technocratic class has legitimized itself in the eyes of society at large'.

I was reminded of this comment on reading Bechhofer's piece on technology and shop-floor behaviour; his article, which is in the way of a review and justification of the 'affluent worker' studies, ends with a clear plea: '. . . it seems (more) sensible to start from the position . . . that the nature of man in his work (and more prosaically, at a lower level, his orientation to his work) are matters for empirical enquiry'. This, and the paper by Trist on scientific management can be read together, and between them provide a fascinating account of modern liberal managerial methods and industrial sociology as applied to man-in-his-work. What is missing is any discussion or confrontation with the authors on their assumptions and methods. It is taken for granted that an account of, say, industrial relations practice in Scandinavia really reveals the 'social meaning'. It may well be that all the studies and experiments reveal is in fact man's ability to manipulate, in a limited way, social situations. Which, of course, brings us right back to technocracy. . . .

There then follow a variety of papers about the possibilities and practice of technological change: in education, government intervention in Research and Development in the UK and the USSR, technological changes in the USA, etc. These are, on the whole, a very valuable set of empirical studies, and especially for those interested in the instrumentality of policy making. With one exception, however, they also manage to avoid a direct confrontation with the two major policy issues. First, who controls? The discussions tell us about governmental planning in the USSR, and the death of MinTech, yet never address the outstanding problem of how 'we the people' can truly control technological development, application and change. The technological imperative is truly overriding. The earlier accounts of industrial 'democracy' apparently support this view, and lead directly into the second omission, which is how social priorities might be incorporated or even achieved. There is hardly a hint in these articles that this, or other 'external' references could ever be an issue, with the one exception of Freeman's outstanding article on the outrageous imbalance between the levels of scientific and technological efforts in and for the affluent nations and the Third world. This is one, and perhaps the most immediately obvious, illustration of the social meaning of modern technology. It is now even easier than before to exploit people. And given the nature of modern capitalism and the size and structure of the multinational companies like ITT, Ford or the large petroleum producers, the possibilities of social control are more and more remote. In fact, as many of these essays exemplify, it is almost impossible even to discuss the the issue, so cleverly has it been eliminated.

Technology *can* and *must* be put at the service and control of the people it now serves only to manipulate and use. To realise this sort of social control will require confrontation and profound change. But it is the only way to respond to Littlejohn's challenge: 'those who question the legitimacy of the technocrat's claims must demonstrate that they are in possession of a truth more true han theirs'. LEO PYLE

PASSING FOR WHITE. A Study of Racial Assimilation in a South African School, by Graham Watson. *Tavistock Publications,* London, 1970 (Paperback edition 1973). 130 pp. 80p.

Appalling social circumstances do not always favour accuracy of analysis: the problems are sometimes too urgent to allow drawn-out deliberation, suffering can be too extreme for further postponement of action. South Africa is a case in point. Much has been written about its social problems, exposing and condemning the political system that keeps them in existence. Apartheid is so obviously wrong that it needs only a rough outline and a few figures to convince the world of its rejectability. The studies sponsored by the South African Institute of Race Relations, for example, would be fully adequate; little more is required to realize that the present regime needs to be opposed. However, we also know that in practical terms there is not much we can or will do to change the situation. Apartheid is indeed quite obviously inhuman, and yet our liberal arguments fail to convince the Afrikaner, or even the African himself, for it remains the analysis of an outsider.

But an approach is possible in which, instead of making general statements about Whites and Blacks border-line cases can be taken as the point of references and in them the intrinsic absurdity of Apartheid exposed. This is the approach of *Passing for White*, which was not initially conceived as a political study. The author quite deliberately tries to steer away from the usual course of most discussions in South Africa by choosing a neutral area, i.e. a school in a working-class suburb of Cape Town. Although Colander High is officially a White school, it is in fact one of those places where coloured people find access to the privileges and status of the White community. Dr. Watson describes how this

comes about and the unpleasant implications it has for the school and its staff. In this way he finds himself writing a most effective criticism of a political climate in which such a self-contradictory phenomenon becomes possible. Racial problems cannot be tidied up by dividing people in the way attempted in South Africa. Apartheid, which is conceived as a solution, gives birth instead to its own problems—it becomes a poisonous medicine. Colander High is the example of a White school which cannot possibly be White just because it has been classified as White.

ROB VAN DER HART, O.P.

BASIC QUESTIONS IN THEOLOGY, Vol. 3, by Wolfhart Pannenberg, trans. R. A. Wilson. *S.C.M. Press*, London 1973. ix + 213 pp. £3·75

This latest volume of Pannenberg's collected essays includes a lengthy article on mythology in the Bible and Christianity and a group of six articles which endeavour 'to identify an anthropological basis for the discussion of the question of God' (p. viii). As it becomes increasingly clear that the background to Pannenberg's attempt to reconstruct a theological anthropology is that of Hegel (just as a critical variant of Hegel's idea of 'history' was proposed in Volume 1 of the *Basic Questions* as the way to overcome the fundamental problem of theological hermeneutic), so it would seem that the central article in this collection is 'The Significance of Christianity in the Philosophy of Hegel'. Pannenberg criticizes and develops Hegel's idea that subjective freedom cannot be realized in the modern age if it breaks away from its historical basis in Christian Freedom in God'. It is precisely this idea which is challenged in modern atheism which claims to be able to construct a philosophical anthropology without resorting to religion, and which claims to offer freedom to man without an appeal to God; as Sartre said: 'Even if God existed, it could make no difference'. Whereas a theology of an authoritative revelation (Barth, Bultmann etc.), or of religionlessness (Bonhoeffer), or of a dead God (Altizer), can only survive the challenge of atheistic criticism by avoiding it, Pannenberg wants to meet this criticism by showing that talk about human freedom leads to religious talk about God. This can no longer be done by assuming, as Hegel did, that 'freedom in God' is the historical origin of subjective freedom, but only by understanding 'the nature of God itself on the basis of the absolute future of freedom, instead of thinking it the other way round' (p. 174). Christianity must be thought of as 'the religion of freedom' (p. 177), and God, like freedom, is to be realized not in the present, but in the future. The task of reconstructing a language about God on an anthropological basis can only come about by thinking out the experience of freedom more deeply than did Hegel.

Because modern atheistic arguments since Feuerbach have been entirely anthropological, Pannenberg argues in 'Anthropology and the Question of God' that any theological interpretation of the human situation will be a positive contribution towards a specifically theological anthropology which can counter modern atheism. But a viable anthropology which includes religious language can only result from a highly professional discussion with the methods and problems associated with human biology, sociology, psychology, and so on. In these sciences, as in theology, the finitude of human experience and the nature of reality as a process make all present knowledge fragmentary and provisional. Consequently, even to think of the unity of all that is, Pannenberg suggests in 'Christian Theology and Philosophical Criticism', is to look to the future in anticipation, and religion does just this. Only in the future, the absolute future, a future in which death is overcome, will we be able finally to interpret the meaning and significance of present experience. In the final article, 'Eschatology and the Experience of Meaning', Pannenberg says that to experience meaning in the present is to experience by anticipation a structural moment of the future which makes absolute meaning possible.

The most startling challenge which Pannenberg offers is his demand that we abandon the untenable scholastic belief in an already existent God who is omnipotent and omniscient. Pannenberg believes that such a God falls before the atheistic challenge that belief in God precludes human freedom, and this he thinks is illustrated in the history of the apparently insoluble problems associated with divine foreknowledge and predestination (p. 107f.). God, then, can only be talked about in terms of futurity, as is also the case with human freedom, where divine omnipotence and omniscience are possibilities not yet realized. The reality of God lies in the future, as does his Kingdom.

The opening article, 'The Later Dimensions of Myth in Biblical and Christian Tradition', stands apart from the themes of the later discussion, though it is not ultimately without its connections. Pannenberg's purpose is to reconsider the place of myth in the Bible and in christology. Bultmann, whose demythologizing programme still dominates much New Testament work, gets short shrift, and Pannenberg prefers to adopt the concept of myth