

contributions. The reviewer (perhaps the more so for being a lawyer interested in animal law), is left confused. Is this an animal law or an animal attitudes book? It succeeds more as the latter – what was needed was a more appropriate title or a firmer hand with the contributors to produce a unity of purpose. However, as the publication is not too expensive, and will probably be difficult to trace in years to come, it will be worth acquiring now if it appeals.

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After Noah: Animals and the Liberation of Theology

Andrew Linzey and Dan Cohn-Sherbok (1997). Mowbray (Cassell plc): London. 128pp. Paperback. Obtainable from the publishers, Wellington House, The Strand, London WC2R 0BB, UK (ISBN 0264674502). Price £12.99.

It can only be a matter of time before reviewers are bound, like everyone else, by the principles of Nolanism, but even in advance of any such requirements I had better declare an interest. The authors of this volume take strong exception to the treatment of the question of the patenting of animals in a report to the Minister of Agriculture by a committee which I chaired a few years ago. They quote the, so they say, ‘chillingly official’ (whatever that might mean) words of the report: ‘...there is no single reason why intellectual property should not reside in animals. It is, after all, human ingenuity or invention which is responsible for the existence of a genetically modified animal in just the form it has,’ and comment that this view: ‘fails to understand the moral and theological grounds for rejecting such a classification of animal. For those who care about animals as God’s creatures, any classification of them as ‘products of human ingenuity’ is theologically a misnomer, a category mistake. Generally it is nothing less than spiritually infantile to go on labelling animals in ways that understand them as little more than tools, resources, commodities, indeed things.’

Readers of Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok’s volume will surely have better things to do than to go back and check the reference, but if they did they would find that the report actually discusses, with some care, whether holding that intellectual property may reside in particular animals is the same as classifying animals as ‘products of human ingenuity’. It might be – but it is not obvious, without argument, that it is the same. After all, we have believed for a very long time indeed that people may have other forms of property interests in animals without thinking this involved labelling them ‘as little more than tools, resources, commodities, indeed things’. Indeed, allowing that people may have property interests in animals has been compatible, so it seems, with the development of concerns for welfare.

It would be impossible to resent the author’s treatment of this report, since they treat everything else in the same cavalier fashion. Their central concern is to establish that within the Christian and Jewish traditions are to be found voices which take exception to the predominant, what they term ‘instrumentalist’, tradition – that is, the tradition which holds that animals are no more than instruments for human use. These voices would thus provide a critical vantage point on certain contemporary practices in relation to animals, and also a critical vantage point on certain underlying assumptions of theological thought. However, in making the case that there are such voices, and that the viewpoints which they express provide a basis for interrogation of present practices, there is no concern for patient exegesis of texts, no careful development of arguments, no critical engagement with alternative points of view. Instead, in what we might think of as the intellectual equivalent of Cold War

'analysis' of the East by the West (or of the West by the East), we have an entirely tendentious parade of the right-thinking who are to be cheered and the wrong-thinking who are to be booed. (As Engels observed, it is the height of open-mindedness in an Englishman to think that there are *two* sides to every question.) The fact is that the tradition is altogether more complex than this schema will allow, so that if one should want to tell its story, one will need to allow for more nuances than the authors seem willing to admit.

All this is a pity. Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok are right, I believe, in suggesting that in relation to the welfare of animals what is stake is no less than 'our ability or otherwise to celebrate our fellow creatures'; and they are right too, in wanting their respective traditions to speak with more care and reflection on these issues. However, it is difficult to believe that care and reflection can be encouraged without its being displayed, whether in the writing of history or in engagement in contemporary debates.

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Animal Models of Human Psychology: Critique of Science, Ethics and Policy

K J Shapiro (1998). Hogrefe and Huber: Kirkland and Göttingen. 328pp Hardback. Obtainable from the publishers, Suite 485, 218 Main Street, Kirkland, Washington, WA 98033, USA; or for European orders from, Röhnsweg 25, D-37085, Göttingen, Germany (ISBN 088936189X). Price US\$39.50/£26.50/DM69.00.

The title of this book is really a misnomer. Anyone expecting a comprehensive review of animal models in human psychology will be disappointed, since the author confines his detailed attention to models of eating disorders. The subtitle 'Critique of Science, Ethics and Policy' gives a much clearer indication of the wide-ranging arguments presented against the use of animal models for the study of human functions and disorders.

Following an introduction which sets out the basic tenets of the author's approach, there are six chapters each to some extent overlapping in content. The first considers the use of animals in experimental psychology and the second examines psychology as a science. The third chapter discusses the concept of animal models of anorexia and bulimia nervosa which comprise about one-third of the whole text. This is followed by two chapters in which the ethics of using animals is examined at length, both in general and in the special context of experimental psychology. The text concludes with a short epilogue summarizing the arguments.

In his introduction, the author attempts to survey the extent of animal usage in psychological research. He suggests that in the USA, 10 per cent of some 40 000 research psychologists study non-human animals and that approximately half of the world's 250 000 psychologists are in the USA. However, an attempt to estimate total animal usage in psychology relies so heavily on assumptions that the strength of the argument is lost. The current worldwide decline in animal usage is noted, but he reaches no firm conclusion regarding trends in the USA. In Britain, it is estimated that about 8 per cent of the animals used annually are for psychological research.

The main message of this treatise is the irrelevance of animal models to progress in understanding human psychology. This is developed along several lines: the irrelevance of animal models to human disorders in general and psychological disorders in particular; the invasiveness and distress associated with many models; the unnatural state of laboratory