
Networks among Elites in a Local Criminal Justice System

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This structural analysis of the relationships among participants in a criminal justice system, viewed in its political context, pursues John Hagan's suggestion that criminal justice theory adopt a "structural-contextual approach." Drawing on data from a survey of 211 criminal justice administrators, interest group leaders, and news reporters in Cook County, Illinois, we examine networks of contact among the various governmental elites and private groups, using smallest space analyses to depict the patterns of relationships. Although the literature suggests that the police and the judiciary are often closely entwined with local political elites, we conclude that the judiciary is a relatively distinct or autonomous set in the Chicago context. The police, however, are found near the political elites. The news media are strongly oriented toward enforcement agencies rather than toward the judiciary or corrections, and the public and private organizations representing less powerful constituencies, such as minorities, juveniles, and the mentally ill, are found on the periphery. Contrary to some suggestions in the literature, government officials are not found in the center of these networks. Rather, the core of the structure is hollow, indicating an absence of central brokers or mediators.

The role of interest groups in criminal justice has usually been examined in the context of legislative efforts to create new crimes or to establish new penalties or procedures. There are published studies of the adoption of sexual psychopath laws (Sutherland 1950), juvenile court and delinquency legislation (Platt 1969), and laws proscribing the use of alcohol (Odegard 1928; Gusfield 1963), opiates (Duster 1970), marijuana (Becker 1963; Galliher & Walker 1977), and prostitutes (Roby 1969).

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There are also a few analyses of the politics of a set of several, disparate legislative initiatives (Heinz 1982; Berk et al. 1977; Heinz et al. 1969). Little serious scholarly attention has been given, however, to the activities of public and private interest groups in the daily administration of criminal justice—in influencing the policies that are made in the offices of prosecuting attorneys, presiding judges, police officials, corrections officers, and county commissioners (but see Jacob & Lineberry 1982; Jacob 1984).

Unlike the legislative studies, our research does not focus on particular instances of policy change. Rather, we examine continuing relationships among the public and private actors who seek to influence the criminal justice process, encompassing a broad range of potential decisions. John Hagan (1989) has called for a “structural-contextual approach” to criminal justice theory because, in his view, existing theories “do not provide sufficient attention to the structural relationships that emerge from a joining of organizational and political forces in the direction of criminal justice operations” (p. 117). In much the same vein, this article reports analyses of the structure of relationships among private and public elites and among the organizations served by these elites. The analyses seek to identify the extent of interpenetration between political actors and criminal justice administrators, and they depict the points at which information exchange occurs within the criminal justice system.

To characterize the degree of integration of criminal justice systems and subsystems, Hagan adopts the terms “tight coupling” and “loose coupling” from the organizational behavior literature (citing Weick 1976; Meyer & Rowan 1977): “In connotative terms, loose coupling is meant to evoke the image of entities (*e.g.*, court subsystems) that are responsive to one another, while still maintaining independent identities and some evidence of physical or logical separateness” (Hagan 1989: 119). It is this quality of “separateness” that we wish to examine here.

The degree to which the various entities in the system are separate may be affected by the extent to which political power is concentrated. If power is widely spread, then the various government agencies may be under the control of different factions; if power is concentrated, that will tend to integrate the elements of the system. But tight coupling of the organizational structure may also make it easier to achieve a concentration of political power since all of the elements of the system may be mobilized toward the accomplishment of particular political goals or the satisfaction of particular interests. The two variables, then, will be mutually interdependent.

A lack of system integration may, of course, produce coor-

dination problems, unpredictable outcomes, inconsistent decisions, rule violations, or other pathologies. It is in this sense that U.S. criminal justice has been characterized as a “nonsystem” (Freed 1970). But loose coupling may also be functional. The relative separation of the elements or subsystems permits each to maintain a measure of independence, which may make the system more flexible and less resistant to innovation (Hagan 1989:119–20). Multiple power centers may provide access to a greater range and variety of interest groups, and reforms or changes can be adopted in a part of the system without requiring the acquiescence of the whole. When limited elements of a system are under attack or are discredited, moreover, their separation makes it possible for other elements to disassociate themselves from those that are threatened, thereby preserving the public support of at least a part of the system. Thus, when several Chicago judges were convicted of corruption in the 1980s, the police department and the prosecutor’s office remained relatively untouched (Special Commission on the Administration of Criminal Justice in Cook County 1988). Loose coupling may, then, enhance the ability of a system to survive or function in certain contexts, even though it will seldom appear to be a model of efficiency.

While Hagan’s article relied on case studies drawn from various times and places, this article uses data from a cross-sectional survey in one locale. Our data lack scope, therefore, but they are quite systematic. They are drawn from interviews with government officials in the Chicago metropolitan area and with representatives of private interest groups such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and the Chicago Abused Women’s Coalition. We have also included news reporters in our analyses because of their role in the process of communication between public and private actors. Several studies have found that journalists affect the policy agendas of criminal justice officials (for a review of this literature, see Doppelt & Manikas 1990).

Hagan inferred the degree of system integration from observed outcomes of the criminal justice process. Thus, for example, because successful prosecution of drug cases or of white-collar crime usually requires that the prosecutors promise sentence reductions to some defendants in return for their cooperation as informants or as witnesses for the prosecution, we may conclude that the prosecutors and the sentencing judges are cooperating closely—that they are tightly coupled—if sentencing patterns suggest that such bargains have been implemented (Hagan 1989:122–27). In such cases, Hagan observes the prosecution patterns and sentencing outcomes and infers the structure or degree of system integration from those indicators. By contrast, we lack data on outcomes, but we have

measures of the structure of connections among the elements of the system. It would have been highly desirable to have measures of both structure and outcome in the same context, so that the association between them could be more confidently assessed, but that remains to be done. To the best of our knowledge, no research has yet observed both.

If one sets out to measure the degree of system integration, the first task is to determine what types or kinds of connections among the elements are important. We might decide to focus on formal organizational mechanisms such as interdepartmental coordinating committees or interlocking directorates (Useem 1984; Zajac 1988). Or we might regard essentially any contact as an opportunity for the transmission of information and the creation of instrumental ties, and we might thus count any contact as within the scope of our interest. We have adopted the latter approach. One might also believe that contacts at the “policymaking” level within the agencies or organizations are of primary interest. That is, one might assume that it would be desirable to concentrate on contacts among higher-ranking officers, who might be thought to be more likely to discuss policy issues. But in practice, the distinction between policy decisions and routine case processing is elusive and perhaps illusory. Michael Lipsky (1980:13) has argued that “street-level bureaucrats make policy” in their daily handling of cases: “They exercise wide discretion in decisions about citizens with whom they interact. Then, when taken in concert, their individual actions add up to agency behavior.” And James Q. Wilson (1989:41) has concluded: “There is no distinction between ‘policy’ and ‘administration’; almost every administrative act has policy implications and may, indeed, *be* policy whether intended or not.” Thus, it would probably be impossible or meaningless to attempt to distinguish between contacts that have policy content and those that do not. To say that policymaking takes place at all levels, however, is not to say that the higher-ranking officers are unimportant or uninteresting. The persons included in our sample were, in any event, the highest-ranking officers of their agencies and organizations. Rather than rank-and-file judges, police, and prosecutors, we included the supervisors, administrators, and politicians.

Most contacts among these top officers no doubt deal with fairly routine exchanges of information, but information transfer may be an important means of influence. Indeed, information may be the principal currency or medium of exchange in the process of influencing public policy (Laumann & Heinz 1985: 474–75). Influence can also, however, be exercised without regular contact. The infrequent telephone call, from the right person, can certainly be an important way of bringing influence to bear, and influence may in fact be exercised without

any direct contact with the decisionmaker, as in an appeal to mass public opinion. But regular channels of communication among elites are also often important. Indeed, frequent contact may produce pervasive influence, whether the effects are intended or not.

No doubt it would often be enlightening to know what was said in these contacts, but it is exceedingly difficult and expensive to get that information, which is usually obtained, if at all, either through the study of documents (letters, memoranda, etc.) or through participant observation. Such research, therefore, is confined as a practical matter to relatively narrow case studies. But even if we are unable to specify the content of the communication through the links, a mapping of the contacts among the players in a set of political decisions may be instructive. Indeed, such a picture might persuade us that we understand what was going on. Suppose we were to analyze the network of contacts among a group of real estate developers, the local aldermen, the members of the board of zoning appeals, and several leaders of minority groups. We might expect the players to be sensitive to the possibility that the real estate developers and the minority group leaders would be able to deliver or withhold votes or campaign contributions. If we were to find that the aldermen and zoning board members had extensive contact with the developers but little or none with the leaders of minority groups, then we might be satisfied that we knew something about the structure of influence on real estate development decisions in that city. We might even infer some probable conclusions about the kinds of resources that pass through the links in the network—for example, that the real estate developers could mobilize (or create the appearance that they could mobilize) wealth, newspaper editorial support, endorsements by some political leaders, and, perhaps, respect or acceptance among a slice of the socioeconomic elite, but that the aldermen were either not concerned about the mobilization of votes in black and Hispanic neighborhoods or did not believe that the minority group leaders would be able to deliver such votes. Thus, the observed contact structure might suggest inferences about its probable effects.

Analyses of social networks employ some measure of “social distance” (McFarland & Brown 1973) of either of two, related kinds. The first measures the extent to which phenomena differ on specified social variables and are thus socially distinct. The other assesses the degree of social interaction among persons or groups. It is the latter sort of distance that we measure here, but the first sort may, of course, affect the second (Heinz & Laumann 1982:60–61 n. 1). To say that persons are distant from each other in this sense means that they are less likely to come into contact. And this, in turn, means that their circles of

acquaintance will also be relatively separate. That is, if public official A is not in contact with public official X (and, in fact, does not know him), then it is probable that A and X move in largely separate social and professional circles—there will not be much overlap among the persons with whom they deal. This separation may be attributable to occupational, ideological, or social differences. If the duties of official A's job have little relevance to the functions of official X, then their work is unlikely to bring them into contact and they will deal with largely distinct sets of other public officials and private actors. Similarly, if A is a liberal Democrat and X is a conservative Republican, they will tend to move in separate circles of acquaintance, it being probable that each of them will associate more regularly with persons of like mind. This will also mean that they probably do not know each other. And if A is a black Catholic from Chicago's West Side and X is a WASP from a North Shore suburb, then A and X will not share acquaintances through their churches and private clubs, they are unlikely to be bound by an old school tie, and they will probably not meet on the golf course. These several types of differences that generate distance among actors, public or private, will tend to overlap and to reinforce one another (Laumann 1973).

Similarly, some public agencies and private groups are interdependent or have clear alliances (e.g., the Juvenile Court and the Citizens Committee on the Juvenile Court), which will, of course, tend to bring those organizations into close contact. Other private groups engage in adversarial relationships with particular public agencies (e.g., the ACLU and the police), which may tend to drive those agencies and groups apart, creating oppositional relationships. Thus, principles of attraction and repulsion may shape these structures.

Party politics might also have effects on the nature of the networks. Judges are elected in Illinois, and judgeships have been regarded as patronage plums (Special Commission on the Administration of Criminal Justice in Cook County 1985). Given the notoriously close relationship between Chicago politics and the Cook County judiciary revealed in prosecutions and public inquiries concerning corruption in the courts (Special Commission on the Administration of Criminal Justice in Cook County 1988), one would not be surprised to find the various agencies of the circuit court closely intermingled with their political patrons. By contrast, one might expect to find some substantial distance between agencies that had been controlled by Republicans in recent years (the U.S. Attorney's office, the Illinois State Police, the Sheriff's Department) and those that had been controlled by Democrats (the State's Attorney's office, the Chicago Police Department, the County Board). Alternatively, there might be operational interdepen-

dencies among some of the agencies that are controlled by opposing political parties. Which would then have more weight in determining the structure of relationships among the agencies, the political difference or the functional dependence?

Methods that have been developed for the analysis of networks of association provide techniques that can be used to describe the structure of relationships among both organizational and individual actors involved in criminal justice issues (Marin & Mayntz 1991). These are replicable procedures that, in principle, will permit comparisons to be made among varying contexts—for example, different locales or political jurisdictions or different points in time. Previous analyses of networks among actors involved in decisions on public issues have found several sorts of structures. To some degree, these differences might be accounted for by the contexts. An article in this *Review*, for example, reported findings regarding the structure of relationships among lobbyists active on labor policy issues in the early 1980s: there were two distinct groups, widely separated, one composed entirely of representatives of organized labor and the other composed entirely of representatives of management, with very little contact between the two sides (Nelson & Heinz 1988:292). Other data from that same research project, however, indicate that lobbyists active on health policy issues display a much more complex, diffuse, and fluid pattern of relationships (Heinz et al. in press 1993). This is a relatively precise measure of some characteristics of the political decision processes in the two policy areas. It documents something that we might have intuited, or that we might demonstrate in other ways, but it documents the point pretty clearly—that political decisions on labor issues are characterized by sharp, bipolar conflict and are thus adversarial rather than consensual in nature, while health policy issues are characterized by more diffuse, shifting alliances and a higher degree of consensus. The point is made even if we do not measure any specific transactions among the links. The mere existence or absence of links has useful, and perhaps persuasive, implications.

Some previous studies of political networks, however, suggest more general theoretical conclusions that appear to be in conflict. In an analysis of “The Structure of a National Elite Network,” Moore (1979:690) concluded that a “central circle” of elites “directly and indirectly integrates leaders of a wide variety of institutions into a network capable of discussing and resolving issues of national concern.” But a more recent analysis of the relationships among a selected set of national policy-making elites found that the core of the network was empty—there was no one in the center (Heinz et al. 1990). The set of elites analyzed in the latter study, however, included only private lobbyists and lawyers; it did not include government offi-

cials. It is possible, therefore, that the core that appeared to be empty in that study was, in fact, filled with public officials. Indeed, the article reporting the findings specifically noted that possibility (pp. 382–83). Because the set of elites used in the study of the Cook County criminal justice system reported here includes both public and private actors, analyzed as participants in the same networks, it may shed light on the issue of whether government officials constitute the core of such political systems.

The Data

The research is based on 211 interviews conducted in 1988 and early 1989 with persons concerned with criminal justice in Cook County. Most of the government respondents were drawn from agencies that have jurisdiction only within the county. To explore the boundaries of the policymaking system, however, we interviewed a limited number of officials from federal and state agencies as well. In selecting the respondents from each government agency, we chose the occupants of the highest-ranking positions. The private organization leaders were drawn from directories of community groups and service providers concerned with criminal justice issues. The organizations selected met three criteria: (1) they employed at least one full-time staff person; (2) they operated in a region that extended beyond one neighborhood or community area; and (3) they devoted a substantial amount of their time to criminal justice, juvenile justice, or mental health issues. (The organizations selected are listed and described in Appendix A.) The news media selected were those that regularly cover criminal justice issues. We selected three daily newspapers, two legal specialty publications, the local wire service, four radio stations that routinely cover the criminal courts, and the area's four television stations with the largest audiences. All the respondents had been in their positions on 1 January 1988, and each had served in that position for at least the previous six months.

Using this selection procedure, 231 persons were initially identified; of these, 211 were interviewed, for a completion rate of 91%. Our resulting sample consisted of 152 government officials (72% of the sample), 45 private interest group leaders (21%), and 14 reporters (7%).

The respondents are overwhelmingly white and male; 79% are male and 82% are white. Only 15% are black and 3% Hispanic; the general Cook County population was 27% black and 13% Hispanic (State of Illinois 1987). Of the sample, 88% had graduated from college, and about one-half of those attended Illinois schools. There are 82 lawyers among the respondents, 39% of the sample. The largest religious group is the Catholics

(45% of the sample). Twenty-six percent of respondents are Protestants and 14% are Jewish. The remaining 15% reported that they were members of another religious faith or had no religious affiliation. The sample is almost evenly divided between Democrats and independents, who respectively account for 47% and 45%. Republicans constitute only 9% of the sample. The large proportion of independents may reflect the fragmentation in the Cook County Democratic party that occurred after the death of Mayor Richard J. Daley in 1976 as well as the growing number of persons nationwide who do not identify with the two major political parties (Nie et al. 1976:47–49).

To assess the relationships among the various actors, the respondents were given lists containing the names of government officials, interest group leaders, and reporters. (The names appearing on these lists are hereafter referred to as “targets.”) Respondents were asked to check off the names of persons with whom they had communicated during the preceding year and to identify the frequency of their contacts with each individual (daily, weekly, monthly, every few months, once or twice a year, or never). They were also asked to identify other individuals with whom they communicated at each agency or organization. We selected the targets as we selected the respondents; that is, they were chosen according to the positions they held. For federal and state agencies, the two highest-ranking officials were named when the agency dealt with matters that extended beyond the criminal justice system (e.g., the Illinois Attorney General’s office). For those government agencies that do not expressly deal with criminal justice matters but nevertheless interact with criminal justice agencies (e.g., the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services and the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities), we identified only the highest-ranking official. When dealing with subagencies of a larger agency or a very small agency, we also identified by name only the highest-ranking official. For private organizations, the top official of each agency was listed. The lists included the names of 148 persons, 97 (66%) of whom were respondents. Since the respondents could name additional targets that we did not specifically identify, however, the actual number of persons named as targets was greater.

There are at least two ways to measure the distances among these targets. One way is to count the number of links in the chain of acquaintances that must be traversed in order to get from A to X. If for information to be communicated from actor A to actor X, the information must go through B, to C, to D and so on, then A and X are obviously more distant, in a real sense, than if they knew each other or if they shared a mutual acquaintance. The other way to assess the distance between

them is to calculate the extent of overlap in the circles of acquaintance of the two actors—the degree to which the persons who are in contact with each of them are the same people.

The analyses reported here rely on the latter method, chiefly because it permits us to include persons who were not interviewed. That is, one may compare the degree of similarity in the circles of acquaintance of A and X without interviewing either A or X, so long as one has interviewed a reasonable sample of the acquaintances of both of them. But to specify the number of links in the chain from A to X, one must interview each link in the chain, including both A and X. The two techniques of measurement usually produce similar findings (compare Nelson & Heinz 1988 with Heinz et al. 1990).

To analyze these data, we use multidimensional scaling techniques, specifically smallest space analysis (Guttman 1968; Raveh & Landau 1986). This permits us to summarize the patterns of our respondents' communications with the targets by representing the targets as points in Euclidean space. The proximity of the points—that is, of the targets—reflects the degree of overlap in the sets of respondents who contact them. (The proximity estimator is Yule's Q , which is a monotonic function of an odds ratio (Bishop et al. 1975:378–80).) The analyses presented here are based on the extent of overlap among the respondents who contacted targets at least as often as “every few months.” To establish communication channels that could be used to resolve issues, regular contact might be necessary. If the criterion were a more frequent level of contact, however, the number of respondents connected to each target would diminish very substantially, making the solutions less reliable and giving the appearance of greater isolation among the targets. If a less stringent criterion were used (i.e., less frequent contact), the effect would be to produce solutions that are less distinct but have the same general properties as those presented here.

The nature of the data permits us to analyze the structure of relationships at either of two levels—the individual level or the organizational level. That is, we can use the individual persons contacted as the units of analysis, or we can aggregate contacts with persons who work for the same organization and thus analyze the structure of contact with organizational targets. In either case, the target organizations or individuals will be represented as points in the smallest space analyses.

Targets will be proximate in the solutions to the degree that the same respondents indicate contact with them. That is, targets who are contacted mostly by the same persons will be close together in the diagrams, while those that have largely separate constituencies will be far apart. Targets with a central location will be those that are about equally contacted (or not

contacted) by persons in all of the regions of the space. Targets who are contacted by large numbers of diverse respondents may be in a position to mediate among conflicting interest groups, and this will usually be a central position. Those who are equally unlikely to be contacted by anyone, however, will also be put in the center because that is the closest the solution can come to making those targets equidistant from everyone else. In computing the solution presented in Figure 1, therefore, we have included the targets that had 30 or more contacts among our 211 respondents (again, at the level of at least “every few months”).

The Structure of Relationships

Figure 1 presents a three-dimensional smallest space analysis of the relationships among the public and private groups, at the organizational level of analysis. The third dimension of the space is represented by arrows next to some of the points. Targets with an arrow pointing up are located substantially above the plane of the page; targets with an arrow pointing down are located substantially below it. Targets without an arrow are located relatively close to the middle of the third dimension of the space. The statistical tests that are commonly used to assess the degree of accuracy (or “fit”) of smallest space solutions indicate that the solution is satisfactory. The stress is .17 and the R^2 is .80 (Kruskal 1964).

Let us examine the general structure of the network. Most of the police and law enforcement agencies are located on the right side of the space. These include the FBI, the U.S. Attorney's office, the Chicago Corporation Counsel, the Illinois Attorney General, the Cook County Medical Examiner, the Illinois State Police, the Chicago Police Department, and the suburban police. The only exceptions to this pattern are the Cook County Sheriff and the Cook County State's Attorney, both of which are located just to the left of the center of the space (but high up on the third dimension). Note that the news media are found near these enforcement organizations—almost all of them quite tightly grouped.

Also on the right side of the space are the private organizations that deal especially with police issues, including both an ally (the Chicago Crime Commission) and an adversary (the ACLU). The left side of the space is more clearly divided, with the courts and the lawyers' organizations in the upper left quadrant and the corrections organizations at the lower left.

The third dimension appears to represent primarily a separation between state agencies and local law enforcement. The local police and prosecutors are high on the third dimension, while all the organizations located substantially below the plane




Figure 1. Relationships among organizations concerned with criminal justice in Cook County, Illinois (three-dimensional smallest space analysis).

of the page are state agencies. An exception to this pattern is that the state police are nearer to the local police than to the other state agencies.

Note that we do not find a structure in which the private interests surround a core of government officials. Indeed, when the third dimension of the space is taken into account, we see that this structure resembles a rough (or lumpy) sphere with a hollow core. The agencies that appear to be closest to the center of the space in the two-dimensional representation—the State’s Attorney, the Sheriff, the Cook County Department of Corrections (“Jail”), and the Criminal Justice Information Authority—are all located at a substantial distance from the center on the third dimension, either high or low in the space. Indeed, when we calculate the distance of each of the organizations from the center of the space, we find that the Chicago Council of Lawyers and the Chicago Crime Commission are, in fact, closer to the center than is any of the government agencies.

Nor does the analysis confirm the hypothesis that organizations engaged in adversarial relationships would be located on opposite sides of the space. Rather, we find that the Court Watchers, who have been critical of the courts, are located close to them, and the John Howard Association, a self-described prison reform “watchdog” group, is located in the same quadrant as the Illinois Department of Corrections. But while the ACLU is near the police departments on the first two dimensions, it is widely separated from them on the third dimension.

In general, we see that the private organizations are intermixed with the public agencies, the private groups tending to be located in the same region of the space as the government organizations that deal with similar subject matter. Thus, the Chicago Bar Association and the Chicago Council of Lawyers are immediately adjacent to the courts. TASC (Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime) and the Citizens’ Committee on the Juvenile Court are located close to the government agencies dealing with juveniles and with rehabilitation and corrections generally. The League of Women Voters is the same region as the General Assembly and the Governor’s Office, where the League pursues its legislative and public policy interests. And, as noted above, the Chicago Crime Commission (a pro-prosecution group) and the ACLU are both located on the enforcement side of the space, although the two are widely separated on the vertical dimension. The constituencies of the private organizations and the government agencies, therefore, appear to be more strongly determined by similarity of subject matter interests or “jurisdiction” than by ideological differences.

Nor do partisan differences appear to separate the government agencies. Despite being under the control of officials

from different parties, the Sheriff (Republican) and the State's Attorney (Democrat) are quite close together, as are the U.S. Attorney (Republican) and the Chicago Corporation Counsel (Democrat), the Governor's office (Republican) and the General Assembly (Democratic controlled), and even the Governor's office and the Mayor's office (Democratic). The functional interdependencies of these agencies thus appear to play a stronger part in organizing their networks of contact than do the political party affiliations.

The hypothesis that the judges would be found in close proximity to their political sponsors also does not receive much support from this analysis. The judiciary and the Mayor's office are diametrically opposed in the space—about as far apart as the two could be. The County Board of Commissioners is closer to the courts, probably because the courts receive much of their funding from the board. Persons concerned with the budget of the court system are therefore likely to be found in the constituencies of both.

We doubt that we would be justified in concluding that the courts are largely divorced from "politics." It may be that the judiciary's distance from city officials merely reflects transient divisions in the area's political system. Harold Washington, Chicago's only black mayor, was in office at the time of our study. Mayor Washington's bases of power were quite different and separate from those of the judges, thus contributing to the distance between them. Cook County is no longer dominated by a powerful party machine that unifies local government. It has been well over a decade, for example, since the mayor of Chicago was also the chairman of the Cook County Democratic Party. There are now competing centers of power that help shape the county's judicial system, and the Mayor's office is only one of them.

The news media might have been thought likely to occupy the center of this space. In their search for sources of information, the media could be in contact with a broad range of both public and private organizations. This would tend to place them in the center. Instead, however, we find almost all the news media at the far right, not only in the direction of the enforcement groups but even farther in that direction than most of the police agencies. The only exception to this pattern is the *Daily Law Bulletin*—a "bulletin board" newspaper directed to the legal profession—which is located closer to the courts and the bar associations. Thus, the data indicate that the media tend to specialize in particular sources. Most of the media draw on the same networks of contacts, and these are clearly based primarily in the enforcement sector, although the media are also quite close to the Mayor's office. Since most crime news stories report primarily the facts of criminal activ-

ity, and since the police and prosecutors have these facts long before the cases go to court, it is easy to understand why the reporters are more likely to be in contact with the law enforcement officials, but a consequence may well be that the news much more often reflects the viewpoint of the law enforcement agencies than that of the defense, the courts, or corrections (Fishman 1978; Christensen et al. 1982).

Relationships with Individual Actors

The preceding analysis dealt with the relationships among organizations, but we asked the respondents to identify target individuals, all of whom were identified with particular organizations. In the previous analysis, therefore, a contact with an organization was tallied if a respondent contacted any individual in an organization with the requisite degree of frequency. But some of the organizations have a large number of employees, while others (especially, some of the private interest groups) have very few. If the networks of association were essentially random, then an organization such as the State's Attorney's office, which has hundreds of professional employees, would have a much higher probability of contact than would the Society to Advance Recidivism. Although contact with the organizations is certainly not random, it is no doubt the case that the size of the organization affects the likelihood of contact with it. Since this size effect is a fact of life in the real world, we do not want to ignore it, but neither is size the only thing that counts. It is not entirely clear, for example, what it means to say that one has contact with an "organization." That is, one may talk to some specific individual or group of individuals within the organization, but there is no guarantee that information communicated to that set of persons will reach all the other people in the agency. Indeed, in an agency of any size, the likelihood is that it will not. The greater the degree of specialization of function within the agency, the greater the likelihood that the communication will not penetrate all of the departmental boundaries.

It is entirely possible, therefore, that the pattern of contacts with a particular agency may paint a picture of considerable breadth or variety of function overall, and thus of relative centrality in the space, even though the contacts with the agency may in fact be highly specialized; that is, the effective reach of communication within the agency is quite limited. Conversely, it is also possible that an individual might have broader contacts than would be expected in his or her agency. When Richard M. Daley was State's Attorney, for example, his political position within the Democratic party and his mayoral ambition might well have extended his contacts beyond those that would

necessarily or ordinarily be associated with his office. (Not long after the completion of our research, State's Attorney Daley was elected mayor.) Since in our organization-level analysis we counted contact with any individual within an organization as contact with that organization, however, the breadth of the individuals' contacts was in effect attributed to their organizations even though that breadth may have been due to the individuals' distinctive characteristics.

There is, therefore, reason to examine the structure of relationships among individual actors as well as that among organizations. The second of our smallest space analyses does this. Figure 2 shows the location of all the individuals who were contacted by 20 or more of our respondents at least as often as every few months. There are 53 such persons. Appendix B indicates the positions that they held during 1987, the year covered by our research. As before, the third dimension of the space is indicated by arrows. (The stress is .18 and the R^2 is .79.)

The first thing to note about this figure is that, once again, we see a "hollow core." Indeed, while Figure 1 showed a hollow sphere, this one more nearly resembles a doughnut, with a quite pronounced hole in the middle. The clarity and size of the empty center suggest that the organization-level analysis was, in fact, aggregating distinct individual networks. None of these individual actors is close to an intermediate position. This is true even of State's Attorney Daley, Sheriff O'Grady, County Board President Dunne, Chief Judge Comerford, and Mayor Washington. In spite of his political connections, Daley is located squarely in the midst of the enforcement sector, surrounded by Sheriff O'Grady, Jemilo and Rice (Chicago Police), Margolis (Illinois State Police), and the other prosecutors (Miner, Hartigan, Valukas). Dunne was then Chairman of the Cook County Democratic Party as well as President of the County Board, but Daley is no closer to Dunne than he is to O'Grady, who is a Republican. Daley, Dunne, and O'Grady were all chief executives of government agencies that play a leading role in the local criminal justice system, but so were Chief Judge Comerford and the Presiding Judge of the Criminal Division (R. Fitzgerald), who are on the other side of the figure. Mayor Washington is found in a more peripheral location, at the lower right of the space. Thus, even the persons who hold the most prominent positions do not have networks of association that are drawn roughly equally from the varying regions.

The general structure of the regions is quite similar to the structure that we observed in Figure 1. The right central area has all the enforcement officials and seven of the nine reporters. The judges are also quite tightly grouped, with one excep-




Figure 2. Relationships among prominent individuals concerned with criminal justice in Cook County, Illinois (three-dimensional smallest space analysis).

tion. As was the case in Figure 1, the exception is the Juvenile Division. Presiding Judge Hamilton is located lower on the left side of the space near persons concerned with treatment and rehabilitation issues—including Stern, of the Citizens Committee on the Juvenile Court, Smith, of the Illinois Probation and Court Services Association, and Jordan, of the Juvenile Temporary Detention Center.

Note the proximity of the police and prosecutors to the political notables (i.e., Washington, Dunne, Daley, O'Grady). It is possible that the proximity of the police to the politicians is due to the fact that some of the prosecutors are political office-holders (Daley, Hartigan), as is one of the police officials (O'Grady). But the judges are also elected officials, and they are found on the other side of the space, as was true in the organization-level analysis.

Recall that the proximity of any two persons in these analyses is determined by the degree of overlap (or lack of it) in the respondents who chose them—that is, by the degree of overlap in their contacts or circles of acquaintance. When we find that the police and prosecutors are rather widely separated from the judiciary, then, it means that our respondents were unlikely to be in contact with both categories. This suggests that the police and prosecutors are relatively integrated elements of the system but that the judges are more loosely connected to them. Thus, the respondents who are judges were likely to be in contact with other judges and court administrators, while the police worked relatively closely with the prosecutors. But since our respondents included private interest group leaders as well as public officials, and since the officials were in high-ranking, supervisory positions, many of the respondents might have been expected to bridge these divisions. Although judges who try criminal cases no doubt have contact with the prosecutors who appear in court before them, they have relatively little contact with the top administrative officials of the prosecutors' offices. Supervisory or administrative judges of the sort included among our respondents might have been expected to have more contact with top prosecutorial officials. Apparently, they do not have much.

We should also note that the African-Americans among these actors are concentrated on the right side of the space. With the exception of Judge Hamilton (who is found at the lower left, as noted above) and County Commissioner Stroger (who is higher in the space, just to the right of the hole), all of the blacks are found at the lower right. These are Washington, Martin, Rice, Locke, and Leak. The prominence of African-Americans in the Chicago Police Department and the presence of Harold Washington in the Mayor's office may account for this concentration.

If we start with the police and proceed counter-clockwise around the space, we see that the arrangement of points conforms generally to the stages in the processing of a criminal case. The police (arrest) come first, then the prosecutors (indictment), then the courts (trial), and finally the postconviction stage (probation, prison or treatment programs). There are some exceptions, but they are few. The other actors, such as the reporters and the politicians, are interspersed within this arrangement wherever they have the greatest affinity.

If the structure were organized only by the administrative necessities involved in the movement of cases from one stage of the criminal justice process to the next, however, the arrangement would be simpler. If that were the case, the basic elements of the system—police, prosecutors, courts, and corrections—would be laid out in a straight line instead of arrayed in a circle. What is it, then, that causes the structure to bend back on itself, into a circular form, rather than merely lining up the stages of the process?

First, most of the communication among these actors is probably not concerned with the disposition of individual cases—at least, not unless the disposition of the case would have broader implications. As noted above, the sample is composed of high-level officials and the top officers of interest groups. It does not include ordinary judges, police, and prosecutors, only the administrators. Some of these people occasionally try cases (the extent to which they do varies by position—some never do), but these are not the soldiers in the trenches.

Second, the bending of the line places the corrections sector closer to the police. Why? Recall that some of the prominent politicians, including the Mayor and the President of the County Board, are found in the police region of the space. These politicians also deal with issues concerning corrections, matters such as prison overcrowding and recidivism by probationers. Crowding in the Cook County Jail was, in fact, a prominent political and legal issue during the period of our study. The fact that these politicians are involved in both police and corrections problems may thus draw those elements into proximity (Welsh & Pontell 1991).

Discussion

John Hagan has observed (1989:118) that American criminal justice systems will tend to be loosely coupled unless dominant political power is directed toward particular crime policy goals. If a criminal justice system is given coherence by a unifying political organization and a particular policy agenda, however, we would expect to find evidence of relatively tight coup-

ling in the patterns of contact and communication among the principal actors (Welsh & Pontell 1991).

Given Chicago's political history, characterized by the long tenure of Mayor Richard J. Daley and the clear dominance of the Democratic party organization headed by Mayor Daley, which was reputed to be the last of the urban political machines (Guterbock 1980), one might have expected to see indications of a greater degree of concentration of political power and thus of greater integration of these criminal justice elites (Eisenstein & Jacob 1977:109–10). Certain key actors—the Chief Judge, the States Attorney, the County Board President, and perhaps the Mayor, the Chief of Police, or the Sheriff—might constitute a *de facto* executive committee that makes the difficult choices among policy options, divides up the available resources, and generally serves to coordinate operations. After our research was completed, a “Coordinating Council” including many of these officials was created to deal with the crisis of overcrowding in the Cook County Jail, but this action was taken in response to pressure from the federal district court, which imposed fines on the county for violations of the terms of a consent decree concerning the size of the jail population (Criminal Justice Project 1990:2, 100–101). One of the authors of this article, Manikas, was a participant in these efforts at coordination. His observations suggest that the Coordinating Council has not become an effective mechanism for the coordination of policy matters other than the jail population issues; indeed, there is much room for doubt about whether it has taken productive action concerning even those issues (see Austin et al. 1991).

Political power was quite diffusely spread in Chicago in the years immediately preceding our research (Gove & Massotti 1982; Kleppner 1985), and this lack of concentration of political authority is probably reflected in our findings. At other times and places, where particular political forces are in control, that political integration may serve to unify the criminal justice system and thus to increase the extent of communication among its several elements, as Hagan suggests. This may have been the situation in Chicago in the 1950s and 1960s during the 20-year mayoral tenure of the first Mayor Daley (Eisenstein et al. 1988:286). But if the present, unsettled state of Chicago politics is typical of that in most major American cities, as we suspect that it is, then we would expect to find that the structure of communication among criminal justice elites in other cities is also balkanized.

In a previous study, the networks of association of a selected set of elite Chicago lawyers during the mid-1970s were analyzed using similar methods (Heinz & Laumann 1982: 297–98). Unlike the findings here, those analyses found that

there were clearly identifiable core actors. The core lawyers bridged several constituencies and appeared to serve as central clearinghouses for the exchange of information. As noted at the outset of this article, however, a more recent analysis of networks among lawyers and lobbyists representing private interests on national policy issues found a structure that is similar to that reported here—a hollow sphere, with no central, core actors (Heinz et al. 1990, 1993). Although Moore (1979) found a “central circle” that was largely composed of government officials, when we put officials and private interest group representatives together in the same analyses, we find that neither is in the core. Our analyses at both the individual and the organizational levels clearly have empty centers.

One might have thought that the County Board of Commissioners would be actively involved in the full range of the process because of its fiscal responsibility for the entire system, and would thus be in a central position in the structure, but the board in fact is much more closely connected to constituencies concerned with the courts and the prosecution than it is to rehabilitation, juvenile, or mental health actors. One might also have thought that the business community would have an interest in the full scope of criminal justice issues (Hagan 1980: 607). This could be the case both because of the effects of crime and social disorder on the business climate generally and because the criminal justice system consumes such a large share of tax dollars. (About 40% of the City of Chicago’s corporate budget is spent on the police department; Manikas et al. 1989; and about 60% of the county’s budget is devoted to criminal justice; Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority 1990:5.) The only group representing corporate business interests that appears to take an active role, however, is the Chicago Crime Commission. Many of the social service agencies do, of course, receive corporate support, but they do not advocate business interests, as such. We should note that the Crime Commission is one of the two most centrally located organizations in the smallest space analysis presented in Figure 1. The other of those two, the Council of Lawyers, is also a “downtown” organization, composed largely of corporate lawyers and perhaps reflecting business interests with a reformist orientation (Powell 1979). Neither of those groups is in the center of the space, however.

Organizations and individuals that represent minority groups, juveniles, and the mentally ill are found at the periphery of the structure. Because organizations that lie near the margins of the smallest space analyses are less likely to command the attention of the other actors, they will generally have greater difficulty in placing their concerns on the agenda for decision (Laumann & Knoke 1987). Thus, observing the struc-

ture of these relationships may lead us to expect particular outcomes in the political decisionmaking process. For example, we observe that the State's Attorney is more proximate to the police than to the courts, especially the Juvenile Court. This would suggest that the prosecutors might be more concerned with preserving their working relationships with the several police agencies than with pleasing the judges of the Juvenile Court. If we look at the handling of juvenile cases, then, what do we find? An analysis by the *Chicago Sun-Times* concluded that 97% of all cases referred to the prosecutors by police are taken to court, but that 61% of these cases are later dismissed in the Juvenile Court (Nelson 1992). Thus, little screening of these cases takes place in the State's Attorney's office; instead of taking responsibility for dropping the cases, the prosecutors transfer that responsibility to the court. Although proceeding with so many of these cases has resulted in overcrowding of the Juvenile Court's dockets, and has in fact angered the judges (*ibid.*), the State's Attorney's office values its ties to the police more than the good opinion of the Juvenile Court, where it does not have such extensive ties.

Similarly, our findings may have implications for the flow of financial resources through the criminal justice structure. Agencies that are distant from their funding source may have greater difficulty in obtaining funding than agencies that are closer. The Juvenile Court's distance from the Chief Judge and from the County Board may thus affect its ability to get resources. Both the State's Attorney and the Public Defender assign their least experienced lawyers to Juvenile Court, and prosecutors there are paid less, on the average, than are other assistant state's attorneys (Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority 1990:242). The State's Attorney is considerably more proximate to the County Board than is the Public Defender, and the outcome is that assistant state's attorneys are paid substantially more than assistant public defenders in Cook County, on the average (*ibid.*, p. 118), although there could of course be other reasons for the board's preference for prosecutors. We find that the Public Defender's office is firmly embedded in a cluster of court-related agencies, and that the Chief Judge is interposed between the Public Defender and the board. The position of the Public Defender thus suggests that that office is politically dependent on the judiciary, perhaps creating conflicts of interest (but see McIntyre 1987:45–61). At the time of our study, the Public Defender was appointed by the judges of the Circuit Court; subsequently, the state legislature, recognizing the potential for conflicts of interest, amended the statutes to provide for appointment of the Public Defender by the County Board. We might think of this as an instance of recognition of a structural defect.

The substantial distance between the Public Defender and the State's Attorney in these analyses tends to confirm our earlier suggestion that the contacts measured here are unlikely to deal with routine case processing. Public defenders who handle individual cases are no doubt in contact with the state's attorneys who are processing those same cases, especially since so many of the cases are disposed of by plea bargains, but the contacts that we have analyzed take place primarily at the supervisory administrative level.

Conclusion

Our principal finding—that the networks have a sizable hole in the middle, with no very central players—suggests that communication within the criminal justice system proceeds around the circle or the surface of the sphere rather than passing immediately from agencies on one side of the space to those on the other or proceeding through centrally located facilitators or intermediaries. Both government agencies and private groups deal with players who share their particular concerns, but not with other elements of the system. Most players thus appear to be highly specialized to their particular functions and to have little concern about the operation of the system as a whole. Some of the subsystems are closely linked (notably the police and the prosecutors, and the press and the law enforcement agencies), but most are quite loosely coupled. This may produce some of the pathologies of loosely coupled systems that Hagan enumerated—rule violations, failure to implement decisions, and lack of coordination (for examples in the Chicago context, see Schiller & Manikas 1987)—as well as, perhaps, some of the advantages.

Blau and Scott (1962:126) note that experiments with small groups demonstrated that communication around the circumference of a circle is less efficient than communication through a center or core. If a structure as large as a criminal justice system is at all analogous to those small groups, we might ask why the structure should evolve into such an inefficient form. Indeed, since the same structural form—a sphere with a hollow core—was observed in a study of private elites engaged in national policymaking, the question may apply more broadly to democratic decisionmaking systems in general. Although the previous study of collegial networks among Chicago lawyers found identifiable core actors, those networks probably did not function as a political decisionmaking system (Heinz & Laumann 1982). What was at stake there may have been quite different. The lawyers' networks may have served primarily as a mechanism for the referral of cases, the seeking of business, or even the conduct of social discourse or the promotion of pro-

fessional solidarity. These criminal justice networks, by contrast, are concerned with the allocation of scarce values—political or governmental interests are at issue. Thus, networks with different purposes have different imperatives, which may affect their structural form.

The greater importance here of conflictual relationships, rather than of cooperation or coordination, may account for the hollow core. The central position in conflictual networks may be so empowering as to be inconsistent with the sharing of power that is necessary for the maintenance of a democratic system (Heinz et al. in press 1993). That is, the occupants of the central position will be able to exercise a substantial degree of control over the flow of information or communication from one part of the system to another (Blau & Scott 1962:126). This control may often permit them to determine the winners and losers on particular issues, or may even enable them to be the winners, themselves. If a small number of persons are in this central position again and again, and are thus able to be consistent winners or kingmakers, there is likely to be a great deal of envy of their position—at the very least. We would all like to be in such a position, but would not want to have someone else there and thus be subject to the control generated by the other's positional advantage. Less advantaged players will therefore have strong incentives to form new communication links that bypass the central elites, thereby having the effect of moving those elites out of the center. For these reasons, a structure with a consistent core will not be a stable equilibrium in a democratic system, where participation is voluntary. Put another way, the uncertainty of outcomes is an essential precondition of participation in democratic politics (Polsby 1980:136). If potential players know in advance that they will not win (or even, perhaps, that they are highly unlikely to win), then they will probably decline to participate—they may pursue other options, such as civil disobedience or public demonstrations, or they may become disaffected drop-outs, choosing to “lump it” (Galanter 1974). Our findings concerning the structure of these communication networks, then, may be generalizable beyond the limits of criminal justice systems to other sorts of democratic decisionmaking contexts.

Appendix A

Private Organizations Related to Cook County Criminal Justice

Abused Women's Coalition: Established in 1977 to provide emergency services to battered women and their children. The organization monitors the activities of Domestic Violence Court.

Afro-American Police League: An organization of black police officials formed in 1968 for the purposes of improving relationships between the Chicago Police Department and the black community and engaging in police reform issues.

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Institutionalized Persons Project: Formed in 1984 to improve conditions in jails, prisons, mental hospitals and other institutions. The ACLU has also filed lawsuits against law enforcement authorities on matters such as police brutality and the surveillance of political dissidents.

Cabrini-Green Legal Aid: Formed in 1973 to represent indigent defendants on Chicago's Near North Side in criminal cases.

Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety (CANS): Established in 1985, it engages in community organization efforts to prevent crime and to reform police practices.

Chicago Bar Association (CBA): Chicago area's largest bar association; founded in 1874. The CBA is involved in a wide range of activities involving the administration of justice and prepares reports on various aspects of the criminal and juvenile justice systems. It also provides legal services through a law clinic staffed by volunteers.

Chicago Council of Lawyers: Created in 1969. The Council engages in a broad range of reform activities and conducts evaluations of judicial candidates.

Chicago Crime Commission: Monitors criminal justice activities and acts as a public watchdog over the criminal justice system generally. Many of its past activities have focused on organized crime issues.

Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group (CLESG): Formed in 1969 to engage in a broad range of research and advocacy efforts concerning the criminal and juvenile justice systems. Its past reports have focused on issues such as police brutality and juveniles transferred to adult criminal courts.

Chicago Legal Aid to Incarcerated Mothers (CLAIM): Formed in 1985. Provides legal services to women prisoners and their families.

Chicago Mental Health Association: Provides information and referrals regarding mental health services. It also advocates for legislative action affecting the mental health system.

Citizens' Alert: Advocate of families who have been the victims of police brutality.

Citizens' Committee on Juvenile Court: Established in 1963 by the Circuit Court to monitor the operations of Juvenile Court and the Juvenile Temporary Detention Center. Committee members are appointed by the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court, and the Committee receives county funds.

Cook County Bar Association: Organization of predominantly black lawyers in Cook County. The organization engages in a broad range of activities to support its membership and improve the administration of justice.

Cook County Court Watchers: Established in 1974 to improve court services. Volunteers monitor the activities in various courtrooms and issue reports on their observations.

Court-appointed Special Advocates (CASA): Part of a national organization that has operated in Cook County since 1986. With the approval of the court,

- it receives cases involving juveniles and helps to plan a housing program for them.
- Human Effective Living Programs, Inc. (HELP)*: Formed in 1980. Provides a broad array of services to children who are the victims of sexual assault.
- Illinois Coalition against Domestic Violence*: Provides services and advocates on behalf of victims of domestic violence.
- Illinois Criminal Lawyers Association*: Established in 1987 to act as an advocate for criminal defense lawyers.
- Illinois Mental Health Association*: Division of the National Mental Health Association. It engages in educational and legislative projects aimed at improving the mental health system.
- Illinois Probation Association*: Provides training to its members (probation officers) and informs them about legislative issues concerning probation.
- Illinois Probation and Court Services Association*: Provides training to its members (probation officers) to help them work with probationers and legislative information. (Individuals pay dues to the association.)
- Illinois State Bar Association*: Established in 1877 to provide services to the state's lawyers and to improve the administration of justice.
- John Howard Association*: Prison reform organization established in 1901. It is the court-appointed monitor in a federal lawsuit concerning overcrowding at Cook County Jail.
- Kaleidoscope*: Since 1973 has provided services to severely disturbed juveniles.
- Kent-IIT Law School Clinic*: Provides clinical training to law students and handles cases against various public agencies.
- League of Women Voters*: Established in the 1920s. It is involved in a wide range of issues concerning county government, including conditions at Cook County Jail.
- Midway Family Center*: Engages in activities to reform the Police Department's response to domestic violence cases. It is supported by United Charities.
- Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD)*: Part of a national organization that has operated in the Chicago area since 1985. It provides services to victims of drunk driving and engages in a broad range of advocacy and public education activities.
- Operation PUSH*: Prison Project focuses on the problems of prisoners and provides religious and social services. The Project was established in the 1950s and was brought to Operation PUSH in the early 1970s.
- Pace Institute (Programmed Activities for Correctional Education)*: Established in 1967 to provide rehabilitation programs for prisoners at Cook County Jail.
- Probation Challenge*: Formed in 1979. Provides educational services to probationers.
- Rape Victims Advocacy*: Provides support services for victims of sexual assault.
- Safer Foundation*: Established in 1970. Provides social services to ex-offenders.
- Sexual Assault Services Network*: Established in 1984 to provide community-based services to the victims of sex crimes.
- Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC)*: Established in 1976. Provides and advocates for sentencing alternatives in cases involving substance abuse. TASC receives referrals from the Circuit Court and funding from the State of Illinois.
- Urban League (Chicago Urban League)*: Provides education and job training programs. It focuses principally on issues of concern to Chicago's black community.
- Voices for Illinois Children*: Founded in 1987. Engages in research, advocacy, and educational efforts on behalf of juveniles.
- Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) Women's Services*: Established in 1972 to provide services to victims of sexual assault, domestic violence, and child sexual abuse.

Appendix B

Positions of Individuals Related to Cook County Criminal Justice as of 1987

- Jeffrey Arnold:* Administrative Director of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
- Frank Barbaro:* Presiding Judge of the 4th Municipal District of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
- Paul Biebel:* Acting Public Defender of Cook County. At the time of the study, appointed by the Court's Chief Judge.
- M. Jeanette Boulet:* Executive Director of Cook County Court Watchers (see Appendix A).
- J. David Coldren:* Executive Director of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, a state agency which conducts research on criminal justice issues and coordinates criminal justice information policies.
- Harry G. Comerford:* Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
- Samuel Conti:* Director of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts.
- Ronald Crane:* Presiding Judge of the 6th Municipal District of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
- Bob Crawford:* Reporter for WBBM-Radio who covers, among other things, criminal justice issues.
- Raymond Curran:* Executive Director of the Safer Foundation (see appendix A). The Safer Foundation receives some funding from the City of Chicago.
- Richard M. Daley:* State's Attorney of Cook County January 1981-April 1989.
- John Drummond:* Reporter for WBBM-TV who covers, among other things, criminal justice issues.
- George Dunne:* President of the Cook County Board of Commissioners. The County Board provides funding for criminal justice activities such as the operations of the Circuit Court, the State's Attorney's Office and the Public Defender's Office.
- Richard Fitzgerald:* Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court's Criminal Division where the post-preliminary hearing stages of all felony cases are heard.
- Thomas Fitzgerald:* Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court's Traffic Court.
- James Geocaris:* Presiding Judge of the 3d Municipal District of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
- Arthur Hamilton:* Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court's Juvenile Division which hears delinquency as well as abuse and neglect cases involving minors.
- Neil Hartigan:* Attorney General for the State of Illinois.
- Patrick Healy:* Executive Director of the Chicago Crime Commission (see appendix A)
- Melody Heaps:* Executive Director of Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) (see appendix A).
- Michael Holewinski:* Administrative Assistant to the Mayor of the City of Chicago. His responsibilities included acting as liaison to the Chicago Police Department.
- John Jemilo:* First Deputy Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department for four and one-half years. He left that position in May 1988.
- Gordon Johnson:* Director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services.
- James Jordan:* Superintendent of the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center.
- Peter Karl:* Reporter for WMAQ-TV who covers, among other things, criminal justice issues.
- Michael Lane:* Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections.
- Spencer Leak:* Director of the Cook County Department of Corrections which

operates the Cook County Jail. The Department is a division of the Cook County Sheriff's Office and the Director is appointed by the Sheriff.

Henry Locke: Reporter for the *Chicago Daily Defender* who covers, among other things, criminal justice issues.

Michael Mahoney: Executive Director of the John Howard Association (see appendix A).

Jeremy Margolis: Director of the Illinois State Police.

LeRoy Martin: Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department. He was appointed by Mayor Harold Washington in November 1987.

Judson Miner: Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago. The Corporation Counsel's Office prosecutes violations of Chicago's City Ordinance Code and provides legal representation for the City's Police Department.

Anthony Montelione: Presiding Judge of the 5th Municipal District of the Circuit Court of Cook County.

Eileen Murphy: Director of the Victim-Witness Task Force of the Cook County State's Attorney's Office.

Patrick Murphy: Public Guardian of Cook County. The Office of Public Guardian is a division of the Circuit Court and acts as court-appointed guardian *ad litem* in Juvenile Court for neglected, dependent and abused juveniles.

Terrence Murphy: Executive Director of the Chicago Bar Association (see appendix A).

Linnet Myers: Reporter for the *Chicago Tribune* who covers, among other things, criminal justice issues.

Donald O'Connell: Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court's First Municipal District. He supervises the operations of misdemeanor and felony preliminary hearing courtrooms within the City of Chicago.

James O'Grady: Sheriff of Cook County.

Fred Rice: Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department from April 1983 to November 1987.

Michael Rohan: Acting Chief Probation Officer of the Circuit Court's Adult Probation Division.

Rosalind Rossi: Reporter for the *Chicago Sun-Times* who covers, among other things, criminal justice issues.

Joseph Schneider: Presiding Judge for the Circuit Court's County Department where cases involving mental health issues are heard.

Kathy Schweit: Reporter for the *Chicago Daily Law Bulletin*.

Andy Shaw: Reporter for WLS-TV who covers, among others things, criminal justice issues.

Darrell Smith: Chief Adult Probation Officer of the Illinois Probation and Court Services Association (see appendix A).

Dr. Robert Stein: Cook County Medical Examiner.

Marlene Stern: Executive Director of the Citizen's Committee on Juvenile Court (see appendix A).

John Stroger: Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Cook County Board of Commissioners.

Harold Sullivan: Presiding Judge of the 2nd Municipal District of the Circuit Court of Cook County.

Joseph Tybor: Reporter for the *Chicago Tribune* who previously covered, among other things, criminal justice issues.

Anton Valukas: United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois.

Harold Washington: Mayor of the City of Chicago from April 1983 to November 1987.

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