

Anarchy and Grace: St Thomas ¹

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Even for those who are still willing to learn with St Thomas Aquinas, the image of him may be that of one whose achievement was, supremely, synthetic: starting from the first and ultimate principles, he descends steadily down from God to man, in the manner of those streams from the heavens down the mountains into the plains celebrated in the psalm (103, 13) which St Thomas chose as the text of his inaugural lecture as Master in the university of Paris:

Rigans montes de superioribus suis,
de fructu operum tuorum satiabitur terra
From your dwelling you water the hills;
earth drinks its fill of your gift

This image has some measure of truth in it, but for reasons which will appear only slowly in the course of this article. Nevertheless, the plain—and to us more sympathetic—fact remains that this image is also false: St Thomas found men much as we find men: man is broken and lives in a broken society, a creature always liable to fall apart into his constituent pieces within a society riven by discord and distortions.

I. MAN BROKEN

This view of man is subjacent to his whole theological enterprise, and receives explicit acknowledgement in scattered comments throughout his works, only some of which can be indicated here. The conflicts in man are an existential fact before they become intelligible, which they do only when seen as the privation or reverse of a primordial state of integration, the negative consequence and aspect of some sort of primitive expropriation; and they become *theologically* intelligible when resolved and related back to God. Thus our present condition can be seen in either of two complementary ways: as a state in which our various potentialities are split in conflict, or as a state marked by loss of a one-time order in which 'just as the mind was subject to God, so the lower powers were

¹Since this article is intended to be primarily a piece of exegesis, I have thought it best to include ample references so that anybody so inclined is in a position to follow up or check any particular statement. But for the sake of the scurrying reader, I have also tried to simplify the notation of such references, as follows: All references, unless otherwise stated, are to the *Summa Theologiae*, and the first figure or couplet of figures denotes the Book of the *Summa*, the second figure denotes the Question within that Book, a third the Article within that Question, and any possible further symbol denotes either the corpus of the Response to the Question or the Reply to an objection (or both). Thus, for example, 1-2, 3, 4 *in c.* and *ad 2* would denote the first part of the second Book, the third Question, and the corpus of the Response as well as the Reply to the second objection in the fourth Article.

subject to mind, and the body was subject to the soul' (3, 61, 2; et cf. 1, 82; *ibid.* 95, 1).

1. *In his emotions*

The very sequence in the *Summa* on the emotions or passions begins in its first article with a quotation from St Paul's ever-graphic evocation of our condition: 'While we were living in the flesh, our sinful passions, aroused by the law, were at work in our members' (1-2, 22, 1, quoting Romans 7, 5). This is the *lex fomitis*, that kindling or fuel with which we are born and which is ever-ready material for the burning of our passions (1-2, 91, 6; et cf. *ibid.* 81, 3 *ad* 2; 82, 3; 94, 3 *ad* 2; 3, 15, 2; *ibid.* 27, 3). And it is perhaps in the unruliness of our feelings and emotions—or passions, as he calls them—that our state of disintegration comes most intimately home to us.

Within each one of us individually, 'it happens that a man's heart is torn in different directions; and this in two ways. On the one hand, because he can want things at different levels: most of the time our lower appetites are in conflict with our higher ones, as St Paul said in his letter to the Galatians: "The desires of the flesh are against the spirit" (5, 17). On the other hand, insofar as one and the same appetitive desire is for various objects which just cannot be had all together. So there must be some turbulence and conflict' (2-2, 29, 1). A man can be surprised by his emotions (v.e.g. 1-2, 17, 7; *ibid.* 74, 3 *ad* 2); he tends to see things the way his emotions bias him to see them (v.e.g. 1-2, 9, 2); many of the actions he performs and the gestures he makes are the products of his pre-reflective fantasy rather than of his deliberate choice (v.e.g. 1-2, 1, 1 *ad* 3; et cf. *ibid.* 18, 9); he can be so overcome by his passions and emotions as to go out of his mind, at least temporarily (v.e.g. 1-2, 6, 7 *ad* 3; et cf. *ibid.* 10, 3, *in c.* & *ad* 2; 77, 7). And, of course, this unruliness of the emotions is particularly manifest, if not particularly important, when it comes to sex. This is not the place to re-affirm St Thomas's original and positive view of human sexuality¹; suffice it to say that precisely on account of the sane lucidity of his insights he knew perfectly well that the genital members could be almost independent forces. This in itself, of course, is not sin, just as the general psycho-physical constitution and state of a man (including the fact that he happens to be unusually highly-sexed) is no sin (v.e.g. 1-2, 17, 9 *ad* 3; cf. 2-2, 153, 3 *ad* 2, *ad* 3). But these *facts* are so many further indications and remnants of that primordial dislocation within man.

2. *In his relationships*

And not only *within* man taken individually: the society of which he is a part and into and through which he grows up (v.e.g. 2-2, 188, 8) is also dislocated. And this social dislocation can be seen with St Thomas under two aspects.

Social dislocation can be seen in the first place as a lack of justice,

¹This will be the subject of one of a series of two articles which we shall be publishing later this year and the object of which will be to call in question certain historical affirmations made by J. Noonan in his book on *Contraception*.—Ed.

since justice is concerned specifically with one's relationships to other people (v. 2-2, 58, 2), being defined as 'the unwavering and persevering will to give each man his due' (2-2, 58, 1). And it is enough to look at the various titles of his sub-divisions of injustice to realize that the scholastics¹ took a realistic view of the defects of man's dealings with his fellow-man: discrimination, homicide, physical injuries to the person, theft, robbery with violence, unjust judgment, slander, calumny, detraction and holding a man up to ridicule, fraud. And the scholastics saw these dealings between men as operating along three lines: as between the community acting through its duly constituted government towards members of that community (distributive justice), as between members of that community as it were laterally (commutative justice), and as between and individual and the rest of society ('legal' justice).

And it is in this last connexion that we rejoin the other aspect under which St Thomas saw society's evils. For he saw that society was travailed by an inner drive towards its own wholeness and completeness, its internal beauty even, which is why the component members of that society have an intrinsic, even if implicit, relationship to this totality (v.e.g. 1-2, 19, 10; 2-2, 23, 7 *in c* and *ad 2*; *ibid.* 58, 5). And, paradoxically, this interior wholeness of society is ensured by its having a goal beyond itself, so that justice is a function of this over-riding goal. But such an exterior goal which ensures the common weal of society may be more or less explicitly, and more or less adequately, formulated and envisaged, and it is to the extent that the effort towards his over-riding good breaks down that the vices of hatred, civil strife and even rebellion and war erupt (v. 2-2, 23, 7; 34; 37; 40; 42).

II. MAN REMADE

So, for St Thomas, man is indeed a broken creature, living in a broken society. And yet there are also counter-forces at work, and counter-signs of something at once more noble and more natural. This time we can start from the more specifically social aspect of man and from there work back to him in his individuality.

A. TOWARDS PERSONALIZATION

1. *In his relationships*

At the social level, then, there is that inherent drive of society towards its own well-functioning and wholeness which we have already indicated. For St Thomas, man, however broken and wounded, is neither 'homo homini lupus' nor a noble savage chafing impatiently under artificial social fetters: man is as integral to society as culture is to nature. And there is one aspect of this natural drive towards universal brotherhood and fairness among

¹The change of subject from 'St Thomas' to 'the scholastics' here is deliberate. For in this whole area of justice St Thomas shared with his contemporaries a common and particular debt to Aristotle: cf. *Psychologie et Morale aux XII et XIII Siècles*, O. Lottin, O.S.B., especially Vol. 3, 1 (1949), pp. 283-299; et cf. *ibid.* Vol 3, 2, pp. 579-601. For the *Summa* itself, v. 2-2, 63-78.

men which needs particularly to be brought out today. St Thomas is quite firm in declaring that the whole earth has been made for the service of *all* men, so that in origin and in destination of use, material things are common, even though the actual concrete means of producing, distributing and exchanging them is left to their joint responsibility (v. 2-2, 32, 5 *in c* and *ad* 2; 64, 1; 66, 2; 66, 7)—and St Thomas likes to recall the affirmation of Ecclesiasticus: ‘God. . . left him in the hands of his own counsel’ (*Sir.* 15, 14: v.e.g. 1, 22, 2, *ad* 4; 2-2, 104, 1 *ad* 1). ‘To give away what is superfluous is a matter of obligation’, he declares (2-2, 32, 5). Similarly, authority derives from the community and can as it were be resolved back into the community (v.e.g. 1-2, 90, 3; 95, 4; 97, 3 *in c* and *ad* 3; 2-2, 57, 2), even to the extent of putting down unjust rulers (1-2, 96, 4; 2-2, 42, 2 *ad* 3).

St Thomas would not, however, concede that a rectification of such structural relationships is enough to ensure the transformation of man. He observes very finely that ‘external actions as it were mediate between external things, which are their raw-material, and the interior emotions, which are their starting-points. And it can happen that the action as a whole may be vitiated under one aspect without thereby being also vitiated under the other. . . . The rectification of our behaviour insofar as this ends in something external is a matter of justice, while the rectification of our behaviour insofar as this stems from our emotions is a matter for the other moral virtues, whose province is precisely these emotions’ (2-2, 58, 9 *ad* 2).

2. *In his emotions*

And so we are back to man’s passions or emotions, and so rather to his individuality, but now under the aspect of those counter-forces to dissolution which is our present topic. And here we may begin by observing with St Thomas that the primary passion of *love* is not merely intrinsically out-going¹, but other-directed, or, as he does not shrink from saying, *ecstatic* (v. 1-2, 26-30, especially *ibid.* Q. 28, 3: ‘Utrum exstasis sit effectum amoris’). To see the true inwardness of this insight, however, we must take it in conjunction with several others, which we must content ourselves with summarizing schematically as follows: that the passions or emotions can be basically sub-divided into two main sorts, love and anger (or aggressivity, as we might say nowadays) (v. 1, 81, 2; 1-2, 23, 1); that there is an interior order as between these basic drives such that aggressivity is subordinate to love and that man’s striving can be seen *both* to begin from *and* to aspire to and terminate in love (v. 1, 81; 1-2, 25, 1); that these basic passional drives are summated in man in a love-drive specific to him as a rational creature (v.e.g. 1-2, 6; 10, 1); that the drive or drawing of love summated in man is in the direction of an ever-growing universality, both, as it were, laterally—towards

¹v. generally 1, 80; *ibid.* 19, 1; 1-2, 18, 1. Et cf. 1, 59, especially art. 2; *ibid.* 62, 1, and the lucid and useful notes to these articles by Fr Kenelm Foster, O.P., in the English translation of the *Summa*, Vol. 9, 1, 50-64, *Angels*.

all men (2-2, 24, 4-7; *ibid.* 26, 6-8; 26, 13)—and interiorly, in the sense of an ever-increasing reclamation or pacifying of the passions and feelings (v. 1-2, 24, 4; et cf. *ibid.* 19, 10); and, finally, that this drive or drawing can be discerned to be the instinct for beatitude or happiness innate in every human being (v. 1, 2, 1 *ad* 1), and which, as a tendency to a final goal, is implicitly present in and the motive force of everything we do (v. 1-2, 1-5, especially Q. 1, 6 *ad* 3; *ibid.* 10,1; et cf. *ibid.* 89, 6; 1, 60, 2).

Now, when we take this ensemble of insights together, we gain a picture of the gradual emergence from out of the seething turbulence of man's relationships and emotions of some directing and goal-seeking power, striving of its own élan for a wholeness characterized by an autonomy and self-mastery which does *not however exclude others : on the contrary*. And if we now condense these observations into technical language and say that 'every agent acts for some goal' (*omne agens agit propter finem*); that, in the case of man this emerging and gradually personalizing force for direction is called 'will' (*voluntas*), and that it is precisely to the extent that this directing force assumes its self-actuating mastery that one can begin to distinguish the fully human from the sub-human in man's behaviour (the distinction between *actus humanus* and *actus hominis*: v.e.g. 1-2, 1 *in c* and *ad* 3; *ibid.* Q. 6, prologue, and art. 1; 9, 4), we must also say that in the vision of St Thomas self-fulfilment, the goal of man's striving, is *essentially other-directed*, con-genial, co-subjective, co-relative, con-joining, co-operative, co-aptive, co-venantal, 'amical'. Antoine de St Exupéry will put it in his own way: 'To love is not to look at one another, it is to look together in the same direction.'

This last point is quite crucial, and it is particularly difficult for the modern mind to grasp, steeped as it unconsciously is in an inheritance of language—such as 'autonomy', 'independence', 'self-fulfilment', 'self-realization', 'self-reliance', 'self-mastery', 'self-composure', 'selfhood' even—which in its very feel and associations is excluding, isolating, acquisitive and individualistic.

B. TOWARDS DIVINIZATION

Once this dimension to a man's drive or drawing is acknowledged, however, then a final layer of awareness becomes accessible. On the genetic view we have been taking so far, we have perhaps caught a glimpse of a process in which the various potentialities within a man become progressively open to a dialogue with each other, which can then be described on the model of political relationships within society at large: so, as St Thomas often says, a man's higher potentialities (of mind, i.e. of judgment and of will) are related to his lower powers of feeling in the same sort of way as a ruler is related to his subjects (v.e.g. 1, 81, 3 *ad* 2; et cf. 1-2, 9, 12 *ad* 3; 17, 7; 56, 4 *ad* 3; 58, 2).

1. *Man's social being*

Now there are two points to be grasped about this genial insight. In the first place, the *fact* of the comparison is much more important than the particular application of it which St Thomas was bound by his culture to use: the fact that he expressed this insight in terms of a non-despotic, constitutional monarchy is far less important than the insight itself—with all its rich suggestiveness of the somehow *intrinsic* and reciprocal relationship between individual and society, and so with its potentiality for 'demythologization' and redevelopment in terms of other culture-contexts. But, secondly, it is also important to see that the political organization exists in its own right and not merely as a projection or model of an individual's intra-psychic structure. Once this is perceived, however, then the problem of the nature of the reciprocal relationship between individual and society is posed.

2. *The root of man's social being*

At this point St Thomas makes another basic option: for him a man does not belong to civil and political human society 'in his entirety and in every respect' (*secundum se totum et secundum omnia sua*: v.e.g. 1-2, 21, 4 *ad* 3; et cf. e.g. *ibid.* 62; 63, 3-4). Characteristically, this apparently so desiccated and scholastic phrase holds quite radical implications—but radical in a fundamentally Christian sense. For what St Thomas means by this is that a man is a citizen of heaven before he is a citizen of earth. This is a quite pivotal insight, and some of the consequences of it must now be spelled out.

The love, whether at the level of the passions or of the will, which has until now been only implicitly social, other-directed, co-subjective, now not only becomes explicitly so, but it stands revealed as rooted ontologically and primarily in God as its first co-subject as well as author, and *only derivatively* extending to oneself and to others. Ontologically speaking, man is not merely a sharer by nature: the first partner, as well as author, of his sharing is God, and only derivatively other beings¹. Similarly, the goal to which society has all the while been more or less implicitly and unconsciously striving stands revealed as the enjoyment of God, with charity, which joins us to God, as the all-commanding and shaping virtue.

And with this decisive shift from the genetic to the ontological view, there comes a complete reversal of perspective in which all that we have so far seen returns, but in a different light. For on such a view, the root of the otherwise only too apparent brokenness of man's condition can now be seen to consist first of all in the brokenness of the relationship to God and only derivatively in the brokenness of relationships to the rest of the world. And, further, loss or restoration of this relationship lies below the level of our capacities and activities, and somehow antecedently to them; it lies deeper, in

¹v. 2-2, 26, 2 and 3; 27, 4, *in c.* and *ad* 1, *ad* 2; et cf. 1-2, 68, 8 *ad* 2; 109, 3; 1, 60, 1-5, especially art. 5, and the notes to this Question by Fr Kenelm Foster, O.P., *op. cit.*, as well as his notes to 1, 54, 2; *ibid.* 55, 1; 62, 1.

our very *being* (v. 1-2, 110, 1-4, especially 3 *ad* 3; 111, 2; et cf. *ibid.* 68, 4 *ad* 3; 83, 2; 3, 62, 2). This is what St Thomas means by insisting that grace is something in the *essence* of the soul, *not* in its powers: our condition, whether as lost or as rescued, is first of all a matter of the very qualification (*qualitas*) of our being, of the quality of our life in a truly deep sense. The living out of our Christian life is then in a real sense a finding and becoming what we somehow already *are*, as far as the limitations of our character and situation admit. But once we have seen this, then it follows that any social reconstruction and rectification achieved in our present political society can only be make-shift and incomplete and pre-figurative—and in this way comic. But for exactly the same reason, all such reconstruction and rectification is also so serious—perhaps to the point of tragedy. All other relationships (of justice, therefore: commutative, distributive and ‘legal’) are now seen for what they are: ontologically speaking, derivative from, expressive of this ground relationship to God, and, genetically speaking, educative for, pre-figurative of it. Both their relativity and their importance become simultaneously apparent:

If ever any beauty I did see,

Which I desir’d, and got, ’twas but a dreame of thee.

3. *The consequent two-fold character of law*

In fact, all social relationships and the ordinances of political life stand in much the same relationship to our final destiny as that typical part of our social structure which we call law stands in relationship to spirit. We might say that social structures are related to our *eschaton* as law is related to spirit. It is the same decisive insight which brings out in relief the intimate nature and place of law in the scheme of things: law is now revealed in its essential subordination and what I have chosen to call its ‘bi-valence’. In what is perhaps the single most important article of the whole *Summa*, St Thomas makes a few remarks of a dense precision which cannot be pondered too much.

In 1-2, Q. 106, in the question ‘about the law of the gospel, which is called the new law’, and in the first article, ‘Whether the new law is a written law’, he writes:

Aristotle says in his *Ethics* that anything is characterized by its most important feature. Now the most important feature of the law of the New Testament, that in which its whole force resides, is the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is given by faith in Christ. And so it is that the new law is primarily (*principaliter*) the very grace of the Holy Spirit itself. This is quite clear from what the apostle says in his letter to the Romans: ‘Then what becomes of our boasting? It is excluded. On what principle? On the principle of works? No, but on the principle of faith’ (3, 27): for he does call the grace of faith ‘law’. And he is even more explicit a little further on (8, 2): ‘for the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has

set me free from the law of sin and death.' That is why St Augustine in his turn says in his *De Spiritu et Littera* that 'just as the law of works was written on the tables of stone, so the law of faith is written in the hearts of the faithful'. And elsewhere in the same book he writes: 'What then is God's law written by God himself in the hearts of men, but the very presence of the Holy Spirit?'

'There are nevertheless certain things in the new law which *dispose us towards* the grace of the Holy Spirit, and which concern the *use* of grace. These are as it were secondary in the new law, about which Christ's faithful need to be instructed in speech and writing, and in matters of belief as well as of practice. This is why we should say that the new law is primarily interior (*indita*), but secondarily a written law.' (italics supplied. Et cf. *ibid.* Q. 108,1).

The real point of this article seems to be, then, that the law (obviously a concept that covers civil as well as Church law, in an analogous way) is *both* education and expression, *both* cultivation and gift, it *both* produces and evidences, though in a way which in real life cannot be concretely be separated out. The relative proportion, as it were, of education and expression can be sensed rather than singled out, it is a matter of growing, dialectical experience. And in any such process of gradual and structured but persistently, if variably, restructuring growth, there is too a gradual shift in the direct activity of God as *felt*. This process can be expressed in many ways: in terms of a gradual shift of the relative importance of the 'virtues' (particularly those skills acquired through practice and perseverance) *vis-à-vis* the 'gifts of the Holy Spirit' (*dona*: v.e.g. 1-2, 68, especially arts. 1-3; cf. *ibid.* 110, 2; 3; 3,19,1); or in terms of the increasing sense of sharing in and serving a life which transcends one's own, of belonging to Another, of submitting co-operatively to a divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will, of one's activity as yielding ever more passively to the gracious initiative of God in his particular and predestinating providence (v. 1, 22-23; et cf. 1-2, 1, 5). But, however one expresses this, there is a growth, a further emergence, a process towards the light.

Evidently, the precise quality of this process as a lived experience will vary enormously according to temperament, age, epoch, one's particular form of adversity and crisis in life, and so on. But, broadly, St Thomas will say that in our lives and loves we are moved and given shape by a desire for happiness and beatitude, and that we in some sense actually already possess this beatitude to the extent that we are charged with the hope of possessing it fully. But we become charged with hope and this anticipated beatitude through leading the sort of life which, by being in line with that fulness, actually and progressively realizes it here and now. And this is what the 'beatitudes' are about: the beatitudes are so many present signs and embryonic realizations of the utopia of final beatitude. But, again, because such realizations are both effort *and* gift, duty *and* appeal, disposition *and*

effect, the process of growth will show itself so differently in different people, in function of the basic physical and psychic equipment they start from and acquire from others and the environment and opportunities they chance or manage to find themselves in, and in function of the way in which they learn to experience the crucifixion of the tensions involved. Whilst we all have to put ourselves in the way of our final beatitude in the shape of the sheer hard work of trying to be poor and meek and ahungered after justice, etc., the saints are those precisely who, under God, arrive at surmounting this crucifixion and even now in this life arrive at showing something of the final splendour of bliss enjoyed (v. 1-2, 69, 1 and 2). So here again there is a bivalence, in sympathy with the bivalence of the law which we have already seen: two variants of the general bivalence of activity *vis-à-vis* contemplation (v. 2-2, 179-182, especially Q. 180, 2; 182 1 *ad* 3; et cf. 3, 40, 1 *in c* and *ad* 2).

4. Looking with God

However one expresses this gradual shift and process, it is one of increasing clarification, and it is precisely the light of this which enables one gradually to change from the genetic to the ontological view of things. And the gradual breaking through of this flood of light is experienced as an increasing sense of passing from the aggressive subjectivity of self-actuating action to the more passive objectivity of humble co-respondence, and the realization that what we had thought of as *drive* is in fact after all a *drawing*—‘Draw me’—a *being* attracted to, allured, enticed always beyond (v.e.g. 1-2 26, 3 *ad* 4; et cf. *ibid.* 22, 1; 23, 4; 6, 1; 8, 1; 9, 4; 10, 1; 109, 6 and 7; 1, 62, 2 *ad* 3).

So, there is a process which we could try to catch in terms reminiscent of St Augustine and St Gregory as follows: we begin by finding ourselves in a state of confusion and anarchy, and so we are led to demand some order and law, only to discover that we cannot keep the law without the gracious help of God. Now this process has come the full circle. And it is precisely from such a reversed and as it were prospectively as well as retrospectively recapitulating vision that St Thomas wrote: from the lived experience of ‘being somehow stamped’ with God’s own knowledge (1, 1, 3 *ad* 2—and bearing in mind that ‘it is with the same knowledge that God knows both himself and what he does’: 1, 1, 4). For that *is* how things really are, for those who have eyes pure enough to see (v.e.g. 2-2, 8, 7). The way down *is* the same as the way up, in the end; Jacob’s ladder has angels both ascending and descending (cf. *Contra Gentes*, IV, 1, Proemium).

And so the synthetic scheme emerges, the truth of the first ‘image’ returns: In the joining to Christ and his passion and resurrection through baptism, the very quality of our life and being is changed—restored in fact (v.e.g. 3, 69, especially 3 *ad* 3; arts. 4 and 5; *ibid.* 8, 1-3; 48, 6; 62; et cf. 1-2, 108, 1); our very state is on a continuum

(*continuatio*: 3, 62, 6) with him, before we even start acting; but because function follows form (*agere sequitur esse*), because becoming is an acting out and discovery of our being, this engraving, energizing and enabling of our being can in principle diffuse itself and extend itself through the rest of our powers and actions and feelings and relationships—and hence the bivalent, dialectical character of law and social structures. Law is now, however, seen not so much as duty and categorical imperative, rather as appeal, a disposing of ourselves towards what we truly are and are meant to be, a disposing which at once realizes and pre-figures the final beatitude,¹ since (good) laws are ‘congruent with our own authentic desire to be ourselves’².

In this way, any gradual rectification of ourselves and of our relationships—or, more precisely, any *allowing* of ourselves to be rectified—is a given and realizing anticipation of the bliss that can only be finally enjoyed in its fulness beyond death. Such a given and realizing anticipation may be on different scales—solitary, domestic, local, national, inter-national—but in any case it is in the direction of an increasing unification of practical endeavour and contemplative insight, of caring and consciousness. It is in the direction of a slow explication and clarification of awareness—for that is the way God is: ‘it is with the same knowledge that he knows both himself and what he does.’ This is the total vision of St Thomas, summarized in a few lines of the *Contra Gentes*:

All other human activities are ordered [to the contemplation of truth] as to their end and goal. For the fulness of contemplation presupposes bodily integrity, which in turn presupposes the production and use of consumer goods. One also requires respite from the turbulence of the emotions, and one attains to this through the exercise of the moral virtues and good sense. One also needs respite from external disturbances, which is the *raison d’être* of civil government and life. If we look at things aright, therefore, we see that all human activities sub-serve those who contemplate the truth’ (III, 37).

¹cf. a passage from the first article of the trilogy by Fr Kerr: ‘Marcuse’s thesis is that the necessary institutional changes must be carried out by people who are already freeing themselves from the repressive and aggressive needs of our society, people who are therefore, at least potentially, the bearers of essentially different needs, goals and satisfactions, people (to anticipate again) with a different understanding of *finis* (end) and *beatitudo* (happiness). It is important to notice that Marcuse is not falling into the liberal separation between individuals and institutions. He is simply saying, against a certain kind of Marxist, that there can be no destruction and renewal of institutions which will be liberating unless it is carried through by people who are, in the very process, changing their attitudes and responses’: *New Blackfriars*, March, 1969, at pp. 311-312.

²The phrase is borrowed from R. D. Laing, *The Divided Self*, with merely the change of person from the third to the first. The whole passage, in our perspective, is, *mutatis mutandis*, richly suggestive: ‘Even when she began to “be herself”, she could at first only dare to do so by completely mirroring the doctor’s reality. She could do this, however, since although his reality (his wishes for her) were still another’s, they were not alien to her: they were congruent with her own authentic desire to be herself’ (p. 173). Is it indelicate to recall one traditional title of the founder of the Order of Preachers, derivative, of course, from his own Master: ‘*Doctor veritatis*’?