

bishop in the Church who can stay in office beyond that age. It would be interesting to have the views of Robert Runcie and George Carey on this question. As Runcie said in his Heenan lecture after seeing the Pope, there are no longer problems 'internal' to one particular church. If one hurts, we are all hurt.

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THE WORD AND THE CHRIST: AN ESSAY IN ANALYTIC CHRISTOLOGY, by Richard Sturch, Oxford: *Clarendon Press*, 1991. pp. 291. £35.00.

Richard Sturch, rector of Islip, offers in this volume a spirited defence and, for the most part, a well argued analysis of the traditional understanding of the Incarnation: that the eternal Son of God came to exist as a man. He specifies that his work is analytic rather than proclamatory or revisionist. Whereas proclamatory Christologies 'seek to move forward' from some starting point and to search out new truths based upon their accepted data, and whereas revisionist Christologies argue that the traditional perception of the Incarnation must be abandoned and a new understanding set in place, analytic Christologies, patterned after the Fathers, accept some basic data of faith and then seek 'to work out what sort of states of affairs must hold, what propositions about Jesus Himself, about God, and about the human race must be true, if their "basis" is to make sense. They are setting out to analyse the implications of their own starting-points' (p. 2). Sturch accepts as his starting point the classical understanding of the Incarnation as defined by Chalcedon and received within the Christian tradition. However, is such an understanding tenable? To answer this question Sturch divides his presentation into three sections. Sturch, in successive chapters, first presents a rousing account of all the arguments against an incarnationalist Christology. So convincing is his presentation that at times the reader may wonder whether Sturch himself is in agreement.

This gives credit to his objectivity and thoroughness. The arguments are summarised as follows. The traditional view of the Incarnation is obsolescent and logically incoherent. It gives rise to insoluble and irrational theological conundrums. Moreover, it is ultimately impossible and lacks solid biblical evidence. Such arguments are found in Wiles, Kung, Cupitt, Hick, and a host of other revisionists.

In the third part of his study Sturch retraces his steps and presents some very telling and even devastating evidence against such revisionist views. Sturch is adamant that arguments which assert that a traditional understanding of the Incarnation is incompatible with the secular scientific mind (Bultmann), is parochial and elitist in light of other religions (Hick), and is onerous for contemporary men and women to believe (Wiles) do not bear upon its truth or falsity. To Sturch's mind, if

the Incarnation is true, that God did become man, then it is so much the worse for our contemporary views and difficulties. It is we who must change and not the truth. Moreover, Sturch argues that if the Church almost immediately came to worship Jesus as God, when he really wasn't, then it not only made a theological mistake, but it also fell into the most hideous blasphemy and idolatry. What is needed then is not revision, but abandonment. Sturch's enterprise is, in many ways, an intellectual defence and articulate profession of the faith of Christian believers through the centuries. Sturch presents his own view in the central portion of his book. He is at great pains to avoid any semblance of Doceticism, Apollinarianism, and Monophysitism. He realises that this charge is the Achilles heel of the traditional view: If Christ is a divine person, then he must lack something as man—a human personality. Following the lead of Jean Galot, S.J., Sturch argues that the humanity of Christ is complete and entire, lacking nothing in his concrete historical humaness. What distinguishes Jesus is that the 'I,' the subject, what Sturch calls the 'central self', is that of the divine Son. 'The "self" who undergoes the joys and pains of Jesus of Nazareth, who is Jesus of Nazareth, is also the "self" of God the Son' (p. 130). Here Sturch is correct, but at times incomplete and confusing.

Sturch could have been more articulate in two ways. One is that he could have been clearer on the distinction between the divine subject (the eternal Son), and his human subjectivity. The Son does have a human 'I,' that is the 'I' of Jesus is the human 'I' of a divine 'who,' a divine subject. When Jesus says, for example, 'I have come to fulfil the Law and the prophets,' that 'I' is a human 'I' of a divine subject with a full human self consciousness. The eternal Son (the divine subject) speaks and acts under the auspices of a human centre of self-consciousness, within the conditions of a human 'I.'

Secondly, Sturch offers an image that lends confusion rather than clarity to the whole enterprise. He compares the Incarnation to two squares that share the same common corner point. Both are complete and both separate, except at the corner. The common corner point for Sturch is obviously the 'central self' in Christ. But is that common point divine? If so, one has embraced Apollinarianism for the humanity is then missing something. Is it human? If so, then one falls into Adoptionism. Is it a combination of the divine and the human? If so, then one is espousing an untenable mixture of the divine and the human contrary to Chalcedon (one person exists in two natures 'without commingling or change or division or separation'). The lesson to be learnt here is that imaginative diagrams for the Incarnation are impossible. The Incarnation (and the Trinity, or the relationship of body and soul, for that matter) is a metaphysical and ontological reality and any diagram will by necessity give expression not to orthodoxy, but to heresy. Thus while Sturch is quite good at discerning the truth of the Incarnation, that is, what must be said if the Incarnation is true, he is not so competent in perceiving the ontological depth and reality of the Incarnation.

Despite these above suggestions and criticisms, Sturch's book is a detailed defence of the Incarnation and a creative, intelligent, and enterprising endeavour to grasp, in faith, its mystery.

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PAUL OF VENICE: LOGICA MAGNA PART I FASCICULE 8, G. ed. and trans., C.J.F. Williams, Oxford University Press, 1991. Pp xxx + 205. £20

This is the seventh volume to appear in the edition of Paul of Venice's *Logica magna* sponsored by the British Academy, and comprises the final treatise, no. 23, of the first part of that work. The *Logica magna* was probably written around the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and is especially interesting because it provides a conspectus of the views of previous logicians, unfortunately for historians unacknowledged, across the full range of topics treated in medieval logic.

The question with which treatise 23 is concerned is 'whether some future being will come about or be produced of necessity'. 'Necessity' is ambiguous. A modern philosopher thinks first of logical necessity; in this sense, to suppose that a necessary being did not exist would be self-contradictory. Like most medieval philosophers, Paul is not concerned with this, but with the Aristotelian sense in which a being which cannot cease to exist is necessary. This is closer to the modern notion of causal necessity. Another kind of necessity which plays a part in Paul's arguments is the necessity which attaches to the past, because it is now unalterable.

The future being which Paul has in mind is the soul of Antichrist, and the reason why this is a plausible candidate is that an intelligent soul could not, in the medieval view, cease to exist. As Professor Williams points out, any intelligent soul fulfils this condition, so why choose Antichrist? The reason, he suggests, is that there is scriptural authority for the belief that Antichrist will indeed come to be, thus guaranteeing the future existence of his soul. This example does not promise much of general logical and philosophical interest, but in fact some of the thirty arguments which Paul deploys raise issues which still engage philosophers, even though others are only of historical interest today.

Professor Williams contributes a useful introduction in which he details some of the topics which are of abiding interest: scope distinctions, definite descriptions, beginning and ceasing, past and future, theological determinism. Among scope distinctions the most famous in medieval philosophy is that between a proposition taken *sensu composito* and taken *sensu diviso*, to which, indeed, Paul devotes Treatise 21. This is illustrated by the schemas 'necessarily, if p then q ' and 'if p then necessarily q ' respectively; but the latter is ambiguous because it can be taken as equivalent to the first. 'Definite description' is