
REVIEW ESSAYS

BEYOND THE MALVINAS CRISIS: Perspectives on Inter-American Relations

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- THE FRACTURED CONTINENT: LATIN AMERICA IN CLOSE-UP.* By WILLARD L. BEAULAC. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. \$11.95.)
- UNEQUAL ALLIANCE: THE INTER-AMERICAN MILITARY SYSTEM, 1938–1978.* By JOHN CHILD. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. \$22.00.)
- LATIN AMERICA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM.* Edited by JOHN D. MARTZ and LARS SCHOULTZ. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. \$24.50.)
- CUADERNOS SEMESTRALES—ESTADOS UNIDOS: PERSPECTIVA LATINO-AMERICANA,* Number 9 (First Semester, 1981). (Mexico City: Instituto de Estudios de Estados Unidos, CIDE, 1981.)

Inter-american relations would appear to be in a state of crisis.¹ In the view of many observers, Washington's role in the British-Argentine war over the Malvinas constituted a major cause of such crisis. A subtler, historically grounded interpretation of the problem, however, leads to the inevitable conclusion that the Malvinas conflict and its derivations were largely an expression or reflection of a preexisting severe deterioration in U.S.–Latin American ties. Such a conclusion is further strengthened in the light of the data and analysis contained in most of the works examined in this review essay.

The Crisis of the Inter-American Military System

It has been stated repeatedly that Washington's decision to back Great Britain in the Malvinas war harmed U.S. relations with Latin America, and more specifically, inflicted severe damage on hemispheric collective security institutions like the Rio Treaty. Although the latter assertion is generally accurate, it is also undeniable that this kind of institution had greatly declined in prestige, credibility, and effectiveness since the 1960s, that is, long before the South Atlantic war. John Child, in his book *Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938–1978*, provides ample evidence for this hypothesis.

Child's work analyzes thoroughly that body of interlinked institutions known as the Inter-American Military System (IAMS) over the 1938–78 period, providing original and detailed data, and arguing that it has been an unequal alliance (due to the power disparities between the United States and the Latin American states) as well as an uneven alliance (due to the "cycles of dramatic growth and decline" that it experienced throughout the four decades in question). Child's core thesis is that the IAMS "was created and functioned vibrantly during World War II, declined but survived during the limbo years of the early Cold War (1945–1961), reached its apogee in the Anti-foco years (1961–1967), and is presently fragmenting, a process that may or may not lead to total disintegration" (p. 233). Because the book was published in 1980, it could perhaps be argued that the 1982 Malvinas war contributed further to the tendency toward total disintegration of the system. Child concludes that during its forty-year lifespan, "clear consensus on threat perception has been achieved in the IAMS only twice: with the Axis threat during World War II and the guerrilla threat in the 1960's." In the view of the author, during the remaining periods the system has been plagued by "divergence on threat perceptions and scenarios" (p. 234). Regarding this latter aspect, the 1967–78 period is identified as the most significant.

During 1967–78, the emergence of new forces of Latin American origin weakened considerably U.S. control of the IAMS. Drifts toward subregionalism, new geopolitical currents, and local drives to become self-sufficient in arms were among the most relevant centrifugal forces in the system. Child indicates that by pushing the antiguerrilla scheme for the Latin American armed forces, Washington "opened the Pandora's Box of military reformism and the Doctrine of National Security and Development" (p. 191). Thus, military developmentalism appeared in two forms in the Brazilian and the Peruvian models. Additionally, during this same period, a growing consciousness by the Latin American military of its technological dependency on the United States led to the establishment of indigenous Latin American arms industries and to the search for alternative suppliers. Hence, "by the early 1970's the U.S. had

clearly lost its monopoly of arms sales in Latin America to France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Israel" (p. 197). Not surprisingly, in view of the history of Buenos Aires–Washington ties, Argentina was the first Latin American nation to attempt to break its technological-military reliance on the United States in 1967, when Washington refused to sell it modern tanks. This incident led to "Plan Europa," under which Buenos Aires diversified its sources of arms and initiated an autonomous weapons industry. Lastly, Child asserts, during this same period several Latin American military establishments began to break away from their assigned anti-*foco* struggle role, which they regarded as demeaning, to return to the "more classical roles of defense against conventional invasion," perhaps due to a general sharpening of border territorial disputes in the area. Parallel to this trend was "an increasing interest by the larger Latin nations in extending their influence to the smaller nations" (p. 199).

The proclivities just noted resulted in specific criticisms and efforts to reform the hemispheric security system. For example, Child mentions that at the 1975 San José meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS), agreement was reached to lift Rio Treaty sanctions by a simple majority rather than by the traditional two-thirds vote, thus facilitating rapprochement with Cuba. Other significant changes were: article 3 was modified to drop Rio Treaty coverage of American States that were not parties to the treaty; article 4 was revised to limit the geographic area of the treaty; and a new article 11 was approved—despite U.S. opposition—that called for the guarantee of collective *economic* security for development by means of a special treaty.

Similarly, efforts at OAS Charter reform translated into the abolition in 1975 of the Special Consultative Committee on Security, created by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers to monitor Cuban activities in the region. Likewise, severe criticisms of the Inter-American Defense Board were launched by Latin American countries at the 1973 and 1975 Conferences of American Armies. At about the same time, and due to various reasons ranging from bureaucratic politics to congressional restrictions, the Latin American Military and Security Assistance Program (MAP/SAP) of the U.S. government declined between 1967 and the late 1970s in terms of dollars, arms, and personnel, a fact that further contributed to the fragmentation of the hemispheric military system.

Child concludes that the principal beneficiary of the system "has been the United States, for whom the IAMS has served as an effective vehicle for influencing the Latin American military whose political role has been considerable" (p. 235). In the last analysis, according to the author, the evidence shows that the United States "employed the multilateral elements mainly as a convenient symbolic 'cover' for the real

business of Inter-American military relations, which generally took place in the bilateral channels, chiefly the Security Assistance Program." As a corollary, Child adds that "the Inter-American Military System as a whole may now be in danger of complete fragmentation as the strongest element (the bilateral Security Assistance Program) declines drastically" (p. 236).

Although the Malvinas war accelerated the progressive deterioration of the IAMS and of North American ascendancy within it, Child overemphasizes the centrifugal forces at work within the system and underestimates the substantial degree of influence that Washington still exercises upon the Latin American military, influence measured not in terms of the allocation of transfer of funds, arms, and personnel to the Latin American armed forces, but in terms of the transfer of values, procedures, attitudes, and worldviews, all of which are long lasting and more difficult to eliminate than a lend-lease program. In short, despite the deep fractures and plain incompatibilities of interests that have become evident in U.S.-Latin American relations in general in the area of military linkages, Washington's influence on key sectors of Latin America may be greater than Child estimates, even after the Malvinas war. Perhaps the alteration of this contradictory situation requires profound changes in the armed forces of the region. Such changes could include the creation of smaller, more modern national military establishments, the long-range development of close ties among these, and more pluralistic, less rigidly organized, but efficient, armed forces such as those of the Scandinavian countries.

On the other hand, the institutions of the IAMS as they were conceived by the United States in the postwar era are undoubtedly in crisis, particularly after the Malvinas conflict, but no clear options are in sight. Child does not suggest specific alternatives to the deterioration of the system, seeming to prefer its strengthening via restitution of its most dynamic element, the bilateral Security Assistance Program. Such an option, however, would appear to address the symptoms rather than the causes of the troubles of the IAMS and inter-american relations as a whole. Because what most Latin American countries have demanded in the last decade is a system that effectively responds to their interests rather than to those of Washington, the post-Malvinas era may witness the emergence of a Latin American system of security, which could materialize as an exclusively Latin American consultation mechanism on security affairs at the highest political level. Such a possibility, of course, would raise such questions as: would Cuba participate in this regional collective security arrangement? and what would become of the Rio Treaty and other institutions of the Inter-American Military System? Another possibility is that the organisms that form the IAMS will survive basically unchanged, but lose their purpose as Latin American countries

seek to set up more autonomous, subregional, or bilateral security schemes.²

U.S.–Latin American Relations: North American Perceptions and Misperceptions

A constant theme in the analysis of inter-american relations, and particularly of U.S. policy toward Latin America, has been the way in which policy makers in Washington view the region. Decision makers not only act or respond according to the objective features of a situation, to what is commonly perceived as reality, but also according to the meaning that individuals attribute to such situations. Thus, the image of Latin America in the minds of North American policy makers becomes as important as its objective position. Erroneous perceptions may prove to have a distorting effect by encouraging reinterpretation of information that does not fit the image, leading in turn to miscalculation and wrong decisions.³

The book by Willard L. Beaulac entitled *The Fractured Continent: Latin America in Close-Up* is useful only to the extent that it precisely illustrates many of the misperceptions held by U.S. policy makers about Latin America. The author, a former North American ambassador to several Latin American countries including Argentina, Chile, and Cuba, unfortunately has given nothing more than a travelogue treatment of extremely important issues such as anti-imperialism, nationalism, and Marxism in the region, the roots and present state of Latin American underdevelopment, and inter-american relations.

Reading the observations of Beaulac about the region, one understands at least partially why relations between Washington and the Latin American nations have been plagued by controversy, distrust, and open conflict. Some of the book's passages can hardly be contested from a serious academic perspective, but are worth citing in this regard. On the church in Latin America the author states, "Raymond Aron has said that Marxism is the opium of intellectuals. One might add that today it is also the opium of some churchmen" (p. xi); on the United States and imperialism, "The United States joined the imperialist world briefly but was never happy in it . . . contrary to popular impression the U.S. was frequently invited to intervene in order to limit loss of lives and destruction of property" (p. 63); on the nationalization of copper in Chile, "The expulsion of the foreign copper mining companies, in 1971, did not add to the wealth of Chileans. It did, however, greatly increase the power of the new aristocrats, the politicians and the bureaucrats" (p. 80); on Marxists and capitalism, "The surplus value that Marxists talk about is made up of profit, interest, and rents, but to the American there are advantages that capitalism offers. They help to make it possible for him to own

his own home, to have a car, and perhaps a boat, to fly to Mexico or drive to Canada during his annual vacations, and to do a hundred other things that he considers normal and desirable" (p. 87). Additionally, the book contains generally negative judgements on the Economic Commission for Latin America, Carter's human rights policy, and the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The essential problem with Beaulac's work is not its conservative perspective but its superficiality. The volume could be classified ideologically under what has come to be known as the "neo-conservative" approach, but it cannot measure up to highly debatable, but intellectually coherent, works such as those of Jeane Kirkpatrick.

By contrast, the collection of essays edited by John D. Martz and Lars Schoultz, *Latin America, the United States and the Inter-American System* (written in honor of don Federico Gil, *excelente persona* and pioneer scholar in the field of Latin American studies in the United States), provides a serious, well-balanced treatment of inter-american affairs. The essays also discuss the perceptions that underlie actual policies. Kenneth Coleman, in an article entitled "The Political Mythology of the Monroe Doctrine: Reflections on the Social Psychology of Hegemony," argues that "a constant in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has been to develop and to maintain as much control as possible with the minimum employment of force." In the view of the author, the latter is facilitated by the existence in U.S. foreign policy of a "political mythology of hegemony" that denies the existence of political and economic domination or, put differently, denies "the existence of U.S. self-interest as a feature of Inter-American relations." It follows for Coleman that episodes of "overt imperialism" have been indicative of the failure to "establish *indirect* U.S. control over the Americas" (p. 96). Coleman seems to utilize a definition of *hegemony* similar to that of Antonio Gramsci, which allows one to understand how an actor may exercise hegemony in a given area through a mixture of force and consensus, but with the element of force never exceeding that of consensus.⁴ Coleman proceeds to analyze the role of the Monroe Doctrine as a central factor in the political mythology of U.S. foreign policy, concluding that "political leaders will continue to find that the theme of protecting the hemisphere from external forces is capable of evoking deep support" (p. 111). Ironically, it would seem that if anything, the Malvinas war laid to rest the Monroe Doctrine in the eyes of Latin Americans and may have also ended its usefulness as a myth for Washington policy makers and the North American public.

In a similar vein, John Martz's essay "Democracy and the Imposition of Values: Definitions and Diplomacy" holds that democracy has become a "rhetorical cornerstone of U.S. interests in the Americas" and that as such, it has provided "a solid foundation for a wide array of policies" (p. 147). The problem, as Martz sees it, is that North American

diplomacy seriously encourages democracy only when security interests are not endangered by so doing; U.S. policy makers have a constricted definition of democracy that does not extend beyond the political dimension; ethnocentric assumptions about Latin America produce paternalistically distorted expectations; and Latin American perspectives on democracy are themselves twisted as a result of historical experience (p. 147). Martz then provides historical evidence for his conclusion that U.S. foreign policy will continue to incorporate a normative dimension "directed at the enshrinement of democratic values, however narrowly or inadequately defined," and that even though the "perfect dream of the democratic ideal may not be fully realized in Latin America, it nevertheless stands as "an inspiration for all of those of the Americas who would be free" (p. 167).

Focusing on more concrete topics, several essays in the Martz-Schoultz collection examine human rights issues in U.S. foreign policy, particularly under the Carter administration. Schoultz, in his stimulating essay "U.S. Diplomacy and Human Rights in Latin America," analyzes the implementation of U.S. policy on human rights during the Carter administration, and the relative weight of human rights considerations in reference to other, often conflicting issues in the decision-making process. Schoultz indicates that Washington's policy on human rights changed dramatically throughout the 1970s, and that although some would argue that the shift toward a policy emphasizing the importance of human rights under the Carter presidency was merely cosmetic, a valid assessment cannot be made until "a systematic analysis of the linkage between words and deeds is completed." Schoultz's assumption in this sense is that "diplomacy is the means whereby a threat is communicated," and that the efficacy of the diplomatic tool depends entirely upon the perceptions by repressive Latin American governments of the costs involved in ignoring words that have a latent content, that is, that "communicate threats" (p. 198). Schoultz also concludes that "malfunctions in U.S. foreign policy probably result from incomplete or incompetent *direction* of the foreign policy bureaucracy, and that, in the case of human rights, the system functioned quite well" (p. 200). A somewhat similar view is expressed by Richard L. Clinton and R. Kenneth Godwin, in "Human Rights and Development: Lessons from Latin America," who hold that "a foreign policy based on human rights is not as naive as is generally supposed and, on the contrary, offers the best option available" in U.S. relations with Latin America and "other late-modernizing states" (p. 256).

A third essay on the topic of human rights in U.S. foreign policy is a solid case study of Argentina by Joseph S. Tulchin entitled "The Impact of U.S. Human Rights Policy: Argentina." Although Tulchin comments that the United States "must do everything in its power to improve the

protection of human rights in Argentina," his analysis of the historical record of U.S.–Argentine relations convinces him that one must recognize that "direct pressure on the Argentine government will most probably prove counterproductive" (p. 231). Tulchin's survey of the history of Argentine foreign policy is particularly relevant to his conclusion, as well as for understanding some aspects of the Malvinas war. According to the author, the basic principles of Argentine foreign policy "are founded upon national perspectives in the nineteenth century when the U.S. was but a minor factor in Argentine international relations" (p. 208). At that time, Buenos Aires was bent on maximizing agricultural exports to Europe and, hence, "anything that turned Argentine energies away from Europe was wasteful or harmful," particularly Washington's effort to push and dominate the Pan-American movement. From that time on, argues Tulchin, Argentine foreign policy became characterized by "extreme caution, dedication to the letter and spirit of international law, moralism, and a firm conviction that the nation's destiny was linked more closely to affairs in Europe than in America" (p. 214). Therefore, when the United States entered the war in 1917 and urged the countries of the hemisphere to join in, Argentina was unsympathetic and did not declare war on the Central Powers. Similarly, during World War I and the Great Depression (when the preservation of export markets was the key issue in Argentine foreign policy), "Argentina's neutrality in World War II was based upon its national interest in protecting export markets and upon the conviction that neutrality, rather than involvement on one side or the other, was most conducive to the achievement of national objectives" (p. 218). Tulchin goes on to explain that Argentine foreign policy during the Peronist era was not really hostile to the United States, but was nationalist and reactive to North American interference in Argentine domestic affairs, and that on balance, Buenos Aires actually remained "firmly committed to the Western side in the Cold War" (p. 226).

Tulchin concludes that because the military government of General Jorge R. Videla was "so closely identified with economic liberalism, historically associated with antinationalism," and because Videla "curbed the hawks and the geopoliticians" on border disputes with Chile and Brazil, he "stacked his nationalist chips" on one issue, an issue on which Videla refused "to compromise, negotiate, or allow anyone to outflank him: the rejection of international criticism of human rights violations in Argentina." In fact, Tulchin indicates, Videla's ability to withstand external interference on this matter became a "measure of his legitimacy among his military colleagues" (p. 229). The central conclusion of the author, in keeping with his historical analysis of the problem, is that if the United States pressures military governments in Buenos Aires on human rights, "it will be less, not more, likely that U.S. influence will be felt in Argentina in the future; and it will be less, not more,

likely that Argentina will emerge soon from the dark shadow of dictatorship and repression that has characterized the nation in the 1970's."

Tulchin's conclusion seems realistic enough, but it leaves one wondering what the United States should do to contribute to the protection of human rights in Argentina and other Latin American countries ruled by military regimes. It would appear that Tulchin's argument ultimately could be used to reinforce the questionable notion that Washington should "cut out the political science lectures," as Kissinger once told a U.S. ambassador in Santiago who was pressuring General Pinochet on human rights problems in Chile. Yet this attitude would lead to a silence that could be interpreted or at least treated by dictators as a tacit green light to continue repressive policies. This is clearly a very complex issue that Tulchin does not address.

From a Latin American viewpoint, a consensus exists that holds that the United States cannot and should not be in charge of engendering or safekeeping democracy in Latin America, a responsibility that belongs to Latin Americans, and that Carter's style of human rights promotion in the region (as Tulchin has suggested) often was highly supportive of the interests of Latin American dictators who used it to mobilize important sectors of public opinion against the "external aggressor" from the North. On the other hand, the United States has the right to use all the legitimate instruments of diplomacy to support democratic forces and human rights in the hemisphere, if it really wishes to, by using a subtle yet forceful approach that avoids grandiose pronouncements but communicates unequivocally the message that Washington is keenly concerned with human rights everywhere, as defined by international law. In this respect, the United States perhaps could benefit from the experience of some Western European countries in their handling of such issues with Latin American authoritarian regimes, which generally has yielded noticeable improvements in situations of human rights violations.

On a different, but complementary, level, a good essay by Enrique Baloyra entitled "The Madness of the Method: The United States and Cuba in the Seventies" convincingly explains both the irrational and rational elements that have characterized relations between Cuba and the United States in the past decade, emphasizing some of the tensions *or* contradictions that will have to be addressed in order to achieve "normalization" between the two countries. Gustavo Lagos and Alberto van Klaveren, representing a Latin American viewpoint in the Martz-Schultz volume, analyze the broader world context that necessarily affects inter-american relations; they also provide an interesting agenda for research on the international relations of Latin American countries.

The remaining two articles of the volume raise many controversial points on the dependency approach, which lack of space prevents dis-

cussing here.⁵ The central problem with the essay by Steven W. Hughes and Kenneth J. Mijeski, "Contemporary Paradigms in the Study of Inter-American Relations," is that two out of the three paradigms that they identify as Latin American approaches to the study of U.S.–Latin American relations, "dependency" and "organizational ideology," were never intended to be used to analyze inter-american affairs as a primary objective. Dependency literature is concerned with explaining and offering normative solutions to the problem of underdevelopment in Latin America, which indeed involves international dimensions, while the work of Guillermo O'Donnell, which the authors feel "best represents" the "organizational ideology paradigm," focuses on the general theme of social change and politics in South America and specifically on the emergence of "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes in South American countries with relatively high levels of modernization. The essay by John S. Gitlitz and Henry A. Landsberger entitled "The Inter-American Political Economy: How Dependable is Dependency Theory?" presents problems similar to those of the Hughes-Mijeski piece. The authors lump together "dependency and world systems theory" and then raise what they call "awkward questions" about these "theories." The questions posed are interesting, but by no means new to the dependency debate; however, the greatest difficulty of this academic exercise is that it is based on the writings of U.S. scholars on dependency. The Gitlitz-Landsberger article contains no reference to the works of major contributors to the dependency literature like Fernando H. Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Osvaldo Sun- kel, Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotonio Dos Santos, Aníbal Pinto, or Aníbal Quijano, and therefore it simply deals with a different intellectual universe from that known as *dependencia*.

U.S. Foreign Policy: A Latin American Perspective

One of the most interesting developments in the field of inter-american studies in recent years has been the creation in Mexico City of the Instituto de Estudios de Estados Unidos at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE). Headed by Luis Maira, the institute publishes the newsletter *Estados Unidos: Perspectiva Latinoamericana* and the journal *Cuadernos Semestrales—Estados Unidos: Perspectiva Latinoamericana*, both of which focus on the analysis of U.S. domestic affairs and U.S. foreign policy, with an emphasis on Latin America. The work of the institute, the first of its kind in Latin America, is of the highest quality in terms of data gathering and analysis and can measure up to any comparable center in the United States. One of the most interesting aspects of the work of the institute is that it does not consider the United States as a unified, rational actor whose policies necessarily reflect an everpresent imperialist drive. In this sense, the institute has helped erase many of the

myths and misperceptions held by Latin Americans about the United States and to stimulate thoughtful and realistic studies on the developed power that is of the highest importance to the region.

Among the latest issues of *Cuadernos Semestrales* is Volume 9 (first semester, 1981), which centers on the foreign policy of the Reagan administration. The volume includes: Atilio Borón on "La crisis norteamericana y la racionalidad neoconservadora," Roberto Bouzas on "La política económica del gobierno republicano," Arturo Borja on "La política exterior de la administración Reagan o el 'desface' de la óptica estratégica," Luis Maira on "América Latina, pieza clave en la política de contención de la administración Reagan," José Miguel Insulza on "Estados Unidos y el dilema de Europa," Olga Pellicer on "La política de Ronald Reagan hacia México," William LeoGrande on "Una nota crítica sobre la política exterior de Ronald Reagan," and Spanish versions of the article by Norman Podhoretz entitled "The Present Danger" and of the Committee of Santa Fe's report on inter-american relations. The volume also includes several documents on U.S. external affairs, interviews with Washington officials, review essays, and an extensive and valuable list of recent bibliography on U.S. problems.

These articles are of generally high quality and interest, one of the most relevant to the subject of inter-american relations being that written by Luis Maira. The author identifies two models that tend to define U.S. policy toward Latin America: the Democratic and the Republican. The Democratic model stresses the strategic importance of Latin America in the global context and generally causes the most transcendental changes in U.S.-Latin American policy to occur while Democrats are in the White House. The expression repeatedly used by Democratic policy makers that "a new era is needed in the relations between the U.S. and Latin America" reflects this attitude. Maira adds that in the formulation and development of Democratic projects, "establishment scholars" play a fundamental role, along with experienced policy makers. Their academic exercises attempt to demonstrate the growing economic and strategic importance of Latin America and often wind up suggesting a complete reform of U.S. State Department practices with regard to Latin America. The new policies are then announced and initially implemented by the President himself with great enthusiasm through ritual acts that may include a summit meeting of the Presidents of the Americas, the presentation of ambitious proposals to Congress, a major speech delivered to entities of paramount importance to the hemisphere, or all of the above. The decline of the new policies, according to the author, also follows a predictable pattern: in most instances problems of interpretation arise among diplomatic sectors that do not share the ideas of the executive branch, or difficulties of coordination with Congress emerge; then follows an extended waiting period that cools the original impetus of the

grand design and gives rise to criticisms from the Latin American countries; eventually, the announced new strategy is quietly discarded and there is a return to traditional attitudes and policies that lead in turn to a generalized wave of disillusionment in the United States as well as in Latin America.

The Republican model, according to Maira, follows contradictory patterns. Republicans decide their policies, using a “pragmatic” or “empiricist” approach, and therefore tend to shun spectacular announcements and privilege the concrete political and commercial aspects of bilateral relations with Latin American governments. Under Republican administrations, argues Maira, one finds an accumulation of policies conceived for each separate country rather than a comprehensive approach to the region. Still, the formulation of Republican policies toward Latin America does show some regularities. The new criteria are elaborated in special task groups, where former government officials with conservative views and businessmen linked to corporations with interests in Latin America play a central role. The presence of the latter group explains to a great extent the strong business content of U.S.–Latin American policy under Republican governments and the largely economic nature of the conflicts that arise between the United States and Latin America during Republican periods.

Unlike what happens in the case of the Democrats, the troubles of Republicans regarding Latin America do not stem from an excess of rhetoric or overly optimistic plans, but from a lack of analysis and incapacity to visualize new phenomena in the region. Hence, Republican policies are periodically questioned by unexpected upheavals or conflicts in Latin America that attest to the changes that have taken place in the area and concomitantly lead to the strengthening of liberal positions that recommend broader, more imaginative policies for the region. In the rest of his stimulating essay, Maira identifies what he considers the general outlook of the Latin American policy of the Reagan administration and describes the contents of Reagan’s policies toward three types of situations: critical cases (Cuba, Grenada, El Salvador, Nicaragua); the middle powers (Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina); and the “loyal allies” (countries ranging from Haiti and Jamaica to Uruguay and Paraguay).

Regarding Maira’s Democratic and Republican models of Latin American policy-making, it is interesting to observe that the Reagan administration does not fit the Republican scheme very neatly in that, from the outset, the Reaganites defined a highly ideological global policy of contention with the Soviet Union that was to be launched specifically in Latin America. Moreover, if the Reagan administration has indeed defined three types of situations to confront in Latin America, as Maira argues, then it would seem that Reagan’s policy is more global and less fragmentary or bilateralist than the “normal” Republican model would

suggest. It could therefore be posited that the Republican model refers essentially to the policies typically followed by the "establishment" or "mainstream" sector of the Republican party and that Reagan represents a more ideological, marginal, and extremist segment of the Republican party that, particularly during the first year, sought to recoup the international ground supposedly lost to the USSR by Jimmy Carter and even by previous (establishment) Republican administrations. On the other hand, it would appear that the Reagan government increasingly has fallen into the Republican mold described by Maira. The designation of George Schultz as Secretary of State certainly strengthened the position of the "core Republicans" in the Executive, although it did not resolve the tensions between the more eclectic "establishment Republicans" and the "Reaganites," a situation that in Latin America has yielded mixed policies of globalism (such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative) and bilateralism (such as the search for preferential allies like Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina prior to the Malvinas conflict). Lastly, Reagan's principal Latin American initiative in the post-Malvinas period was a hurriedly planned, brief five-day visit to Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Honduras, which the White House (following the Republican model outlined by Maira) played down as an unambitious tour with a modest agenda that included concrete discussions on ways to resolve such problems as the Brazilian external debt. For North American observers, the trip seemed to be a success because Reagan "handled himself well" and kept a "low profile"; for many Latin Americans it was all "*dejà vu*": a President of the United States who cares little and knows even less about the region came to a visit as a sign of good will and to mend by mere personal presence any misunderstanding still lingering in the aftermath of yet another crisis in inter-american relations.

On the Future of Inter-American Relations

The Malvinas war evidenced some of the continuities as well as the changes that have occurred in inter-american relations. The majority of the publications reviewed in this essay describe and analyze both aspects of this complex relationship. Among the continuities, Child, Maira, Martz, and others mention that Latin America continues to be considered a low-priority area in U.S. foreign policy, except when crises or upheavals break out in the region. Otherwise, to use a phrase quoted by Child, Latin America remains a "dumping ground," or perhaps a "testing ground," for North American policies that cannot be readily applied in more sensitive, strategic regions. Another continuity in inter-american relations cited by several authors in the Martz-Schultz volume is the persistent presence in U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America of a normative, idealistic, "civilizing mission" element, particularly notice-

able in Carter's human rights strategy for the region. Unfortunately, too often it has been manipulated to serve "realpolitik" intentions, a fact that in the end has contributed to the deterioration of inter-american ties.

The changes, especially the hard-to-accept changes, seem to dominate the present discussion of inter-american affairs and the materials reviewed. The book by Child, for example, demonstrates the progressive decay and fragmentation that has affected the so-called Inter-American Military System, particularly since 1967, that possibly could lead to its "total disintegration." Several of the works covered in this review stress another fundamental change in inter-american relations: the growing relevance for Latin American countries of the economic dimension of U.S.-Latin American affairs, as opposed to the traditional military component emphasized by Washington, which stands as a concrete evidence of divergent interests in the inter-american system. The latter theme is undoubtedly a key to understanding the present crisis of the inter-american system and the Malvinas episode.

The history of inter-american relations has been founded on the false premise that a community of interests existed among the United States and Latin American countries, while the system actually responded solely to the interests of Washington. By 1969 the rhetoric of Pan-Americanism already had been questioned publicly by the Latin American governments, and by the time the Malvinas war broke out, that notion had lost any remaining credibility in the region. The mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts within the inter-american system did not function appropriately to manage the South Atlantic war precisely because they had been discredited and paralyzed along with the overall system.

For the United States, the major lesson of the Malvinas conflict should be that Washington simply does not control Latin America the way it used to.⁶ Nowadays, Latin American states act with greater autonomy to define their national interests individually and regionally. Although this trend does not mean that the United States is no longer the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere, or that there are not areas of possible cooperation between Washington and Latin America, it does mean that the United States must recognize that inter-american ties make sense only, in the words of Lagos and Van Klaveren, "within the increasingly relevant context of multiple political, economic and military interactions between the region and the capitalist triangle on the one hand and the non-Latin American Third World on the other" (p. 78). In short, the United States should come to terms with the fact that Latin American countries generally will not yield to North American interests and that they will not renounce the margins of autonomy that they have gained. Hence, a realistic and effective Latin American policy for Washington should accept the greater independence of Latin American na-

tions because any attempt to curtail it will only cause further strains in hemispheric relations.

NOTES

1. Although a fine distinction can be made between United States–Latin American relations and inter-american relations, for the purposes of this review essay, the terms are used interchangeably, as has become customary in the relevant literature.
2. A recent, post-Malvinas military cooperation scheme for weapons production involving Argentina and Peru was announced in December of 1982. This bilateral arrangement transcended an already existing relationship of cooperation between the two countries regarding nuclear technology. Clearly, this new cooperation scheme is not precisely a comprehensive “security” accord.
3. On this subject, see Ole R. Holsti, “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy,” in *Image and Reality in World Politics*, edited by John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 16–39.
4. On the concept of hegemony in Gramsci, see Luciano Gruppi, “El concepto de hegemonía en Gramsci,” in *Revolución y democracia en Gramsci*, U. Cerroni et al. (Barcelona: Editorial Fontamara, 1976), pp. 39–57. See also Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1980).
5. For a detailed discussion on this matter, see Heraldo Muñoz, ed., *From Dependency to Development* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981).
6. For an analysis of some of the lessons of the Malvinas war, see Heraldo Muñoz, “Efectos y lecciones del conflicto de las Malvinas,” *Estudios Internacionales* 15, no. 60 (October–December 1982): 499–512. See also the other essays of the same volume that deal with Latin America and the United States in the post-Malvinas period.