

Vatican I and the Papacy

4: The Conflict between the English Bishops

Fergus Kerr O. P.

The decade that preceded Vatican I saw what was by far the most intensive and exciting theological debate there has ever been in modern English Catholic history. Compared with the pious torpor of the decade that preceded Vatican II, certainly, the zest and odium of theological exchange prepared the clergy and educated laity in England more thoroughly for the proclamation of the doctrine of papal infallibility than was the case anywhere else in the Catholic world. It is true, of course, that nobody elsewhere expected papal infallibility to be so high on the agenda at the Council. The English debate, through Manning's extraordinary influence at the Council, may even be described (with little exaggeration) as the key factor in ensuring that papal infallibility was moved to the head of the agenda.

The Dublin Review, from 1863 onwards, was the principal organ of the "New Ultramontanism". In that year the editorship passed to William George Ward, the most brilliant of all the ex-Anglicans from Oxford who dedicated their energies to "Romanizing" the English Catholic community. A fellow of Balliol College by 1834, when he was twenty-two, Ward of course took minor orders but it was in mathematics and logic that his brilliance lay. As the DNB entry delicately puts it, "his union of a severely logical intellect with a craving for more concrete assurance in matters spiritual than reason can afford" led him inexorably to seek communion with Rome. Censured by Convocation on a famous occasion in the Sheldonian Theatre, because of his "Romanism", Ward at once resigned his fellowship, married, and became a Catholic six months later. Six years later, in 1851, much to the horror of most of the Catholic clergy, Ward had been installed, against strong opposition both within and without the college, as lecturer in moral philosophy in the Westminster archdiocesan seminary.

His wife, unlike Manning's, had not died, and we were spared the speeches that he might have made at the Council in 1870. But, from his articles in *The Dublin Review*, reprinted in 1866 as a book, right through to his essays after 1870 (he at least had no doubt that the text as finally approved was a great defeat for his infallibilist views), Ward ensured that neo-ultramontanism would seep into the English Catholic community. He died in 1882, lamented in verse by Tennyson, his friend and neighbour in the Isle of Wight ("Most generous of all ultramontanes, Ward,/ How subtle at tierce and quart of mind with mind").

In 1886 we find Ward writing apologetically to Newman about their theological differences (*Letters*, XXII, p. 157): “I do not feel our differences to be such a trouble, as you do; for such differences always have been, always will be, in the Church, and Christians would have ceased to have spiritual and intellectual life, if such differences did not exist. It is part of their militant state”—which, I think, is what Karl Rahner means by “gnoseological concupiscence”. The differences, over Marian devotion and papal infallibility, had come out in Newman’s *Letter to Dr Pusey*, published that year, where he had insisted that Faber, Manning and Ward (“our Oxford friends”) could not be regarded as spokesmen for what English Catholics believed. He pointed rather to Wiseman, Ullathorne, Lingard, and others, admitting in a private letter shortly afterwards (*ibid*, p. 203) that “their *literary* merit may not be high”, but insisting that “they are *witnesses*, and it does not require to be great authors in order to witness well”. The sense that they went to witness to what their people believed, and not simply to acclaim what Roman theologians might be teaching, seems to have been deeply rooted in the minds of the majority of the English bishops as they set off for the Council in 1869.

Newman pointed to representative spokesmen for the English Catholic mind as it was in the first half of the century—that is to say, before the influx of two or three hundred disillusioned Anglicans (clergymen, landowners and academics mostly (gave Wiseman the key men to carry out his Romanizing. *Theologically*, of course, Wiseman had not always been ultramontane; it was a bit of *style* that he wanted so much to impose. The sort of battles he had to fight belong more to the campaign to restore ceremonial and etiquette. How badly this was needed may be illustrated by the story of how, in 1839, when Augustus Welby Pugin, the architect, arrived with the Earl of Shrewsbury and Ambrose Lisle Phillipps for the opening of St Marie’s church, Derby, expecting to find a plainchant choir and the bishop in vestments presented by the Earl, “What was their dismay when on their arrival they found a full orchestra in possession, and a large choir, including females, in accordance with the custom of the day. Pugin protested in vain. Bishop Walsh was in the sacristy, ready vested, and said that it was too late to alter the arrangements. Pugin appealed to the Earl of Shrewsbury, and not altogether without success. Being the donor of the vestments, he declared that they should not be used if there were to be lady sopranos and fiddlers, The Bishop, however, was inexorable; so he exchanged his beautiful cloth-of-gold vestments for a dingy set of the French pattern, and the service proceeded” (Ward’s *Sequel*, volume I, p. 116).

Bishop Walsh, as it happens, would almost certainly have become the first archbishop of Westminster in 1850, instead of Wiseman, if he had lived. What is more interesting, however, is the fact that he had started his education, before the French Revolution,

at Saint-Omer, which, with Douai, were the seminary-colleges from which Ushaw and Old Hall, Ware, sprang. The great majority of the English bishops in 1869 had been formed in what one might label a semi-Gallican tradition. The Sorbonne was suppressed in 1792 but, as the greatest school of theology in France, it had from the later Middle Ages onwards favoured Gallican tendencies in ecclesiology and vigorously defended the so-called "Gallican Articles". These had, of course, been frequently condemned by Rome, but such texts as the *Tractatus de Ecclesia* (Dijon, 1771) of Louis Bailly, which is plainly Gallican, were being used not only at Douai but even at Ushaw. The most respected figure in English Catholicism was in any case John Lingard the historian and priest-in-charge at Hornby, Lancashire. He died in 1851, at the age of eighty. He had been at Douai until 1793 and had a great deal of influence on the development of Ushaw. He never disguised his contempt for "Italian" devotions, but he was also quite Gallican in outlook.

The third of the four Gallican Articles (a document drawn up by Bossuet and passed by an assembly of bishops and deputies in Paris in 1682 in an attempt to regulate a dispute between the king and the pope about the appointment of bishops and the revenues of vacant sees) insisted that the ancient liberties of the Church of France were inviolable. However that might be, it is easier to see how the other three might appeal to English Catholics in the early nineteenth century. In particular, the first of the Articles denied that the pope had dominion over things temporal, and affirmed that kings are not subject to the authority of the Church in temporal and civil matters or to deposition by the ecclesiastical power, and that their subjects could not be dispensed by the pope from their allegiance. From the foolish decision by Pope Pius V in 1570 to excommunicate Queen Elizabeth of England until the nineteenth century English Catholics had striven to prove that they need not be disloyal citizens. One has only to think of the problems that a Polish pope creates for the government in Warsaw to realize how relevant the first of the Gallican Articles still is, or anyway the papal condemnation of it. It is abundantly plain that for Bishop Goss, for example, as for Gladstone or Acton, the doctrine of papal infallibility raised the problem of the status of precisely that condemnation, and the doctrine of papal primacy raised the spectre of claims to temporal dominion. (But before we conclude that we are all Gallican now, we must ask ourselves to what extent we think bishops, for example in some countries in Latin America, should "keep out of politics", and how far we think the pope should refrain from making statements that might disturb any country's internal policies.)

The second of the Gallican Articles upheld the decrees of the Council of Constance and thus reaffirmed the authority of an ecumenical council over the pope. The fourth (more immediately

related to the text of chapter 4 of "Pastor Aeternus") asserted that, in controversies about the faith, the judgment of the pope is irreformable only when it has the *consensus Ecclesiae*. While there is no reason to suppose that any of the English bishops were "conciliarist" in outlook, some of them at least were shrewd enough to wonder how else a pope who becomes unfit for the office might actually be deposed.

What was called "Anglo-Gallicanism" at the time, as it comes to focus in 1870, was plainly the fear that a claim to temporal and political sovereignty was included in the neo-ultramontane doctrine of papal supremacy, and that the doctrine of the personal infallibility of the pope completely isolated him from the *consensus Ecclesiae*, to make of him an inspired oracle, speaking independently of his fellow bishops, and on virtually any matter that occurred to him. In the writings of Manning and Ward in the decade before the Council it is not at all difficult to find phrases to justify that fear. It was in Bishop Clifford's speech at the Council on May 25th, 1870, that the fear of the majority of the English bishops became articulate. But the first speech that day, one of the major events at Vatican I, was the speech in favour of the doctrine of a "personal, absolute, and separate" papal infallibility, which Archbishop Manning had been preparing for several days. When he heard that Clifford was down to speak that day Manning exercised his right as a member of the *Deputatio de fide* to interrupt the order of the debate and make his intervention.

There had already been a week of speeches, of which the detailed minutes make fascinating reading (Mansi 52, 28 - 249). The bishops who spoke against any declaration of papal prerogatives maintain a consistently higher level of argument. All the time, however, one can see how differently the notion of "personal and absolute" infallibility was interpreted. Had the speech of May 17th by Archbishop Dechamps of Malines, the leader of the ultramontanists, represented their position completely, the fears of the others would soon have been removed. In his mind, clearly, the doctrine did no more than articulate the ancient practice of turning to Rome as the last resort, to judge in some matter of faith that had been questioned; far from being "absolute", he said, the infallibility was "altogether relative, being related to the truths contained in the deposit of faith"; and again, far from being "personal" it was merely functional (Mansi 52, 66-67). That line was eventually inscribed in the text of "Pastor Aeternus". But on May 24th, for example, in a brilliantly rhetorical and effectively short speech by a Spanish bishop (Caixal y Estrade of Urgel), it was insisted, against Dechamps, that papal infallibility must be regarded as personal—and furthermore, "whenever the bishop of Rome wants to teach the universal Church it is just as certain that the Holy Spirit will be with him to keep him from erring as it is certain that the omnipotent power of God will be with a priest

who intends to consecrate bread and wine” (Mansi 52, 226). The infallibilists were thus not agreed on the meaning of their basic terms, and some of them could sometimes suggest that they had such confidence in the Holy Spirit that they imagined that the pope could instruct the Church infallibly on almost anything. Little wonder that bishops like Errington, William Vaughan, Clifford, and the others, representing (perhaps unwittingly) a more old-fashioned ecclesiology, felt some alarm.

Manning wrote in his autobiography that after composing the whole speech on his own he read it over to Bishop Cornthwaite and to Matteo Liberatore, who “made no change in it” (the latter, a Jesuit, was an editor of the influential ultramontanist periodical *Civiltà Cattolica* and one of the principal instigators of the Thomist revival). The speech took nearly two hours to deliver. Both this speech and Clifford’s, which followed that morning, have been analysed by Cwiekowski (pp. 240-249).

In his opening sentence Manning declared that he would leave theology to others, and concentrate on showing, “from experience and from what Protestants and non-Catholics say, at least in England”, that the Council simply had to proclaim the infallible *magisterium* of the Roman pontiff. By this time, and indeed for years past, Manning’s conception of papal infallibility seemed to many people much nearer to that of Caixal y Estrade than to that of Dechamps. His ingenuous opening gambit saved him from having to say what he meant by it. In his second sentence, quoting Gregory the Great to the effect that the teachers of the faithful are the disciples of the Church (*fidelium doctores sunt ecclesiae discipuli*), he said that he stood among them at the Council not as a teacher but as a disciple: having been (unlike any of them) called from darkness into the light the contribution he alone could make was to tell them what the Catholic Church looked like to people who had not enjoyed the sunny radiance of faith from birth. In all simplicity he would explain how the doctrine of papal infallibility looked to his Protestant and non-Catholic brethren in England, and how they regarded the sorry wrangle about the matter that was being conducted “round the very tomb of St Peter”.

Manning then began doing some theology. He first of all insisted that papal infallibility was the common and constant teaching of the Church (except at the Sorbonne) and already *de fide catholica* (a statement which was corrected by the following speaker, Bishop John MacEvilly of Galway, Mansi, 52, 264). He then cited the text of “*Dei Filius*”, Chapter 3, to show that the Council had already defined papal infallibility (a misinterpretation of a phrase which had been excluded officially during a discussion in March instigated by Errington). Manning went on to insist that papal infallibility was no “mere opinion” but a *doctrine*, “not defined, admittedly, but revealed, altogether certain, at least proximate to faith” (Mansi 52, 251). He had already said that it was of

little consequence whether a doctrine of this kind was defined or not: defining in itself added nothing to revealed truth, not defining subtracted nothing. As he went on to say: "Raising a Catholic truth of this kind from undefined to defined doctrine adds nothing to the intrinsic certainty; it is only the extrinsic certainty that is increased". He goes on to cite as his authorities first the Spanish Jesuit Tirso González de Santalla (who, in a book published in 1698, "speaks not just for himself but communicates most accurately the teaching of the Catholic Church and the Catholic theology faculties"), and then the Spanish Jesuit Cardinal Francisco de Toledo (who flourished in the second half of the sixteenth century).

Archbishop Errington and the others must have been smouldering inwardly throughout all this. For them the crucial question was what the doctrine of papal infallibility meant—not whether it had been held in some form for centuries (they knew that). What is not clear, in their case or in anybody else's, is whether the bishops and theologians at Vatican I recognised that the concept of "defining" was being used in two quite different senses. It seems beyond dispute (as we shall see in our next instalment) that the older sense of papal "defining", as settling a controversy when required to do so as a last resort in some doctrinal crisis, is the sense inscribed in the text of "Pastor Aeternus". But the other sense, in which what is true acquires greater certainty by being raised from being "proximate to faith" to being "of faith", quite independently of any doctrinal crisis or controversy, was uppermost in Manning's mind. It belongs to the jargon of a powerful theological tradition for which the more defined doctrine there is the better. Any resistance movement easily gets drawn into using its enemy's methods. In post-Cartesian scholasticism a need for certainty to rival Luther's took the form of seeking to raise Catholic truth from intrinsic to extrinsic certainty.

Manning goes on to say that the constant and indefectible faith of Peter has never ceased to preside and rule, and, as supreme and infallible witness, master and judge, never ceased to guard, defend and propound the truth". Well (one surely wants to say) yes—in principle no doubt; but leaving aside the question of Honorius and suchlike faux pas, could Manning really have thought that popes had ever played any very significant role in the making of Christian doctrine? Did he not realize that in most of his successors, for better or for worse, St Peter had remained remarkably dormant? There have been scores of popes who could not have been trusted to preach a simple homily, and to whom other bishops would have turned in vain for help. But Manning was more at home in more recent history. He turned next to blast those who thought that a doctrinal statement was "inopportune". They predicted widespread confusion among the faithful. He reminded them of the confusion that had prevailed since the last ecumenical

council. For two hundred years now there had been opposition in the Church to the teaching authority of the pope and it had caused endless confusion among the faithful. Gallicanism in France, Febronianism in Germany, and now a fresh mixture of these errors by men of no little culture (Acton no doubt among others), all seeking to subject the Church everywhere to the State: the doctrine of papal infallibility was the only way of countering all that.

As for the argument that a statement of the doctrine would turn away non-Catholics from the Church—well, there certainly Manning had a word to say. Once again professing to leave theology to others he declared that he both could and felt obliged to speak of England: “In England I was born and among the English I have grown old, with Englishmen I have been deeply involved all my life, how could I not know them through and through. At public school with my own race and at the best university in England I completed my education entirely with my contemporaries; united with them to this very day, with bonds of every kind of relationship and friendship, I am accustomed to converse with them with the greatest familiarity”. There can be no doubt that Manning was forestalling any claims that Clifford or Errington might make; *they* had not been at Oxford or even at public schools. He yielded to those born among Catholics to speak of the internal condition of Catholics; he yielded to nobody in his knowledge of the outlook of Protestants and non-Catholics in England. To speak of England’s imminent return to the Faith was possible, as he had often said, only if one was somewhat misled into ecstasy by charity or else could not perceive clearly the facts of the case. But there had been some movement over the past fifty years: the Anglican schism was disintegrating, while Catholic truth and unity were being restored. There were many converts; but what mattered was the progressive penetration of the whole English people by Catholic ideas. Papal infallibility was no threat or drawback; on the contrary, internal Catholic conflict, and in particular this conflict that questioned the basis of the certainty of the faith as a whole, was precisely what would put people off. He quoted what Wiseman had said on his deathbed, sorrowing that while the bishops of France could welcome the encyclical “*Quanta cura*”, he himself could say nothing. There had been a great campaign in the press, and even among Catholics, to pour scorn on papal infallibility as a “figment of curial yes-men”.

Far from being an obstacle to non-Catholics a proclamation of the doctrine of papal infallibility would attract them to the Catholic Church. It was the questioning of the doctrine that estranged people from the Church. Manning quoted the case of a young Catholic, “reared as a Catholic and educated in our schools”, who had deserted the faith because he could no longer believe in the infallibility of the Church; his faith had been undermined, so he told Manning, by controversies about the Four Gallican Articles.

Nothing would bring England back to the faith more surely than a declaration of papal infallibility; you could see from the newspapers ("In England we have four very good newspapers ... in which English public opinion is mirrored") that papal infallibility was regarded as the logical outcome of Catholic doctrine. If only the Council would stop arguing and get on with proclaiming the teaching authority of the Holy See and then the infallible teaching of the Church as a whole.

It would do English Catholics good also. There was one Catholic in every twenty of his countrymen. Of the million Catholics in England Manning estimated that 800,000 were either Irish or of Irish blood, and "the Irish Bishops would speak for the integrity of *their* Catholic faith". Of the remainder, so Manning went on, about half had been educated by the Jesuits and they had escaped any such danger (i.e. of unsound doctrine about papal infallibility). Of the rest Manning had nothing to say except that they were the children of martyrs and confessors who had gladly given their lives for the Catholic faith and the authority and rights of the pope, fighting against the tyranny of the king of England.

Manning returned to the subject of the evils that could have been avoided if only the Council of Trent had affirmed the doctrine. It would be much worse now if the Council failed to speak out; national churches (as they call them) would fall all the more easily under the corrupting sway of the State. If, on the other hand, the doctrine were to be proclaimed, new energy would sweep through the bishops, the faith and obedience of all Christians would be greatly strengthened, the unity of the whole Church would be consolidated, and the certainty of infallible teaching, impenetrable all round like the ancient Roman tortoise of joined shields, would receive and extinguish the fiery missiles of the evil one. And so he had done, with this vision of a Church built on the *certitudo* (the word runs right through his speech) of an infallible *magisterium* that would protect the faithful against the encroachments and dominion of kings and states. Dupanloup, bishop of Orleans, who was against any definition of papal infallibility, and had himself both fought for church rights against the state in France and advocated the pope's claims against the house of Savoy, noted in his journal (Cwickowski, p. 245): "Maning (sic) ... vrai Protestant ... idée fixe, où tout revient ... subjectivisme ... sans une preuve ... affirmations ... c'est prodigieux". For him at least Manning must have insisted too much on "certainty".

The Bishop of Galway made the next speech, but after the best part of an hour he interrupted himself—"I have a lot more that I want to say to you but not to bore you any further I shall stop" (Mansi 52, 269); and he handed in the rest of his text (which itself occupies five columns in Mansi). Thus the ambo was cleared for the third, and last, speech of the morning: that by William Clifford, bishop of Clifton. Council speeches were always delivered from

scripts and though they often took up points made a few days previously it is rare that anybody takes up points from a speech made earlier on the same day. Clifford's fluency in Latin, and no doubt the time that MacEvilly was talking, enabled him to pick up a number of points in Manning's address.

Clifford opened with a bit of a joke: "I fear that you will think it most inopportune for me to talk to you at this hour about opportuneness, after so much has been said about this matter"; and he went on to say that the more he listened the more convinced he became that it *was* inopportune to treat the doctrine of papal infallibility "on its own and apart from the question of the Church", *solitarie et a quaestione de ecclesia separatim*. What they had heard from the most reverend and the most wise archbishop of Westminster had not moved him in the least; on the contrary, much that he had said only confirmed his view that the question of the authority and infallibility of the pope should not be divided from the question about the authority and infallibility of the Church.

Manning had suggested that controversy about papal infallibility since the Council of Trent had obscured the doctrine of the infallibility of the Church. That only went to show that the two questions should be treated together. And if the English were to be drawn to the truth by way of papal infallibility then it was all the more important to be able to show them the *connection* between the infallibility of the pope and the infallibility of the Church. Manning had quoted from the four best newspapers in England, to show that papal infallibility was thought to be logical: "It is obvious, most reverend fathers, that I need not prove to you that these Protestant newspapers do not write to further the Catholic cause. The fact that they are talking as they are should give rise to the suspicion that a snake is hiding in the grass. If it is true, as the most excellent Archbishop has said, that it is necessary for the English that things be demonstrated to them logically, the one thing certain is that, to convert an Englishman to the Catholic religion, what you have to demonstrate first of all is that the Catholic religion is not in fact *despotism*". At this point, so Mansi records, there were "signs of disapproval" in the aula. The difficulty that Protestants have with the Catholic Church—the "Popish" Church as they call it—is whether or not it is a kind of tyranny. The newspapers that the archbishop had quoted, to the effect that the English realized that papal infallibility is in the logic of Catholicism, only show for them that the Church is a tyranny, and the pope really a tyrant. Not only should they not treat papal authority on its own, they should be showing what the nature or essence of the Catholic Church was, what true authority in the Catholic Church was, how the authority of the Church and the authority of the pope complemented each other, and how in all this it was not dictatorial and despotic. If after so many months of labour the Council was to do nothing but offer people some decree about papal infallibility, in no matter what

terms the decree might be formulated, the impression people would get (so Clifford went on) would simply be that they had done nothing but make the pope a despot. At this point there were once again "murmurs and signs of disapproval". It is true that the acoustics were bad, but even so it is astonishing that some in the audience thought that Clifford was telling them that they wanted to make the pope a despot (cf Cwiekowski, p. 246).

That reads like Clifford's answer to Manning. The rest of his speech sounds as if it had been carefully prepared. Clifford first allowed that he knew of theological controversy over papal infallibility, but he testified that Catholics in England, while they believed in the infallibility of the Church, had been told that it was an open question in theology whether the ultimate basis of infallibility lay in the pope alone or in the pope together with the Church (an interesting sidelight on what he at least thought the doctrine under discussion involved). In catechisms and in sermons it was only the Church's infallibility that was taught. Not to speak of Milner, Challoner, John Gother and other witness-bearers of the English Catholic tradition, Clifford thought it would suffice to quote from Wiseman's *Lectures* (1836 and frequently reprinted) to show that papal authority, in some great crisis, would not be exercised apart from an ecumenical council, and that an ecumenical council would be conducted by using all possible rational enquiry and human prudence to arrive at a "judicious decision".

Next Clifford agreed with an earlier speaker that the Church should be ruled by the truth and not by public opinion. But he also believed that prudent action was important in governing the Church; to disregard public opinion and to commit everything to heaven was not faith but fatalism. Was it wise to provoke governments against the Church? Was it wise to pay no attention to the fears of bishops from Germany, Hungary, France, Portugal, Switzerland, and even from Italy itself? After the disaster of the sixteenth century the Church was rising again in England, Germany and elsewhere, and growing in North America and in the British colonies. Was it wise to burden people with the doctrine of papal infallibility, without any account of authority in the Church, particularly if the extreme theories be considered which were circulating everywhere and being zealously promoted?

Then why should Protestant sensibilities not be respected? The Catholic Church in England and elsewhere enjoyed complete freedom; why should Protestants who upheld that freedom be unnecessarily alienated?

The Archbishop of Dublin had described to the Council how the Irish had resisted the imposition by the state of a "national church". How Clifford wished he could have said the same of England, Scotland, Scandinavia and elsewhere! No other people had suffered so bitterly for the Catholic faith as the people of Ireland. They had kept the faith not only for themselves but for England,

America, Australia, and wherever the English language might be heard. All the same (so Clifford went on) would not history have been different if Queen Elizabeth had been approached more prudently, and particularly if James II had received less extreme advice?

Clifford turned to the history of Catholic emancipation in England and the oath, to meet anti-papist fears and prejudices, that the pope should have no temporal authority or jurisdiction, direct or indirect, in the realms of the king of England. This had all been negotiated with Rome, and the liberties that English Catholics enjoyed must not now be threatened by any declaration of papal authority apart from an exposition of authority in the Church. There was nowhere in the world where religion was more free, or the spiritual authority of the pope more fully recognized or more freely exercised than in England.

Finally Clifford turned to the greatest difficulty of all which was simply that, since they did not have the *status quaestionis*, they really did not know what they were talking about. The more they talked the more obvious it became that the same words and the same phrases were being taken in completely different senses. He cited several instances. On the question of "personal infallibility", for example, the bishop of Urgel and the archbishop of Malines, both on the same side, were evidently poles apart in their understanding of the basic terms—"And yet the matter keeps being discussed as if we were dealing with one and the same thing"! Clifford showed that the archbishop of Dublin had completely misunderstood the archbishop of Prague. The latter had only been asking about the relationship between papal and episcopal authority, not denying the doctrine of papal infallibility. The archbishop of Westminster had said that they were all agreed on the doctrine and arguing only about the opportuneness of proclaiming it; Clifford said that they were not even agreed on what the doctrine was. But these were only examples: Clifford's point was that, so long as the *status quaestionis* had not been established clearly, "although nominally they might be talking about one thing, namely infallibility, in fact they were talking about quite different things". The only rational way forward was to have a round-table discussion at which a small group representing all sides to the argument would work out the basic terms. This could never be done by a long series of orations having no connection with one another.

Later that day Clifford told Acton that he felt his point of view was making headway. Manning asked Bishop Amherst if he did not think it would be better for him and for Clifford, who had grown very thin, to leave the Roman heat. Pius IX was enraged at Clifford's speech: according to the Bavarian ambassador's story the pope told a group of Frenchmen that the only reason Clifford would not believe in his infallibility was because he had not made him archbishop of Westminster.

A month later, on June 22nd, Archbishop Errington (his titular see was Trebizond), in a short speech, neatly argued and glinting with irony, repeated Clifford's plea for a rational attempt to clarify the terms of the debate; there was little less disagreement about the meaning of the doctrine among those who wanted infallibility proclaimed as there was between them as a whole and people like himself (Mansi 52, 806-808). But by this time neither Manning nor Clifford was in the forefront. Ullathorne had come into his own, the past-master of irenic accommodation. While seeking an audience with Pius IX on July 6th to tell him that he had always been an infallibilist (the pope patted him on the back, saying "Bravo, bravo!"), Ullathorne was also working hard, and with some success, to have phrases written into the text of chapter 4 of "Pastor Aeternus" which might allay the fears of Clifford (not to mention Newman, waiting for him in Birmingham). Clifford had a speech on the draft of chapter 4 ready by June 7th; but as the Roman heat forced the debate to a close he was among the many who renounced their right to speak. It would be very interesting to have his script, but Cwiekowski's search has yielded nothing.

On July 13th, at the crucial trial vote, Errington, Clifford and William Vaughan were among the 88 bishops who voted *non placet*. Ullathorne voted *placet juxta modum* (with reservations). Of the other seven English bishops who had been summoned to the Council the elder Brown was still at home in Newport, Goss was still at Cannes, and Grant had died, while Roskell, Turner, James Brown, and Amherst had all left for home. At the solemn proclamation of the doctrine, on July 18th, during the famous thunderstorm, Ullathorne and Vaughan joined Manning, Chadwick and Cornthwaite in voting *placet*. Errington and Clifford absented themselves and were probably already on the way home.

At that point, of course, the Council was expected to reassemble in the autumn (and in fact did so, briefly). There was every reason to expect that the question of papal infallibility would be placed in perspective in some further decree on authority in the Church. But by September it had become plain that the Council would have to be interrupted or abandoned. Manning had dismissed the head of his archdiocesan seminary and issued a lengthy pastoral letter in October, giving an extremely ultramontanist interpretation of "Pastor Aeternus". Ullathorne issued a much shorter pastoral, which is a careful and moderate analysis. James Brown, interestingly, in his even shorter pastoral issued in February 1871, concluded by citing with approval the declaration by the German bishops, (Acton's English home was in his diocese). Clifford issued no pastoral; after much thought and correspondence, with Newman among others, not to mention requests from Rome for him to make a public statement, he seems to have sent round an *ad clerum* by the end of 1870. Rome was still inviting

Archbishop Errington to declare himself as late as February 1872 (he opens a letter to Clifford, through whom Rome approached him: "I am very much obliged to Cardinal Barnabò for the kind interest which your communication shews him to take in my welfare"). In 1875, at their Low Week meeting, the English bishops finally issued a collective pastoral, signed by Manning as well as by Clifford, together with six of the others who had been at the Council as well as old Brown of Newport; but it was simply a presentation of the famous Fulda declaration of 1875 by the German bishops, which affirmed episcopal as well as papal authority in the Church. It was a kind of victory for Clifford's theology in the end; but a century of Manning's interpretation has obscured that.

(To be continued)

Reviews

VIRTUES AND VICES by Philippa Foot. *Basil Blackwell, 1979. pp. xiv + 207 £8.25*

Mrs Foot needs no introduction to students of moral philosophy; she has been a powerful voice in the subject for some years. In this book, which might usefully be compared with Peter Geach's *The Virtues* (Cambridge, 1977), she brings together a number of papers most of which are already in print. Altogether, the collection comprises the following essays: *Virtues and Vices, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, Euthanasia, Free Will as Involving Determinism, Hume on Moral Judgment, Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values, Moral Beliefs, Goodness and Choice, Reasons for Action and Desires, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, A Reply to Professor Frankena, Are Moral Considerations Overriding? Approval and Disapproval*. Numbers I and XIII are the only items so far unpublished, but there are some new comments attached to some of the other papers.

Throughout her text Mrs Foot provides plenty of stimulating and solid argument. And it seems to me that on the whole her general approach is warmly to be welcomed. The kind of line she adopts in ethics (Aristotelian/Thomist as opposed to Humean/Intuitionist/Non-naturalist/Prescriptivist) has been heavily criticized in recent debate; but it still seems persuasive insofar as we can surely make out a case for saying, as Mrs Foot does, that moral

judgments are true or false, that there are limits to what can count as a moral viewpoint or argument, and that moral conclusions can be defended by appeal to evidence that is, as many would tiresomely say 'factual', (see especially papers vii-x). It is also useful to be reminded by Mrs Foot of the advantages of approaching moral philosophy with reference to virtues and vices. Philosophers sometimes regard ethics as an enquiry into the nature and status of moral obligations which are taken to be independent of contracts or which are supposed to be discerned independently of what is needful to human beings as such. Sometimes, of course, moral obligations are presented in terms of doing what one decides one ought to do, the understanding being that almost anything can count as a moral obligation granted certain formal admissions concerning consistency, impartiality and so forth. The attempt to engage in ethics via the virtues can seem by contrast a salutary corrective to all this. By means of such an attempt one avoids the difficulty of talking as if the only significant evaluative terms worth discussing in moral philosophy are those like 'good' and 'ought' which are supposed to have a moral meaning or use independent of the situations in which they are used both morally and otherwise. One can also allow for moral argument in a way impossible for many