

book; not because it contains any great new discovery, but because it says what has so long needed saying, and moreover says it well. It is a book to ponder upon, and all who are already engaged on some form of liturgical work would do well to read and dwell on it, for it will throw more light on his work than ever ictuses, neums or collects can. This is but to repeat the author's plea that his book be re-read. He is not aiming at a mere intellectual appreciation, but a full human realisation, emotional as well as intellectual; something of the whole man; and this can only come about by continual and repetitive thought. This that we should become more perfect Christians, for ' . . . we mean indeed to say that Liturgy understood in the sense in which we use the term is integral, unalloyed and uncompromising Christianity.'

GERARD MEATH, O.P.

PHILOSOPHY

FROM MORALITY TO RELIGION. By W. G. de Burgh. (Macdonald and Evans; 12s. 6d.)

One's high expectations on opening the 1938 Gifford Lectures are not disappointed. Professor de Burgh resumes, with many amplifications, the theme of *Towards a Religious Philosophy* (vide BLACKFRIARS, July, 1937). In the second, third and fourth lectures he deals with the question, so much treated of in recent years, of the right and the good, and certainly deserves thanks for insisting that both action *sub ratione boni* and action motivated by duty must alike be respected and accepted, instead of one of the two being 'explained' out of existence. For all that, however, the scope of action *sub ratione boni* is too much restricted, for not all action, that done for duty's sake included, is allowed to be *sub ratione boni*. Hence it is found 'necessary, at the cost of some violence to accepted usage, to employ the term "ethical" generically, to cover both specific types of action, and (with Kant) to confine the term "moral" to one of those types—viz., to action in the line of duty.' We do not dispute, what it is indeed acute of the author to recognise, that the concept of duty is developed in widely differing degrees in different and, it may be, exceedingly virtuous people; but it is something more than paradoxical to deny the epithet 'moral' to one who acts aright because such action is ordered to the true good for man, and not because he feels it his duty to act so. The fact is rather that whereas all action is for the sake of good, in the case of free agents we have to distinguish between their real and apparent good, or what is good for them

as being specifically of such a nature, and what is good for them in some particular respect. In them it is their ontological order to a universal good which is the foundation of a sense of duty. Whether this end and the means which will lead to it are thought of as truly good or morally obligatory will depend on acquired habits of thought.

In the fifth lecture is discussed the moral argument to theism; by far the most personal and interesting, it is also the most speculatively challenging. Is it valid, we are asked, to argue from a moral order to the existence of God? And can we validly ascribe to God the attribute of goodness as the moral argument requires? In the reply to the first of these questions that aspect of the moral order is taken which involves the striving to realise the ideal, and it is rightly said that 'the reality of values and their relation to the reality of the temporal process is rendered more intelligible than on any other hypothesis if we conceive of values as possessed of reality, . . . in the mind of an actually existing God.' But this affirmation of the ultimate identity of thought and being in God is strangely equated with the 'so-called ontological argument,' which is rather 'a vote of confidence in the validity of thought,' and the assumption of which is that 'thought must, at long last, guarantee its own truth, at the point where thought and being meet as one.' When the ontological argument is 'rightly understood' in this way it absolutely ceases to be the ontological argument, and though there is some recognition of this the very continuance of the name is most misleading. In fact, what we have here is the *Quarta Via, a posteriori*, of St. Thomas, as is put beyond all doubt when it is stated (p. 163, n. 3) that 'the passage is not from thought to existence, but from my thought which is not *a se* to the thought which is *a se* as its condition.'

The answer to the second question, about the predicability of goodness of God, is answered by the author, with further precisions, as he has answered it before. Rejecting the way of analogy as ineffectual, he claims that only religious experience can free us from the perils of anthropomorphism, by giving us a univocal predicate, love, in conformity with which we can then argue analogically to other predicates consistent with this. And he explains that he does not speak of God's subsistent love, but of that love communicated by grace to man, and of man's response of love inspired by grace. But even if we were to admit that any two acts of love are univocal, we must ask how this experience justifies the ascription which it is intended to

validate; because the love of God that is in question is admittedly a created participation, are we not thrown back to St. Thomas's principle, already rejected as inevident, that the effect bears the similitude of the cause; and likewise to the way of analogy, since the love from which we are arguing is a created quality and that to which we are arguing is uncreated and subsistent? Furthermore, the truths of faith to which this argument makes appeal are not within the province of the philosopher at all. Not that they are irrational or unintelligible in themselves, but grace by which we come to 'a veritable participation in infinitude' is a supernatural quality, not *naturally* knowable by any created mind. It seems to us that at this point the author deserts the paths of 'legitimate philosophic argument' and does more than merely *illustrate* what he says from Christian belief and theology.

One's view of a chief contention of these lectures, that human action displays a dualism of principle which can only be resolved on the religious plane, will mainly depend on one's acceptance or rejection of the reality of this dualism. Of that we have written at the start. We may, however, add that it is curious that a thinker who is so bent as Professor de Burgh on bringing all phases of human activity, and especially religious activity, within the bounds of rational discussion, should reject in so summary a fashion as he does, the view of religion as a part of the virtue of justice. This is due in part to his method of distinguishing religion from morality. 'Religion implies worship,' but 'morality is possible apart, not only from the belief in and worship of God, but even from any recognition of an other-worldly reality.' Possible, but surely always imperfect also. Without the recognition of the primary right of all rights, that of the Creator over the creature, not only will the immediate duty of reverencing and worshipping God be unrecognised, but the other rights and duties of man will be without their ultimate safeguard and justification.

We cannot signalise more features of the book than these, but we are not therefore unconscious of, for example, the interest of the illustrative use made of St. Thomas's doctrine of *virtus infusa* in the seventh lecture, or the value of some elementary but too often forgotten apologetic truths in the eighth, or again of that thorough attempt at a lucid honesty and fairness which so delightfully characterises the lectures throughout.

IVO THOMAS, O.P.