

# TITLE IX OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT

## Foreign Aid and Political Development

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*The effort to provide aid for development, undertaken on an unprecedented scale by the United States after World War II, provides an excellent opportunity for social scientists to contribute to the clarification and implementation of public policy. The relationship between given policies and the desired process of development has not been adequately understood. Nor has the nature of development been clearly identified or conceptualized.*

*In recent years, there has been an increasing awareness of these problems in Congress. This is particularly manifest in the hearings, debates, and reports which led to the passage of title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966,<sup>1</sup> and the public statements of the Congressmen who were responsible for the passage of the title. Efforts at implementation of this section indicate the complexity of the problem and the need for a major contribution from the social sciences if the policy embodied in the act is to be effectuated.*

SINCE THE END of World War II, the United States has extended to other nations more than eighty billion dollars in economic assistance.<sup>2</sup> Most of the aid has been administered by a succession of government agencies,

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1. 22 U.S.C. §2218 (1967).

2. J. MONTGOMERY, FOREIGN AID IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 28 (1967).

the present one being the Agency for International Development (AID), which is connected with the Department of State. A relatively small percentage of assistance has been channeled through multilateral organizations such as the United Nations Development Program and the World Bank.

A primary goal of foreign assistance has naturally been the economic development of recipient countries. Economic progress, however, has been viewed not only as desirable in itself, but also as a way of fostering political and social change in the direction of democracy and stability. As it became apparent that economic development does not necessarily have these results, however, policy-makers and scholars began to seek different ways of influencing political and social change. The emphasis on political and social reforms in the Alliance for Progress reflects this continuing search.<sup>3</sup> Social science research into the underdeveloped world,<sup>4</sup> has generated a considerable intellectual ferment, out of which has emerged the concept of "political development." Social scientists define the term in many ways, but most definitions are said to include, in varying combinations, the following four elements: (1) rationalization (which would include, for example, change from a government agency recruitment system based on ascription to one based on merit); (2) national integration (the building of a nation-state out of diverse groups); (3) democratization; and (4) participation (which would include increase in citizen political involvement).<sup>5</sup>

Some AID officials have been thinking about political development in similar terms,<sup>6</sup> and Congress in 1961 and 1962 added provisions bearing on the problem to the Foreign Assistance Act.<sup>7</sup> There remains, however, much disagreement about what political development is, and how

3. The political aspects of the Alliance are discussed in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 90TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SURVEY OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS—THE POLITICAL ASPECTS (Comm. Print 1967).

4. Since World War II social science research into underdeveloped areas has proliferated, with all the disciplines and subdisciplines making contributions. For an account, see K. Silvert, *Development and International Politics, in AMERICA: PURPOSE AND POWER* 222, 245-54 (C. M. Lyons ed. 1965).

5. S. P. Huntington, *Political Development and Political Decay*, 17 WORLD POL. 386 (1965). See also L. Pye, *Introduction to POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT* 11-12 (L. Pye & S. Verba eds. 1965).

6. See J. Nelson & E. Mihaly, *Political Development and U. S. Economic Assistance*, December 1965 (Office of Program Coordination, AID); R. A. Packenham, *Political-Development Doctrines in the American Foreign Aid Program*, 18 WORLD POL. 194 (1966).

7. In 1961, Congress adopted an amendment offered by Senator Humphrey of Minnesota which reads as follows: "[I]t is declared to be the policy of the United States

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and why it occurs. Political scientists have “produced a wide, confusing, garbled and often contradictory array of ‘models’ and ‘theories’ of political systems and political development.”<sup>8</sup> Of necessity then, there has been considerable disagreement as to what policy the United States should pursue in this area. The Congress, however, decided in 1966 upon one political development policy to be followed, and stated it in title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act.<sup>9</sup> The original and still the most important part of title IX reads as follows:

### Title IX—Utilization of Democratic Institutions in Development

In carrying out programs authorized in this chapter, emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic de-

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. . . to encourage the development and use of cooperatives, credit unions, and savings and loan associations.” 22 U.S.C. §2351(a) (1965). The 1962 amendment states “In . . . [a country having an agrarian economy] emphasis shall be placed . . . upon programs of community development which will promote stable and responsible governmental institutions at the local level.” 22 U.S.C. §2271 (1964).

Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, 22 U.S.C. §2218 (1967), further emphasizes both cooperatives and community development. The relation of such projects to political development is elaborated *infra*.

8. J. LaPalombara, *Theory and Practice in Development Administration: Observations on the Role of the Civilian Bureaucracy*, 4-5 (paper delivered at Brookings Institution Symposium on the Theory and Practice of Political Development, Airlie Farms, Va., Sept. 12-16, 1966); the papers delivered at this symposium will be published in book form in 1968. This is not to deny, of course, that a great deal of the work has been of great value. Much of it has derived from the theories of Max Weber and Talcott Parsons. For a review of some major contributions, see J. Palombara, *supra* at 4-10. Among the works he mentions are: THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS (G. Almond & J. Coleman eds. 1960); D. APTER, POLITICAL MODERNIZATION (1966); E. HAGEN, ON THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE (1962); D. LERNER, THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY (1958); S. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN (1960); D. McCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVING SOCIETY (1962); and EXPECTANT PEOPLES (K. Silvert ed. 1963).

9. 22 U.S.C. §2218 (1967). Title IX is not the only part of the Foreign Assistance Act stating political development policy. Some of the other statements are as follows: (1) The Humphrey and Zablocki amendments, set out at note 7 *supra*. (2) The 1967 amendments to the preamble of the act, Act of Nov. 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-137, §102. The preamble states, *inter alia*, “that it is the policy of the United States to support the principles of . . . freedom of the press, information, and religion.” (3) Sections which direct the President, in furnishing various kinds of assistance, to take into account “the degree to which the recipient country is making progress toward respect for the rule of law, freedom of expression and of the press, and recognition of the importance of individual freedom, initiative, and private enterprise.” 22 U.S.C. §§2161(b) (7), 2171(a) (7), 2211(b) (5) (1967). (The language varies slightly among the sections.) (4) Chapter 7 of the Act, 22 U.S.C. §2281 (1967), which authorizes Joint Commissions on Rural Development patterned after the successful joint commission in Taiwan. For a description of that commission, and its effect on political development, see notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text *infra*.

velopment on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions.<sup>10</sup>

This article examines the legislative history of title IX and concludes that the legislation aims at enhancing economic development, at changing attitudes and values, and at promoting pluralistic democracy. It then discusses some problems involved in pursuing these goals, and ends with observations on the implementation of title IX.

### THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE IX

The one sentence of title IX, as a broad statement of policy on a problem as complex as political development, is not a very helpful index to what Congress was hoping thereby to accomplish. Thus, reference to its legislative history is essential to an understanding of the title.

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10. 22 U.S.C. §2218 (1967). While additions have been made which are discussed *infra*, this is still the most important part of the title. The reference to "programs authorized in this chapter" is apparently no longer significant. The reason is that language similar to title IX now appears in two other places in the act, Act of Nov. 14, 1967, Pub. L. 90-137, §§102, 207(a), resulting in its application to all programs authorized by the act.

Title IX was amended in 1967 by the addition of the following guidelines for its administration:

(b) In order to carry out the purposes of this title, programs under this chapter shall—

(1) recognize the differing needs, desires, and capacities of the people of the respective developing countries and areas;

(2) use the intellectual resources of such countries and areas in conjunction with assistance provided under this act so as to encourage the development of indigenous institutions that meet their particular requirements for sustained economic and social progress; and

(3) support civic education and training in skills required for effective participation in governmental and political processes essential to self-government.

(c) In the allocation of funds for research under this chapter, emphasis shall be given to research designed to examine the political, social, and related obstacles to development in countries receiving assistance under part I of this Act.

(d) Emphasis shall also be given to the evaluation of relevant past and current programs under part I of this Act and to applying this experience so as to strengthen their effectiveness in implementing the objectives of this title.

Act of Nov. 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-137 § 108(b)-(d).

As this article goes to press, the House has passed additional amendments to title IX. The amendments add to subsection (c) above the following language: "In particular, emphasis should be given to research designed to increase understanding of the ways in which development assistance can support democratic social and political trends in recipient countries." In addition, the amendments add a new subsection:

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This article will consider the legislative history of title IX as it appears in congressional material such as hearings and reports. In addition, it will consider writings and speeches of Congressman Donald M. Fraser which are not part of the official legislative record. Fraser, a Minnesota Democrat, is generally given credit for the legislation,<sup>11</sup> though it was also strongly supported by Congressman Bradford Morse, a Massachusetts Republican.<sup>12</sup> Both men are members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Fraser's views are included here because AID will likely

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(e) In order to carry out the purposes of this title, the agency primarily responsible for administering part I of this Act shall develop systematic programs of inservice training to familiarize its personnel with the objectives of this title and to increase their knowledge of the political and social aspects of development. In addition to other funds available for such purposes, not to exceed 1 per centum of the funds authorized to be appropriated for grant assistance under this chapter may be used for carrying out the objectives of this subsection.

H. R. 15263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 109 (1968).

For other parts of the Foreign Assistance Act bearing on political development, see note 9 *supra*.

11. *E.g.*, STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, *supra* note 3, at 22.

12. Fraser has stated that he offered title IX, 112 CONG. REC. 14,756 (daily ed. July 13, 1966), and Morse has acknowledged this, *id.* at 14,765. However, Morse has referred to himself as a co-sponsor of the legislation, 113 CONG. REC. 4,331 (daily ed. April 19, 1967), and Fraser has acknowledged that "this amendment conforms substantially to one of the recommendations made by a group of Republican Congressmen . . . These recommendations were developed largely at the initiative of . . . [Mr. Morse]." 112 CONG. REC. 14,756 (daily ed. July 13, 1966) (brackets in original). The Republican recommendations are reprinted at 112 CONG. REC. 5,600-02 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1966). Some of Morse's views on political development are found in his speech at 112 CONG. REC. 5,605-09 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1966).

Other Congressmen particularly interested in political development and title IX are John Culver (D. Iowa), Clement Zablocki (D. Wisc.), and Dante Fascell (D. Fla.). Letter from Marian A. Czarnecki, Staff Consultant to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to Brian Butler, Feb. 12, 1968. All of these men are members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

For an indication of Culver's thinking on political development, see *Hearings on H.R. 7099 Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 1,099-1,100 and pt. 6, at 1,285-89 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 *Hearings*]. He was largely responsible for the 1967 amendments to title IX, which are set out at note 10 *supra*. R. Braibanti, *External Inducement of Politico-Administrative Development: A Design for Strategy* 19 in R. BRAIBANTI & ASSOCIATES, *POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT*, Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press (forthcoming, 1968).

Zablocki co-sponsored title IX. *Id.* at 13. Moreover, he was responsible for an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 bearing on political development. The amendment is quoted at note 7 *supra*.

Fascell is the chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. His subcommittee has conducted hearings and issued reports bearing on political development. See, *e.g.*, *BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY*, H.R. REP. No. 1224, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (Report no. 4 on Winning the Cold War: The U. S. Ideological Offensive), together with

consider them in interpreting title IX, and especially since he is one of AID's staunchest supporters in the Congress.

Though the words "political development" do not appear in title IX,<sup>13</sup> the legislation clearly grew out of a conviction that policy-makers have failed to take this dimension of development into proper account, viewing underdevelopment primarily as an economic problem. This has led them to prescribe economic aid as the principal solution, from which they assume political stability and democracy will follow. Fraser argues, on the other hand, that economic development does not necessarily have desirable political results, and that even if it did, it is proceeding too slowly, where it is proceeding at all, to bring these results appreciably closer.<sup>14</sup>

The proponents of title IX see the problem of development as one of building the kinds of political and social institutions that will enhance economic development and effective self-government. Thus, the United States should deemphasize economic aid, and "go forward with a massive program of political development activities . . ." <sup>15</sup>

But what does the language of title IX mean? AID is directed to assure participation in the task of economic development through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions. Some of the "institutions" to be encouraged are specified in the report<sup>16</sup> of the House Foreign Affairs Committee recommending the passage of title IX [hereinafter referred to as the 1966 report]: "[T]he goal . . . of popular participation in development . . . can best be achieved through the fostering of cooperatives, labor unions, trade and related associa-

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*Hearings on Behavioral Sciences and the National Security*, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (Pt. 9 of the Hearings on Winning the Cold War: The U. S. Ideological Offensive); SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS, HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 90TH CONG., 1ST SESS., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY (Comm. Print 1967) (Report no. 5 on Winning the Cold War: The U. S. Ideological Offensive), together with *Hearings on Modern Communications and Foreign Policy*, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (Pt. 10 of the Hearings on Winning the Cold War: The U. S. Ideological Offensive).

The Senate has given little attention to title IX.

13. See note 22 *infra*.

14. Address by Congressman Fraser, International Development Conference, February 7, 1967, reprinted at 129 *WORLD AFFAIRS* 244 (1967); see H.R. REP. NO. 551, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 119-20 (1967) (Additional Views of Hon. Donald Fraser). [The report is hereinafter cited as 1967 REPORT.]

15. Address by Congressman Fraser, reprinted at 112 *CONG. REC.* 14,765-67 (daily ed. July 13, 1966).

16. H.R. REP. NO. 1651, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 REPORT].

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tions, community action groups, and other organizations which provide the training ground for leadership and democratic processes . . . ”<sup>17</sup>

More generally, the 1966 report calls for “the building of democratic private and public institutions *on all levels—local, state, and national.*”<sup>18</sup> A 1967 amendment to title IX further emphasizes a broad spectrum of institutions.<sup>19</sup> And according to Fraser, title IX institutions include legal institutions such as courts, as well as legislatures, administrative agencies, schools of all kinds, and a wide variety of business organizations.<sup>20</sup> One would think that it also includes political parties.<sup>21</sup>

It seems at first glance that so broad an authorization goes beyond the language of title IX, which refers only to *local* governmental insti-

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17. *Id.* at 27.

18. *Id.* at 28 (emphasis added).

19. Act of Nov. 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-137, §108(b)(2). The text of the amendment is at note 10 *supra*. The House Foreign Affairs Committee comment, with respect to this amendment, reads:

The development of an infrastructure of self-sustaining, viable institutions on the local, provincial, and national levels is necessary to achieve increased popular participation in development and to enhance the success of developmental undertakings. During the past two decades, public and private entities, including credit unions, cooperatives, labor unions and other voluntary associations, have helped to mobilize the human resources of the developing countries. . . . Additional institutions, tailored to the conditions prevailing in particular recipient countries, can further advance this process. The committee hopes, therefore, that AID will begin to provide more support for the building of public and private institutions which can channel the vast creative energies of the people of the developing countries into constructive developmental endeavors.

1967 REPORT 29.

20. See D. Fraser, *The Farmer—New Focus for National Growth*, INT’L AGRIC. DEV. 9 (Sept. 1967) (published monthly by the U. S. Dept. of Agriculture in cooperation with AID). For an analysis of the possibilities of assisting legal institutions under title IX and generally, see Address by Thomas L. Farmer, then General Counsel of AID, before the Council of the Section of International and Comparative Law, American Bar Ass’n, August 7, 1966, reprinted at 112 CONG. REC. A4,661-63 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1966). See also J. W. Salacuse, *Lawyers Have a Volunteer Role*, 5 PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER 12 (1967). One form of assistance to legal institutions under title IX being planned by AID is “a training program in juridical administration for a select group of foreign lawyers, administrators and jurists.” AID, Report to the Congress on the Implementation of Title IX, at 14, May 10, 1967.

There is a growing literature on law and development. See, e.g., M. Galanter, *The Modernization of Law*, in MODERNIZATION 153 (M. Weiner ed. 1966); L. C. B. GOWER, INDEPENDENT AFRICA—THE CHALLENGE TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1967); M. Rheinstein, *Problems of Law in the New Nations of Africa*, in OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES (C. Geertz ed. 1963).

21. But see the testimony of Samuel P. Huntington in *Rural Development in Asia, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs*, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 121 (1967), where he recommends amending title IX to include “democratic political parties” among the institutions to be encouraged.



tutions. It is arguable, of course, that the building of nonlocal institutions is to be a *means* of encouraging local institutions. However, if a choice had to be made between the narrow and the broad authorization, the latter probably more accurately reflects the intent of the framers. The word local may well have been inserted in the statute as a stratagem to prevent Congress and aid-recipient countries from getting the impression, which Fraser considers erroneous, that title IX aims at undue political intervention at the national level.<sup>22</sup>

The 1966 report also directs the "broader and more effective utilization of the experience and resources of existing private and voluntary organizations."<sup>23</sup> This language directs AID to work more with private groups which are engaged in organizing cooperatives, labor unions, and other "democratic institutions" in underdeveloped countries.<sup>24</sup> One such group is the Community Development Foundation.<sup>25</sup> Another is the International Development Foundation (IDF), which carries on "programs of building constituencies for reform through leadership training and organizational development."<sup>26</sup>

The 1966 report does not clearly indicate, however, *why* participation in democratic institutions should be encouraged. It says only that "[o]ver the years, in exercising legislative oversight with respect to the administration of the foreign assistance program, the committee has observed that there is a close relationship between popular participation in the

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22. Much of the legislative history of title IX evidences the feeling of its proponents that too explicit a statement of its purposes and possible implications would shock and mislead some people, among them Congressmen whose votes were needed for passage. Conversation with Dale MacIver, Administrative Assistant to Congressman Fraser, in Chicago, Fall 1967. Thus, for example, the term "political development" is not used in the two House Foreign Affairs Committee reports on title IX. See 1966 REPORT 27-28; 1967 REPORT 28-30. Another example of circumspection is found in the committee's comment on the 1967 amendment to title IX calling for support of civic education and training in political skills. The text of this and other 1967 amendments is at note 10 *supra*.

23. 1966 REPORT 28.

24. For a list of groups engaged in cooperative work, see note 37 *infra*. For a directory and analysis of overseas programs of private nonprofit American organizations and American colleges and universities, see H.R. REP. NO. 368, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (Report no. 3 on Winning the Cold War; The U. S. Ideological Offensive).

25. For an indication of the type and scope of work carried on by this organization, see 1 Community Development Foundation, International Community Development Statistical Bulletin, ser. D, no. 4, July 1967.

26. Letter from George A. Truitt, President of IDF, to Hon. Donald M. Fraser, August 14, 1967.



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process of development, and the effectiveness of this process.”<sup>27</sup> However, the purposes of title IX can be inferred from other materials. In discussing these purposes, the focus will be on the specific institutions named in the 1966 report, *i.e.*, cooperatives, labor unions, and so forth.

One purpose of title IX is to advance economic development. Fraser believes in general that “the mainspring for development lies with the individual’s desire for a better shake in life,”<sup>28</sup> and that economic progress will be advanced if this desire is released “through responsive social, political and economic organizations close to that person.”<sup>29</sup> On a concrete level, this means, for example, that a farmer can raise his living standards by participating with other farmers in a cooperative.<sup>30</sup> It also means that economic assistance will be more effective if indigenous people participate “in the planning, execution, and evaluation of development undertakings.”<sup>31</sup> For example, if a school or a dam is built, people in the locality of the project should have a say in its planning, and should be trained to operate the facility after AID technicians have left.<sup>32</sup>

A second purpose of title IX is to change attitudes and values. In some parts of the less developed world, people who live in poverty tend to be infected with a sense of fatalism and despair, a conviction that their lot is hopeless. Such attitudes are often reinforced by a traditional value system which perceives the status quo as divinely ordained. Other people in less developed areas, perhaps most of them, are breaking from tradition, undergoing changes in values and attitudes. Such persons may have inconsistent “traditional” and “modern” attitudes contemporaneously. Their break from the old ways may cause feelings of insecurity and make them vulnerable to appeals from extremist movements. These illustrations are of course oversimplified, for attitudes

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27. 1966 REPORT 27.

28. Address by Congressman Fraser, International Development Conference, February 7, 1967, reprinted at 129 WORLD AFFAIRS 244 (1967).

29. *Id.*

30. An instance is recorded in the 1967 *Hearings*, pt. 4, at 884-85: “‘per capita income of craftsmen involved in cooperative artisan project increased, in Colombia 37 percent, Ecuador 62 percent, and in Peru over 1,000 percent.’”

31. 1966 REPORT 27-28.

32. The dam example was given by Mr. Robert R. Nathan at a breakfast discussion of title IX, sponsored by the Committee on Political Development, Washington Chapter of the Society for International Development, Nov. 14, 1967. The society has about 5,000 members in 60 chapters located in over 40 countries. The Committee on Political Development of the Washington Chapter is probably the group most actively promoting title IX in Washington.

and values are very complex phenomena. The point is, however, that attitudes and values are crucial variables in economic, social, and political change. Recognizing this, title IX assumes that participation in democratic institutions can foster attitude and value changes which will contribute to economic, social, and political "progress."

Thus, for example, participation in a cooperative can teach people in an atomized society how to work together to promote the common interests of the group and produce benefits for all. It can instill "the desire and interest to become involved in development."<sup>33</sup> It can channel energies which might be manifested in extremism into more constructive endeavors.<sup>34</sup> It can teach the meaning of democracy and foster democratic political culture by employing democratic voting procedures.<sup>35</sup> The example of a cooperative is chosen here because private groups engaged in organizing co-ops in less developed areas make such claims for them.<sup>36</sup> A number of these groups have been doing their organizing on contract with AID, as authorized by the Humphrey amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.<sup>37</sup> Title IX gives added emphasis to their work.

33. 1967 REPORT 29.

34. *Hearings on Modern Communications and Foreign Policy*, *supra* note 12, at 155-56. For an example of a title IX-type project in northeast Brazil where AID was "particularly interested in trying to re-orient . . . groups that were paramilitary operations into a more positive trade union movement," see *1967 Hearings*, pt. 5, at 1088-89 (1967).

35. With regard to the "teaching of democracy" function of title IX institutions, Fraser has argued:

One of the problems is going to be seen in the difficulty of getting people to accept the limitations of democratically elected governments. That is to say, when you arouse the expectations of people they vote for somebody who holds out promises to them, as we all do who run for office, and then they are confronted with the realities of the performance of government and there tends to be a disillusionment with the entire process.

One of the levels at which this can be accommodated and learned is at the local level. This is my view at least. If you elect a local government which is quite visible, you can understand the resources they have or don't have, and the limitations on their capacity to act, it seems to me that this is where you begin to build the kinds of tolerances which are required for the survival of open societies and democratic governments.

*1967 Hearings*, pt. 2, at 453.

36. See, e.g., *Hearings on S. 1872 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 31-41 (1967); *1967 Hearings*, pt. 4, at 694-95, 885; *Hearings on H.R. 12449 and H.R. 12450 Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs*, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 706, and pt. 6, at 1037-38 (1966) [hereinafter cited as *1966 Hearings*]; reports on progress under the Humphrey amendment, cited at note 37 *infra*; notes 68-70 and accompanying text *infra*.

37. 22 U.S.C. §2351(a) (1965). The text of the amendment is at note 7 *supra*. Annual reports on the implementation of the Humphrey amendment have been made

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A third purpose of title IX is to encourage growth of political power among lower strata in less developed areas, and thereby encourage the evolution of democratic, pluralistic societies. This purpose receives scant attention in the House Foreign Affairs Committee's reports on title IX, but Fraser clearly intended it to be an objective of the legislation:

[O]ne of the general conclusions that can be reached about . . . changes . . . we have seen so far is that . . . people never got any change unless they organized for themselves. As I suspect this is true in most societies, the only person who can get some help is the person who needs the help and who goes about organizing himself so that he can induce those who are in power to make changes that are needed. This was true of the women, it was true of the farmer, and it was true of the worker.<sup>38</sup>

In his view, the underprivileged in many less developed societies are not organized sufficiently to induce needed changes. Title IX is aimed at helping to remedy this situation by encouraging grassroots organizations which will enable lower strata to press their demands.<sup>39</sup> The building of these organizations of course requires politically skilled indigenous leaders, and title IX was amended in 1967 to provide for political leadership training.<sup>40</sup>

It is assumed that the proliferation of grassroots organizations will result in a pluralistic society, where decision-making power will be dispersed among a wide variety of social, political, and economic institu-

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to the Congress. *E.g.*, S. Doc. No. 65, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISES UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 (Subcomm. Print 1966); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 90TH CONG., 1ST SESS., DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE—1966 (Subcomm. Print 1967).

The following groups organize co-ops on contract with AID: National Rural Electric Cooperative Association; Farmers Union International Assistance Corporation; Foundation for Cooperative Housing; National League of Insured Savings Association; Cooperative League of the USA; CUNA International, Inc.; International Cooperative Development Association. *1967 Hearings*, pt. 2, at 317.

38. Address by Congressman Fraser, First African-Latin American Farm Cooperative Seminar, August 1966 (sponsored by AID, the Farmers Union International Assistance Corporation, and the Wisconsin Farmers Union); see 1967 REPORT 117, 120-21 (additional Views of Hon. Donald Fraser).

39. See D. Fraser, *supra* note 20, at 9.

40. Act of Nov. 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-137, §108(b)(3). For the text of the amendment, see note 10 *supra*. See also note 22 *supra*.

tions. Such a society can evolve at lower social levels even though conditions are static at upper levels.<sup>41</sup> And the evolution of pluralism, according to Fraser, is essential for economic growth and development:

[A] glimpse into changes in American society as it continues to grow reinforces the impression that from the beginning, a concomitant of economic development, if not a prerequisite, is a growth in pluralism. Where this pluralism is inhibited—where decision making is not located at the most advantageous point—growth is bound to be inhibited.<sup>42</sup>

Fraser buttresses his assertion that the United States can encourage pluralism through its foreign aid program by citing instances where this has occurred. One example is Taiwan. Since 1948, much of the United States assistance to Taiwan has been channeled through a unique institution, the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR). The JCRR is a joint Chinese-American organization, which enjoys semi-independence from both the Chinese and American governments. In administering assistance, it has worked through and with a multiplicity of local rural organizations such as farmers' associations. In so doing it has strengthened these organizations and contributed significantly to a pluralism which has flourished despite the existence of an authoritarian central government.<sup>43</sup> One observer describes this development as follows:

Socio-economic pluralism and, to a lesser though significant extent, political pluralism are the most appropriate descriptive terms for the rural society of Taiwan in 1965. A broad array of community-based organizations—private, semipublic, and public—had sprouted and spread on the land. . . .

Notwithstanding their nonpolitical origins, these organizations had increasing political implications. Rural capabilities and attitudes were being created that, in variable measure, were removed from the con-

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41. See Address by Congressman Fraser, National Student Association Annual Congress, August 25, 1966; *1967 Hearings*, pt. 2, at 409.

42. Address by Congressman Fraser, International Development Conference, February 7, 1967, reprinted at 129 *WORLD AFFAIRS* 244 (1967). See *1967 Hearings*, pt. 2, at 297; *Hearings on Rural Development in Asia*, *supra* note 21, pt. 1, at 97-98.

43. N. JACOBY, *U. S. AID TO TAIWAN* 172 (1966). Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act in 1966 to encourage the use of Joint Commissions on Rural Development patterned after the JCRR. 22 U.S.C. §2281 (1967). For a study of the transferability of the JCRR experience, see R. Hough, *Aid Administration to the Rural Sector—The JCRR Experience in Taiwan and Its Application in Other Countries*, Sept. 1967 (to be published in 1968 in the AID Discussion Series).

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trols and pressures of the central government. Indeed, it appeared that the stirrings of a more democratic order were manifest at the local level, particularly in rural communities among farmers' and irrigation associations. . . .

Former tenant farmers were taking a more active role in public affairs through their voluntary associations. . . . The farmers' associations were, to a considerable extent, based upon local initiative, management, and control. They appeared to be increasingly able and willing to represent the interests of the rural population. In so doing, they broadened the base of political participation. . . .

The evolving pluralistic organization of rural life fostered democratic practices. For example, management positions in most social organizations were filled and major decisions were made through voting. . . .

[T]hese clusters of rural organizations stimulated the political awareness of the farmer and extended his influence, while providing seedbeds for the germination of democratic values.<sup>44</sup>

A second example of pluralistic development is provided by East Pakistan, where a "Basic Democracies" system operates. The system gives local government units autonomy in planning and executing development tasks such as road-building, irrigation, and drainage. American assistance, in the form of a Rural Works Program, has concentrated on increasing the vitality of the system. The economic results of Basic Democracies have been impressive, but equally important are the alleged political and social results:

The East Pakistan program can be described as the creation of municipal institutions in which men can learn how to use and enjoy liberty. It is the creation of political power for people who have never possessed it in the institutions of democracy. . . .

Today there are around a half million people, out of seven million rural families, who are members of either planning committees or project implementation committees. . . .

[T]he election of Basic Democrats, or township councillors, as we would call them in America, is by universal adult suffrage. . . .

In the elections of 1964-65, there is considerable evidence that the people are beginning to believe that development is possible in their lives now, that development begins with political institutions, and that they equate development leadership with political leadership. . . .

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44. JACOBY, *supra* note 43, at 113-15.

Those who participate in development gradually become the dominant group, often before they become the majority. Gradually trust begins to replace suspicion. The villagers begin to work together and with others from the same township and county as they realize that all can benefit from common effort, and as they come to realize that an irrigation ditch follows the contour of the land and not the contour of local rivalries. The nature of argument is beginning to change. People are learning that compromising differences of opinion or accepting the will of the majority is a necessary prelude to action, that meeting deadlines is important if plans are to be turned into reality.<sup>45</sup>

The Taiwan and East Pakistan experiences heavily influenced the framers of title IX.

#### A POSTSCRIPT TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The legislative history traced above does not reflect all the intentions of the framers of title IX. Indeed it could not, for an attempt to generalize about legislative intent necessarily entails highlighting certain aspects of legislative history and playing down or ignoring others. The problem is deciding which aspects should be emphasized. The analysis above generally emphasizes the ideas most frequently and forcefully expressed in the legislative history of title IX. This emphasis conveys the impression that the legislation embodies some rather strong convictions as to what kinds of political and social change are best, how these changes occur, and their relation to economic development.

Title IX does indeed embody strong convictions. But the highlighting of these has left a crucial aspect of the legislative history as yet unmentioned: namely, the recognition by the framers that their convictions cannot be dogmatically held, but must be subject to qualification. The framers realized that the complications of political, social, and economic change are not wholly understood, and that it is difficult to influence these changes in predictable directions. Thus, the legislative history contains expressions of doubt as well as of certainty.

On the one hand, Fraser has made positive statements:

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45. Address by Edgar L. Owens, panel discussion sponsored by the Society for International Development, June 8, 1966, reprinted at 112 CONG. REC. 12,492-94 (daily ed. June 14, 1966). Owens is an AID official. For additional discussion of the East Pakistan program, see 1967 *Hearings*, pt. 2, at 390-91.

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I have the strong impression that we need to move now. . . . [W]e need to move on what we know. . . .

It seems to me we need to draw heavily on the things that we think have worked. . . . [T]he thing that has been the most useful in our own society has been our own pluralistic development. I don't want to give a speech about this, but if I thought that our Nation had to be developed out of Washington, D.C., as most of the rest of the nations of the world look to their national capitals, I would throw up my hands. Having served in Congress I would say it couldn't work, and I don't believe it will work in most of the other nations.

When we talk about the social structure in Latin America as an inheritance of the Spanish tradition, the land holdings held by the oligarchy, it does seem to me that we ought to move very much in the direction of trying to encourage local institutions, either of a governmental or private character, to begin to mobilize the resources of people, then we begin to work with those organizations. . . . We need to get away from just the strict economic input. We need to do much more. This is the thrust of my concern.<sup>46</sup>

On the other hand, he has expressed doubts:

I want to pay tribute to the valiant efforts, to the range of approaches, which our Government has pursued in finding the key to the social and political side of . . . [the Vietnam] conflict. . . . The Agency for International Development has struggled earnestly with this problem. . . .

Those who talk with confidence about our capacity to intervene in these societies have their heads stuck firmly in the sand. We know very little about nation-building. Few of us even understand how our own nation developed, much less how other nations are likely to develop. We operate on simplistic, almost pious assumptions which have failed repeatedly. There is as much risk—yes, even greater risk—in overestimating our capacity to be helpful in this respect rather than underestimating it.<sup>47</sup>

Congressman Morse has been similarly ambivalent.<sup>48</sup>

Two 1967 amendments to title IX also indicate an awareness that the area to which the title pertains is exceedingly complicated. The amendments are intended in part to make AID become more sophisticated about the complexities of the developmental process.<sup>49</sup> These

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46. *Hearings on Modern Communications and Foreign Policy*, *supra* note 12, at 155-56.

47. 113 CONG. REC. H2042 (daily ed. March 2, 1967).

48. *See* 112 CONG. REC. 5609 (daily ed. March 15, 1966).

49. Act of Nov. 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-137, §108(c) and (d). For the text of the amendments, *see* note 10 *supra*. For the comments of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the amendments, *see* 1967 REPORT 30.



manifestations of tentativeness are as important a part of the legislative history of title IX as are the expressions of conviction. The next section attempts to show the problems inherent in trying to implement title IX with dogmatic adherence to the convictions expressed in the legislative history, and with inadequate attention to the complications of development.

PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS—  
OBSTACLES AND UNCERTAINTIES

*Economic Development*

One of the goals of title IX is economic development. The legislation manifests the conviction of its framers that participation in democratic institutions unleashes individual energy and talent so that it contributes to economic growth. Moreover, the framers felt that participation in particular institutions has specific economic benefits. A cooperative or a labor union, for example, is likely to raise the income of its members. In addition, a cooperative can invest the share contributions of its members in capital development projects.

It takes but a moment's reflection, however, to realize that few, if any, categorical statements can be made about the economic effects of title IX institutions. Consider, for example, cooperatives. A co-op may raise per capita income—or it may not. Even if it does, the gain may be distributed so as to increase the gap between wealthy and poorer members. A study of a village co-op in Indonesia indicated that: "[T]he cooperative's standard operations—like providing seeds, fertilizer, and other chemicals to the membership at cost, or providing loans through its bank—have tended to contribute to the polarization of class and wealth in . . . [the village]." <sup>50</sup>

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Fraser has frequently expressed his feeling that AID is too insensitive to political development, that it needs reorganization to become more sensitive, and that it is inadequately organized to take advantage of its political development experience. See, e.g., *1967 Hearings*, pt. 1, at 248-52, and pt. 4, at 772-75; *1966 Hearings*, pt. 1, at 219-22, and pt. 4, at 652-55.

In the same vein, the House Foreign Affairs Committee expects AID to devise criteria for measuring political and social progress under title IX. 1966 REPORT 28. For suggestions as to some of the phenomena which should be measured, see 112 CONG. REC. 14,756-57 (daily ed. July 13, 1966). For AID's comments on the measurement problem, see AID, Report to the Congress on the Implementation of Title IX, at 6-7, May 10, 1967.

50. J. M. Van Der Kroef, *Social Structure and Economic Development in Indonesia*, 23 SOCIAL RESEARCH 394, 398 (1956).

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Moreover, cooperatives may be a poor way of mobilizing investment capital relative to other methods. For example, the government of India, attempting to use village co-ops as a prime source of investment capital, found that poverty-stricken farmers were often hard put to contribute shares.<sup>51</sup> Officials thought that share contributions of small farmers could be supplemented by investments of wealthy farmers, but the co-ops challenged the power of the rural wealthy, and they were unwilling to invest.<sup>52</sup> Another problem was that a large share of co-op capital was used for consumption rather than production expenditures.<sup>53</sup> The result of such problems was that the mobilization of agricultural savings through co-ops was much less than planners anticipated,<sup>54</sup> and probably less than could have been achieved by other means.<sup>55</sup> Democratic institutions, then, may or may not enhance economic progress.

The Indian example demonstrates not only this point, but also that social goals of title IX may conflict with economic growth. Indian co-ops would probably have been more effective economically if they had been organized on a multivillage rather than a village basis. The government chose the latter type of organization, however, because it sought the kind of social development which is also sought by title IX. It was believed that "village-size societies were superior in preserving the essential characteristics of cooperation—close contact, social cohesion, and mutual obligation."<sup>56</sup> An emphasis on the social benefits of co-ops and community development programs has pervaded Indian

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51. This is a pervasive problem in starting co-ops in many less developed areas. See, e.g., E. L. Owen, *Cooperatives in Pakistan*, 44 *SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH* 251, 252-54 (1960).

52. F. R. Frankel, *Ideology and Politics in Economic Planning—The Problem of Indian Agricultural Development Strategy*, 19 *WORLD POL.* 621, 640 (1967).

53. *Id.* at 636.

54. *Id.* at 634.

55. This is the suggestion, though not the conclusion, of the Frankel article, *supra* note 52.

56. *Id.* at 629. See J. VOORHIS, *AMERICAN COOPERATIVES* 176 (1961). The British experience has been that as cooperatives formed unions and subjected their policies to central control for purposes of economic efficiency, participation at the local level decreased. It has been estimated that in that country only 2% of co-op members attended co-op meetings and took part in policy discussions. Three percent were "interested" in their co-ops' affairs, and followed them. Ninety-five percent were indifferent or apathetic. P. GREER, *COOPERATIVES—THE BRITISH ACHIEVEMENT* 122-23 (1955).

Indonesia offers another example of economic goals having to be sacrificed to make a co-op a more effective social institution. In order to be accepted, cooperatives there have had to contribute some of their surplus to charity instead of to reserve capital. M. HATTA, *THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA* 16-17 (1957).

planning, and has seemingly resulted in serious misallocation of resources.<sup>57</sup>

There may also be conflicts between economic development and the title IX objective of promoting the growth of the political power of lower socioeconomic strata. As workers and peasants gain political power, they may successfully demand that economic resources be used for consumption rather than for the investment necessary for economic growth. In the United States and other industrialized Western nations, government policies and social values inimical to organized efforts to raise mass consumption during early crucial stages of capital formation were significant factors favoring economic development.<sup>58</sup> This was also true of Japan, where “[a] docile and productive agrarian labor force was . . . an element of great importance” in building “the urban, commercial, industrial, and military sectors of society.”<sup>59</sup>

It would be gratuitous, however, to argue that less developed countries ought to suppress consumption on the Western model. For today a revolution of rising desires and expectations sweeps the underdeveloped world. The miserable are aware of their misery, and are no longer content to live with it. Silvert strikingly illustrates the problem:

Laborers working in copper mines and living in semitribal conditions, burdened by the pressures of very extended kinship systems, with a vivid belief in witchcraft organize themselves into trade unions, dream of controlling the mine themselves, and become aware—however dimly and even romantically—that at least one effective way to economic power is through seizure of the political mechanism and its ancillary means of coercion.<sup>60</sup>

Moreover, governments of underdeveloped countries are for the most part ideologically committed to bettering the living standards of their

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57. See Frankel, *supra* note 52.

58. See J. LaPalombara, *Distribution and Development*, in MODERNIZATION 218, 221-23 (M. Weiner ed. 1966); S. LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW NATION—THE UNITED STATES IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 91 (1963); M. F. Millikan, *Equity versus Productivity in Economic Development*, in MODERNIZATION 307 (M. Weiner ed. 1966); A. F. K. ORGANSKI, THE STAGES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 9-12, 68-69 (1965); K. de Schweinitz, *Industrialization, Labor Controls, and Democracy*, 7 ECON. DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 385 (1959).

59. R. E. Ward, *Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan*, 15 WORLD POL. 569, 580 (1963).

60. K. Silvert, *Introduction to EXPECTANT PEOPLES* 29 (K. Silvert ed. 1963).

populations. In short, the problem of constraining consumption is much more difficult today than during the 19th century.

In this context, title IX institutions may play a useful role. There is of course the danger that labor unions and cooperatives will press excessive economic demands. On the other hand, such *organized* expression of demands may be considered preferable to other alternatives, which might include spontaneous, destructive revolt. If labor and peasant group leaders are responsible, compromise may be possible. Again, the organization of lower groups will perhaps facilitate communication between government and people which will enable each to better understand the problems of the other.<sup>61</sup> Finally, to the extent that labor and farmer organizations are able to divert some resources to the betterment of their constituencies, they will provide a kind of "payoff" which may be essential to creating loyalty toward the whole system.<sup>62</sup>

The point to be emphasized, however, is that there is no simple relationship between democracy and economic development. Democratic participation may enhance or retard economic growth, depending on a multiplicity of factors, including the type and degree of democratic participation. The range of possibilities is very wide indeed.

### *Attitudes and Values*

A second purpose of title IX is the transformation of values and attitudes. The assumption is that participation in democratic institutions can develop attitudes favorable toward "working together," can insulate persons from extremist appeals, and can cause persons to value democracy. This raises general questions about changes in attitudes and values, and the control of such changes.

Unquestionably, human attitudes and values are changeable. Indeed, they are changing on a large scale in many parts of the less developed world. "[M]ass communications [are permitting] cultural penetration and change to proceed extremely quickly, demonstrating 'human nature' to be very malleable indeed."<sup>63</sup> Of course the occurrence of change is one matter, and the control of change in predictable directions is another. Nevertheless, some experts are optimistic about the possibilities of controlling psychological change. The psychologist David McClelland, who

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61. See J. LaPalombara, *supra* note 58, at 228-29.

62. See S. LIPSET, *supra* note 58, at 45-46.

63. K. Silvert, *supra* note 60, at 5.

has theorized that a "need to achieve" is an important characteristic of men in developed societies, claims to have succeeded in implanting a need to achieve in various groups, and argues that this can be done on a broad scale in less developed areas.<sup>64</sup> Communications experts argue that the mass media can be an effective tool for inducing predictable changes in human personality.<sup>65</sup>

There are practical limits, however, on the ability to control attitude and value change. In simplest terms, the limits derive from the human beings one is attempting to change, and from the kind of stimuli that can be brought to bear on them. Some people are more changeable than others, and some of a given individual's attitudes may be more changeable than some other of his attitudes. Conversely, the strength and type of stimuli needed to induce changes will vary. One result of these limits is that inducing radical but predictable changes in strongly-held attitudes requires a high degree of control:

There is evidence to indicate that . . . institutions for adult socialization are most effective . . . when they manage to exclude counteracting social stimuli through isolation of the trainees, to maintain consistent goals within the institution, to manipulate rewards and punishments in the service of official training goals, and to use both formal instruction and opportunities for imitation and practice of new roles. In other words, a complete social environment in which the individual becomes temporarily involved may be necessary to effect drastic alterations in his motives, habits, and values after childhood.<sup>66</sup>

These basic considerations make one skeptical that participation in a democratic institution—membership in a cooperative, for example—has any necessary and predictable effects on values and attitudes. Of course title IX institutions need not involve only adults whose attitudes and values are relatively set. A 1967 amendment to the title calling for "civic education" would seem to permit work on child development.<sup>67</sup>

64. See, e.g., D. McClelland, *Achievement Motivation Can Be Developed*, 43 HARV. BUS. REV. 6 (1965).

65. See, e.g., L. Pye, *Communications and Political Development* (paper delivered at Brookings Institution Symposium on the Theory and Practice of Political Development, Airlie Farms, Va., Sept. 12-16, 1966); the papers delivered at this symposium will be published in book form in 1968.

66. R. Levine, *Political Socialization and Cultural Change*, in OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES 280, 301-02 (C. Geertz ed. 1963) (footnote omitted).

67. Act of Nov. 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-137, §108(b) (3). The amendment is set out at note 10 *supra*. Fraser would include "schools of all kinds" among title IX institutions. See note 20 and accompanying text *supra*.

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This kind of work, however, may be strictly limited by host country sensibilities. In any case, there will be attempts to change adult values and attitudes through community development projects, labor unions, and cooperatives. The question may legitimately be asked, then, does participation in such organizations cause predictable changes in attitudes and values?

The question will be pursued with respect to cooperatives, because proponents of these organizations make some strong claims on their behalf. Consider the following, for example:

Through cooperatives people learn the working of democratic processes—to stand by decisions, to work in committees and to accustom themselves to electoral methods.<sup>68</sup>

When the man on the land and his family are involved with the community in a . . . cooperative program, new and often neglected human talents are discovered and put to work. Each individual, moreover, comes to identify himself with the total effort of the group, and this gives to each individual, not yet too confident on his own, new-found ability, the added strength that comes from this identification with the whole group. This is the power that comes from working together. Many of these achievements are made possible with the help of AID and U. S. cooperatives.<sup>69</sup>

In whole villages there are broken centuries-old attitudes bred of despair and grinding poverty. They are supplanted by the cooperative ideals of hard work, democratic participation and integrity in personal dealings.<sup>70</sup>

In light of what has been said above, these claims are overly optimistic. Whether participation in a co-op can have the claimed effects is determined generally by the characteristics of the participants and the stimuli which operate on them. Proponents of co-ops assume that a primary stimulus to attitude and value change is the operation of the co-op itself and the economic and psychological rewards this brings. Members will see the value of working together, of employing democratic procedures. The rub is, however, that existing attitudes and values of participants may preclude the successful operation of the co-op.<sup>71</sup>

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68. P. GREER, *supra* note 56, at 129.

69. DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISES—1966, *supra* note 37, at 4-5.

70. 1967 *Hearings*, pt. 4, at 702.

71. For a study of the psychological attributes one must possess before he can cooperate, see L. W. Doob, *Psychological Aspects of Consumers' Cooperation*, 191 *ANNALS* 46, 47 (1937).

In some societies the kind of cooperation required for the functioning of a democratic cooperative is unheard of. The kinds of cooperation which may be carried on in the society, such as building houses or tilling rice fields, may not be transferable to an institution envisioned by title IX.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, individuals may be emotionally disposed against participation in a cooperative by the belief, not atypical of traditional societies, that the way things are done is divinely ordained and ought not to be changed. Another attitudinal problem is described by Mohammad Hatta, the "father of the Indonesian cooperative movement":

Besides a feeling of solidarity, economic cooperatives require *individuality*, a conscious self-respect in relation to one's fellow members, because only members with proper self-respect can be expected to look after and protect the common interests. Self-respect creates confidence in one's ability to do things. In the traditional Indonesian villages individuality is more or less suppressed.<sup>73</sup>

Whether an individual is predisposed to cooperate may also depend on with whom he is supposed to cooperate. Thus he may be willing to cooperate with members of his own extended family, but balk at working with outsiders.<sup>74</sup> Or he may not wish to cooperate with persons of an opposing political faction.<sup>75</sup>

Even in cases where such psychological factors do not preclude a co-op from "working," other problems may arise. Relations between co-op leaders and members, for example, may unfavorably affect operations. On the one hand, members might interfere with decisions which efficiency requires be left to leaders.<sup>76</sup> On the other, the manager may become a dictator of co-op policy, or at least a force so dominant that maximum member participation is not realized.<sup>77</sup>

It appears, then, that the problems of creating a co-op which "works" may in many situations be formidable, and the possibilities of changing attitudes and values may be slight. Co-ops appear to have been most successful where members were psychologically "ready" to make such

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72. R. Rahim, *Introduction* to M. HATTA, *supra* note 56, at xix.

73. M. HATTA, *supra* note 56, at 3.

74. R. Krishna, Book Review, 12 *ECON. DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE* 104 (1963).

75. M. HATTA, *supra* note 56, at 73.

76. *See* J. VOORHIS, *supra* note 56, at 176.

77. *See* L. KERCHER, V. KEBKER & W. LELAND, *CONSUMERS' COOPERATIVES IN THE NORTH CENTRAL STATES* 50 (R. Vaile ed. 1941); J. VOORHIS, *supra* note 56, at 59; J. WARBASSE, *CO-OPERATIVE DEMOCRACY* 202 (5th ed. 1947).



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an organization work.<sup>78</sup> This is not to say that psychological obstacles are insurmountable. Attitudes and values which would prevent a co-op from functioning well may be overcome by education and persuasion. Indeed, educative efforts are a prime tool of the cooperative movement. Sophisticated educational techniques such as “socio-dramas” are used by the International Development Foundation, an organization which encourages popular participation through co-ops and other institutions in Latin America.<sup>79</sup> The testimony of a credit union organizer before the House Foreign Affairs Committee also suggests that headway has been made through education:

[W]e have . . . 188 credit unions in . . . three African countries, 21,000 members, and 480,000 member savings and loans to date. We consider this good progress from the standpoint of the job, the hill to climb there, the illiteracy, the lack of any basic background or skills in working together. It is rather amazing, Congressman Taft, how far back we have to start with these people as compared to this country, the illiteracy, the lack of any know-how in democratic procedures, or handling their own finances, plus a great deal of plain distrust which has to be overcome insofar as their being convinced they can do this themselves, and that their money will be there and somebody won't run away with it.

We are pleased so far with the progress. . . .<sup>80</sup>

The point nevertheless remains that participation in co-ops and similar institutions does not per se cause certain attitude and value changes. An effort to predict what if any changes will occur must look to a number of other factors. The point is important, since if the values and attitudes allegedly resulting from participation in democratic institutions assist

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78. The strong co-op movement in Saskatchewan provides an example. The area was settled by European working-class immigrants, some of whom had belonged to radical movements at home. Some were Scandinavians who had belonged to cooperatives. All had moved west in search of a better life, and disappointment in their achievements made them receptive to new ideas. Moreover, they were not divided by strong class or other cleavages. See S. LIPSET, *AGRARIAN SOCIALISM* 23-30 (1950). Scandinavians have also been important to the cooperative movement in the United States. Cf. T. SALOUTOS & J. HICKS, *TWENTIETH-CENTURY POPULISM* 58 (1951).

The rural organizations of Taiwan provide another example. An important reason for their success was that the Japanese occupation left to the people of the island a legacy of discipline and receptivity to change. See N. JACOBY, *supra* note 43, at 83; R. Hough, *supra* note 43, at 58.

79. See, e.g., International Development Foundation Project Achievement Report No. PAR—1 on Rural Organization Development Program—Guatemala 3, Aug. 11, 1967.

80. 1967 Hearings, pt. 4, at 702. See also 1966 Hearings, pt. 4, at 665.

development, as much should be known as possible about how to create them. Otherwise, any efforts may be self-defeating. Attempts to cause people to value a democratic way of doing things may turn out to strengthen antidemocratic, antiooperative sentiments.

The next section concerns the assumption just made—that certain attitudes and values assist development. The assumption raises the question, what *is* development? And further, what do attitudes and values have to do with it?

### *Democratic Pluralism*

The study of African, Asian, and Latin American countries, and comparison of them to the United States, the Soviet Union, and other advanced nations, has produced a host of theories as to what “modernization” or “development” is, and how it evolves. Ward and Macridis suggest that a modern society is “a massive and new type of social development” which “in its non-political sectors” is characterized by high ratios, degrees, or levels of:

- (1) inanimate to animate sources of energy; (2) tool technology, mechanization, and industrialization; (3) specialization and professionalization of labor; (4) gross and per capita national product of goods and services; (5) urbanization; (6) differentiation, achievement orientation, and mobility in social organization; and (7) literacy, mass education, and mass media circulation.<sup>81</sup>

Most characterizations of modernity, like the above, are broad enough to encompass societies as different as the United States and the Soviet Union. This reflects the effort of social scientists, not always successful,<sup>82</sup>

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81. Ward, *supra* note 59, at 570.

82. See J. LaPalombara, *supra* note 8, at 19-21 (footnote omitted):

[I]t is not always clear whether generalizations offered by scholars relate to a general theory of political development or to a normative commitment to a specific kind of polity. . . . I can best illustrate this perhaps by raising a series of questions. . . .

a. Is the type of rational, hierarchical, disciplined, expert professional public administration we have in the West clearly the most efficient means of implementing economic and social change in the developing countries? . . . The myth of merit and neat classification systems can become a conceptual and, more important, an operational trap. Clearly, recent experiences at the state and national levels in the U. S. suggest that political innovators may find such systems too rigid and therefore formidable obstacles to change. Thus, when some scholars make the apparently shocking suggestion that technical assistance advisors may not wish to take a completely dim view of corruption or spoils in civilian administration, they may be reflecting a concept of organizational and human behavior

to devise concepts of general application—to avoid identifying modern society solely with Western society. This effort has also characterized many attempts to conceptualize *political* modernity or development. Thus, for example, Diamant defines it as follows:

A political system is said to be developing (political development takes place) when there is an increase in its ability to sustain successfully and continuously new types of social goals and the creation of new types of organization.

For political development to continue over time a differentiated and centralized polity must come into being which must be able to command resources from and power over more spheres and regions of the society.<sup>83</sup>

This definition is neutral as respects form of government. Under it a totalitarian government or a democracy could be “politically developing.”

Title IX implies at least a partial definition of political development. It conceives a society to be politically developed when citizens at all levels of the society participate in both local and national decision-making. They make some decisions themselves, through local institutions which operate by democratic procedures; and when the local institution does not have authority to make a given decision, it at least influences, on behalf of its members, decision-makers at a higher level. This concept is clearly not neutral. It idealizes a central characteristic of Western political systems. This is not surprising, of course, for in passing title IX the Congress was not engaged in a social science exercise—it was advocating democratic pluralism as a superior system. And that is only to be expected.

The purpose here is not to argue with the equation of democratic pluralism with political development. The purpose is rather to discuss

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that is less normative, more operationally viable, than a mechanical extrapolation from what is considered “good” in the U. S. or other Western polities. . . .

b. A second question would relate to the role of “traditional” institutions and structures on the articulation and implementation of developmental goals. Early theory and practice tended to see most such structures as inimical to “modernization.” Many post-colonial political elites, often educated in the West and either committed to Western values or ambivalent about them, moved to reduce the importance of “traditional” institutions and forces. Typologies and ideal-typical constructs provided a seeming intellectual rationale for such action. Yet, . . . [t]he idea that “modernization,” however defined, requires a *radical* break with the past seems to me to be rooted in some instances in the revolutionary ideas of Marx-Lenin-Stalin and in other instances in the polemical postures of those who fostered the development of economic and political liberalism in the West.

83. Political Development: Approaches to Theory and Strategy 21 (1963) (CAG Occasional Paper), cited in J. LaPalombara, *supra* note 8, at 40-41.

problems which must be considered in trying to achieve that goal. Pluralism is a matter of degree—more or less of it may exist at a given time and place. Moreover, it may exist in various forms. Both the United States and Mexico have pluralistic political systems, yet the former is a two-party democracy while the Mexican system is dominated by one party.<sup>84</sup> The problem is to decide, taking other values into account, what degree and form of pluralism is appropriate in a given context, and how can it be reached. AID officials will in a sense be making this decision. They will not, of course, be telling foreign governments how to run their political systems. They will be giving advice, however, and they will be suggesting title IX-type programs. They will be trying to advance democratic pluralism. Responsibility requires that in doing so they make as wise decisions as possible, on the basis of all the knowledge as well as all the judgment at their command. What are some of the problems which must be considered in making such decisions?

One is difficulty in many less developed lands of building loyalty to the nation-state—of making the state “legitimate” in the eyes of the populace. Lipset describes the problem as it has arisen in the new states of Asia and Africa:

The old order has been abolished and with it the set of beliefs that justified its system of authority. The imperialist ogre upon whom all ills were blamed has now disappeared, and there has been a slackening of the great unifying force, nationalism, under whose banner private, ethnic, sectional, and other differences were submerged. The new system is in the process of being formed and so the questions arise, To whom is loyalty owed? And why?<sup>85</sup>

The importance of creating loyalty to a national state is underlined by Silvert. He convincingly demonstrates that neither democracy nor modernization are possible unless citizens develop a loyalty such that they accept “the state as the impersonal and ultimate arbiter of human affairs.”<sup>86</sup>

The problems involved in building national loyalty, however, are enormous in many less developed countries. Tribal, ethnic, regional,

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84. For a brief discussion of pluralism in the Mexican system, see S. LIPSET, *supra* note 58, at 316-17.

85. *Id.* at 16.

86. K. Silvert, *supra* note 60, at 19. See the introduction and conclusion of the book for his argument.

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racial, cultural, class, religious, language and other groups frequently compete with the nation-state for loyalty. These societies are engaged in *overcoming* pluralism, in the sense of trying to create an overriding identification.<sup>87</sup> The question arises, then, what effects may title IX institutions have on the effort to create legitimacy?

The answer is, of course, that they may have a variety of effects, depending on a number of variables. Organizing a particular group of persons in a particular way may strengthen parochial loyalties, thus blocking national identification. Thus, the experience in East Pakistan has been that "there is rapid progress in . . . the identification of local interest, but only a little progress in . . . the fusion of local interest with national interest."<sup>88</sup> The experience of a Latin American organizer is that "in the early stages [of organization] it is unrealistic to expect much sophistication or concern with national problems; generally at this point the concerns are local and the mood is militant."<sup>89</sup>

While these examples suggest inconsistency between local organization and national loyalty, it is possible that where there exist very weak loyalties to any group outside of the family, persons must experience loyalty to a local community before they are capable of a larger national loyalty.<sup>90</sup> The problem would then be to somehow discriminate between situations where local organization would probably lead to the development of larger loyalty (assuming the system could survive a strengthening of parochial loyalty in the short run), and situations where local organization would likely have the opposite effect.

Three additional examples suggest further the variety of possible relationships between title IX organizations and national loyalty. In Vietnam, where "the traditional autonomy of the villages and their com-

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87. Deutsch suggests the amount of time this may take by pointing to a European example:

In the forcible incorporation of the Saxons into the Frankish empire and their forcible conversion to the Christian religion and culture, the period of open violence lasted thirty-two years, from 772 to 804; and it took more than another century, until 919, for a Saxon prince to don Frankish dress to ascend, as Henry I, the throne of the empire and to symbolize the active integration of his people into the common state.

K. Deutsch, *Introduction* to NATION-BUILDING 8 (K. Deutsch ed., 1st Atheling ed. 1966) (footnote omitted).

88. Address by Edgar L. Owens, *supra* note 45.

89. Summary of International Development Foundation Workshop on Methods of Political Development Assistance in Latin America 77, June 10-11, 1965 (remark of George W. Wheelwright).

90. *Id.* at 99 (remark of H. Field Haviland).

ponent hamlets has been eroded," AID is operating on the assumption "that revitalization of local self-government [is] indispensable in the task of winning the commitment of the population to the national cause."<sup>91</sup> In Africa, AID has a contract with a labor group which testifies that it works with

organizations within the country that transcend tribal and regional attitudes.

In Nigeria, for example, the trade union movement is the one organization that embraces people from all tribes and membership and participation from all of the regional sectors. This transcends tribal and regional ties.<sup>92</sup>

In Indonesia, the growth of cooperatives has been fostered by nationalist movements, and "[n]ational feeling [has become] . . . the guiding spirit [of the cooperative movement]."<sup>93</sup>

Finally, insofar as popular participation in national decision-making is essential to creating loyalty to the system,<sup>94</sup> title IX institutions may provide a conduit for such participation.

Another problem of underdeveloped societies may be termed the problem of ordering change. Political, social, and economic changes create conflicts which may threaten the whole social fabric. The task of ordering change is in large part the task of preventing conflict from becoming upheaval, of keeping it within peaceful bounds and providing means for settlement. A hallmark of modern societies is that they have "created attitudes, social devices, and traditions which permit orderly institutionalized change."<sup>95</sup>

The problem of ordering change is related to the problem of legitimacy, because settlement of some disputes requires that the disputants recognize the nation-state as a legitimate arbiter. In many less developed nations the nation-state is not generally so recognized. This may be for a number of reasons, *e.g.*, the state machinery is under the control of alien tribes, or the accepted way of settling disputes is interfactional warfare, or the state is controlled by an oligarchy which is willing to have disputes settled only in its favor.

91. 1967 *Hearings*, pt. 1, at 6.

92. *Id.*, pt. 5, at 1100.

93. M. HATTA, *supra* note 56, at 7.

94. See S. LIPSET, *POLITICAL MAN* 66-67 (Anchor Books ed. 1963).

95. K. Silvert, *supra* note 60, at 4-5. See also S. N. Eisenstadt, *Breakdowns of Modernization*, 12 *ECON. DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE* 345 (1964).

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The possible relationships between title IX institutions and the problem of ordering change are many. One possibility is that organizing certain sectors will aggravate the problem by placing heavy demands on dispute-settling machinery. When repressed strata are organized they frequently are concerned only with the needs of their own groups. Thus, the strong cooperative movement in Saskatchewan was concerned almost exclusively with government action or inaction affecting the farmer, rather than issues such as national debt and economic planning priorities.<sup>96</sup> Such a narrow focus is certainly not bad per se. The danger is, however, that such a group will develop power to press its demands effectively and will not possess an adequate sense of restraint. This could place intolerable demands on dispute-settling mechanisms, and lead to institutional breakdown—perhaps in the form of revolution. The cooperative ideology might say that organizing groups into co-ops tends to obviate this danger: co-ops, after all, teach the value of democratic procedures and compromise. As previously suggested, however, co-ops may or may not teach these things. And even if they do, it is one matter to practice democracy within a group of one's peers, and another to practice it with "outsiders."<sup>97</sup> It may be asserted, on the other hand, that revolution is sometimes necessary to achieve justice. The approach of the United States' foreign policymakers, however, seems to assume that reforms are possible without violence. This is a major premise of the foreign assistance program, and is particularly manifest in the Alliance for Progress.

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96. S. LIPSET, *supra* note 78, at 212. See *Hearings on Rural Development in Asia*, *supra* note 1, pt. 1, at 123 (testimony of Dr. Ness):

When rural peoples are mobilized they will work to promote their own interests. Where such interests have been neglected, or oppressed by central governments, conflict is bound to ensue.

Throughout southeast Asia there is a longstanding undercurrent of conflict between hill peoples and lowland peoples, and between rural peoples and urban peoples. We have already seen that the mobilization of the Montagnards in South Vietnam, admittedly for security purposes, results in heightened conflict between hill people and the central government. I think we can expect a great deal more of this type of conflict in the future, especially if we are successful in organizing hill peoples.

97. See also S. LIPSET, *supra* note 58, at 280:

Could we say . . . that there is some minimum level of so-called democratic traits that are requisite in "national character" for a nation successfully to develop a democratic polity? . . . "Democratic" traits do show up in tests of French national character; but France has not been able to develop a viable democracy. Thus, simply ranking polities according to the degree to which "democratic" traits are prevalent does not tell us much about the necessary conditions for successful democratic institutions.



The recent history of Guatemala provides an interesting example of tension between the development of title IX-type institutions and the ordering of change. In that country the government was either unable or unwilling to mediate disputes between an organized rural sector and the oligarchy. The results were disastrous.

Pluralism began to flourish in rural Guatemala during the 1940s. Peasants obtained new power through participation in various rural organizations. A revolutionary government aided this development, and used the rural population as a power base. In 1952, however, a counter-revolution took place. The oligarchy took over the government and suppressed rural movements, causing some rural activists simply to give up, and others to turn to extremist underground tactics.<sup>98</sup>

The revolutionary government apparently failed to ameliorate the conflict between peasant and oligarch so as to permit further orderly progress. Indeed, it was probably not interested in doing so, but rather in promoting the welfare of lower groups at the expense of the oligarchy. The case suggests that the degree to which title IX institutions are encouraged should depend partly on the possibilities of accommodation.<sup>99</sup> The case yields another point as well. The 1952 counterrevolution was financed by the CIA and encouraged by the State Department. Query whether AID's efforts under title IX will always enjoy the approbation of these agencies.

Again, it is arguable that orderly change was impossible in Guatemala. It may be that the oligarchy would never have compromised, and that it was necessary to gamble on defeating it. This may have been so. But to *assume* that Latin American upper classes are incapable of accepting social reform is dubious determinism. The assumption fails to consider that often Latin American upper classes are divided, with some members archconservative but others amenable to change.<sup>100</sup> This sug-

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98. See R. Adams, *The Problem of Political Development in Light of the Recent Socio-Political History of Guatemala* 21, 27 (paper delivered at Brookings Institution Seminar on the Theory and Practice of Political Development, Airlie Farms, Va., Sept. 12-16, 1966); the papers delivered at this symposium will be published in book form in 1968.

99. One wonders what will develop in Taiwan, where the rural populace is well organized and becoming more politically active. "By 1965, well-phased actions by the Nationalist government progressively to liberalize political rights, participation, and institutions were necessary in order to afford healthy outlets for social pressures and tensions." N. JACOBY, *supra* note 43, at 170-71.

100. See Summary of International Development Foundation Workshop, *supra* note 89, at 85, 91-93 (remarks of K. H. Silvert).

gests the possibility of fostering orderly change by working toward acceptance by certain upper groups of demands pressed by rural organizations, labor unions, and so forth. Such a strategy of course requires knowledge of where to find upper class persons sympathetic to change.<sup>101</sup>

Another problem in many less developed societies is the fostering of individual freedom. The government is frequently a source of oppression, and "private governments" may also be careless of individual rights. The encouragement of title IX institutions may have a variety of relationships to this problem. On the one hand, they may enhance the power of oppressed minorities, enabling these groups to resist attempts to limit their freedom. They may also cultivate attitudes of tolerance and respect for others' rights. On the other hand, they may breed intolerance.<sup>102</sup> Lipset suggests that the spirit of populism which title IX may encourage is inimical to individual rights.<sup>103</sup> Rights may be safer under a frankly authoritarian regime than under one which bases its authority on the "popular will" and seeks to destroy opposition to that will.<sup>104</sup> Thus, as Lipset puts it,

it is necessary to look for factors which, on the one hand, sustain the separation of the political system from the excesses inherent in the populist assumptions of democracy—the belief that the majority will is always sovereign—and on the other, encourage participation in organizations that conflict with one another and with state agencies concerning the direction of public policy on all major issues.<sup>105</sup>

The problematic relationships between title IX institutions and economic development, attitudinal and value changes, loyalty to the nation-

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101. Perhaps influential intellectuals of radical political persuasion will provide a promising opening. On the other hand, their political radicalism may be "vitiating by a deeply ingrained social conservatism," deriving from a "strong middle class anchorage and the sustained powerful hold of sentimentalized bourgeois notions of propriety and social decorum." F. Bonilla, *The Intellectual and Political Development* 6 (paper delivered at Brookings Institution Seminar on the Theory and Practice of Political Development, Airlie Farms, Va., Sept. 12-16, 1966); the papers delivered at this symposium will be published in book form in 1968.

102. Did the areas of Wisconsin which spawned a strong cooperative movement turn into hotbeds of McCarthyism, xenophobia, anti-intellectualism, and anti-semitism? Cf. S. LIPSET, *supra* note 94, at 169-73. *But cf.* N. POLLACK, *THE POPULIST RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIAL AMERICA* (1962).

103. *See* S. LIPSET, *supra* note 58, at 11.

104. *See* A. F. K. ORGANSKI, *supra* note 58, at 182.

105. S. LIPSET, *supra* note 58, at 209. *See also* J. R. Pennock, *Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods*, 18 *WORLD POL.* 415 (1966).

state, orderly conflict, and individual freedom, raises questions regarding the interpretation and implementation of the legislation.

INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

When title IX was passed in 1966, AID was not totally unprepared to begin its implementation. It had been engaged for some time in work called for by title IX, including the promotion of cooperatives, credit unions, and labor unions, and it had behind it the JCRR experience.<sup>106</sup> In Vietnam, the agency had been heavily engaged in political development work, attempting to build support for the "national cause."<sup>107</sup> Moreover, AID officials were perhaps thinking explicitly about political development more than in previous years.<sup>108</sup>

Nevertheless, AID greeted title IX as an innovation. It established a title IX division in the Office of Program and Policy Coordination. Its first report to the Congress on the legislation stated that:

Title IX has policy implications, and points to opportunities, which go beyond previous AID activities and traditional economic development considerations. Title IX requires AID not only to consider new types of activities, but to view the developmental process in different and much broader terms than before: it will not do simply to relabel and multiply on-going AID activities consistent with Title IX's objectives. It is evident

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106. For a summary of title IX activities engaged in by AID before the legislation passed, see AID, Report to the Congress on the Implementation of Title IX, app., May 10, 1967. See also *1966 Hearings*, pt. 1, at 219-22.

107. The Revolutionary Development, or pacification, program in Vietnam has been largely concerned with the political development of rural Vietnam. One aim of the program was to revitalize local government units which have come under control of the central government. It was felt this would build support for the national government. For some discussion of political development in Vietnam, and AID's role therein, see *1967 Hearings*, pt. 1, 5-8, 12-17, 27-29; *1966 Hearings*, pt. 4, 652-53.

108. Compare Packenham, *supra* note 6, with *1966 Hearings*, pt. 4, at 654 (remarks of Mr. Gaud, then Deputy Administrator, AID). Packenham concluded from his study, *inter alia*, that explicit attention to political development in AID/Washington was slight. His interview data was collected in late 1962 and early 1963. More recently, Mr. Gaud stated:

[A]re we adequately set up in AID to deal with the broad question of development, including political development?

We do not have in AID, as you know, any office—I will take that back—in our Program Office we have a group that is working on this subject. We do not have in our Agency a central group comparable to the engineers, the lawyers, the agriculturalists, who deal with this problem. We are doing a good deal more thinking about it, and are a good deal more conscious of it now than a year or 2 or 3 ago.

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that the successful, long-run implementation of this provision requires a serious and extensive analytical effort on the part of the Agency into aspects of the developmental process to which inadequate attention has hitherto been given. As the House Committee indicated, Title IX involves AID in a new approach toward development.<sup>109</sup>

According to the report, AID intends to take a flexible, undogmatic approach in implementing title IX. It will not attempt a wholesale transfer of American democratic institutions, but will cooperate with host governments in "building viable institutions in accordance with their own traditions and self-identified needs."<sup>110</sup> Nevertheless, AID claims to be guided by the principle that the best kind of government is one which responds to expressed needs of its people, and that this often requires governmental decentralization. It will also be guided by the belief that economic development and social justice depend on citizen participation in economic, cultural, and political life.<sup>111</sup>

The report also indicates that AID will seek through training and recruitment to develop personnel possessing skills necessary to implement title IX. This will mean some departure from a personnel now heavily weighted with economic and technical experts. The agency has also established a title IX advisory committee composed of outside experts on social and political development.<sup>112</sup>

AID's intention to take a flexible approach to title IX is encouraging in light of the issues raised in the foregoing sections. Such an approach is surely warranted by the legislative history. Title IX does not and was not intended to imply a universally applicable theory of development. Though the history contains statements evidencing strong convictions about the desirability of certain kinds of change, the framers also uttered expressions of doubt.<sup>113</sup> Their statements of certainty, moreover, must be read in light of the fact that they were acting as advocates—they were trying to persuade AID to act in certain areas which they believed were

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109. Report, *supra* note 106, at 1. For further information on the implementation of title IX, see 1967 *Hearings*, pt. 1, at 100; pt. 2, at 390-91, 448-49; pt. 3, at 565, 595; pt. 4, at 767, 839; pt. 6, at 1357-60.

110. Report, *supra* note 106, at 2.

111. *Ibid.*

112. *Id.* at 7. The members of the committee are Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard; Aristide Zolberg, University of Chicago; Robert B. Stevens, The Brookings Institution; Howard Wriggins, Columbia; and Fred von der Mehden, University of Wisconsin. Letter from Jutta Parsons, Title IX Division, Office of Program and Policy Coordination, AID, to Brian Butler, Jan. 19, 1968.

113. See notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text *supra*.

neglected, and in so doing they probably tended to overstate their case. Finally, the framers recognize many of the specific difficulties raised above, and would presumably want AID to consider them in implementing title IX.<sup>114</sup>

In addition, the language of title IX is amenable to flexible interpretation. Though the title calls for *maximum* participation, in the task of economic development, this need not be read as requiring the encouragement of participation to the exclusion of all other ends. It can be read as requiring the maximum participation which is reasonable in a given set of circumstances. Moreover, the participation called for must be such as to foster economic *development*, rather than create economic problems. Finally, in light of the broad range of institutions authorized by title IX,<sup>115</sup> it is clear that AID can encourage not only interest organizations such as cooperatives and labor unions, but also institutions which would tend to build loyalty to the nation-state by cutting across cleavages, which would serve to ameliorate conflict, and so forth.

If the legislative history and language of title IX permit AID to implement it flexibly and carefully, a sense of responsibility requires this approach. For title IX activities constitute intervention in the affairs of other nations. The word is not used here to connote bald, uninvited meddling. An aid-recipient nation which does not wish to accept title IX projects can refuse to do so. On the other hand, this may not be easy, for AID's practice in extending assistance is to bargain for certain actions on the recipient's part in return.<sup>116</sup> If economic assistance is made conditional on the establishment of title IX institutions, the recipient nation may be hard put to refuse.<sup>117</sup> This is a kind of intervention, even though "invited." And even where an aid recipient

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114. See, e.g., 1967 Hearings, pt. 2, at 408; *Hearings on Rural Development in Asia*, supra note 21, pt. 1, at 97; *Hearings on Modern Communications and Foreign Policy*, supra note 12, at 119-20, 141. Discussions among persons interested in title IX sponsored by the Society for International Development in Washington also indicate an awareness of these problems. See D. Reynolds, compiler, *Role of Local Governmental and Voluntary Organizations in Country Development*, May 15, 1967; Draft resume of Nov. 14, 1967, breakfast discussion on criteria and measures for popular participation in country development, Nov. 25, 1967.

115. See notes 16-21 and accompanying text supra.

116. See, e.g., 1966 Hearings, pt. 1, at 145-46.

117. AID may have an extra lever in bargaining with Latin American countries, because the Declaration of the Presidents of America, Punta del Este, April 14, 1967, calls for, in language almost identical to title IX, strengthened democratic institutions and increased popular participation in development. The declaration is reprinted at 1967 Hearings, pt. 3, at 573-84.

welcomes title IX activities,<sup>118</sup> AID is intervening in the sense of acting in a way that will influence that country's politics. It must be observed, however, that AID was intervening in these senses before the advent of title IX, simply by rendering economic assistance. Such assistance inevitably affects the social and political conditions in a country. Thus, to the extent that title IX makes AID more aware of its political and social influence—and more responsible in wielding it—the legislation is a step forward.

To say that title IX must be implemented flexibly and carefully does not help AID decide what it should or should not undertake in a particular situation. In making these decisions, AID will turn to experts. Some of these may be the activists who see only the alleged benefits of the kind of organization they advocate. Probably the agency will be more receptive to the advice of social scientists. To them will fall much of the burden of considering the possible effects of title IX institutions discussed in this article, and assessing the probable results. Some scholars are presently heavily involved in assisting AID. For example, in 1965 AID and the Asia Society cooperated to form the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (SEADAG), an organization of private social scientists who carry on advisory discussions with the agency.<sup>119</sup> Moreover, some political scientists have suggested the development of a special breed of "applied social scientists" who could furnish information needed by decision-makers.<sup>120</sup>

Liaison between the government and academia, which will doubtless increase under title IX, confronts scholars with some weighty problems. One is the need to refine their work. Much of the analysis of political development problems so far produced by social scientists is of little practical value to decision-makers. Complicated theories of extremely high levels of generality may provide a useful background for dealing

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118. Dr. John Schott, then Chief of the Title IX Division of AID's Office of Program and Policy Coordination, recently remarked on returning from an overseas trip: "I found the fearfulness here in the 'States' about host country sensitivity to assistance toward 'popular participation' in their development programs greatly exaggerated. The countries have problems in reaching, in winning the confidence, of their people. They recognize this even better than we do. They welcome help." Draft resume of Nov. 14, 1967, breakfast discussion on criteria and measures for popular participation in country development, Nov. 25, 1967 (discussion sponsored by the Committee on Political Development, Washington Chapter of the Society for International Development).

119. For a discussion of this group, see *Hearings on Rural Development in Asia*, *supra* note 21, pt. 1, at 125-28, 202.

120. *E.g.*, L. Pye, *supra* note 65, at 22.

with these problems, but they are of questionable utility in making day to day decisions. The operator needs to know his options in a concrete situation, and the probable short- and long-run effects of choosing one or another of them. This will require the generation of more empirically grounded theories and more data than are presently available.

The collection of data in foreign countries raises another problem. A few years ago, the Army embarked on "Project Camelot," a research enterprise designed partly to identify "the forerunners of social breakdown and the resultant opportunity for Communist penetration and possible takeover. . . ." <sup>121</sup> in less developed countries. Camelot was cancelled, however, because an adverse Chilean newspaper report of the activities of one of its personnel led to an uproar in Chile, elsewhere overseas, and in the United States. According to a seasoned Latin American expert, an immediate effect of Camelot was that: "[n]ot a single survey research study can be done in Chile. Throughout Latin America quantitative studies have halted or been impeded, and all scholars, whether in teaching or research, find their actions questioned. . . ." <sup>122</sup> Camelot raises important questions of scholarly ethics and competence;<sup>123</sup> it also suggests possible difficulties which United States government-sponsored or sanctioned research on political development may encounter. The collection of data needed for the effective implementation of title IX may at times be a very sticky business, requiring the utmost sensitivity.

A final problem confronting scholars who advise the government is the ethical one of discriminating between tendering helpful information and making policy suggestions based on personal value judgments. Scholars can serve a highly useful function only in the first regard.<sup>124</sup> It can well be argued that ethics require scholars to indicate clearly the

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121. BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY, H.R. REP. NO. 1224, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3R (1966) (Report no. 4 on Winning the Cold War: The U. S. Ideological Offensive).

122. K. SILVERT, AMERICAN ACADEMIC ETHICS AND SOCIAL RESEARCH ABROAD I (1965) (American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, 12 West Coast of South America Series, no. 3, General).

123. *Id.* Silvert's piece is a scathing attack on Camelot and its implications.

124. See *Hearings on Rural Development in Asia*, *supra* note 21, pt. 1, at 114 (remarks of R. Tilman, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale); K. Silvert, prepared remarks before the Subcomm. on Government Research of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, July 20, 1966.



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nature of the advice they are giving, for there is a danger that the respect accorded their expertise in the first sphere will carry over to the second.

### CONCLUSION

Title IX reflects an increasing concern in AID, in the academic world, and in the Congress with problems of political and social change in less developed countries. The wholly economic approach to development has been falling into disfavor. Moreover, title IX charts a direction for development policy including social and political considerations. A mechanical application of title IX, however, would be unwise, and is neither required nor warranted by the legislative history. The legislation poses a real challenge to AID and the scholarly world.