there is no reason why he should not also have drawn on the *Gesta*, which predates the work of Raymond. The *Gesta's* structure is the same as Tudebode's and substantial passages are almost word for word identical with Tudebode. The divergences between them on which the Hills lay such stress (Tudebode 7-9) can be explained by Tudebode's use of minor sources supplementing his main source, the *Gesta*. These sources could have ranged from written via oral ones to his own observations as a participant on the Crusade: hence, for example, his information about the offer to Bohemond of 'lands of Romania' and the minute details about the deaths of members of the Tudebode family, clearly his kinsmen. See above 22; Tudebode, X, 8, p.67; . XII, 3, p.85; Hill & Hill 72-3, 93. The occasions where Tudebode's text is fuller and more coherent than the *Gesta's* could be explained by Tudebode's access to a more complete text of the *Gesta* than that now extant, e.g. for the account of Peter Bartholomew's visions of St Andrew: *Gesta*, IX, 25, p. 59; Tudebode, X, 10, p. 70; Hill & Hill 76, 77, n. 36.

133. *Gesta*, II, 6, pp. 11-13.

devised a plan whereby 'all the leaders of our army' would swear an oath to the emperor. The leaders rebuffed him at first. Then follow lamentations: 'Perhaps, though, we were often to be misled by our leaders, for what were they to do in the end?' The *Gesta's* author cites them as pleading necessity, recounts Alexius' offer of 'lands beyond Antioch' to Bohemond, and again laments as to why 'such brave and determined knights . . . did this? It must have been because they were driven by great necessity'. The emperor's sworn undertakings are outlined, and then the emperor's attempt to exact from Raymond '*hominium* and *fiduciam* such as the others had done' is related. Bohemond's prominence in inducing Raymond to swear is mentioned and the oath which Raymond eventually swore is described. Taken as a whole, this section of the *Gesta* can be faulted on literary and historical grounds. Transitions are abrupt and changes of subject are sudden. No reason for Count Raymond's brooding over 'vengeance against the emperor's army' is given.¹³⁴ No indication is supplied here that Godfrey of Bouillon and his brother were returning to Constantinople from Asia Minor and not arriving for the first time. In implying that only at this time, in April, did the idea of exacting an oath occur to Alexius at the prompting of 'the elders', the *Gesta* is positively misleading. For in fact Godfrey had sworn his oath to Alexius months earlier, in January,¹³⁵ and we have no reason to suppose that Alexius owed the idea of the oath to any advisers. And surprisingly, in view of the space devoted to the issue of the oath, no narrative of the leaders' actual swearing of the oath is given. The event is only obliquely mentioned, when Count Raymond is required to swear 'as the others had done'. In this ill-proportioned section, the passage recounting Alexius' special offer to Bohemond is not glaringly out of place. The *Gesta's* author was plainly distressed that the Crusading leaders should have placed themselves under a sworn obligation to Alexius, whose implications he himself later traces.¹³⁶ It seems that he could not bring himself to spell out

134. *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 13. Above 206.

135. See above, n. 82. The *Gesta* earlier mentions laconically a *pactum* between Godfrey and Alexius, and also the plan to exact *fidelitas* from Hugh of Vermandois: I, 3, pp. 6-7.

136. *Gesta*, IV, II, p. 26; VIII, 20, p. 45; X, 30, p. 72.

the terms of that obligation clearly, or even to narrate the taking of their oaths by the leaders (including Bohemond).¹³⁷ The author, while broadly sympathetic to ‘that most gallant man’, does not conceal the facts that Bohemond (alone) conferred ‘secretly’ with Alexius or that he sided with him against Count Raymond. The passage showing Bohemond as susceptible to an offer of material gain — ‘lands beyond Antioch’ — is not out of keeping with the general tone of the *Gesta*’s picture of the situation at Constantinople. In fact, while making Bohemond the foremost figure of his narrative, the anonymous author was not uncritical of him.¹³⁸ He was probably trying to explain away, but not wholly excuse, Bohemond’s pivotal role in the oath-taking. His implication that Bohemond was led on by an offer of ‘lands’ and was, in effect, the dupe of Alexius’ wiles may well echo one of the rumours circulating among the Crusaders in 1097.

To query whether the passage in the *Gesta* relating Alexius’ offer of ‘lands beyond Antioch’ has been interpolated is not, of course, tantamount to accepting the literal truth of its contents. The form of the offer has a distinctly Western tinge, seeing that it would have amounted to a land-fief in return for Bohemond’s oath. Nonetheless, as has already been noted, the fact that a Greek and a Latin source should independently represent Bohemond as having received special treatment from Alexius is in itself suggestive. Somewhere behind the smoke of the rumour related by the *Gesta* there may lurk fire of a sort.

IV

Hitherto we have deliberately referred to the oaths sworn and ritual performed by Bohemond and the other leaders in only the most general terms. For our main concern is whether Bohemond’s relationship with Alexius differed from that of the others. But this in turn necessitates a glance at the form and content of the Crusaders’ undertakings to Alexius. The topic is bedevilled by the same source problems that have been encountered in consider-

137. And this even though the true nature of Bohemond’s (liege-) homage was very probably unknown to him: below, 240-1.

138. See above, n. 47.

ing the *Gesta's* account of Alexius' offer of lands. Our Latin sources are not strictly contemporaneous with the events of spring, 1097, and they recount only cursorily the terms which the Crusaders swore to observe. Far fuller attention is paid by, for example, the *Gesta* to those which Alexius is supposed to have sworn. The overall impression which the earliest sources give is that a sworn treaty was made between the Crusaders and Alexius. The words used by the *Gesta* to describe Alexius' undertakings closely resemble those in a letter of uncertain authorship, written, probably, in April 1098. Already this letter describes the arrangement between Alexius and the Crusaders as a 'peace treaty' (*pax*), while Bohemond's postscript to the princes' letter of September 11, 1098 claims that Alexius 'promised us many good things'.¹³⁹ Anna Comnena, from her very different standpoint, is just as emphatic. Making no mention of any sworn pledges of Alexius, she emphasizes the obligations towards her father into which the Crusaders entered. And her usage is opaque: 'a solemn oath', 'oath in good faith' or possibly, in a more technical sense, 'an oath of fealty' (*horkia pista*) is sought of Bohemond, and subsequently he assents to Alexius' desire that he swear 'the Latins' customary oath'.¹⁴⁰ Hugh of Vermandois has earlier sworn 'the Latins' customary oath' and has at the same time become the emperor's 'man' (*anthropos*), a condition to which a Western-style oath of fealty would not, in itself, have reduced him.¹⁴¹ Through words which she puts into the mouths of Crusaders. Anna gives us to understand that the leaders had 'become the sworn servants (*doulous . . . omotas*) of his majesty', having 'pledged service (*douleian*)' to him.¹⁴² Anna does not, in her ac-

139. 'Omnibus nostris fidem et securitatem dedit', *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 12; 'dedit nobis fiducias atque securitatem cum iuramento', Hagenmeyer no. 12, p. 154. See, on Alexius' pledges, Hagenmeyer 296; Bohemond's postscript: Hagenmeyer no. 16, p. 165.

140. *Al. X*, II, pp. 231, 232; Sew., 327, 328. Anna's vague term, 'customary oath', is inaccurate in that, on her own evidence, Godfrey of Bouillon (and, clearly, the other leaders) swore specific terms which did not feature in 'customary oaths' of Latins in the West or in Byzantine service.

141. *Al. X*, 7, p. 215; Sew., 315; Ganshof, *Recherches* 58 & n. 8, 59. On *anthropos*, see n. 142.

142. *Al. X*, 10, p. 229; Sew., 325. Compare these words of Baldwin with those which Godfrey, his brother, addresses to Hugh of Vermandois: Godfrey upbraids Hugh for having brought himself 'to the rank of slave (*eis doulou taxin*)', *Al. X*, 9, p. 225;

count of her father's handling of the Crusaders in 1097, give any hint that he might solemnly have sworn undertakings towards them, or that a bilateral agreement might have been concluded.

The gap between Anna's viewpoint and that of the Latin sources looks, at first sight, vast as well as befogged by our uncertainty as to what Anna may have meant by such terms as *horkia pista*. It must also be borne in mind that the concepts underlying the ritual of 'homage' and 'fealty' were not uniform, static or very precisely formulated in Western Europe in the eleventh century. And in any case the unprecedented and extraordinary circumstances of the Crusading leaders in 1097 could have caused them to put new glosses on the concepts and practices which they brought with them from their various homelands. Above all, even though the Byzantines may have been familiar with the outward forms of the ritual of homage and fealty, they may not have understood the resultant relationship in the same way as Westerners did.¹⁴³ And total internal consistency in the Byzantines' attitude towards the relationship should not be presupposed. Thus Anna Comnena treats the procedure imposed by Alexius on each Crusading 'count' as tantamount to an act of submission, committing each to obedience and active service. Yet on her own evidence in Book X, more than a simple act of submission was involved. For the oath which Godfrey of Bouillon swore was to hand over whatever former Byzantine 'towns, territories or fortresses' he managed to capture to the emperor's

Sew., 322. Anna here intends 'slave' to heighten the contrast with Hugh's alleged former status of *basileus*, and her usage should not be regarded as technical or as a literal translation of Western terms. But clearly in this imagined conversation, as in the words attributed to Baldwin, Anna supposes the Crusaders to have by their oaths placed themselves on the footing of agents of the emperor, to whom they owe positive, active, service and not just general loyalty and deference. It is therefore probable that by 'man' (*anthropos*) Anna had in mind either the condition of servitor/retainer or a translation (or calque) of the Latin *homo* in its technical sense of 'one who has done homage to a lord'. Anna's usage in this context is too opaque and capricious for a choice between the two interpretations to be made. But that she was at least acquainted with *anthropos* = *homo/homme* emerges from the text of Bohemond's sworn terms of 1108, which she cites: *Al. XIII*, 12, pp. 126, 127, 129, 137; Sew., 424, 426, 427, 432.

143. As Pryor rightly stresses: *Oaths* 111, 131-2; see also France, *Anna Comnena* 29-30 and the valuable remarks of M. de Waha, reviewing R.-J. Lilie's *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* in *B* 54 (1984) 408.

representative.¹⁴⁴ In other words, Godfrey was recognised as being in command of a military force capable of operating independently. Nonetheless, Anna harps on the servile status of Godfrey and the other commanders. Most probably, she mirrors the outlook of her father in regarding as a 'customary' oath of obedience what was in fact an unprecedented and essentially reciprocal agreement.¹⁴⁵ It was all the easier for the two parties to the agreement to interpret it in different ways when ambiguity lingered in the West as to the significance of oaths of fealty and above all, of homage when rendered by one high-ranking potentate to another.¹⁴⁶ A final ingredient in the fog facing modern observers is the fact that Western writers of the eleventh and earlier twelfth centuries often failed explicitly to mention both the doing of homage and the swearing of a fealty oath. Even when the two acts had in fact been performed, only one of them might be mentioned by contemporary writers.¹⁴⁷

Yet dense as is the fog enshrouding Alexius' dealings with the Crusading leaders, it is not impenetrable and the gap between

144. *Al.* X, 9, p. 226; *Sew.*, 323. Subsequently other leaders were required to take 'the same oath as Godfrey': *Al.* X, 10, pp. 228, 229; *Sew.*, 325; cf. France, *Anna Comnena* 24. Clearly Anna regards the terms of Godfrey's oath to be standard. Her specification of Godfrey's oath seems reliable. For the Crusaders' pledge to restore whatever cities they captured is recounted in compatible terms by Ekkehard of Aura, *Chronica* 148-9; cf. *Raym.* ch. 14, p. 267; Hill & Hill 74-5. The *Gesta*, which claims that Alexius swore personally to accompany the Crusaders, makes no mention of the Crusaders' oaths to return cities to him or his representative. Nonetheless, it states that Comana was handed over to Peter of Alifa to be held 'in fealty to God and the Holy Sepulchre and to our leaders and the emperor': *Gesta*, IV, II, pp. 25-6; cf. Tudebode, IV, 4, p. 32; Hill & Hill 40-1. This is surely a biased and somewhat distorted allusion to the Crusaders' enactment of their pledge: see above, n. 31. Tudebode does, in fact, mention Taticius' role as being to receive land liberated by the Crusaders 'in fidelitate imperatoris': VI, 5, p. 41; Hill & Hill 49.

145. The oath of fealty would previously have been known to Alexius exclusively in his capacity of employer of Latins as mercenaries; then, their relationship with him would, in effect, have been that of obedient servants to a master. When Anna claims that a 'customary oath' was taken by Count Robert I of Flanders while merely passing through the empire (several years before the Crusade), she betrays the looseness of her usage: *Al.* VII, 6, p. 105; *Sew.*, 229; above, n. 140; Lilie, *Kreuzfahrstaaten* 20-1 & n. 96 on p. 347.

146. J.-F. Lemarignier, *Recherches sur l'hommage en marche et les frontières féodales* (Lille 1945) 1, 95-6; C. Warren Hollister, 'Normandy, France and the Anglo-Norman regnum', *Speculum* 51 (1976) 203. For the latter reference I am grateful to George Garnett. See also below 235.

147. Ganshof, *Recherches* 59-60.

the Latin sources and the *Alexiad* can be spanned. The omissions and compressions of the Latin accounts and the variations between them are not of major significance, and a collation of these accounts shows clearly that not only an oath of fealty (*fidelitas*) but also the performance of homage was required of the princes.¹⁴⁸ The very indignation which Alexius' requirement aroused suggests that more was at issue than an oath of general 'faithfulness and loyalty' in the sense of refraining from prejudicing the interests of the empire.¹⁴⁹ Ralph of Caen states plainly that Bohemond 'is submitted by Alexius to that yoke which is commonly called homage (*hominagium*)'. Tancred is represented as deploring the conduct of the other leaders, whose weight of numbers should have enabled them to avert 'the yoke of homage'.¹⁵⁰ And, as we have seen, Bohemond undertook to submit Tancred himself to that yoke, with the result that eventually Alexius and Tancred 'joined their right hands; however, the marquis' son [Tancred] was fuming within, and externally his glance grew savage'. Ralph is, of course, rhetorical and partisan, but his testimony carries weight in that he had every reason to suppress the fact that Tancred, for all his subterfuges and alleged foresight concerning the burdensome tasks and regrets which homage would engender, did perform homage in the end.¹⁵¹ Ralph's evidence is all the more important in that he shows no clear sign of having drawn on the *Gesta* and thus ranks as an

148. Ganshof, *Recherches* 59, 62-3. On the ritual enacting, and concepts embedded in, homage and fealty, see Bloch, *Feudal Society* 145-7, 160-2; J. Le Goff, 'The symbolic ritual of vassalage', repr. in Le Goff's *Time, work and culture in the Middle Ages*, trs. A. Goldhammer (Chicago 1980) 240-8.

149. This, together with the limited terms of service mentioned in Anna's description of Godfrey's oath, comprised the Crusaders' sworn obligations to Alexius, in the view of Pryor, *Oaths* 122, 124.

150. Ralph, ch. 10, p. 612; ch. 11, p. 613.

151. Ralph, ch. 12, p.614; ch. 17-18, pp.618-19. See above 210; Ganshof, *Recherches* 56, 60. The work of Ralph is, with that of Baldric of Dol and Ekkehard of Aura relegated to the level of 'second- and third-generation chronicles' by Pryor (*Oaths* n. 74 on p. 139). Ralph was writing after the death of Tancred (December 12 1112) but during the second patriarchate of Arnulf I of Jerusalem, who was re-elected in 1112 and died in 1118: preface, 604. Ralph states that 'the daily conversation' of Bohemond and Tancred used to recall the Crusaders' victories and 'the captured cities, Antioch by guile by night, Jerusalem by arms by day'; and each, but especially Tancred, had reminisced as if in the hope that Ralph would record these events: preface, 603. We have no good reason to doubt Ralph's claim. See n. 75.

independent source. In fact, his preface seems to imply that he has not used written sources and has waited in vain for others to repay Tancred's largesse by writing down his deeds.¹⁵² That the *Gesta's* portrayal of the Crusaders' oath-taking has its shortcomings has already been noted: it is ill-proportioned, abrupt and allusive.¹⁵³ But its narrative of Count Raymond's confrontation with Alexius is clear enough. Raymond was ordered by Alexius 'to do him homage and fealty (*hominium et fiduciam*) as the others had done'. Eventually, after counsel from the other leaders and threats from Bohemond, Raymond did swear an oath to Alexius regarding his life and his possessions (*honorem*), 'that he would neither take them nor permit anyone else to do so; but when he was asked to do homage, he said that he would not, even on peril of his life'.¹⁵⁴ A more elaborate, but essentially compatible narrative is offered by Raymond of Aguilers. According to his account, Alexius, upon receiving Count Raymond, demanded of him 'homage and the oaths which the other princes had made to him'. Raymond refused, though he offered to 'commit . . . himself, his men and all his possessions' to Alexius, if Alexius would lead them with an army to Jerusalem. There followed the news that Byzantine forces had attacked Raymond's host, Raymond's bitter recriminations and a form of arbitration.¹⁵⁵ Then Alexius repeatedly sought homage from him and in the ensuing crisis Bohemond declared himself for the emperor 'should the count contrive anything against him, or if he put off homage and the oaths any longer'. Count Raymond's refusal of homage, together with the limited oath which he eventually swore are recounted in words almost identical to those of the *Gesta* and Tudebode.¹⁵⁶ The oath was thought worthy of a relatively

152. Ralph, preface, 603-04. Ralph acknowledges a debt only to Patriarch Arnulf, who has corrected his style. His claim that Bohemond, too, had hinted at the need for a written record of the First Crusade suggests that, at the time of their conversation, Bohemond was not making use of the *Gesta* as an instrument of propaganda. See above 219.

153. See above 226.

154. *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 13.

155. Raym. ch. 2, p. 238; Hill & Hill 23-4; above 205. Tudebode's account of the earlier part of Raymond's stay at Constantinople is close to, and quite possibly derivative from, Raym.'s: II, 6-8, pp. 20-2; Hill & Hill 29; above, n. 126.

156. Raym. ch. 2, p. 238; Hill & Hill 24; *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 13; Tudebode, II, 8, pp. 21-2; Hill & Hill 30.

detailed description at least partly because it was so exceptional. If, then, Raymond's oath was only a qualified one of non-aggression, non-incident and perhaps also of limited assistance (having close analogies in South French conventions), the oath of 'the other princes' which he refused must have involved a considerably more positive, forthright, commitment to Alexius. This inference dovetails with the clear indication of our early narrative sources that homage was the standard requirement made of the princes.¹⁵⁷

It was, indeed, customary in the West for homage and an oath committing a man to positive, active, service of his lord to be requited with a fief in the form of lands.¹⁵⁸ However, this was not a hard and fast rule even in Western Europe, and the position and predicament of the Crusader leaders at Constantinople in spring, 1097 was anything but customary. They regarded themselves as 'knights of Christ' or 'armed pilgrims' performing a sacred mission to Jerusalem at the pope's behest,¹⁵⁹ and very few of them were to show themselves in any way interested in lands of 'Romania'. To some extent, the ample presents of money which Alexius proffered in return for homage and an oath could have been regarded as a money fief.¹⁶⁰ But the decisive

157. Hill & Hill, *Convention of Alexius Comnenus* p. 323, nn. 9 & 10, p. 324 & n. 11, p. 326; Ganshof, *Recherches* 55, 62; above, n. 68. Pryor (*Oaths* 126-7) claims that the *Gesta* and the almost identically worded Tudebode are 'badly confused', seemingly on the grounds that while they represent Alexius as demanding 'homage and fealty' they make Bohemond threaten Raymond only in the event of his refusal of 'fealty', without mention of 'homage'. But this amounts to compression, not confusion. The two texts do not recite the declaration of Bohemond in full, because their immediately subsequent sentence suffices to show that homage as well as fealty was still at issue. There is no real contradiction between their version and Raymond of Aguilers' more circumstantial account, wherein Bohemond demands both homage and the oath (of fealty) of the count. The *Gesta* and Tudebode clearly regard 'homage and fealty' as Alexius' standard demand, but do not always spell out the cognate terms: above, n. 147.

158. As Pryor emphasizes: *Oaths* 115, 127; cf. de Waha in *B* 54 (1984) 408; J.C. Holt, '1086', *Domesday Studies*, ed. J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, Suffolk 1987) 58-9 & n. 78 (in relation to England after the Norman Conquest).

159. Riley-Smith 16, 99, 111 & nn. 102, 104 on p. 195. On the various forms a fief could take, see Bloch, *Feudal Society* 173-4.

160. Ralph of Caen indicates that the Crusade leaders were given to expect 'renewal' of the money which they had already been paid by the emperor: ch. 11, p. 613. Albert claims that Godfrey of Bouillon's host received weekly payments (in the form of 10

reason for the Crusade leaders' compliance with Alexius' demands was bleakly acknowledged by the author of the *Gesta*: 'It must have been because they were driven by great necessity'. Fulcher of Chartres states the position straightforwardly: 'It was essential that all establish friendship with the emperor, since without his aid and counsel we could not make our journey'.¹⁶¹ Short of supplies and far from home, they had no alternative but to agree to do homage, unpalatable as this undoubtedly was to proud, high-ranking magnates such as Godfrey of Bouillon and his brother, Baldwin. There is no good reason to doubt that a ceremony signifying homage was performed by each of them, while their oaths of fealty were solemnly sworn over some of the holiest relics in Christendom, including the Crown of Thorns and the True Cross.¹⁶²

At the same time, our Latin sources insist that sworn pledges were made by *both* parties, the emperor as well as the Crusade leaders. The *Gesta* recounts the terms which Alexius swore to the Crusaders, and earlier describes Godfrey as making a *pactum* with Alexius, while Fulcher of Chartres regards the leaders as having made a 'treaty' (*foedus*). A similar term, *pax*, is used in our earliest extant reference to Alexius' arrangement with the Crusaders.¹⁶³ The unanimity of the Latin sources on this point imposes on us the conclusion that Alexius did in fact offer sworn terms to the

modioi of gold *tetartera*) for a protracted period: II, 16, p. 311; Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie*, 56. Cf. Ganshof *Recherches* 62; Lillie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 23.

161. *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 12 (above, 226); Fulcher, I, 9, p. 332; trs. Ryan & Fink 80.

162. Raym. ch. 14, p. 267; Hill & Hill, 74-5; Hill & Hill, *Convention of Alexius Comnenus* 325, n. 13. Judging by the words which Raym. puts in Count Raymond's mouth, he swore his limited oath over these relics while the other leaders swore their (different) oaths over them, too. It is possible that this was the occasion upon which Adhemar of Le Puy acquired his relic of the True Cross: Riley-Smith 93. Adhemar joined Raymond at Constantinople: Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie* 69.

163. *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 12; I, 3, p. 6, where *pactum* presumably designates Godfrey's oath and homage rather than merely a ceasefire: see above 218 & n. 135; Fulcher, I, 9, p. 332; trs. Ryan & Fink 79; Hagenmeyer no. 12, p. 154; Ralph, ch. 17, p. 618 (*pacta foedera* of Bohemond); Albert, II, 19, p. 313 (*foedus* of Robert of Flanders). The close resemblance between the descriptions of Alexius' sworn undertakings in the *Gesta* and in the letter of, probably, April 1098 indicates that from a very early date (probably April 1097) the Crusaders at least believed in the existence of such an undertaking: above 228 & n. 139. The passage of the *Gesta* outlining what Alexius swore is not regarded as an interpolation by Krey.

Crusaders, individually or collectively, for all the silence of Anna Comnena.¹⁶⁴ Counter-oaths on the part of lords were not common, particularly when the ‘man’ had committed himself to a form of military service, as Godfrey of Bouillon and his fellows clearly had.¹⁶⁵ But the existence of counter-oaths would help to explain why so many of the leaders did comply with Alexius’ requirements. For his counter-offer (made, presumably, at the time of their oath-taking) seemed to assure the Crusaders of what they needed most — naval and military support, provisions and secure lines of communication. These corresponded, in the circumstances, most closely with the needs and aspirations of the majority of the Crusaders — far more so than any fiefs in the form of lands would have done. And the existence of counter-oaths would have made it the easier for the Crusaders to regard their arrangement with Alexius as a bilateral treaty instituting military cooperation, even though they had done homage to him. Ambivalence and inconsistency of thinking concerning ‘feudal’ relationships was not unknown in Western Europe. ‘Medieval theory’, it has been observed, ‘did not draw a very clear line between the feudal contract and what we should call a treaty’: in both cases, confirmation by means of a sworn oath played a key role.¹⁶⁶ The underplaying of the element of service is most apparent where both parties to the contract stood, or had hitherto stood, at the head of political structures. The homage of the duke of Normandy to the king of France in the eleventh or early twelfth century did not necessarily entail his tight subordination to, or service on behalf of, the king.¹⁶⁷ While the Crusaders’ indignation at the exaction of homage and, indeed, their subse-

164. It is not clear whether Alexius’ sworn terms were written down or whether they were in that case bestowed on the Crusaders in the form of a privilege — a chrysobull. No Latin source expressly mentions such a document. But a chrysobull containing, *inter alia* the emperor’s ‘promises’ (*hypeschemena*) was issued by Alexius for Bohemond in 1108; *Al. XIII*, 12, pp. 126, 137; *Sew. 425, 433*, See above 218 and n.171

165. Pryor, *Oaths* 128; cf. Bloch, *Feudal Society* 224; Ganshof, *Recherches* 61 & n. 9.

166. M. Powicke, *The loss of Normandy* (Manchester 1961²) 80; cf. Warren Hollister, *Anglo-Norman regnum* 203.

167. Warren Hollister, *Anglo-Norman regnum* 203. See, on the *gradual* emergence of a distinction between *homage de paix* and *homage vassalique* in the twelfth century, rendered on the border between Normandy and the French kingdom, Lemarignier, *Recherches sur l’hommage en marche* 90-112, 123-5.

quent behaviour indicates that they took their homage seriously, the foresaid considerations compounded that strong sense of reciprocity, of a contract entailing *mutual* obligations, which anyway informed vassals' bonds with their lords.¹⁶⁸

How far Alexius was, with his counter-oaths, consciously catering for the sensibilities of the high-ranking leaders of the Crusade is difficult to fathom.¹⁶⁹ It may well be that in practice he made concessions to Western pride and customs — concessions whose full significance he was inclined to obfuscate or simply failed to comprehend. We do not know the exact form of the arbitration to which he submitted himself in response to Count Raymond's charge of treachery. But such acts as handing over a pledge to the plaintiff smack more of Western than of Byzantine imperial practices.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that, a decade afterwards, it was still recognized on the Byzantine side that the deals struck with the Crusading leaders had been bilateral 'treaties', and not unilateral acts of submission.

The evidence comes from the *Alexiad*, whose Book XIII incorporates the terms which were sworn by Bohemond upon the failure of his bid to capture Dyrrachium in 1108. The text, drafted in Bohemond's name, refers back to 'the former treaty' (*he men protera symphonia*), concluded when Bohemond passed through Constantinople 'on my way from Europe to Asia for the liberation of Jerusalem'.¹⁷¹ There is no reason to suppose that the drafters of the 1108 terms were using an inappropriate label to designate the earlier terms. A copy of what was unquestionably a written document was available to them, and that document could, like the 1108 text itself, be called a 'treaty' (*symphonia*). Alexius, having essentially the upper hand in 1108, did not need to salve Bohemond's pride by referring to the earlier document by an unduly exalted name. So that document, like the 1108 text,

168. Bloch, *Feudal Society* 228; Le Goff, *Symbolic ritual of vassalage* 252-4; France, *Anna Comnena* 30.

169. Cf. de Waha in *B* 54 (1984) 407.

170. Above 205.

171. *Al.* XIII, 12, p. 125; Sew., 424. See Dölger no. 1243, pp. 51-2. Strictly speaking, the 'treaty' of 1108 was constituted by the chrysobull containing Bohemond's sworn terms, which Anna mentions but does not cite: Rösch, '*Kreuzzug*' *Bohemunds* 189-90.

most probably described itself as a ‘treaty’. Judging by the allusions made by the 1108 text, Bohemond’s *symphonia* of 1097 contained several clauses. It must, furthermore, have been confirmed by Bohemond with an oath. Part of that oath may have been couched in terms similar to those which he used for his oath at Dyrrachium, when several of the instruments of Christ’s Passion were invoked. Over at least two of these instruments, the Crown of Thorns and the True Cross, Raymond of Toulouse and other leaders had sworn their oaths in 1097.¹⁷² At Dyrrachium, Bohemond admits that he has violated ‘the agreed terms’ of the earlier ‘treaty’, which is now to be considered as in abeyance: Alexius may therefore not cite in accusation against Bohemond ‘what is agreed and written down in it’.¹⁷³ Only one of the clauses of the earlier ‘treaty’ is described and reaffirmed as valid, all the other clauses being declared null and void. This resurrected clause stated that Bohemond was ‘servant . . . and liege man’ (*doulon . . . kai lizion anthropon*) of the emperor. Thus in 1097 Bohemond had done liege homage to Alexius — a kind of super-homage, overriding one’s obligations to any other lord.¹⁷⁴ The connotations of liege homage in 1097 were presumably the same as those spelt out in 1108, when Bohemond declared himself ‘to speak more plainly and clearly, your household servant and underling (*oiketen kai hypocheirion*), since you have been pleased to draw me under your right hand and wish to make me your liege man’.¹⁷⁵

172. *Al.* XIII, 12, p. 137; *Sew.*, 433. See above, n. 162. Bohemond in 1108 swore holding the Gospels, the instruments of Christ’s Passion presumably being far away in Constantinople: Buckler, *Anna Comnena* 468, n. 3.

173. *Al.* XIII, 12, p. 125; *Sew.*, 424.

174. *Al.* XIII, 12, p. 126; *Sew.*, 425; J. Ferluga, ‘La ligesse dans l’empire byzantin’, *ZRVI* 7 (1961), repr. in Ferluga’s *Byzantium on the Balkans* (Amsterdam 1976) 401, 405-06. Pryor’s attempt (*Oaths* 131 & n. 108 on p. 141) to place more weight on the lack of mention of *lizios* in Book X of the *Alexiad* than on the very specific statement in the 1108 text fails to reckon with the opaqueness and compression of Anna’s narrative of the Crusaders’ oath-taking in 1097. See above 228, Lillie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 22-3. The original clause of the 1097 ‘treaty’ is represented as declaring Bohemond to be liege man to both Alexius and John Porphyrogenitus (his son and designated heir). The interests of Alexius and John were presumably deemed identical, however anomalous liege homage to two lords may have seemed to Westerners.

175. *Al.* XIII, 12, pp. 125-6; *Sew.*, 424. On the significance of liege homage, which is only widely attested in the West from the second half of the eleventh century onwards, see Bloch, *Feudal Society* 214-16.

If Bohemond in 1097 swore to abide by specific clauses of a written document, it is unlikely that the other Crusading leaders would have been excused from this requirement. Presumably their sworn undertakings, too, were dignified with the description of 'treaty' and were set down in writing. It is unlikely that there was any substantial variation between the undertakings of these individual leaders. Both Anna Comnena and the Latin sources clearly imply in their general references to 'the oaths' that they were standardized, and Western sources indicate that only the oath of Count Raymond differed significantly, on account of his stubborn refusal to swear 'the oaths which the other princes had made'.¹⁷⁶ The one specification of the terms of the oath vouchsafed by Book X of the *Alexiad* concurs with the evidence of Ekkehard of Aura and Raymond of Aguilers.¹⁷⁷ The fact of this concurrence adds credibility to our sources' general portrayal of the oath-taking. One may therefore suppose that Bohemond's oath and undertakings were broadly in line with those of the other leaders. However, an exception must be made of the key clause declaring Bohemond to be the 'servant . . . and liege man' of the emperor. For it is most improbable that the likes of Godfrey of Bouillon or his brother Baldwin could have stomached this degree of submission to Alexius. In the eleventh-century West homage might occasionally be rendered, at the dictates of circumstances, by one great lord to another. But the intense, unambiguous and highly personal bond of subordination which liege homage forged was of a different order. Dire as were the Crusaders' logistical problems at Constantinople and disunited as they then were, they would surely have offered even more resistance to a demand for liege homage than they did to that for homage. Plain homage is represented by the *Gesta* as an unwarranted humiliation for 'such brave and determined knights', and in this period liege homage was commonly named as such when it had occurred.¹⁷⁸ It is true that our early Latin descriptions of the oath-taking are very terse and the *Gesta*'s author seems

176. *Al.* X, 9, 10, pp. 221, 228-9; *Sew.*, 319, 325; *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 13; *Raym.* ch. 2, p. 238; *Hill & Hill* 23-4. See above 232.

177. See n. 144.

178. *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 12; cf. Lilie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 23.

to shy away from straightforwardly narrating the Crusaders' taking of their oaths.¹⁷⁹ It must also be conceded that neither the Latin writers nor, in her narrative of the Crusade in Book X, Anna Comnena, specify that Bohemond did liege homage or clearly distinguish between his form of homage and that of the other commanders. Not even Bohemond's liege homage of 1108 is expressly mentioned by the Latin writers who recount his unsuccessful assault on Dyrrachium.¹⁸⁰ However, it should be noted that none of these Latin writers actually participated in the Dyrrachium campaign, and two relatively well-informed sources do indicate that close ties were forged (or rather, reforged) between Alexius and Bohemond: the emperor adopted him as 'his son' according to the *Historia Belli Sacri*, while the *Narration of Fleury* clearly implies that Bohemond did homage to him.¹⁸¹ Collating their evidence with the sworn terms of the 'treaty' incorporated in Book XIII of the *Alexiad*, one may conclude that although Bohemond really did perform liege homage to Alexius in 1108, he managed to prevent news of this from circulating widely, at least in the West.¹⁸² In 1097, in contrast, most of the Crusade leaders had every reason to broadcast the contents of their sworn undertakings so as to account for their subsequent actions to their bemused followers. Some word of their abasement would surely have found its way into our sources, had their undertakings in fact involved liege homage. For nearly all the authors of the earliest narrative accounts went on the Crusade themselves or, in Ekkehard of Aura's case, passed through Constantinople a few years later.

179. Above 226-7.

180. This fact is stressed by Ferluga (*Ligesse* 410-11) in his bid to show that all the Crusading leaders performed liege homage in 1097. See Fulcher, II, 39, p. 418; trs. Ryan & Fink 193; Albert, X, 45, p. 652; *HBS*, ch. 142, p. 229; Will. Tyre XI, 6, col. 491; *Narratio Floriacensis de captis Antiochia et Hierosolyma et obsessio Dyrrachio*, ch. 14, *RHO*, V, p. 362; Yewdale 129-30.

181. *HBS*, ch. 142, p. 229. The *Narratio Floriacensis* (ch. 14, p. 362) describes Bohemond as 'submitting himself to him (Alexius) and promising fealty so long as he (Alexius) observed the terms which he had sworn'. On the date and provenance of these two works, see Rösch, "Kreuzzug" *Bohemunds* 182-4, 186.

182. In fact he succeeded in giving Western writers the impression that his Dyrrachium campaign had been successful for at least a generation after the event: Rösch, "Kreuzzug" *Bohemunds* 187-8, 190.

Why, then, did these authors fail to mention Bohemond's performance of liege homage to Alexius in 1097? It is possible that the liege homage may have been known to, or very strongly suspected by, writers such as the author of the *Gesta*, and that they deliberately passed over the event in silence, on grounds censorious or compassionate, or a combination of the two. Alternatively, Bohemond may have managed to prevent the full contents of his undertakings from becoming public knowledge among the Crusaders even though, as we have seen, those undertakings must have been written down in Greek. Bohemond's oath, if it was not sworn at his first, 'secret' meeting with Alexius, could have been given at another such private encounter. For over a month he was cut off from the overwhelming majority of his followers, who accompanied Tancred across the Bosphorus, and he thus had less occasion than other leaders to divulge to his followers the exact contents — or a copy — of his sworn undertakings. Thus the *Gesta's* statement that he was offered 'lands beyond Antioch' may simply echo speculative rumours which his long spell at Constantinople and conspicuous cooperation with Alexius had aroused.¹⁸³

A clear-cut boundary between information deliberately suppressed and more or less uninformed speculation on the part of the early writers is difficult to draw in this context. Bohemond must sooner or later have given some account of his oath to his followers and fellow-commanders, but he may well have withheld or grossly distorted the fact that he had done liege homage. Ralph of Caen represents Bohemond as swearing under duress a second oath to Alexius, that he would bring Tancred to render homage to him.¹⁸⁴ No express mention is made of liege homage. This tale, whether told to Ralph by Tancred or directly by Bohemond, may have been peddled by Bohemond in an attempt to explain away his collaboration with Alexius in 1097 and to disguise the fact that he was really acting then as Alexius' liege man. If Ralph's tale relays disinformation disseminated by Bohemond in the early 1100s, Bohemond is all the more likely to have wanted to mask

183. See above 215, 224-5, 227.

184. Ralph ch. 12, p. 614. See above 209-10 & n. 129.

the exact nature of his homage to Alexius at the time of its performance, in 1097. On balance, it seems to me much more likely than not that the author of the *Gesta* and other early writers wrote in ignorance of the fact that Bohemond had performed liege homage. In any case, their silence on this matter does not detract from the clear evidence as to his liege homage which the text incorporated into the *Alexiad's* Book XIII provides. Most significantly of all, Bohemond was almost certainly the only one of the Crusading commanders to perform liege homage to Alexius. This peculiarity dovetails with the evidence which we have assembled from, mainly, the Western sources and which points to the existence of a special relationship between Alexius and Bohemond in the spring and early summer of 1097.

V

Anna Comnena acknowledges that Bohemond was then on his best behaviour. She ascribes this partly to his innate deceitfulness, but also partly to the meagreness of his resources and the modest size of his warband: Bohemond, lacking a large following or wealth and in a position of relative inferiority, was eager to win Alexius' good-will and to mask his own basically hostile designs. Alexius, however, was wise to his wiles and schemes.¹⁸⁵ Anna maintains that Alexius merely pretended to be taken in by his show of compliance. Anna's statements about Bohemond's army and his position in Italy are inaccurate and yet not wildly wide of the mark, and they presumably derive from information available to Alexius in 1097. Bohemond's way of forming his band suggests that he could not call upon large reserves of manpower, and also attests his unscrupulousness. He was a late-comer to the Crusading movement, espousing it only in the summer of 1096; yet he managed to reach Constantinople before many who had responded to the launching of the great expedition in the closing weeks of 1095, notably Count Raymond of Toulouse.¹⁸⁶ Geography alone does not account for Bohemond's head-start.

185. *Al.* X, 11, pp. 230, 232, 233-4; *Sew.*, 326, 328-9. See above 190.

186. Above 210-11 & n. 68. On the financial burdens of preparing for the expedition, see Riley-Smith 44-7.

Essentially, he poached warriors from the army of his half-brother and uncle while they were besieging Amalfi by land and sea in a major operation. He was assisting in the siege when ‘suddenly by the inspiration of God’ he ordered his best cloak to be cut up and made into crosses. He wore one on his right shoulder and urged others to do likewise.¹⁸⁷ According to Lupus Protospatharius, ‘the other counts and more than 500 knights’ joined him.¹⁸⁸ Duke Roger Borsa of Apulia and Count Roger of Sicily, respectively Bohemond’s half-brother and uncle, dolefully abandoned the siege of Amalfi, for want of Christian warriors.¹⁸⁹ If, as Geoffrey Malaterra bitterly complains, Bohemond became involved in the siege deliberately in order to gain a ready-assembled army,¹⁹⁰ it is probable that the troops he could muster from his own lands and sphere of influence in Apulia were too few to make up an adequate contingent for the Crusade.

Anna Comnena is plainly at fault in making out that Bohemond possessed no lands at all.¹⁹¹ For his second revolt against his half-brother had yielded him the key city of Bari, as well as confirming him in the possession of the greater part of Apulia and some districts in Calabria.¹⁹² But it is no less plain that Bohemond remained far from content with his lot, as witness his alacrity, on hearing rumours of the death of his half-brother, in

187. Lupus Protospatharius, *Chronicon* s.a. 1096, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores*, V (Hanover 1844) 62; *Gesta*, I, 4, p.7.

188. Lupus Protospatharius s.a. 1096, 62.

189. Malaterra, IV, 24, p. 102. Numerous Saracens — to the tune of 20,000 — were there under the command of Count Roger, according to Lupus Protospatharius s.a. 1096, 62.

190. Malaterra, IV, 24, p. 102. Malaterra echoes the annoyance of his patron, Count Roger, at the collapse of the siege. But his scepticism about Bohemond’s motives may have been committed to paper before he had heard of his appropriation of Antioch: news of this would not have reached the West before the late summer of 1098. Malaterra links an abiding ambition of Bohemond to conquer ‘Romania’ with his observation of a huge host that was passing, without a leader, through Apulia *en route* for ‘Romania’. An idealistic gloss upon Bohemond’s motives is offered by Robert of Rheims, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, II, 3-4, pp. 740-1; cf. Jamison, *Some notes* 191-2; above, n. 42.

191. *Al. X*, II, pp. 233-4; Sew., 329.

192. Malaterra, IV, 10, p. 91; Ralph ch. 2, p. 606; Yewdale 27-8. Apparently, Bohemond and Roger Borsa had formally been reconciled by August 1088: L.-R. Ménager, *Recueil des Actes des Ducs Normands d’Italie*, I (Bari 1980) 168.

seizing the fortresses in Calabria which belonged to him.¹⁹³ This was in late 1093. The rumours proved false and Roger Borsa rallied from the grave illness which had given rise to them. Bohemond hurried to his half-brother's side and formally returned to him the fortresses which he had appropriated. Bohemond's revenues from cities such as Bari may well have been substantial but Roger Borsa still controlled such strategic keys to Apulia as Melfi, where he sat out his near-fatal illness. And Roger Borsa was able, in 1093 as on previous occasions, to discipline Bohemond by calling in his uncle, whom 'he used as a whip, to terrify the others'.¹⁹⁴ At the same time, Bohemond's own authority in Apulia did not go unchallenged. In 1091 he had been besieging Oria, one of the leading cities of Apulia supposedly under his sway, when the citizens 'with the assistance of certain persons' put him to flight and captured all his siege-equipment and his banners.¹⁹⁵ Exposed to both 'a whip' in the form of his formidable uncle and to irrepressible dissidence on the part of his own subjects, Bohemond's ambition (upon which Geoffrey Malaterra insists) was likely to be restless and to seize upon an opportunity for advancement elsewhere. Ducal authority was being infringed or challenged outright at many points in Southern Italy, and the revolt of Amalfi in 1096 was but one in a series of risings which had frayed the power of Roger Borsa since his second reconciliation with Bohemond.¹⁹⁶ Bohemond cannot have failed to appreciate the many obstacles which would impede his effective governance even were he to succeed in dislodging his half-brother and staying the 'whip'. Whatever his motives for joining in the siege of Amalfi may have been, his abrupt diversion of hundreds of knights away from it deftly placed him at

193. Malaterra, IV, 20, p. 99; Yewdale 33.

194. Malaterra, IV, 10, 20-1, pp. 91, 99.

195. Lupus Protospatharius s.a. 1092 (*sic*) 62.

196. The mounting dislocation in Calabria, Apulia and other lands under Norman rule is emphasized by S. Tramontana, 'La monarchia normanna e sueva', *Storia d'Italia*, III, *Il mezzogiorno dai Bizantini a Federico II* (Turin 1983) 546. On the proliferation of private castles to the detriment of ducal authority in Calabria from 1085 onwards, see G. Noyé, 'Féodalité et habitat fortifié en Calabre . . .', in *Structures féodales et féodalisme dans l'Occident Méditerranéen (X-XIII siècles)*, *Collection de l'École Française de Rome* 44 (1980) 625.8.

the apex of a substantial force which might enable him to find in the East richer pickings than Apulia or Calabria could ever yield.

It was not, however, a particularly large force. Neither was it indissolubly bound to Bohemond. If 'the other counts and more than 500 knights' amounted to around 550 cavalrymen in all, and if they were supported by six or seven times that number of infantrymen, the total number of combatants would have come to perhaps between 3,500 and 4,000 men, including the soldiers of Tancred.¹⁹⁷ This force is described by the *Gesta* as 'very strong' but not as numerous.¹⁹⁸ It is only later, Western-based writers such as Albert of Aix who offer specific figures for Bohemond's army.¹⁹⁹ It was probably the spectacular performance of Bohemond during the Crusade that induced Guibert of Nogent and Robert of Rheims to write vaguely of the multitude that flocked to Bohemond when he sported his cross at Amalfi.²⁰⁰ So Bohemond's contingent was not especially large, in comparison with those of rich magnates such as Godfrey of Bouillon or Raymond of Toulouse.²⁰¹ The fighting quality of the South Italian Normans was, indeed, high. However, their allegiance to Bohemond was less than staunch. Of the very few knights who can be identified as having already been Bohemond's vassals before the Crusade, the most prominent was Robert of Ansa.

197. 2,000 men are said to have followed Tancred back across the Vardar in order to aid those on the far side against the emperor's Turks and Pechenegs: *Gesta*, I, 4, p. 9. The rear-guard consisted of the unarmed and of sick or superannuated warriors, according to Ralph, who reckons their number as 'six hundred': ch. 5, p. 608. Not all Bohemond's men followed Tancred back across the river, so a total of between 3,500 and 4,000 combatants for Bohemond's force is plausible. Manselli (*Normanni d'Italia* 62) puts at between 3,000 and 4,000 Bohemond's 'army', counting therein women and servants but not the Norman counts and their retainers. Such a figure seems to me excessive.

198. *Gesta*, II, 5, p. 10.

199. Albert, II, 18, p. 312; Manselli, *Normanni d'Italia* 62.

200. Guibert, III, I, p. 151; Robert of Rheims, *Historia Hierosolimitana*, II, 4-5, p. 742. The 'many others' of Tudebode (I, 7, p. 16; Hill & Hill 24) represents, in my view, an abbreviation of the same list of companions of Bohemond as is to be found in the *Gesta*, and does not represent the words of a hypothetical lost source. Some additional names were, however, available to the author of *HBS*, ch. 7, pp. 176-7. The speech about Bohemond's army attributed to a messenger of Alexius by Ralph of Caen is, on Ralph's own avowal, not authentic: ch. 8, pp. 610-11.

201. On the Crusaders' numbers, see Runciman 337-9; Riley-Smith 63.

Only five years earlier he had helped Oria in its revolt against Bohemond and contributed towards his humiliation.²⁰² Bohemond was not to know in 1096 that Robert would stand by him through the expedition ahead. At least six of those who started off with Bohemond in the autumn of 1096 were related to him by blood or marriage, and it is likely that most of the other 'counts' and knights were connected in some way with the ruling houses of Apulia and Capua.²⁰³ These ties of kinship were not, however, invariably to Bohemond's advantage. At least one of Bohemond's relatives felt himself the near-equal of Bohemond. Tancred, his nephew, was only induced by flattery and presents to agree to a 'treaty' (*foedus*) whereby he would be second-in-command, 'as if a duke beneath a king'.²⁰⁴ Ralph of Caen represents Tancred as the hero of the long march eastwards. Ralph is manifestly biased and most probably relays the reminiscences of Tancred, but his swash-buckling account of Tancred's swimming of his horse back across the Vardar to the rescue of the rear-guard is confirmed by the *Gesta*, which states that 2,000 men followed him across the river.²⁰⁵ In fact, the *Gesta's* laconic statement that Bohemond 'was furious with Tancred and *all* the others' (my italics) when they proposed to sack a well-stocked town gains in intelligibility from Ralph's claim that many of the South Italian Normans were placing themselves under Tancred's lordship, in the wake of his feats on the Vardar.²⁰⁶ Bohemond overruled Tancred in the forementioned incident but, judging by the *Gesta's* wording, many shared Tancred's sentiments, and his independence of mind soon showed itself again. For after Bohemond had gone ahead to Constantinople, Tancred seems to have disregarded his wishes in leading the contingent off to

202. Jamison, *Some notes* 203; above 243.

203. Jamison, *Some notes* 195. The six relatives whose names are known to us are:— Tancred; Richard and Rainulf, sons of the count of the Principality of Salerno; Herman of Canne; Geoffrey of Montecaglioso; Robert, son of Gerard: Jamison, *Some notes* 195-8, 200-201.

204. Ralph chs. 2-3, pp. 606-07.

205. Ralph ch. 6, p. 609; *Gesta*, I, 4, p. 9; Tudebode, I, 10, p. 17; Hill & Hill 25-6; *HBS* ch. 10, p. 177. Here, Tudebode does add a significant detail, the name of one of the brothers of Count Geoffrey of Rossignolo: Jamison, *Some notes* 205-06. See also above n. 197.

206. *Gesta*, II, 5, p. 10; *HBS* ch. 11, p. 178; Ralph ch. 7, p. 610. See above 203.

a fertile valley where it could, in effect, pillage.²⁰⁷ Tancred's growing ascendancy is shown most clearly by the fact that 'nearly all Bohemond's host' accompanied Tancred across the Bosphorus. Only Richard of Salerno is named in our sources,²⁰⁸ but it is most probable that the other high-ranking Normans went with him. From these, too, homage and fealty would have been expected. Tancred and his fellows were, in dodging an encounter with Alexius, patently flouting the line which Bohemond had taken. And, as we have seen, open disagreement was to follow over Bohemond's 'delays' at Constantinople and over the homage which Bohemond obliged Tancred to render to Alexius.²⁰⁹ The differences between the two men over the treatment of the Greek towns which they passed and over policy towards Alexius were symptomatic of rivalry burgeoning between them. Bohemond, aged not less than thirty nine in 1097, was in danger of being outshone by his much younger nephew, of whom many were, 'from the great things they had seen, predicting greater'.²¹⁰

Anna Comnena is, then, wrong to depict Bohemond as landless, but she does convey the essence of his political and military stance in representing him as turning his back on Southern Italy and as possessing forces inferior to those of some of the other leaders.²¹¹ In this, she is probably roughly reflecting her father's reading of the situation in 1097. She shows no awareness of the incipient tensions between Bohemond and Tancred but her father had then recently received a reminder (albeit gratuitous) of the secessionist and self-willed tendencies of the South Italian Normans in the form of William de Grandmesnil.²¹² What Anna

207. *Gesta*, II, 5, p. 11; *HBS* ch. 12, p. 178. Above 207-08.

208. *Gesta*, II, 7, p. 13; *HBS* ch. 19, p. 180. See above 208.

209. See above 209-12.

210. Ralph ch. 7, p. 610.

211. *Al.* X, II, pp. 233-4, Sew., 328-9. We have no evidence that Bohemond appointed a regent for his Southern Italian holdings, neither do we know whether many of these had been sold to finance his expedition: Yewdale 36. More suggestive is the circumstantial evidence of the disparity between Bohemond's residual aspirations and his position in Southern Italy in the years immediately preceding 1096: above 242-3. See also France, *Anna Comnena* 22.

212. William de Grandmesnil had, like Bohemond, exploited the rumours of Roger Borsa's death in 1093 and had seized Rossano. He refused to relinquish it even after Count Roger intervened with 'many thousands of Saracens from Sicily and Calabria (*sic*)'. Eventually he had to submit to judgement and lost not only Rossano but also

singularly fails to offer is a satisfactory explanation of her father's treatment of Bohemond. For if he already knew that Bohemond was, in effect, a viper in his midst, why did he build up his prestige and power to a significant extent? There seems, in fact, to be some inconsistency, or at least unevenness, in Anna's account of her father's dealings with Bohemond at Constantinople. Initially she states that Alexius was anxious to whisk him across the Bosphorus before he could corrupt the other commanders, and the *leitmotif* of Bohemond's incitement of the other 'counts' to seize Constantinople under the guise of pilgrimage runs through the preceding pages of her account of the Crusade.²¹³ Yet Bohemond is represented as being summoned with the other commanders to receive advice from Alexius: he has not, after all, been chivvied across the Bosphorus.²¹⁴ The theme of Bohemond's baleful influence upon the other 'counts' does re-appear, but in a rather odd context — as the reason why Alexius headed off Bohemond's request for 'the Domesticate of the East'.²¹⁵ This is a remarkably temperate reaction on Alexius' part to a request which, from all that Anna has led us to expect, must have seemed impudent and unthinkable. Anna begs the question of how such a topic could even have arisen during Bohemond's conversations with Alexius: so brazen a request hardly fits the picture which she has painted of Bohemond's efforts to ingratiate himself with Alexius and to conceal his hostile designs. Anna explains Alexius' mild response to the request as being equally disingenuous stalling tactics: he did not want the villain to suspect that he had been unmasked already. But one may wonder whether Alexius did not overdo the alleged charade. For, on Anna's own evidence, he lavished on Bohemond valuable presents, of a sort that could be

the fiefs he held of Roger Borsa. Thereupon he went with his wife Mabel, a daughter of Guiscard, to Constantinople. He made this journey in, probably, the summer or autumn of 1094: Malaterra, IV, 21-2, pp. 99-101; Yewdale 33; Jamison, *Some notes* 199; L.-R. Ménager, 'Inventaire des familles normandes et franques émigrées en Italie méridionale et en Sicile (XI-XII siècles)', in *Roberto il Guiscardo e il suo tempo* (Rome 1975) 316-17; see also below 250.

213. *Al. X*, 5, 6, 9, 10, pp. 209, 212, 220, 228-9; *Sew.*, 311, 313, 319, 325; cf. France, *Anna Comnena* 21-2.

214. See above 191.

215. *Al. X*, II, p. 234; *Sew.*, 329.

translated into politico-military power.²¹⁶ The presents must have relieved — though, as we shall see, they did not solve — Bohemond's lack of means. Moreover, Western sources indicate that Bohemond was given important tasks, such as responsibility for the supply train to feed the hungry Crusaders at Nicaea.²¹⁷ All this did have the effect of keeping Bohemond isolated from Tancred and most of the South Italian Normans for several weeks and, to that extent, it disarmed him. However, far from being placed in isolation like a contagious virus (as some statements in the *Alexiad* would lead us to expect), Bohemond is employed to pressure the other commanders into doing homage. He threatens to 'take the emperor's part' against Count Raymond, if he persists in rebuffing the emperor's requests.

It is, indeed, possible to dismiss the forementioned inconsistency in Alexius' dealings with Bohemond as minor and as merely a flaw in Anna's literary craftsmanship. And one might interpret Alexius' conduct as an effective application of traditional 'divide-and-rule' diplomacy: Alexius spots the financial shortcomings and politico-military handicaps of Bohemond and does even more to alleviate them and to enhance his position among the Crusading leaders than Anna expressly acknowledges; he uses Bohemond to whip others into line, allowing him to become thoroughly unpopular with them in the process. Thus, it could be argued, Alexius played off Bohemond against the other leaders. Such an interpretation of Alexius' rationale is not absurd, but the concatenation of evidence up to the time of Taticius' withdrawal suggests that Alexius' attitude towards Bohemond was or became more positive than this. It was in such a context that the notion of 'the Domestication of the East' for Bohemond might have been aired without incongruity. I suggest that Alexius believed that he could buy Bohemond with an array of gifts and honours more abundant than his military position really warranted. He found him, in his actions, more pliable and also more reliable than the other commanders. He therefore hoped to use him as his chief intermediary with and, in effect, lieutenant over the Crusaders. Bohemond fulfilled this role punctiliously; pressing recalcitrants

216. *Al. X*, ll, p. 233; *Sew.*, 328.

217. See above 212-13.

to do homage and, after the fall of Nicaea, urging all the other commanders to take ship and journey to meet Alexius on some island in the Gulf of Nicomedia.²¹⁸ Alexius would not immediately formally appoint Bohemond as his commander-in-chief over the Latin forces bound for the East, even though Bohemond reportedly requested such an appointment and though his services to date would seem to have warranted it.²¹⁹ There was, after all, the possibility that, with the ‘Domesticate’, Bohemond ‘having subordinated all the counts . . . might bend them whichever way he wished’.²²⁰ Alexius did not trust anyone absolutely and preferred to maintain direct lines of communication and command with several leaders. Godfrey of Bouillon, Hugh of Vermandois and Robert of Flanders were among those who supplemented Bohemond’s efforts to induce magnates to swear fealty to Alexius. And Stephen of Blois — the man whom, from considerations as yet unexplained, the Crusaders elected to be their ‘lord’ (*dominus*) or ‘overseer’ (*provisor*) at some juncture after the battle of Dorylaeum — believed himself to be the special favourite of the emperor.²²¹ But while Alexius clearly did not treat exclusively with Bohemond, he regarded him as at once more capable and more trustworthy than the other leaders.

Did Alexius have *no* apprehensions about Bohemond as he approached the capital? I suggest that he did harbour apprehensions, but they were more to do with Bohemond’s talents as an obviously ambitious warrior than as a cunning diplomat or double-crosser. Anna claims that, at the time of the Crusade, Alexius knew ‘his false and deceitful character from of old’.²²² But in fact Alexius’ previous direct experience of Bohemond had been mainly of him as a brave, intelligent but rather impetuous

218. See above 209 & n. 101; Runciman 152, n. 1.

219. It may not be wholly fortuitous that Anna mentions his request for ‘the Domesticate of the East’ at the conclusion of his encounters with Alexius.

220. *Al. X*, 11, p. 234; *Sew.*, 329. Even seen against a background in which Bohemond was satisfactorily discharging major responsibilities, such a calculation on Alexius’ part would not have been unreasonable. It may, unlike the other premonitions and insights about Bohemond with which Anna credits him, be authentic. See above 247. 221. *Gesta*, II, 6, p. 13; Tudebode, II, 6, p. 20; Hill & Hill, 28-9; *Raym.* ch. 2, p. 237; Hill & Hill 22; *Al. X*, 9, p. 221; *Sew.* 319. See above 214. On Stephen’s election: Hagenmeyer no. 10, p. 149, 276-7; Riley-Smith 74 & n. 94 on p. 183.

222. *Al. X*, II, p. 230; *Sew.* 326.

general, during the Balkan campaign of 1082-83. Bohemond had routed Alexius and his army in battles at Ioannina and Arta, showing great resourcefulness as a field-commander, and swiftly altered his tactics to avoid the caltrops laid down by Alexius in the latter engagement.²²³ But at Larissa in 1083 Bohemond had fallen for a feigned flight manoeuvre which enabled the Byzantines to sack the Norman camp and to attack one of the Norman cavalry units from the rear. Bohemond, 'the consummate tactician', proved able to rally his troops and to maul the Byzantine forces which dogged him too boldly. Nevertheless, the loss of his camp and his provisions obliged Bohemond to raise his siege of Larissa and, since many of his 'counts' were suborned by Alexius' enticing messages, he had ignominiously to withdraw to Avlona and from there to Italy.²²⁴ To all intents and purposes, Alexius outwitted Bohemond, who had shown superb martial qualities and high intelligence, but no special signs of cunning. The character sketches of Bohemond which Alexius must have obtained from the defecting 'counts' would not, given the circumstances of their authors, have laid particular stress on his perfidiousness and some later Norman refugee rebels, such as William de Grandmesnil, acted in conjunction, if not direct alliance, with Bohemond and were presumably sympathetic towards him.²²⁵ So Alexius had no

223. *Al. V*, 4, pp. 18-21; Sew, 163-5; Malaterra, III, 39, p. 81; William of Apulia, *La geste de Robert Guiscard*, V, 5-23, ed. & trs. M. Mathieu (Palermo 1961) 236-7; Yewdale 18; M. Angold, *The Byzantine empire 1025-1204: a political history* (London 1984) 108.

224. *Al. V*, 6-7, pp. 27-32; Sew, 170-3; William of Apulia, *Gesta*, V, 30-76, pp. 236-41; Yewdale 20-2; Angold, *Byzantine empire* 108; A.A. Glabinas, 'Οἱ Νορμάνδοι στὴ Θεσσαλία καὶ ἡ πολιορκία τῆς Λαρίσας (1082-1083)', *Βυζαντικά* 4 (1984) 39-43; *idem*, 'Οἱ Νορμάνδοι στὴν Καστορίαν', *Βυζαντινά* 13 pt. 2 (1985) 1259-1260.

225. For the 'counts': *Al. V*, 7, p. 32; VI, 1, 5, pp. 43, 50; Sew., 173, 182, 188. On Peter of Alifa, see Nicol, *Some Greco-Latin families* 131. See n. 31 and, on William de Grandmesnil, n. 212. Bohemond's own half-brother, Guy, who migrated to Byzantium in or after 1085, is credited with great distress upon hearing a (false) report that Bohemond, 'honour and glory of the whole world, whom all the world feared and loved', was dead (*Gesta*, IX, 27, p. 64). These words, though concocted by the *Gesta's* author, may suggest that Bohemond's reputation among his fellow Normans in 1097-8 was that of a gallant warrior, not a political operator. The doubts which have been raised as to whether Alexius' consultation of Guy and Guy's lamentation originally formed part of the *Gesta's* text have yet to be substantiated. On Guy, see William of Apulia, *Gesta* 359 (Mathieu's commentary); *Al. VI*, 5, p. 51; Sew. 188-9; France, *Tatikios* 141.

reason to be on his special guard against deviousness and double-crossing on the part of Bohemond in 1097. He most probably regarded him as ambitious, able and less well-endowed than several of the other leading Crusaders: Bohemond was greedy, but every barbarian had his price and if his greed could be harnessed to the empire's service, he could be immensely useful. Such had been the case with other Frankish notables who had served at Byzantium. With at least one of them, Roussel de Bailleul, Alexius had been directly acquainted.²²⁶

There was, I suggest, one additional skill which marked out Bohemond from the commanders hailing from north of the Alps or, even, from Languedoc in 1097 — a language skill. For it is my contention that Bohemond spoke Greek, albeit with a 'barbarous' accent, and thus had a crucial advantage as intermediary between Alexius²²⁷ and the other Crusaders, and as liaison officer dealing with Greek officials and merchants in such matters as the provisioning of the Crusaders at Nicaea. One might suppose as much on *a priori* grounds. Norman rulers were prone to attend carefully to their sons' education in Normandy and in the South. According to Geoffrey Malaterra, himself of Norman extraction, 'eloquence' played such an important part in their education 'that you listen even to boys as though they were orators!' And he praises Count Roger of Sicily as being 'most eloquent'.²²⁸ Malaterra represents this 'eloquence' as serving practical political purposes. For example, through a mixture of threats and 'flattering words' Count Roger wins over eleven of the key towns in Calabria and subsequently harangues the citizens of Gerace, in the toe of Calabria, to induce them to hand over his captive brother to him.²²⁹ Assuming the essence of

226. On Roussel, see G. Schlumberger, 'Deux chefs normands des armées byzantines au XI siècle', *Revue Historique* 16 (1881) 296-301; L. Bréhier, 'Les aventures d'un chef normand en Orient au XI siècle', *Revue des Cours et Conférences* 20 (1911-12) 176-86; R. Janin, 'Les "Francs" au service des byzantins', *EO* 29 (1930) 66-7; K. Ciggaar, 'Byzantine marginalia to the Norman Conquest', *Proceedings of the Battle Conference on Anglo-Norman Studies* 9 (1987) 45-6.

227. That Alexius could not understand the language (or languages) of the Westerners is indicated by the fact that, upon observing the movement of a Crusader's lips, he had to ask an interpreter what he had said: *Al. X*, 10, p. 229; Sew., 324.

228. Malaterra, I, 3, 19, pp. 8, 19; Boehm, *Nomen gentis Normannorum* 687-8.

229. Malaterra, I, 36, p. 24; II, 26, p. 38; A. Nitschke, 'Beobachtungen zur normannischen Erziehung im 11. Jahrhundert', *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 43 (1961) 269-70.

Malaterra's account of the incident at Gerace to be true, Roger must have addressed the citizens in a language that was comprehensible to them — perhaps a Romance tongue, but quite possibly Greek. Important as were martial arts for the imposition of the Hautevilles' hegemony in Southern Italy, negotiation, cajolery and diplomacy were almost as essential in coming to terms with the heterogeneous inhabitants of the region, who far outnumbered them and many of whom were ensconced in inaccessible, fortified, hill-top towns. Neither the need for diplomacy nor the military service of numerous Saracen warriors was the less real for being underplayed in the Normans' propaganda about their exploits in the South.²³⁰ Language skills were, in these circumstances, vital components of statecraft and they are likely to have formed part of the education of second-generation Normans in the South. Thus both Tancred and Richard of Salerno are credited with having spoken Arabic at the siege of Antioch;²³¹ they are far likelier to have learnt the language before the Crusade than to have done so during its early stages. These scraps of evidence concerning individual Norman leaders, together with general consideration of the Normans' often uncertain hold on their subjects' loyalties and consequent need of the arts of persuasion, are more suggestive of their ability to speak their subjects' languages than the copious documents in Greek which they and their subordinates issued, confirmed or tolerated.²³²

230. On the Normans' self-image of valour and *strenuitas*, see Capitani, *Specific motivations* 7-8, 10, 21; G.A. Loud, 'The "Gens Normannorum" — myth or reality?', *Proceedings of the Battle Conference on Anglo-Norman Studies* 4 (1981) 111-12. For mention of the Saracens in Count Roger's employ, see above nn. 189, 212; Malaterra, IV, 17, p. 96. The recourse to diplomacy is exemplified by Roger Borsa's restoration to the citizens of Rossano of their right to a 'Greek' metropolitan in a (successful) bid for their surrender: Malaterra, IV, 22, p. 100; L.-R. Ménager, 'La "byzantinisation" religieuse de l'Italie méridionale (IX-XII siècles) et la politique monastique des normands d'Italie', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* 54 (1959) 28, repr. in Ménager's *Hommes et Institutions de l'Italie normande* (London 1981) no. 1.

231. *HBS* ch. 67, p. 198. Count Roger's son, Roger II, was, of course, familiar with both Greek and Arabic.

232. See, e.g. charters of Count Roger in *I diplomi greci ed arabi di Sicilia*, ed. S. Cusa, I (Palermo 1868) 4-6, 385-90; *ibid.*, II (Palermo 1882) *sommario* 695ff. The Byzantine imperial ideological topos of the ruler dispensing benefits on his subjects as the sun radiates light occurs in, for example, a charter issued at Palermo in 1097:

These *a priori* grounds for attributing to Bohemond a working knowledge of Greek gain some support from South Italian evidence. That the design of his lead seal and the formula of its legend should have conformed to Byzantine conventions is perhaps unremarkable, in view of the importance of the Greek element in towns such as Taranto, which were under his sway.²³³ Rather more significant is a charter in Greek, dating from October 1087. In it Bohemond confirms the rights of the monastery of St Peter in Taranto over various possessions around the town. Bohemond states that the abbot had approached him while he was staying in Taranto and had 'shown' him the ancient document in which 'Leo the son of David' had made over these possessions to St Peter's. Bohemond's charter is said to have been sealed with a wax seal: 'I have done this, because I do not have my lead seal here'.²³⁴ This statement suggests a fairly informal context for the meeting of Bohemond with the abbot. Doubtless the charter was drafted — somewhat colloquially — by a clerk. But the following words strongly suggest that Bohemond had personally perused the deed of Leo the son of David: '. . . this you have shown me in the document indicating that these [properties] are dedicated

ibid., II, 509; cf. H. Hunger, *Proimion. Elemente der byzantinischen Kaiseridee in den Arengen der Urkunden* (Vienna 1964) 78 & n. 109. The dossier of acts of a Messina monastery points to the persistence of *spoken* Greek of a distinctive form in parts of Sicily and Calabria even in the thirteenth century: A. Guillou, *Les actes grecs de S. Maria di Messina* (Palermo 1963) 24, 32-3. See also A. Guillou, 'Les archives grecques de S. Maria della Matina', *B* 36 (1966) 306-07 repr. in Guillou's *Studies on Byzantine Italy* (London 1970) no. 5; A. Guillou *et al.*, *Saint-Jean-Théristsès. 1054-1264* (Vatican 1980) 47-58, 59-61, 69-73. While the Latin élite in Apulia and Calabria frequently imposed restrictions on Greek monasteries, even they had to come to terms with the persistent strength of Basilian monasticism in certain areas: Ménager, "Byzantinisation" religieuse, 27-32.

233. The seal authenticates a Latin diploma of 1090. Its reverse bears the conventional invocation in Greek: 'Lord, help thy servant Bohemond': A. Engel, *Recherches sur la numismatique et sigillographie des Normands de Sicile et d'Italie* (Paris 1882) 92 & pl. II: 1; Yewdale 30; Epstein, *Cathedral of Canosa* 87. For the repercussions of the Greek element's importance on Norman ecclesiastical policy in the area of Taranto, see C.D. Fonseca, 'La prima generazione normanna e le istituzioni monastiche dell'Italia meridionale', *Roberto il Guiscardo e il suo tempo* (Rome 1975) 138-40.

234. F. Trinchera, *Syllabus Graecarum Membranarum* (Naples 1865) 65-6; R. Morris, 'The Byzantine aristocracy and the monasteries', *The Byzantine aristocracy*, ed. M. Angold (Oxford 1984) 123-4.

to the monastery'.²³⁵ Presumably Leo's deed of dedication was, like Bohemond's charter of confirmation, in Greek. But it is Anna Comnena who offers the most unequivocal evidence that Bohemond understood Greek — and could even pun in it! For when Bohemond fell for a feigned flight of the Byzantines near Larissa, he pursued them in the direction of Lykostomion. According to Anna, he halted on a small river island and, while eating grapes, he kept repeating a joke. He said, 'pronouncing Lykostomion with a barbarous accent, "I've thrown Alexius to the wolf's mouth!"'.²³⁶ Bohemond was not actually at Lykostomion, which lay a considerable distance north of his camp at Larissa, at the time of perpetrating this pun.²³⁷ He is most unlikely to have enquired about the derivation of Lykostomion in advance. Therefore his pun was impromptu and sprang from a working knowledge of Greek.

This conclusion interlocks with the evidence of the Latin sources concerning Bohemond's method of gaining entry into Antioch. He is said by the *Gesta* to have struck up 'a very great friendship' with Firuz, who was the warden of three towers and a Moslem of Armenian descent.²³⁸ The precise means whereby the

235. ' . . . touto epi to eggraphon hypedeixas moi, deloun tauta einai eis apherosin tes mones': Trinchera, *Syllabus* 66. Manselli concluded from this document that Bohemond knew Greek, but did not detail his reasons or elaborate upon this topic: *Normanni d'Italia* 57, n. 2.

236. 'ton Alexion eis lykou stoma enebalon': *Al.* V, 6, p. 29; Sew., 171. See above 250. Anna's detail of the grapes would point to a date in July, at the earliest, for the battle, whereas an earlier dating for the battle seems more probable: Glabinas, *Oi Νορμάνδοι στη Θεσσαλία* 41.

237. See J. Koder & F. Hild, *Tabula Imperii Byzantini* 1. *Hellas und Thessalien* (Vienna 1976) 208 & map facing 316.

238. *Gesta*, VIII, 20, p. 44. The *Gesta* represents Firuz as an 'emir of the Turkish race', echoing the allusion to him as 'a certain Turk' in the princes' letter of September 11 1098: Hagenmeyer no. 16, p. 162. However, he was according to Raym. (ch. 8, p. 251; Hill & Hill 46) 'one of those who had been Turkicized' and Anna regards him as an Armenian (*Al.* XI, 4, p. 19; Sew., 342). So, too, does Ralph, who emphasizes that although he had apostatized to Islam, his former religion was not forgotten by his Turkish master, who put him in charge of a tower where he would be least likely to encounter the Crusaders: ch. 62-3, pp. 651-2. Ralph's detailed, coherent account of the traitor's origins and circumstances is compatible with Raym. and Anna, as well as with Matthew of Edessa and the Arabic sources: Runciman, 231, n. 3. It is therefore to be preferred even to the princes' letter of September 11 1098 where Bohemond's deal with 'a certain Turk' is recounted in the first person singular. This represents, in my view, deliberate simplification on Bohemond's part for the sake

'friendship' was formed are unclear. For while the *Gesta* and subsequent or closely-related chronicles represent Bohemond as communicating with Firuz by a series of messages, Ralph of Caen and Fulcher of Chartres regard Firuz as first broaching his plan on a secret visit to Bohemond.²³⁹ Since Ralph may well have gleaned his information from Bohemond himself, and since his account is similar to Fulcher's, their version of Firuz's mode of contacting Bohemond may well be correct. It is therefore noteworthy that, according to Bartolf of Nangis, Bohemond 'knew his (Firuz's) language'.²⁴⁰ Bartolf's work is essentially a résumé of the earlier chapters of Fulcher, but Bartolf was writing in the East and at an early date — probably around 1108. He may therefore here be offering authentic information, rather than merely a rationalization. Bartolf does not specify which language was used by Bohemond for his converse with Firuz, but seeing that Firuz was a wealthy, well-established citizen of Antioch, he is very likely to have spoken Greek,²⁴¹ while Bohemond would not have known Arabic or Turkish.²⁴² So Bartolf's gloss upon Fulcher points clearly to a knowledge of Greek on Bohemond's part. And even if we reject the version of Firuz's contact with Bohemond proffered by Bartolf, Fulcher and Ralph in favour of the *Gesta's* version, Greek still emerges as the likeliest medium of communication. For the *Gesta* indicates that Firuz spoke some Greek and that he supposed that troops under Bohemond's command would be able to do the same. When Firuz saw that only

of heightening the contrast between himself and the infidel foe: to have explained that the traitor was an Armenian apostate would have been to risk bathos. Bohemond could have been more discursive in recounting the affair to Ralph.

239. *Gesta*, VIII, 20, p. 44; Tudebode, IX, 3, p. 54; Hill & Hill 61; Ralph ch. 63, p. 652; Fulcher, I, 17, pp. 342-3; trs. Ryan & Fink 98-9. The accounts of Ralph and Fulcher seem to be independent of one another, even though they are similar. For Fulcher takes Firuz to be a Turk.

240. Bartolf of Nangis, *Gesta Francorum expugnantium Hierusalem* ch. 13, *RHO*, III, p. 499.

241. Raym. implies that he was one of the Armenians who had been 'Turkicized . . . fourteen years previously', when Antioch had fallen to the Turks: ch. 8, p. 251; Hill & Hill 46. See also Ralph ch. 62, pp. 651-2; Runciman 231, n. 3.

242. This can be inferred from the fact that he communicated with the 'Saracen' leaders of Marra through an interpreter: *Gesta*, X, 33, p. 77; Yewdale 7, n. 28. Armenian would also surely have been beyond Bohemond's ken.

a few men had clambered up the ladder onto the battlements, he reportedly cried ‘“Micro Francos echome!” (That is: we have few Franks!) “Where is the hero Bohemond? Where is that unconquered man?”’²⁴³ It was a ‘Lombard’, i.e. a non-Norman inhabitant of Southern Italy, who descended the ladder to fetch Bohemond. Presumably he had heard and understood Firuz’s question. The same assumption can, in my view, be made of the author of the account to be found in the *Gesta* and in Tudebode: he seems to have been one of the scaling party.²⁴⁴ Greek, albeit of a rough and ready sort, seems to have been the *lingua franca* of these habitués of fringe areas of the Byzantine world. So if, following the *Gesta*, we suppose Bohemond and Firuz to have forged a ‘very great friendship’ by means of ‘messengers’, the language used is most likely to have been Greek.

Assuming that the above evidence — of which the pun on Lykostomion is the most conclusive item — does establish Bohemond’s command of Greek, one must admit that other South Italian Normans at Constantinople in 1097 could probably do so, too. If Tancred and Richard of Salerno could speak Arabic, they may well also have had Greek, while those who had migrated to Byzantium before the Crusade had every reason to learn the language. We have already noted William de Grandmesnil, a son-in-law of Guiscard, and Peter of Alifa, to whom Comana was entrusted by Taticius.²⁴⁵ Still more suggestive is the case of Bohemond’s own half-brother, Guy, who had changed sides in or after 1085. By 1098 he had gained sufficient fluency in Greek to be one of Alexius’ confidants. When Alexius was told by the fleeing Stephen of Blois that the Crusaders had probably been wiped out at Antioch by the Turks, he ‘called Guy . . . and certain others to a secret council’ and sought their advice.²⁴⁶ It is

243. *Gesta*, VIII, 20, p. 46; Tudebode, IX, 6, pp. 57-8; Hill & Hill, 63.

244. The vivid, detailed, description of the scaling of the battlements, together with the use of the first person plural, indicate that it was written by an eye-witness: *Gesta*, VIII, 20, p. 47 & n.1; Tudebode, IX, 6, pp. 57-8; Hill & Hill 64. Firuz’s laudatory reference to Bohemond is not implausible: according to Ralph, Bohemond’s earlier campaigns against Byzantium had made him famous in Asia and Orientals now supposed him to be the ‘prince of princes’ among the Crusaders: ch. 63, p. 652. Ibn al-Atir (or rather, his source) was numbered among them: Yewdale 65, n. 65.

245. nn. 31, 212.

246. *Gesta*, IX, 27, p. 63.

probably no accident that, of all the Crusading leaders, Bohemond alone is described as having ‘talked’ or ‘secretly’ conferred with Alexius.²⁴⁷ Among the Crusaders, an ability to communicate with Alexius in his own language is likely to have been the prerogative of the South Italian Normans and, as we have seen, most of them bypassed Constantinople in order to avoid a meeting with Alexius.²⁴⁸ Thus Bohemond probably emerged as the only leader of a Crusading contingent who was both able and willing to ‘talk’ with Alexius — and with his Byzantine officials. This may well be one reason, though not the sole or paramount one, why Bohemond is pictured so vividly and with such detail by Anna Comnena. For she could draw on a wider range of informants, who had spoken with or simply heard him, than was the case with other leaders. Thus we have stories of Bohemond’s conversations with Byzantine cooks in the Cosmidion and with an official in the palace.²⁴⁹ Moreover, the conversation between Alexius and Bohemond at Dyrrachium in September 1108 is reported in considerable detail. The obvious implication of Anna’s account is that the dialogue was conducted without interpreters: Bohemond’s words are described as carefully phrased, and his replies were ‘evasive in every way’.²⁵⁰ For all the emperor’s eloquence, the

247. See above 216-17, Guy, who was already at Constantinople in 1096, cannot be regarded as a Crusading leader.

248. Above 208. Fluency in spoken Greek was highly exceptional, though not wholly unknown, in Normandy: Ciggaar, *Byzantine marginalia* 49, 51.

249. *Al. X*, ll, pp. 231, 233; *Sew.*, 327, 328. Anna’s account of the conversations between Alexius and Bohemond in 1097 is inconclusive as evidence, for she also depicts Alexius as addressing a Frank directly in a situation where an interpreter must have been employed: *Al. X*, 10, pp. 229-30; *Sew.*, 326; above, n. 227.

250. *Al. XIII*, 10, p. 123; *Sew.*, 423. Yewdale (7 & n. 28) considers and casts grave doubt upon the possibility that Bohemond knew Greek, on the grounds that one member of the delegation sent to initiate negotiations with him, and to act as hostages, is said to have ‘known the Celtic language’ (*Al. XIII*, 9, p. 117; *Sew.*, 418). But his role cannot have been that of an ‘interpreter’, as Yewdale supposes. For two others of the four-man delegation could speak for themselves, being of Western origin, Marinos of Naples and ‘the Frank Roger, who was celebrated for his bravery’. Both are said to have been ‘intelligent and to have had great experience in Latin customs’ (*ibid.*). While their language skills qualified the three Latin-speakers to comb through the preconditions for negotiations with great care and to answer any awkward points that Bohemond might raise, they also enabled them to comprehend what others in Bohemond’s camp were saying, such as the ‘count called Hugh’ (*Al. XIII*, 9, p. 120; *Sew.*, 420), and generally to appraise the situation through conversing with persons

two men failed to reach agreement. According to Anna, it was her own husband whom Bohemond, on the point of departure from Alexius' camp, invited to his tent. Nicephorus Bryennius used all his powers of persuasion, being 'matchless in argument and oratory', to try and induce Bohemond to accept most of Alexius' terms. Upon succeeding, he took Bohemond by the hand and led him back to the emperor.²⁵¹ Anna does not credit Bryennius with a knowledge of Latin and his matchless oratory would have been rather pointless if it had had to be channelled through an interpreter. Anyway, this seems to have been a very private meeting *à deux* in the tent assigned to Bohemond. There is therefore every reason to believe that this and other conversations between Bohemond and Byzantines were conducted in Greek. Some of them, such as the talks of Alexius and Bryennius, were recounted directly to Anna, and her quite detailed reportage of Alexius' debate with Bohemond at Dyrrachium may well capture some of the phrases actually used by either party.²⁵²

It had, I suggest, been Bohemond's facility with Greek, as well as his obvious military talents and his less than abundant resources, that made him look so promising an instrument of policy for Alexius in 1097: not so much as one strong leader to be played off against the others as a celebrated soldier of fortune, rather down on his luck. Bohemond was, with his formidable military record, his intelligence and his organizational skills, unique, but not uniquely threatening. Rather, he appeared to Alexius uniquely serviceable, competent to act both as a persuasive go-between, accurately interpreting on Alexius' behalf, and as whipper-in of the packs of 'Franks'. And assuming that he could

other than Bohemond. These three Latin-sepakers remained as hostages with Bohemond's half-brother, Guy, himself Grecophone, and now back in league with Bohemond. It was the fourth, and seemingly Latinless, emissary, Constantine Euphorbenos, who escorted Bohemond to the Byzantine camp (*Al.* XIII, 9, 10, pp. 120-1; *Sew.*, 420-1). This last fact tends to confirm my contention that Bohemond could speak Greek. On 'the frank Roger', see Nicol, *Some Greco-Latin families* 123-4. 251. *Al.* XIII, 11, p. 125; *Sew.*, 423-4.

252. *Al.* XIII, 11, p. 124; *Sew.*, 423. Anna seems also to indicate that Bohemond corresponded with Alexius in Greek, reading 'in private' a letter from Alexius and then 'writing' a reply, which Anna cites: *Al.* XI, 9, p. 39; *Sew.*, 358. Further, she appears to quote *verbatim* from a message which Bohemond dictated, 'using an insolent and utterly barbaric utterance (*phone*)', to be sent to Alexius: *Al.* XI, 12, p.

read and write, as well as speak, Greek, his potential as a kind of quartermaster and, indeed, general administrator must have seemed great: in provisioning and supplies lay Alexius' best means of aiding and influencing the Crusaders.

Alexius probably regarded Bohemond as volatile, subject, like 'all Latins' to sudden shifts of mood, in the manner suggested by the tale of his successive reactions to the gift of treasures.²⁵³ But the same tale suggests that Alexius believed he had taken Bohemond's measure: a roomful of silver and gold could buy him. Alexius' response to Bohemond's request for 'the Domestic of the East', deferring a formal appointment until Bohemond had given further proof of himself through his actions and 'fidelity', implies residual apprehensions about Bohemond and a preference for direct lines of command with several leaders.²⁵⁴ But the request, as reported in the *Alexiad*, may well have confirmed Alexius in the impression that Bohemond had now nailed his colours to the Byzantine mast. It did not rouse in him suspicions that Bohemond was especially devious and perfidious. Other Norman notables had, after all, changed their spots, including Bohemond's half-brother, Guy, while another sibling of Bohemond, his half-sister, Olympias-Helena, had been brought up at Alexius' court and had been sent back to the West, to Count Roger of Sicily, only a year or so previously.²⁵⁵ Bohemond was not quite on the footing of a family friend of the Comneni. But his irreproachable conduct throughout his stay at Byzantium gave Alexius reason to believe that Bohemond's interests were now attached to his own. It must be emphasized that Alexius remained fearful and wary of the Crusading leaders as a whole, and took care to prevent Nicaea from falling to an armed assault on the Crusaders' part. His choice of a sea island for his final encounter with the leaders suggests a continuing preoccupation with his per-

51; Sew., 368. Perhaps it is significant that there is no mention of provision for translation in the text of Bohemond's sworn terms of September 1108.

253. *Al. X*, 11, p. 233; Sew., 328.

254. *Al. X*, 11, p.234; Sew., 329; above 249.

255. Having journeyed to Byzantium in 1076, Olympias-Helen stayed there 'for about twenty years': Orderic Vitalis, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, VII, 5, ed. & trs. M. Chibnall, IV (Oxford 1973) 14-15; von Falkenhausen, *Olympias* 67-8 & n. 57.

sonal security.²⁵⁶ Viewed against this background, his instruction to pay Taticius to pay more heed to Bohemond than to any other Crusading commander becomes understandable. The Latin hosts, whose constituent parts shifted like grains of sand, still lacked a command structure worth the name,²⁵⁷ and God alone knew what would become of them, as they lumbered off towards the hinterland of Asia Minor. To Alexius, Bohemond must have appeared one of the few elements making for order and discipline in an essentially anarchic rabble.

Bohemond's position during his time of proximity to Alexius has already been outlined.²⁵⁸ Tancred's crossing of the Bosphorus with 'nearly all Bohemond's host' was an event which neither Bohemond nor Alexius can have foreseen. It was of great importance in crystallizing the relationship between the two men. For it compounded the general considerations which had already prompted Bohemond to cooperate closely with the emperor. Having no firm assurance that he would regain the leadership over the Italian Normans (who seem already to have been inclining away from him and towards Tancred during the march across the Balkans)²⁵⁹ and basically living from day to day, Bohemond was heavily dependent on Alexius' favour and funds, and all the readier to comply with his wishes. This, in turn, must have appeared to Alexius confirmation of the efficacy of his cossetting of Bohemond. In the event, Bohemond seems to have had no difficulty in reasserting his authority over most, if not all, the members of his contingent during the siege of Nicaea.²⁶⁰ And when the Crusaders set forth from the Sangarios valley in the direction of Dorylaeum, Bohemond was one of the commanders of what was, in effect, the vanguard. Tancred, Duke Robert of Normandy and seemingly all the Normans from Northern Europe as well as the South, were in this company, together with Stephen

256. *Al.* XI, 2, pp. 12-13; *Sew.*, 337-8; above 249.

257. Riley-Smith 73-9.

258. Above 199-201.

259. Above 245.

260. *Gesta*, II, 8, p. 16; Tudebode, II, 9, p. 22; Hill & Hill 31. However, the *Gesta's* statement that Tancred was 'next to him' may well indicate that Tancred now had gained sufficient followers (presumably at Bohemond's expense) to command a separate station.

of Blois and Count Robert of Flanders.²⁶¹ With every mile trodden away from Byzantium, and with every fresh feat of generalship — such as his resourceful response to the Turkish attack in the plain near Dorylaeum — Bohemond's personal stock and authority grew, and his immediate reliance on Alexius' patronage lessened. In Bohemond's cool calculations of where his interests lay — in a mould far removed from that of the 'sea polyp' mentioned in the *Alexiad* — his connexion with Alexius hung in the balance. But the balance had still not swung wholly against a policy of cooperation. The principal roles of the contingent commanded by Taticius were formally to receive captured cities from the Crusaders and, presumably, to negotiate with those cities or forts willing to surrender without bloodshed. Most important of all, though, Taticius' men served as guides to the Byzantine road system,²⁶² and probably also as scouts. They must therefore have travelled in the van, with Bohemond. It is significant that Anna's account of the hostilities near Dorylaeum concentrates on the actions of Bohemond and his companions: presumably her informant was Taticius, and he was in the vicinity of Bohemond.²⁶³ Bohemond would have been aware that, once

261. Only Anselm of Ribemont's first letter (of November 1097) mentions Stephen and Robert of Flanders as in the 'lesser army' of the van, and in grouping Robert thus Anselm contradicts the *Gesta* (III, 9, p. 18) and other, later, chronicles (Hagenmeyer no. 8, p. 145). But preference must be given to Anselm's version, as being almost contemporary, even though Anselm himself was absent — at Alexius' camp — at the time of the battle of Dorylaeum. The *Gesta's* author, although present, may have supposed that Robert of Flanders was in the second army from the fact that he fought beside Raymond of Toulouse, Godfrey of Bouillon and Hugh of Vermandois, leaders of the second army, in the main battle. See also Yewdale 48; Runciman 184, 186. It is noteworthy that neither Robert of Flanders nor Robert of Normandy had shown any hostility to swearing an oath to Alexius, while Stephen's delight with his reception is manifest: Lilie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 9, 15; below 269. Tancred alone among the leaders would have been a less than congenial travelling companion for Taticius in the vanguard.

262. *Al.* XI, 3, XIV, 2, pp. 17, 146; Sew., 341, 439. Though the role of guidance is not specifically mentioned by Anna, it was the obvious way in which Taticius could have 'by every means assisted [the Crusaders] and braved the first danger (*prokindyneuonta*)'. Moreover, Taticius' commission to act as guide is expressly mentioned by Tudebode, VI, 5, p. 41; Hill & Hill 49. Taticius' men, cognizant with Turkish military formations, would also have been useful as scouts. They appear to have been lightly-armed 'peltasts': above, n. 21.

263. *Al.* XI, 3, p. 18; Sew., 341-2. Above, n. 34.

the Crusaders attempted to take large fortified cities, they would have either to blockade or to storm them, and that Antioch would pose particular problems. There, the Crusaders would be likely to need Byzantine supplies, in the event of a lengthy siege, or siege-equipment, in the event of an assault: Byzantine-built catapults and other engines (*helepoleis*) had played an important part in the reduction of Nicaea,²⁶⁴ and Byzantine ships had the capability of supplying the Crusaders at Antioch or the coastal cities further south. Thus Byzantium's usefulness to the Crusaders in general and to Bohemond in particular was by no means exhausted: he had, after all, probably gained in influence and standing from his role as quartermaster at Nicaea. And in the event that the description of Bohemond as 'count of the Romans' (*comes Romanorum*) represents the original reading of a letter of Anselm of Ribemont, Bohemond at the time of the battle of Dorylaeum was still conspicuously closely associated with the Byzantines.²⁶⁵

VI

No attempt will be made here to resolve all the source problems beclouding the history of the siege of Antioch or closely to follow Bohemond's military feats during the winter of 1097-98. Not only are the sources contradictory or opaque: the situation at the time was confusing and fast-changing. The Crusaders' position during the siege was often very vulnerable. It was a time when an opportunist would wish to keep his options open and Bohemond was an arch-opportunist, as Anna Comnena observed with the benefit of hindsight.²⁶⁶ Even so, a number of certainties, or at least high probabilities, about the course of events stand out.

264. *Al.* XI, 2, pp. 11-12; Sew., 336-7. Above 200-201, 208.

265. Hagenmeyer no. 8, p. 145. Hagenmeyer (p. 260) suggests 'Normannorum' as an emendation of 'Romanorum', and the phrase could then designate Robert of Normandy, as it does in Anselm's second letter (*ibid.*, no. 15, p. 160). However, the phrase could be interpreted (as it is by Hagenmeyer) as being in apposition to 'Boemundus' and, giving preference to the *lectio difficilior*, one could take it as an allusion to Bohemond's close ties with the empire — though surely not as an official title that had been conferred on him.

266. 'oxys pros ta symptonta', *Al.* X, 11, p. 233; Sew., 328. The Byzantines' final judgement on Bohemond concurs with that of his contemporary, Malaterra. See n. 190.

At the beginning of the siege of Antioch many of the leaders proposed that the Crusaders should spend the winter dispersed in various strongholds; they should wait for the arrival of a Byzantine army and for that of an army which was reported to be coming from the West.²⁶⁷ These leaders are not named, but Taticius is most likely to have been one of them: delay would allow the Byzantine navy time in which to bring siege-equipment, provisions and, perhaps, troops; Byzantine strategy anyway tended to favour blockades as substitutes for, or preliminaries to, direct assaults on fortresses. However, Raymond of Toulouse together with some other leaders pressed for a close siege. They reportedly proclaimed that they should all put their trust in God and (inaccurately) attributed the capture of Nicaea to him. Their arguments or Raymond's influence carried the day. The close siege which followed failed to bring about a rapid surrender and by January 1098 the food shortage was horrendous, for all the Crusaders' attempts at foraging. In these efforts to secure provisions Bohemond had played an outstanding part.²⁶⁸ In the first days of the New Year, Bohemond began to cry poverty and threatened to depart, saying that his men and his horses were perishing from 'want', and 'that he was not a rich man (of the sort) whose private wealth might suffice for so long a siege'.²⁶⁹ A few days later Taticius revived the notion of a blockade, 'daily' urging its merits upon leading Crusaders: they were to harry — and, in effect, starve out — the Turks from their bases in nearby *castella*.²⁷⁰ Taticius seems to have managed to organize the bringing of some corn and other essential food from Cyprus, Crete, Rhodes and some Aegean ports before the winter weather hindered sea travel.²⁷¹ It is unlikely that these Byzantine supplies

267. Raym. ch. 4, p. 241; Hill & Hill 30; France, *Tatikios* 138, 144.

268. Yewdale 56-7.

269. Raym. ch. 6, p. 245; Hill & Hill 35. The date can be deduced from the fact that while the earthquake which Raymond proceeds to recount is dateable to December 30 1097, Bohemond only returned from a fruitless five-day foraging expedition on January 1: Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie* 114-19. He probably began to talk of withdrawal immediately after returning from the unsuccessful expedition.

270. Raym. ch.6, p. 245; Hill & Hill 36; France, *Tatikios* 138, 144.

271. Taticius is presumably identical with the 'herald' (*praeco*) of Alexius whom Ralph (ch. 54, p. 647) describes as responsible for the influx of supplies. In early February there was a 'Roman fleet' in the harbour at St Symeon, which Taticius was able to

can have been really significant; for as long as the bridge-gate of Antioch was still unmarked by the Crusaders, the defenders were easily able to intercept supplies while they were being brought up the main road from the port of St Symeon.²⁷² But in reviving the proposal for a blockade Taticius was keeping the door open for a resumption of Byzantine provisioning once regular navigation became feasible again in March. Moreover, the Crusaders, scattered in *castella*, would not be so vulnerable to the interception of traffic from St Symeon by sorties darting out from the bridge-gate; and the arrival of a Byzantine army was still to be hoped for.²⁷³

Taticius' proposal was countered by Raymond as soon as he heard of it. He immediately introduced a scheme for compensating knights who lost their horses while trying to protect foraging parties of 'the poor', so vulnerable to Turkish attacks in the conditions of a close siege. Raymond was able to fund the compensation out of his own resources, which must still have been ample. His opening contribution to the fund was to the tune of 500 silver marks.²⁷⁴ The compensation proposed by Raymond was to be available to any of the knights of 'his princes'; the latter, together with the papal legate, Adhemar of Puy, were present at the council to which Raymond announced the scheme.

join and direct to Cyprus: *Al. XI*, 4, p. 20; Sew., 343. Since the 'herald' is said by Ralph to have been 'present' (*aderat*), this provisioning seems to have been organized while Taticius was stationed at Antioch, in the earlier stages of the siege. Ralph's immediately subsequent statement that 'the siege had begun with winter' (ch. 54, p. 647) tends to support this inference. (See, however, Lilie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* n. 134 on 352). Raym. alludes to English ships which, he says, had reached Antioch and Laodicea ahead of the Crusader army (ch. 18, 290; Hill & Hill 113). Raym. claims that these ships and Genoese vessels 'daily' brought supplies from Cyprus 'and the other islands' and, by intimidating the Moslems, made the sea safe for Greek shipping (*ibid.*). Raym.'s account thus tallies with Ralph's in suggesting that supplies of Byzantine provenance were arriving by sea in the early stages of the siege (cf. Ralph ch. 58, p. 649). See Hagenmeyer 264-5; Runciman 255 & n. 2 and, on the likely sequence of events at Laodicea in 1097-98, Lilie *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 268-9. The English ships would seem to have been commissioned by the emperor. See also n. 298.

272. Hagenmeyer 287-8; Runciman 226-8 & map on 214; Lilie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 29. 273. According to Raym., Taticius was spreading a rumour that a large Byzantine army was approaching; allegedly, he knew it to be false: Raym. ch. 7, p. 246; Hill & Hill 37; below, n. 293.

274. Raym. ch. 6, p. 245; Hill & Hill 36; France, *Tatikios* 138, 145; Riley-Smith 65.

Together, they constituted a ‘brotherhood’ (*fraternitas*) in which the concepts of mutual assistance, Christian fraternity and *noblesse oblige* intermingled.²⁷⁵ But the compensation scheme over which Raymond presided can only have served to accentuate the disparity in wealth between him and the other leaders, and also to enhance his influence over the army as a whole — the common folk as well as the knights. For we are told that the scheme was a success. Foraging parties once more ventured further afield, because knights were now willing to risk their horses to protect them. In fact, those with poor quality steeds were particularly willing, being assured of the means of buying better ones as replacements!²⁷⁶ Raymond of Aguilers states that other Crusading contingents had been suffering from the same problem, expressly naming Bohemond’s. Thus the supply crisis was somewhat eased, and Taticius’ proposal of dispersal to *castella* effectively quashed, by Raymond’s shrewdly chosen use of his own wealth. This sort of compensation scheme would have been beyond the means of Bohemond, who had only recently complained ‘that he was not a rich man’. It was less than a month after the launch of Raymond’s successful scheme that Taticius left Antioch, early in February 1098.²⁷⁷ So it was about this time, a time of tension and, most probably, mutual suspicion between Raymond and his associates and Taticius, that Taticius received his tip-off from Bohemond.

This sketch of events is, in my opinion, reasonably certain. For although it relies on Raymond of Aguilers, his confusions over chronology can generally be spotted, if not fully rectified, by comparison with other sources.²⁷⁸ Seeing that Raymond of Toulouse

275. Unfortunately, the ‘princes’ in Raymond’s council are not named: Raym. ch. 6, p. 245; Hill & Hill 36. On ‘brotherhoods’, see Riley-Smith 65.

276. Raym. ch. 6, p. 246; Hill & Hill 37.

277. See Hagenmeyer, *Chronologie* 120, 122.

278. Thus Raym.’s allegation (ch. 6, p. 246; Hill & Hill 37) that, at some time after the launch of Count Raymond’s compensation scheme, all the leaders except Count Raymond met and pledged the city to Bohemond is highly implausible. Most probably, Raym. has conflated the decisions of a meeting at which the leaders swore not to abandon the siege, even if it were to last seven years, with those of the meetings in May at which the leaders eventually agreed that the city should pass to whoever managed to acquire it: *Gesta*, VIII, 20, pp. 44-5; Tudebode, IX, 3, pp. 54-5; Hill & Hill 61-2. No separate mention of the May meetings occurs in Raym.. France

remained the wealthiest of the leaders,²⁷⁹ his influence at a time of famine and high prices is likely to have been correspondingly great. And Raymond of Aguilers' statement that Bohemond threatened to abandon the siege is credible, given that his threat can be placed in the context of the failure of his determined expedition to secure provisions from the countryside.²⁸⁰ Raymond does full justice to Bohemond in recognizing that his tactical brilliance was a great asset to the Crusaders at that time.²⁸¹ So his overall picture of the scene at Antioch in the early weeks of 1098 should command respect. It has a crucial bearing on the plausibility of the *Alexiad's* tale of Bohemond's tip-off to Taticius. For it shows that there was at that time a fundamental difference of opinion between Taticius and Count Raymond and 'his princes', who together constituted a 'brotherhood'. And while it does not expressly represent Bohemond as siding with Taticius on this question of strategy, it shows him to have been greatly exercised (as was Taticius) with the problem of supplies, and to have been ill-disposed towards Count Raymond. For his declaration 'that he was not a rich man (of the sort) whose private wealth might suffice for so long a siege' is an obvious jibe at Raymond. Taticius' proposal for withdrawal to *castella* would have involved a protracted siege, but it would, in dispersing the Crusaders in strongholds over a wider area, have alleviated their basic deficiency. For, by congregating in a makeshift camp within bowshot of the walls of Antioch, the Crusaders had created for themselves the formidable and to a large extent unnecessary task of transporting masses of supplies to a vulnerable central point lacking its own economic or demographic base. They had done so upon Count Raymond's urgings,²⁸² and the resultant situation was

(*Tatikios* 143) argues for accepting Raym.'s account of the decisions of a single meeting. Raym. seems to represent that meeting as occurring before the departure of Taticius. It is, however, far more probable that the meeting in which the leaders swore not to abandon the siege was convened as a direct response to the departure of Taticius — or to his failure rapidly to return.

279. Riley-Smith 69, 74.

280. See above n. 269; Riley-Smith n. 72 on p. 182.

281. Raym. ch. 6, pp. 244, 245; Hill & Hill, 32, 34-5; cf. *Gesta*, V, 12, p. 29; France, *Tatikios* 143.

282. Above 263.

one where, in effect, cash was king. Taticius' proposal offered a better prospect of remedying the general shortage of supplies than did Count Raymond's protraction of the status quo with the aid of his compensation scheme. Bohemond's evident anxiety concerning the 'want' of his horses and men is at least compatible with Taticius' thinking on strategy. And while we have no express evidence that the two were acting in collusion — Bohemond threatening withdrawal while Taticius 'daily' urged upon leaders the merits of dispersal and blockade — their continuing collaboration is suggested by Taticius' grant of the Cilician cities to Bohemond at the time of his departure from Antioch.²⁸³

Viewed against this backdrop of disagreement and tension between Taticius and Count Raymond and of, at the least, strategic concerns held in common by Taticius and Bohemond, the tale of the tip-off becomes comprehensible. Well might Taticius believe the warning that most, if not all, the Crusade leaders were gang-ing up against him.²⁸⁴ Why, though, should Bohemond have decided to hoodwink into departure the man whom, on the above evidence, he should have regarded as an ally? Any answer is inevitably speculative and very tentative. Source problems apart, there is the danger that one may 'over-explain', finding a pattern of deviousness where there was really merely impulse and chance. But assuming that Bohemond did knowingly feed false information to Taticius, his calculations may have been as follows.

Bohemond's personal stock was very high, but his resources were meagre and the longer the close siege lasted, the more his men and horses would suffer from the difficulties of foraging mentioned by Raymond of Aguilers.²⁸⁵ The few remaining horses would die but the knights might well defect to Count Raymond's 'brotherhood', if only in hopes of gaining a new

283. Raym. ch. 7, p. 246; Hill & Hill 37; above 194-5.

284. Whether the reason for the 'conspiracy' — the leaders' belief that Taticius had persuaded 'the sultan' to attack them — was concocted by Anna or by Bohemond himself is an open question. Bohemond's authorship is at least possible. Lilie may object (*Kreuzfahrerstaaten* n. 156 on 354-5) that Taticius was not in fact utterly isolated, having such sympathizers as Stephen of Blois and, probably, Robert of Normandy and Robert of Flanders. However, Taticius may well have shared Anna's oft-repeated view of the Westerners' character as 'unstable and easily led': *Al. X*, 5, p. 206; Sew., 308; Buckler, *Anna Comnena* 441.

285. See above 263.

mount.²⁸⁶ To so ambitious and masterful a character as Bohemond, this situation must have been galling in the extreme. No amount of superb generalship on his part could reverse the flow of knights towards a wealthier patron, and he might eventually find himself left with a skeleton contingent. At the same time, Bohemond's 'Byzantine connexion' was becoming a liability and, probably, a grievous disappointment after the expectations of the previous year. For Taticius' attempts to influence strategy had been unsuccessful, his scouts and guides were of diminishing use to the static mass of Crusaders encamped outside Antioch, and his resources could not compete with Count Raymond's silver marks.

Seemingly, Bohemond's bond with Alexius as his liegeman was not known to his fellow Crusaders. But it was presumably known to Taticius, who could have publicized its existence as and when he wished. Moreover, Bohemond's close links with the Byzantines were probably quite visible. He had remained in the van through most of the long march across Asia Minor, as Taticius must also have done. He was one of the few commanders with whom Taticius could converse directly in Greek. Judging by the *Gesta* and Tudebode, Bohemond was still in the vanguard upon nearing Antioch, following closely upon 'our scouts' (*cursores*), among whom were, presumably, Taticius' men.²⁸⁷ At Antioch itself, Taticius was not encamped directly beside Bohemond's contingent, which remained in the position which it took up upon reaching the city. This was on the north-east side of the enceinte, before St Paul's Gate. He was not far off from Bohemond, however. The Byzantine force was positioned in a plain behind

286. Bohemond's position as leader of the South Italian Normans was no longer in danger of being sapped by Tancred, as it had been in the Balkans (above 246). However, a horseless knight was incapable of fighting, as the Byzantines (e.g. *Al.* V, 6, pp. 28-9; Sew., 171) observed. And to sell one's arms and become a footsoldier was to sacrifice status. The shortage of horses at Antioch is therefore very likely to have stimulated knights to look to affluent lords for patronage or regular pay, besides aggravating the purely military situation. On the payment of wages by the wealthy leaders and the considerable mobility of knights between contingents, see Riley-Smith 68, 71, 77-9.

287. *Gesta*, V, 12, p. 28; Tudebode, V, 1, pp. 34-5; Hill & Hill 43. Bohemond had darted ahead of the Crusaders' main host in quest of the Turks beyond Comana: Runciman, 191-2, 216.

the camp of Baldwin of Hainault, beside which were the camps of Robert of Normandy and Robert of Flanders. The latter three camps were to the north of Bohemond's, and beyond them was the camp of Stephen of Blois. The Byzantines were on the outer fringe of this ensemble — the better to take flight, according to Albert of Aix!²⁸⁸ But in fact their position would have been an exposed one, on the north-eastern extremity of the encampment, looking towards the road to the Iron Bridge and Aleppo. This was the direction from which the most formidable Turkish counter-attacks were to be expected, and it was in this direction that the Byzantine scouts and spies could monitor enemy movements to greatest effect. While these military considerations may well have determined the Byzantines' choice of site for their camp, its proximity to the camps of the two Roberts and of Bohemond was probably not accidental. The components of the vanguard must have grown accustomed to liaising with one another during the long march,²⁸⁹ and relations between them can hardly have failed to become amicable (if they were not so already). If the detail in the *Gesta* and Tudebode that Taticius left behind all his possessions represents the observations of an eye-witness stationed in Bohemond's camp, it suggests that denizens of the two camps were on visiting terms, at least, in early February 1098.²⁹⁰ Baldwin of Hainault, Taticius' closest neighbour, was on fair terms with the empire, judging by the fact that he, together with Hugh of Vermandois, was sent off to Byzantium bearing the princes' invitation to Alexius in July 1098.²⁹¹ It is probably no coincidence that the two Roberts' relations with Byzantium had not been marred by conflict over oath-taking, while Stephen of Blois' links undoubtedly remained close.²⁹² In other words, Taticius was positioned in the vicinity

288. Albert, III, 38, p. 366; Ralph ch. 49, p. 642; Yewdale 54; Runciman 216-17 & map on 214; Lillie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 15. It is perhaps noteworthy that Albert mentions Taticius' position directly after mentioning Bohemond's. See also Gislebert, *Chronicon Hanoniense* 504.

289. It had been with Robert of Flanders that Bohemond had gone on his fruitless foraging expedition in the last days of 1097: above n. 269.

290. *Gesta*, VI, 16, p. 35; Tudebode, VI, 5, pp. 41-2; Hill & Hill, 49-50.

291. Albert, V, 3, pp. 434-5; Gislebert, *Chronicon Hanoniense* 504; Runciman 250-1.

292. Lillie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 15, n. 83 on 342-3. Stephen, on fleeing from Antioch,

of more or less sympathetic commanders and was not a wholly isolated figure. And he was visibly associated, in terms of the layout of the camps, with other leaders besides Bohemond. The fact remained that Bohemond alone was the emperor's liegeman and was, presumably, bound to cooperate closely with the emperor's representative, Taticius. Yet it was Count Raymond who was calling the tune on strategy, trouncing Taticius' proposals. And if, as Raymond of Aguilers alleges, Taticius was in 1098 putting about rumours that the emperor's army was on its way,²⁹³ he was most probably responding to criticism from Crusaders at Alexius' failure to assist them. The situation must have seemed profoundly unsatisfactory to Bohemond, in whom impatience and impetuosity occasionally overrode cool calculation. His special connexion, albeit secret, as liegeman with an increasingly unpopular, seemingly remote and ineffectual emperor began to weigh on him like a ball and chain. This was aggravated by his own inability to match Raymond's silver marks.

Bohemond then, I suggest, hit upon a daring ploy which was virtually certain to improve his situation by hook or by crook. He warned Taticius of the other leaders' suspicions of and 'plot' against him, and he probably also suggested that Taticius' best course was to flee and to return with supplies, as being the only way in which he could allay the suspicions and antipathy which many (though clearly not all) the leaders harboured. In the short term, Bohemond stood to gain the gratitude of Taticius, and presumably the 'grant' of the cities in Cilicia was made in recompense for the tip-off. We do not know whether Tarsus, Adana and Mamistra had specifically been requested by Bohemond, and only in the most nominal sense were they within Taticius' gift. For they had been seized by Tancred and other Westerners during the previous autumn, and were apparently still

went to the trouble of making his way to Alexius in order to inform him of the Crusaders' dire plight and, presumably, to justify his own withdrawal: *Gesta*, IX, 27, p. 63; Tudebode, XI, 1, p. 74; Hill & Hill 81; *Al.* XI, 6, p. 27; Sew., 348. 293. Raym. ch. 7, p. 246; Hill & Hill 37. Raym. may, however, be imputing to Taticius responsibility for rumours which arose among the Crusaders themselves. Judging by the *Gesta* and Tudebode, Taticius at the moment of his departure laid emphasis on his ability to fetch provisions and horses rather than rapid military assistance.

being garrisoned by small forces left by them.²⁹⁴ But formal authority over communications centres of the Cilician plain, including the key port of Tarsus, might go some way towards remedying Bohemond's lack of means. More importantly, Taticius either would or would not return. Taticius, when excusing his departure (which was to take him by ship to Cyprus), promised to send or bring back with him in the near future 'many ships laden with corn, wine, barley, meat, flour, cheese and all the goods which we need'. He also promised to have horses brought to be sold at Antioch, and made mention of merchandise being brought overland, presumably by way of Cilicia. It was as pledge for all these promises that he left behind all his belongings, vowing to return in person.²⁹⁵

Bohemond would not lose out, whether or not Taticius returned. If provisions and perhaps siege equipment arrived from the Byzantines, Bohemond would still be in imperial favour, and might, aided by his position in Cilicia, resume his former role as liaison-officer and play a part in the organization of the provisioning. Moreover, the arrival of horses would help solve one of his gravest problems, although cash would still be needed to buy them. If neither Taticius nor Byzantine supplies showed up, Bohemond would be rid of the presence of an ineffectual and potentially irksome imperial representative, and he could claim that he, in particular, as well as the Crusaders in general, had been abandoned to their fate by their lord and were therefore freed from their obligations towards him.

In the event, this is what he did, as the siege wore on and substantial aid from Byzantium failed to materialize. Bohemond was able to slip out of the role of Alexius' liegeman and collaborator and to pinpoint the discrepancy between Alexius' pro-

294. Tancred is said to have left a small garrison at Mamistra, as had Guynemer the pirate-chief at Tarsus; Adana was under the sway of Welf, a Burgundian knight: Runciman 199-201; France, *Tatikios* 146, 147. There is no evidence that these towns were lost again to the Turks during the winter of 1097-98, and Stephen of Blois was able to withdraw to Tarsus as a place of safety in the spring: *AI*. XI, 6, p. 27; Sew., 348; Ralph ch. 58, p. 649. Mamistra was reckoned as a port of embarkation for Cyprus and as three days' land journey from Antioch by the peasant Peter Bartholomew: Raym. ch. 10, p. 255; Hill & Hill 54.

295. *Gesta* VI, 16, pp. 34-5; Tudebode, VI, 5, pp. 41-2; Hill & Hill 49.

mises and the actual amount of assistance sent. He could pose as a commander who had been especially assiduous in keeping faith with the emperor and who was now especially wronged. His past cooperation with Alexius could be explained away as inspired by trust in Alexius' promises of assistance. The *Gesta's* tale of the offer of 'lands beyond Antioch' to Bohemond probably reflects a rumour circulating among the Crusaders as to the reason for Bohemond's compliance with Alexius' wishes, and does not relate an actual historical happening. Neither is it likely to have emanated from Bohemond himself.²⁹⁶ But it does suggest how receptive Crusading knights were to the notion that Bohemond had been led on by false blandishments and that he had been particularly badly let down.

These outlines of Bohemond's concerns, calculations and perhaps even impetuosity are inevitably hypothetical, but they seem to fit his known actions and with the tale of the tip-off. Bohemond must not, of course, be credited with total foreknowledge of events. It was still believed by some Crusaders that Alexius was contemplating a march to their aid in June 1098, and probably later still.²⁹⁷ Moreover, some supplies did arrive from, or were fetched by individual Crusaders from Cyprus, the isle to which Taticius had sailed in February.²⁹⁸ Nonetheless, by May Bohemond was making his own arrangements to acquire

296. See above 224.

297. Guy, Bohemond's half-brother, is clearly represented as believing that the Byzantine army with which he was serving was heading for Antioch, up to the time of their encounter with Stephen of Blois and other fugitives at Philomelion: *Gesta*, IX, 27, p. 64. Anna claims likewise: *Al.* XI, 6, pp. 27-8; *Sew.*, 348-9. The expectation, if not hope, that Alexius might anyway proceed to Antioch was probably one of the considerations behind the invitation which the Crusading leaders sent to him from there in July 1098. See the observations of Hagenmeyer 296; cf. Lilie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 34-6.

298. *Al.* XI, 4, p. 20; *Sew.*, 343. Although some ships bearing provisions were able to dock at St Symeon in the winter months (*Raym.* ch. 5, 7, pp. 242, 248; Hill & Hill 32, 41), the road between the port and Antioch only became safe in March: *Runciman* 228-9. Regular navigation would anyway have resumed in the Mediterranean in that month, and thenceforth individual journeys to Cyprus for provisions were unremarkable: Hagenmeyer no. 17, p. 166, cf. 288, 360-1; *Raym.* ch. 10, p. 255; Hill & Hill 54. While Byzantine consent was a precondition of the traffic with Cyprus and Greek bottoms may well have carried some of the provisions to the Crusaders in the spring of 1098, our evidence for active organization of the provisioning by a Byzantine official appears to relate to the earlier stages of the siege. See above, n. 271.

Antioch by stealth and, as we have seen, he was probably able to communicate with Firuz in Greek,²⁹⁹ the same linguistic accomplishment which had helped gain him a special relationship with Alexius now enabled him to secure the city quite independently of Byzantium and to ignore, if not formally renounce, his obligations towards the emperor. For Bohemond's proposal to his fellow commanders that the city should pass to whoever first managed to take it was not compatible with the oath they had sworn to hand over former Byzantine towns to the emperor's representative. So, at least, it appeared to the other commanders; for they are said to have insisted on reserving the right of the emperor to take over the city, if he should come to their aid and fulfil 'all his obligations' to them.³⁰⁰ Thus they were invoking Alexius' rights against someone who could previously have been described as his 'officer' (*adjutor*) and who had been entrusted with Cilician cities by Taticius less than four months previously. Assuming that the *Gesta* and Tudebode do record correctly the gist of the deliberations between the other commanders and Bohemond,³⁰¹ the commanders may well have been somewhat bewildered at his apparent *volte-face*. It may even have been possible for them to entertain the suspicion that Bohemond might once more take the emperor's part, and that he was seeking by some devious means to seize Antioch and then to proclaim himself to be Alexius' representative. But while such suspicions would not have been absurd, in the light of Bohemond's past conduct, it is most probable that he was now openly expressing hostility

299. Above 255-6.

300. *Gesta*, VIII, 20, p. 45; Tudebode, IX, 3, p. 55; Hill & Hill 62. See n. 304.

301. The account presumably represents reports on the commanders' deliberations which were made public after the seizure of the city. It simplifies matters, to the advantage of Bohemond, in that Raymond of Toulouse seems to have refused to agree to Bohemond's proposal (Raym. ch. 6, p. 246; Hill & Hill 37). But the essence of the story is to be found not only in the pro-Norman Ralph (ch. 64-65, pp. 653-4) but also in Anna Comnena: *Al.* XI, 4, p. 21; Sew., 344. So it is probably authentic. See also Albert, IV, 15, 16, pp. 399-400; above 196 & n. 278. It should also be noted that, according to the *Gesta* and Tudebode, the initial response of the other commanders to Bohemond's proposal was that they should share the city alike: 'As we have had equal toil, so we shall have equal possession': *Gesta*, VIII, 20, pp. 44-5; Tudebode, IX, 3, p. 55; Hill & Hill 62. If such words really were uttered, they indicate that Alexius' rights were not at the forefront of the Crusaders' considerations at that time, seemingly the end of May.

towards Alexius and declaring that his failure effectively to honour his sworn undertakings now released the Crusaders from their oaths and their homage. A document dated as July 14, 1098 indicates that by then Bohemond was acting as if he were the legal authority in Antioch. For by this charter he donates to the Genoese the church of St John, together with a warehouse and other properties to be held in perpetuity. The rights of all others to these properties are declared invalid.³⁰² The original document was written by Bohemond himself and attested by several members of his contingent.³⁰³ This is an indication of Bohemond's proficiency in written Latin — yet another accomplishment which marked him out from most of the Crusading leaders — but it also clearly suggests that he did not yet possess any semblance of a chancery and that his right freely to dispense property and to exercise jurisdiction over Antioch was not recognized by the other leaders. For had the latter done so, they might well have acted as witnesses to the deed. A few days earlier, following the victory over Kerbogha, they had sent Hugh of Vermandois and Baldwin of Hainault to Alexius, 'asking him to come and take over the city, and fulfil the obligations which he had undertaken towards them'.³⁰⁴ We have no record of Bohemond's attitude

302. Hagenmeyer no. 13, p. 155; Yewdale 73; Runciman 251. In return, the Genoese at Antioch undertook to help Bohemond defend Antioch against all attackers except Count Raymond — a clear indication that conflict between Raymond and Bohemond was to be expected and that Bohemond's title to Antioch was far from secure: Hagenmeyer no. 14, p. 156. Bohemond was presumably trying to provide for his maritime supply and communication lines, which the Byzantines would now threaten. 303. Hagenmeyer no. 13, p. 156; cf. 310.

304. *Gesta*, X, 30, p. 72; Fulcher, I, 23, p. 350; trs. Ryan & Fink 107; Albert, V, 3, pp. 434-5; Gislebert, *Chronicon Hanoniense* 504; Yewdale 72-3; Runciman 250; Lillie *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 34-5, 37-9, 42-3, n. 163 on 356; n. 181 on 358-9. It should be noted that the message, while broadly compatible with the leaders' agreement with Bohemond of a month or so earlier, is not in total accord with their oaths sworn at Constantinople. For according to Anna, who seems here to be reliable, cities were to be handed over to the emperor's representative: *Al.* X, 9, p. 226; Sew., 323. See above 229-30. To require that the emperor come *in person* to receive Antioch and 'fulfil (his) obligations', rather than merely to seek the despatch of an imperial representative seems to introduce a new condition into the Crusaders' readiness to observe their fealty. Whether or not Alexius had really sworn to accompany them in person with an army (*Gesta*, II, 6, p. 12), many Crusaders must now have become indignant at his failure to provide effective aid or supplies: hence, perhaps, their insistence that he now show up in person, even though their need for supplies and siege-equipment was now less pressing.

towards the despatch of this invitation, but it is likely to have been negative in the extreme. The invitation constituted a deferment, though not a breach, of full implementation of the other leaders' agreement with him that Antioch should go to him who secured entry for the Crusaders into the city. Bohemond's public stance at that time was probably already one of outright hostility towards Alexius, of the same tone as that expressed in his postscript to the princes' letter of September 11, 1098. In his postscript he emphasized the disparity between what 'the unjust emperor' had promised and what he had actually done to help the Crusaders, 'the winners of all Romania, Cilicia, Asia and Syria'.³⁰⁵

It is impossible to determine the precise time between February and May 1098 when Bohemond decided that the balance of advantage for him lay in cutting his links with Alexius and in denouncing him for neglect and perfidy. The intrigue with Firuz at all events finalized what the passage of time and Taticius' abandoned pavilion were already suggesting to him: that neither for the Crusaders' survival nor for his own acquisition of power and possessions in the East was Alexius of much use. It had been an intelligent and realistic assessment of his position that had led him to cooperate with the emperor in the spring of 1097 and to continue to cooperate with his representative throughout the crossing of Asia Minor. His action in scaring Taticius into a precipitate

305. Hagenmeyer no. 16, p. 165. Bohemond's injunction to Urban II to 'separate (*separare*) us your sons . . . from the unjust emperor' seemingly represents a demand that Urban dissolve the sworn undertakings of the Crusaders to Alexius (cf. Hagenmeyer 357). Bohemond's aim was to invalidate Count Raymond's invocation of the oath sworn to Alexius (*Gesta*, X, 31, pp. 75, 76; Tudebode, XII, 6, p. 87; Hill & Hill 95). Bohemond himself probably suffered few qualms about perjury but Raymond could and did awkwardly recall that his oath had been sworn 'per consilium Boamundi'. Some other leaders probably had residual qualms. See above 188, 216; Lilie *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 42-3. It must be emphasized that only at Antioch, from the time when he began invoking his oath as an obstacle to Bohemond's appropriation of the city, can Raymond be regarded with certainty as aligning himself with Byzantium — and even then the alignment may only have been tentative, inchoate and contingent upon his antipathy towards Bohemond. The tableau of relationships between Alexius, Bohemond and Raymond presented in the *Alexiad's* Book X is thus almost an inversion of the actual state of affairs in spring 1097. See also France, *Tatikios* 143-4, 147; *idem*, *Anna Comnena* 21-2, 25-6, 31; Lilie, *Kreuzfahrerstaaten* 8-13, 44.

departure at one of the grimmest stages of the siege of Antioch sprang from a mixture of calculation and anxiety. He was acutely concerned about the plight of his own men and horses, and irked by the erosion of his own position and the ascendancy of Count Raymond, which seemed likely to grow. At the same time he was impatient that effective aid had failed to arrive from Byzantium, and felt hamstrung by the bond of liege homage, which must have influenced (if it did not wholly govern) his relations with Taticius and which would cause him serious embarrassment if its existence became widely known among the Crusaders. His solution was to alarm Taticius into rapid departure: he could hope thereby either to speed up the despatch of Byzantine supplies or to rid himself of an association with Byzantium which now seemed to him burdensome.

Viewed against the background of the previous ten or so months, and of the particular crisis which was threatening Bohemond's position among the Crusading leaders in January and early February 1098, the *Alexiad's* tale of the tip-off is credible. And if the tale is credible, it is also significant. For it shows that Bohemond had managed to give a false impression of far more whole-hearted loyalty and commitment to Alexius and his representative than was in fact the case. The 'Cretan' had indeed met the 'Cretan', or Greek met Greek.

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Abbreviations

- Al.* Anna Comnena, *Alexiade*, ed. & trs. B. Leib, I-III (Paris 1937-1945)
- Albert Albert of Aix, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, *RHO*, IV
- Fulcher Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, *RHO*, III
- Gesta* *Gesta Francorum*, ed. & trs. R. Hill (London 1962)
- Guibert Guibert of Nogent, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, *RHO*, IV
- Hagenmeyer H. Hagenmeyer, *Die Kreuzzugsbriefe aus den Jahren 1088-1100* (Innsbruck 1901)
- HBS* *Historia Belli Sacri* (often designated as Tudebodius Imitatus et Continuatus) *RHO*, III
- Malaterra Geoffrey Malaterra, *De rebus gestis Rogerii Calabriae et Siciliae comitis et Roberti Guiscardi ducis*, ed. E. Pontieri, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, V, pt.1 (Bologna 1928)
- Ralph Ralph of Caen, *Gesta Tancredi*, *RHO*, III
- Raym. Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, *RHO*, III
- RHO* *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Occidentaux*, I-V (Paris 1841-1895, repr. Farnborough 1967)
- Riley-Smith J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the idea of Crusading* (London 1986)
- Runciman S. Runciman, *A history of the Crusades*, I (Harmondsworth 1965)
- Sew. *The Alexiad of Anna Comnena*, trs. E.R.A. Sewter (Harmondsworth 1969)
- Will. Tyre William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum* J.P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latina* 201
- Yewdale R.B. Yewdale, *Bohemond I, Prince of Antioch* (Princeton 1924)
- W.B. McQueen's 'Relations between the Normans and Byzantium 1071-1112', *B* 56 (1986) 427-76 became accessible to me only after the present article was in the press.

