

pamphlet. Since Chernyshevsky's practical activities were characterized by a certain *shlemielstvo*, since his erudition was unassimilated (his ideas borrowed from Fourier, Feuerbach, and Belinsky and vulgarized), since his style was soggy, with its attempts at humor and deep seriousness extremely difficult to distinguish, it is only by recognizing and characterizing this complicity with his cultural environment that a biographer can still do useful work.

Already there is a vast literature on Chernyshevsky: there are his complete works, totaling sixteen volumes in Russian (including, in addition to much scholarly annotation, *two* versions of *What To Do?*), and then there are, from Pypin and Plekhanov to Steklov and Nechkina, the multivolumed studies, apologetic and tending toward hagiography.

We have available in English the long passages on Chernyshevsky in Venturi and Lampert and the small popularizing work, written with considerable gusto, by Francis Randall. This distinguished if somewhat abundant company has now been joined by William Woehrlin. He has written the fullest, most comprehensive, most judicious, and—as intellectual history—most “professional” account of Chernyshevsky's life and work available so far in English. He is less enthusiastic about revolutionary activity than Venturi, less speculative than Lampert, and considerably less ebullient and more judicious than Randall. His book truly and competently represents the present state of Chernyshevsky scholarship. Although it is true that he fails to answer them, he does at least by heavy implication raise two fundamental questions: Why did Chernyshevsky become a revolutionary? How did he come to have such incredible sway over so many minds, including even some rather good ones?

Perhaps a more fruitful approach to the materials of Chernyshevsky's life would not attempt so strictly to separate the events and products of that life from the hagiography they have created, but would rather resemble that of the mythographer to *The Golden Legend*. Woehrlin's book makes many corrections and emendations to past interpretations, but adds little. Far more interesting, not only for its wit and Gogolian drama, but because it places Chernyshevsky in the context of Russian culture, is the biography by Godunov-Cherdyntsev, the hero of Vladimir Nabokov's *The Gift*, and the reviews it elicits, as set forth in that extraordinary novel first published thirty-five years ago.

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OCHERKI PO ISTORII IUZHNYKH SLAVIAN I RUSSKO-BALKANSKIKH SVIAZEI V 50-70-E GODY XIX V. By S. A. Nikitin. Moscow: “Nauka,” 1970. 328 pp. 1.51 rubles.

This collection of articles by a leading Soviet historian deals with Bulgaria's economy and struggle for liberation, and Russian diplomacy and public opinion toward the South Slavs. Though disparate and specialized, the articles provide quite a cohesive picture of Russian policy and aspects of the Balkan economic and political situation between the Crimean and Russo-Turkish wars. Most of the selections appear for the first time; those previously published have been revised. Nikitin, a meticulous yet imaginative scholar, has made thorough use of Soviet archival and newspaper collections and Serbian and Bulgarian published sources. Much of the material comes from his massive unpublished doctoral dissertation,

"Russkoe obshchestvo i voprosy balkanskoi politiki Rossii, 1853–1876 gg." (Moscow State University, 1946).

The initial articles on Bulgaria are the most ideological. The first describes the economic aspect of the Bulgarian town during the era of emancipation from the Turks, and is based on materials for the Bulgarian census of 1879 conducted by the Russian occupation authorities. Employing many tables, it emphasizes the beginnings of capitalist development but notes the great importance of agriculture in the lives of the city dwellers. "The Revolutionary Struggle in Bulgaria in 1875–1876 and the April Insurrection" stresses peasant differentiation and growing national self-consciousness as revealed in the revolutionary committees. The April rising, though largely peasant, is described somewhat incongruously as a bourgeois-democratic national liberation movement against Turkey and local pashas. Crushed because of its uncoordinated character and inadequate preparation, the rising nonetheless undermined the Turks' hold and caused public indignation in Russia, thus helping to bring on the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. The April rising, Nikitin claims, aided in Bulgaria's liberation and thus led to Russo-Bulgarian cooperation.

The next three articles describe Russian diplomacy and official policy between 1853 and 1876. "Russian Policy in the Balkans and the Beginning of the Crimean War," originally published in *Voprosy istorii* (1946, no. 4), suggests that Nicholas I's Balkan policy failed because he neglected its peoples' interests and sought to use the Slavs to achieve his own selfish aims. "Russia and the Slavs in the 1860s" depicts a Russia diplomatically isolated and undergoing reform, seeking to restore its position in the Black Sea and prestige in the Balkans, but not to destroy the Ottoman Empire. Perhaps the most significant article in the collection is "Russian Diplomacy and the National Movement of the South Slavs, 1850–70s," which ably summarizes Russian objectives and policy. Russia, affirms Nikitin, generally considered Serbia the focus of the struggle against Turkey but did not neglect other Balkan peoples. Viewed objectively, Russia played a progressive role in the Balkans which led after twenty years' effort to South Slav emancipation.

Unofficial Russian attitudes toward the Balkan peoples and their struggle for liberation, as expressed in newspapers and periodicals, are analyzed in the next two articles. They demonstrate the deep Russian public interest in the Balkans and the considerable influence of Pan-Slav ideas on Russian opinion between 1860 and 1874. Finally, the brief article "Vuk Karadžić and Russia" stresses how highly this Serbian nationalist-scholar valued Russian aid and encouragement, and characterizes him as a Russophile progressive.

The numerous quotations and references from Soviet archives and Russian periodicals unavailable in the West will be valuable to students of Russian foreign policy, public opinion, and Balkan nationalism. Nikitin relies little on Marxist-Leninist "classics," but the party line peeps through in his insistence on the "objectively progressive" and defensive nature of tsarist Russia's Balkan policies. He finds in unofficial Russian views, and sometimes even government policies, a foreshadowing of the current Soviet doctrine of the friendship between the Russian and Balkan peoples. He seems to exaggerate capitalist development and bourgeois influence in Balkan lands, which at that time were overwhelmingly agrarian. Nonetheless, these thorough, richly documented articles represent a major contribution to the study of Russo-Balkan relations.

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