

# DEPENDENCY ANALYSIS OF LATIN AMERICA:

## Some Criticisms, Some Suggestions

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### I. INTRODUCTION

While dependency analysis has a long tradition within Latin America, only recently has it emerged from the relative obscurity of certain Latin American writers to be included among the approaches used by scholars in the United States.<sup>1</sup> The dependency approach was first adopted by a group of "radicals" in the United States, partially as a reaction to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, but also as part of a general attack on the capitalist system, the military-industrial complex, and U.S. imperialism. It is now evident that dependency analysis has emerged as a legitimate field of inquiry for Latin Americanists, even if some scholars refuse to acknowledge its existence.<sup>2</sup> In spite of generating considerable analysis of Latin America and the inter-American system, the *dependentistas* have not been subjected to the critical scrutiny they deserve, primarily because of the lack of academic respectability of the radicals and the different channels through which their publications appear. Aside from the critiques of Raúl Prebisch (Flanders, 1964; Hodgson, 1966; Salera, 1971), an article by David Ray (1973), and the internal bickerings among the dependentistas themselves, systematic criticism of the dependency approach has been lacking. For this reason we felt the need to delineate the broad outlines of the dependency theory of underdevelopment; present a selective critique of the methodologies, content, and conclusions of the major writers; and identify some of the more potentially rewarding areas for subsequent research.

In addition to needed methodological criticisms of existing developmental theory, dependency analysis has already made two major contributions to an understanding of the inter-American system. First, it has pointed out graphically (and occasionally, hysterically) what should have been obvious to anyone: It is impossible to discuss the internal economic and political systems of Latin American countries without reference to their relationship to outside factors, especially the role of the United

States. Throughout the 1960s, nonetheless, many of the books and articles written on Latin America did not even bother to consider these external factors. Second, the dependency approach has stressed the need for combining economic and political analysis. In Latin America, as well as elsewhere, there exists the absolute requirement of reintegrating the distinct academic disciplines of political science and economics if better understanding is to be achieved. Several commentators, dependentistas as well as others, have emphasized the need for studies of political economy (Frank, 1967a; Hirschman, 1971). As an economist and a political scientist, we also recognize the need to combine the two often isolated disciplines for a better understanding of Latin America.

Dependency analysis has also suffered because it elicits emotional responses, both pro and con, that blur and disguise the real value of the approach. It seems to invoke, on the one hand, fears of Marxism, communism, radicalism, general disrespect for established academic procedures, and a hint of the unwashed; on the other hand, pro-dependency adherents tend to regard their critics as defenders of the status quo, wealthy capitalists, and imperialist pigs. We are not committed to either position, but would like to mention our own ideological convictions. The economist regards himself basically as an apolitical, whose economic position is orthodox Keynesianism with frays and unravelings appearing around the edges. The political scientist was a member of the North American Congress on Latin America research project on the operation of multinational companies in Latin America (unfortunately, little work has been accomplished) and the Union of Radical Latin Americanists, but he does not regard himself as primarily a Marxist. In fact we would accept any political and/or economic approach to the solution of general problems of income distribution and social justice in Latin America. Furthermore, we have no quarrel with the general thesis of dependency analysis, but feel that current interpretations may unduly restrict policy options open to the Latin American nations.

While heartily endorsing an integrated economic and political approach to the study of Latin America, we will follow here a division of responsibility assigned to the academic area of specialization. The economist will discuss the general dependency thesis focusing on economic factors; the political scientist will discuss internal analysis of Latin American countries with the chief focus on writings of Chile. Hopefully, we will get together in the final section to critique dependency analysis and offer some suggestions for future research.

## II. DEPENDENCY THEORY: THE "LAY OF THE LAND"

*Definitional Aspects*

There are four specific points on which dependentistas are in broad agreement. First, the condition of underdevelopment is intimately connected with the expansion of industrial capitalist countries. Quoting Theotonio Dos Santos, a leading Latin American dependentista: "By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another country to which the former is subjected" (1970e:231). Most writers on dependency would subscribe to this proposition with only slight modifications of the wording.

A second consensus is found in the view of development and underdevelopment as two components of *one unified system*. Osvaldo Sunkel, a leading Chilean dependency theorist, serves as a representative spokesman when he speaks of "underdevelopment and development [as] simply the two faces of a single universal process." Furthermore, underdevelopment and development have been, historically, simultaneous processes that have been linked in a functional way, that is, have interacted and conditioned themselves mutually (Sunkel, 1973:135–36).

Third, the dependentistas universally insist that viewing underdevelopment as a natural and temporary precapitalistic state ignores reality completely. Importing models that may have applied to the economic development of Western Europe, the United States, Russia, or Japan results in damaging policy choices in some instances or amounts to having no policy at all in others. Given the strength of the "center" or "metropolises" and the dependent position of the "periphery," underdevelopment is not seen as a temporary, evolutionary stage, but a persistent, natural condition.<sup>3</sup>

Fourth, the dependentistas are convinced that the subordinate relationship of Latin America is not exclusively an external, country-to-country matter. Rather, they claim, the dependence extends to the *internal* decision-making apparatus, social structure, ideological beliefs, and cultural elements. On this point there is considerable difference in the degree to which internal problems are attributed to external subordination. Some of these distinctions will come into relief in the ensuing description and classification of dependency writers.

*A Preliminary Taxonomy*

Although these items of harmony afford enough cohesion to justify the term "dependentistas," the scholars involved are hardly a perfectly homo-

geneous group. There are differences in analytical approach, degree of emphasis, and policy recommendations. The broad outlines are given below.

*The Conservative Approach: Prebisch, Pinto, and Wionczek* / The "Prebisch thesis" was born in 1949 when he wrote *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems*.<sup>4</sup> Since that time, the thesis has been evolving with some elements grafted on and others pruned. Prebisch began with the idea that long-term weaknesses in the prices of raw commodities invalidated the beneficial results that were supposed to obtain from the classical theory of international trade. By 1959 and the publication of his "Commercial Policy in Underdeveloped Countries," Prebisch had (1) strengthened his argument by adding the implications of surplus labor in less developed countries, (2) couched his price weakness arguments in the technical concepts of income elasticities of demand and terms of trade, and (3) attempted to demonstrate the means by which productivity gains in raw commodity production would be exported in the form of lower prices rather than captured domestically.<sup>5</sup>

Dependence, then, took the form of exporting raw commodities with low income elasticities of demand and importing goods with high income elasticities. Furthermore, labor unions and oligopolistic markets in developed countries were able to capture productivity gains in the form of higher wages and profits whereas surplus labor and foreign ownership made it impossible for the raw commodity exporting country to retain all of its gains.

By the late 1950s, Prebisch's policy recommendations had taken shape: (1) Push import substitution industrialization through protective measures in order to reduce dependence on imports of income elastic goods, absorb surplus labor, and capture productivity gains in industry within the periphery country; (2) encourage economic integration among periphery countries to increase market sizes and capture productivity gains with the periphery as a whole; (3) negotiate a scheme of "reciprocity" for transferring resources from the center to the periphery in compensation for the productivity gains leaked from the periphery through falling raw commodity prices—this later became the basis for demanding preferential tariff treatment for manufactured exports from the periphery; and (4) organize raw commodity control schemes in order to reduce price fluctuations.

Prebisch headed the Economic Commission for Latin America during its earlier years and was the driving force that resulted in the inception of the Central American Common Market and Latin American Free Trade Area. He gave new impetus and rationale to import substitution as a means for industrializing. As secretary general of the United

Nations Commission on Trade and Development in the middle and the late 1960s, he was instrumental in shaping demands for preferential tariff treatment for exports of developing countries. Thus, Prebisch has been immersed in real world policy formulation.

In his latest major work, *Change and Development*, no impressive theoretical refinements are added. The instrument for drastically reducing dependence, as seen by Prebisch, is a heroic economic transformation of the economy. He has always felt that heavy reliance on outside resources would be required. Indeed, *Change and Development* is largely a plea for a concerted effort at international cooperation among developed and Latin American countries designed to yield a rapid jump in the rate of economic growth in Latin America. Unlike most dependentistas, and one reason for referring to him as a "conservative," Prebisch has no abiding fears of foreign investment and foreign aid, although he favors more selective programs, and is certainly concerned with the growing balance-of-payments difficulties stemming from servicing foreign debt and profit repatriations.

Prebisch is less accusative in his tone than most other dependency theorists. No dark forces are seen pulling the strings; his writing is almost exclusively technical and impersonal. Reference to social or class differences are often couched in terms of income groups and, though he bemoans the effects of maldistribution of income and mentions outmoded oligarchic social structures, he does not write in terms of elitist control or class consciousness. He uses history in his analysis, but in a cursory way, usually referring to the macro-level and rarely with penetrating depth.

Two Latin American scholars who write in a similar vein are Aníbal Pinto and Miguel S. Wionczek. Pinto, writing with Jan Křákal (1973), compares the trends of international trade and direct investment of Latin America with the rest of the world and the Third World as a whole, and finds that Latin America's share of exports and investment inflow is shrinking, a phenomenon he dubs "the marginalization of Latin America." At the same time, the growing absolute amount of foreign investment, the more intensive use of local funds to finance investment, the greater propensity for foreign investment to take the form of purchases of existing domestic firms, and the increasing proportion of foreign exchange earnings required to service foreign investment, are forces causing an erosion in Latin America's ability to act independently. This process is called "dependent insertion."

The policy implications of all of this are not made clear, but Pinto (1974) sees a danger in either continued "horizontal integration" (a strengthening of trade relations within, but not between, developed and

less developed countries), or a return to a new form of "vertical integration" (a rebuilding of stronger economic ties between center and periphery nations). The first tendency would result in continued marginalization; the latter would lead to greater dependency. This "damned if you do, damned if you don't" condition can be avoided by an ill-defined, truly global, economic integration, requiring considerable action within Latin America in concert with cooperative efforts by the rest of the world.

Wionczek is editor of the *Journal of Common Market Studies* and, until recently, was the director of the Center for Latin American Monetary Studies located in Mexico City. He is now associated with Mexico's National Council on Science and Technology. Since the late 1960s, his writings have been both prolific and influential in the areas of Latin American economic integration, problems of foreign investment, and technology transfer. Wionczek does not believe foreign investment is an evil per se, but holds that the failure of the economic cooperation blocs within Latin America to establish a coordinated industrial program and socioeconomic goals left the area wide open to foreign investment (actually encouraged by high tariffs, tax breaks, and the like) that poured in with little or no compatibility with long-term, sustainable economic growth.

Like all other dependency writers, he is concerned over the shift of foreign direct investment away from the more traditional sectors into the more dynamic ones, the increasing prevalence of foreign "takeovers" of domestic firms, and the balance-of-payments problems occasioned by servicing the accumulated foreign capital (Wionczek, 1969–70). Technology, largely a concomitant of direct foreign investment, is anything but a "free flow," a fact that he feels is not adequately appreciated in more developed countries. It is acquired under monopolistic conditions in the form of patents and licenses, or embodied in capital goods, intermediate inputs, or managerial know-how. Much of the technology is ill-suited to the resource mix and socioeconomic problems of Latin America. When outright monopoly payment is not involved, more subtle strings are attached, e.g., prohibiting exports, retaining rights on any innovations, or limiting output. Few beneficial spread effects of learning by performing research and development functions take place within Latin America.

Thus, Wionczek is convinced that Latin America is, indeed, "taking its lumps" from outside forces, mainly the United States. The reason, however, that he is considered a conservative in our classification scheme, is simple: Wionczek believes the way out rests largely, if not exclusively, on Latin America itself. He may oscillate in his conviction as to *whether* Latin America *will* do it, expressing extreme pessimism in one instance and long-run optimism in another, but he is firm on the point that developing nations *should* and *can* take useful initiatives on their own.<sup>6</sup> To

be specific, Latin America can (1) come up with sensible plans for sharing investment projects among countries within the major economic co-operation blocs; (2) regulate foreign investment in such a way that it is permitted on a selective basis, complementary to the long-term interests of socioeconomic development of the recipient countries; and (3) in a similar manner, establish legal provisions enabling Latin America to acquire technology in all of its multivariate forms on a more favorable basis. Furthermore, Latin America should channel much more effort into her own scientific and technological efforts, which includes necessary changes in the education system.<sup>7</sup> Also, Wionczek hints at the possibility of diluting the traditional sources of dependency by establishing stronger economic ties with Australia, Japan, and Canada (1971f).

*The Moderates: Furtado, Sunkel, and Dos Santos* / The appellation "moderates" is applied here, of course, relative to the dependency theorists as a whole, and refers less to their policy conclusions than to the degree of stridency in their arguments and to the apportionment of blame for internal Latin American problems attributed to external influences. The moderates leave no doubt of their belief that some internal problems are worsened by a dependent relationship on external forces, but they do not convey the impression that domestic problems would disappear with the advent of external dependence. Sunkel's "Change and Frustration in Chile," for example, deals largely with domestic problems that are shaped but not totally dominated by international affairs, and Celso Furtado has a major section on "Internal Structural Obstacles" in one of his later works on Latin American development (1970b). There is a clear danger in carrying this point *too* far. Dos Santos speaks of the world capitalist system "conditioning the internal structures of our countries, rendering them dependent on their own makeup" (Dos Santos, 1970b:7). Furtado and Sunkel would not argue. Perhaps the operative word for the moderates is "conditioning" as opposed to "determining" when applied to external influence on Latin American policy decisions.

A further justification for placing Furtado, Sunkel, and Dos Santos in the same classification is the fundamental position accorded to multinational corporations (MNCs, hereafter) in their analysis. International enterprise is placed in a historical setting that, with some slight variations among the three, views the MNCs as succeeding the older colonial and purely financial forms of domination. Sometime between the beginning of World War II and the advent of the 1960s, depending on the writer, a new financial-technological domination began. The enormous advantages of technological know-how, access to world markets, managerial talent, financial power, and information control have radically altered the old rules of the game.<sup>8</sup>

The moderates differ from Prebisch in that they profess a belief that foreign aid, foreign investment, and trade negotiations are consciously used by the center, especially the United States, as policy weapons. Furtado still believes that the common market principle and import substitution industrialization holds promise for Latin America if policy is rationalized sufficiently to diminish the advantages of the MNCs. Sunkel and Dos Santos are more skeptical.<sup>9</sup> MNCs are blamed for producing consumer goods for higher income groups and using capital intensive methods that contribute to a further skewing of income in favor of the already advantaged segments of society. Furtado especially bears down on the patterns of income distribution, the resulting demand profile that is heavily weighted toward consumer durables, the high technology content of such goods, and the symbiosis of elite consumption and foreign production that follows from it.<sup>10</sup>

Social class plays a part in the moderates' framework, but it is not emphasized. Furtado believes that the new external technology superimposed on a traditional society with landed elites fails to result in the types of conflict that give rise to true class consciousness. There has been "clear social differentiation [but it] has contributed nothing to class consciousness" (Furtado, 1965b:64). In a similar vein, Dos Santos believes that revolutionary forces have had the steam taken out of them by the clientele relationship between technicians of the urban masses and traditional elements in society (1970b:169). Sunkel also holds, in the case of Chile at least, that the fusion of new and traditional groups has not resulted in a middle class that is a driving force for general socioeconomic change. It has resulted in fragmented interest groups attempting to pressure for their own economic benefit (Sunkel, 1965:129–30).

A final similarity: Although the moderates' policy recommendations seem to range from Furtado's capitalism with a strong state intervention to Sunkel's and Dos Santos's more revolutionary sympathies, they share the trait of being incredibly vague about concrete, down-to-earth policy prescriptions. The words "seem to" in the previous sentence are used advisedly. To a lesser degree this complaint can be generalized to most dependentistas and we return to it later.

*The Radicals: Frank, Cockcroft, Johnson, and Petras* / André Gunder Frank, an old hand at dependency scholarship, has been joined by a group of political scientists and sociologists in the United States, such as James D. Cockcroft and Dale L. Johnson (both of whom collaborated with Frank on a book), and James Petras, who writes along similar lines. In the writings of the radicals, the battle lines are drawn in which the interests of Latin America and the center, especially the United States, are definitely opposed rather than complementary. A conflict model offers a more com-



plete explanation of the relationships between Latin America and the exterior (Petras, 1968b). Indeed, Frank claims the most backward institutions of Latin America are incorrectly labeled “feudal” since they are actually due directly to involvement with capitalism. Furthermore, the earlier and more persistent the contact with capitalistic institutions, the more backward an area is likely to be (Frank, 1972b:318). According to the radicals, dependent external relations do not merely *shape* internal economic and political decisions, social structure, ideology, and culture; these are largely *determined* by the domination of outside forces or internal controlling groups that benefit from dependence. Foreign aid and foreign investment are seen as unmitigated evils. The increasing penetration of foreign capital within the Latin American Free Trade Area and Central American Common Market that is stimulated by protectionist import substitution policies is adduced as conclusive evidence that any Latin American efforts to improve her condition will be subverted as long as the center-periphery conditions exist.

The radical dependentistas make use of macro-historical analysis as do Furtado, Sunkel, and Dos Santos, but they distinguish themselves from the other theorists by their extensive use of micro-historical research from which they attempt to buttress their case. A further methodological distinction: The manner in which class consciousness and class conflict has developed within a dependent relationship is given much more attention and is more fully woven into their theory of underdevelopment. The moderates are more inclined to explain why strong class consciousness did *not* develop and let it go at that. The manner in which the radicals apply their concepts of social stratification comes under critical review in the following section. Finally, although there is little elaboration on precise mechanisms, it is clear that the radicals favor social revolutions as the means to sever Latin America’s dependent status. We hope to shed further light on their rationale and methodology in the following section that analyzes and critiques their explanations of the failure of revolutionary forces in contemporary Chilean history.

### III. POLITICAL FACTORS IN DEPENDENCY ANALYSIS

The previous section has analyzed the dependency model from a general viewpoint focusing on economic factors. This will discuss the dependentista writings primarily from a political science perspective. Much of the criticism of dependency literature is based on the absence of any empirical data (Ayres, 1972), but there does exist considerable dependency analysis written on Chile since 1970 and therefore this discussion will focus on writings relating to the abortive revolution attempted by Salvador

Allende. The review of the literature is not exhaustive but will concentrate on the work of the radicals; James Petras (1968a, 1973; Petras and Zemelman, 1972); those resulting from the Chile Research Group, chiefly Dale Johnson (1972a, b, c, 1973, 1973[ed.]; and those from NACLA (1973a, b).<sup>11</sup>

One immediate problem presents itself—the dependentistas' preoccupation with Chile. Although Cuba has also offered a showcase for dependency analysis (Zeitlin, 1970; Bray and Harding, 1974), Chile was generally regarded as the most promising example of how to break out of the dependency mold. The other country most often studied by the dependentistas is Brazil, but solely as a case study in fascist dictatorship. With the possible exceptions of Argentina and Guatemala, all other Latin American countries are generally ignored in the concentration on the two polar models of Chile and Brazil. However, this does present a problem for dependency analysis, namely, what is to be done with Peru? The radical dependentistas assume that the *only* means of destroying the existing relationship between the capitalist, developed countries and the underdeveloped countries is through violent revolution carried out by the masses. If such a revolution is unsuccessful, then the likely result will be a neofascist military state. As Cockcroft states, "Latin Americans are left with only two viable alternatives for establishing their political identities: revolutionary nationalism or pro-U.S. militarism" (1972b:118). Johnson adds, "this is the basic alternative for much of the Third World: popular revolution or authoritarian reaction" (1973 [ed.]:33). Petras posits the polarization models of Chile and Brazil as the only models of development (1973). One must be suspicious of any social scientist who offers two choices for any future political/economic development. Surely there may be other possibilities.

More important is that the exclusion of any consideration for a genuine revolution being carried out by the military in Peru is based on the ideological convictions of the dependentistas. They simply refuse to accept even the possibility that the military could effect revolutionary change. Frank concludes that the revolutionary reforms in Peru will lead to nothing more than further dependency (1972a:142–45). Johnson does concede that the Peruvian military is attempting to impose a "kind of revolution," but since it does not include mass participation it can only lead to further dependency and will, of course, eventually fail (1973 [ed.]:46). Chilcote and Edelstein (1974:75) state that only three nations have made any effort to break their dependent relations with the outside world but "the efforts of Peru have already been discounted by Quijano" (Quijano, 1971). Chilcote does later admit that while Quijano's class analysis of Peruvian society is the most sophisticated, it is not yet defini-

tive (Chilcote, 1974:20), and this would seem to pave the way for future analysis of the Peruvian experiment. In general, however, Peru is ignored, and one gets the feeling that the basic reason is that it does not fit the two polarized models thought appropriate. Once again, there may be more than two choices available, and the dependentistas might develop additional alternatives.

Two key political concepts in the dependency approach that must be analyzed are the structures of internal dependence and the subjugation of these internal structures to outside influences. In the analysis of the dependence of internal social and political groups on external factors, the primary focus of dependency theory may be regarded as being in the subfield of comparative politics. However, dependency theory also enters the field of international relations when it stresses the dependent status of these social groups on capitalist systems such as the United States. (In all honesty, we must add, dependency theory does immediately point out the rather arbitrary distinctions between the two subfields in political science and the virtual impossibility of adequately separating the two in field research.) We would, therefore, like to analyze dependency theory from the perspective of existing comparative politics and international relations literature. In a recent book, James Bill and Robert Hardgrave (1973) discuss both the methodological and theoretical difficulties encountered in the use of various approaches to the study of comparative politics. Similarly, an article by Abraham Lowenthal (1973) appears to offer an excellent interpretation of foreign policy analysis towards Latin America. While neither of these two interpretations should be regarded as definitive, they may provide useful frameworks for analyzing the writings of the dependentistas on Chile.

Bill and Hardgrave illustrate that many of the approaches used in comparative politics either present significant methodological problems or contain an inherent bias that should be noted by the observer. For example, the structural-functional approach contains an equilibrium bias that could result in a defense of the status quo. More importantly, especially in terms of dependency theory, one must be very careful to specify the type of approach being used in analyzing any group, elite, or class within a given political system. Group politics, for instance, is ideologically associated with democratic systems such as the United States, and contains the basic assumption that equilibrium is a desired goal. The problem with the political-elite approach is methodological in that research tends to focus on those who have power and ignore those who are excluded from power—and this could make it very difficult to explain a revolution. At the same time, elitist theory may concentrate on those aspects of the modernization process that account generally for deliberate,

reform-oriented change. Class analysis cannot be separated from the assumption of conflict within a society nor can it be clearly distinguished from the ideological predilections of the Marxist approach. The difficulty within comparative politics is that the researcher often does not distinguish analytically whether the group, elite, or class approach is being used. Bill and Hardgrave do not exclude the possibility of using a combination of all three approaches: "An eclectic utilization of all three approaches has become a promising method of confronting social problems and political issues. Any successful integration of approaches, however presupposes a careful and detailed dissection and differentiation of each of the elements involved. In other words, a sound *synthesis* of approaches rests upon a prior *analysis* of the approaches in question" (1973:192). From the perspective of comparative politics, then, the central question is just how analytically and methodologically rigorous have the dependentistas been in their assessment of internal groups within Latin America?

Obviously, dependency theory cannot be considered outside the framework of class analysis. Dependency analysis is intimately linked to Marxism and therefore contains the key element of class. Immediately this presents problems. "For Marx, 'class' was more significant in terms of political strategy than in terms of conceptual clarity" (Bill and Hardgrave, 1973:184). The strategy goal of the radical dependentistas is readily apparent in their acknowledged aim of revolution to destroy the capitalist system. One can understand the ideological conviction; what remains to be discussed is the methodological clarity in refining the concept of class within the framework of dependency analysis. Or, as phrased by Suzanne Bodenheimer: "What is the infrastructure (internal structure) of dependency?" (1971:337–38).

The available dependency analysis of internal groups operating in Latin America would indicate that the dependentistas are none too sure themselves what specific groups, attitudes, or behavior should be stressed. In none of the writings is a clear definition of the concept of class given. Frank acknowledged several years ago that there was still an inadequate analysis of class in Latin America, and those dependency theorists writing on Chile most certainly have not contributed to analytical clarity (Frank, 1967a:xxii). The only objective effort to define the Chilean middle class is that of Richard Feinberg, who identified it as the 20 percent of all Chileans who enjoy the highest income (NACLA, 1973a:28). One could rightly quibble that this definition must certainly include some who would have to be classified as upper class, not to mention the fact that only one indicator of class is used. More important, in the dependency writings there is an indiscriminate use of different terms, such as "elite,"

“strata,” “class,” and “group,” which is confusing and totally lacking in any analytical or methodological conceptualization. Even the term “sector” is employed by Johnson and Petras and this is perplexing since it would appear to be an endorsement of the John Johnson thesis that class in Latin America has not emerged in the Marxist sense (Johnson, 1958). Dependency analysis requires a far more rigorous definition of class than has been forthcoming so far.

The recent effort of Chilcote and Edelstein to differentiate clearly between the diffusion model and the dependency model has, if anything, contributed to further confusion (1974:59). They argue that “class” is an economic term and “rule” is a political term, and the “ruling class” is characterized by such factors as wide, general scope of authority, a closed system, coincidence of interests, recruitment by ascription, loss of democracy, and increased dependence on foreign interests. Then we are told: “Another problem is that the middle class is usually economically and socially dependent on the upper strata of Latin American society; they are tied to the ruling class, conservative, they defend the status quo, and they seek individual privileges” (Chilcote and Edelstein, 1974:58). We have no particular quarrel with the general conclusion; indeed our observations would tend to support the findings with respect to attitudes found in the middle class. But how is one to operationalize, in research terms, such disparate concepts as “middle class,” “upper strata,” and “ruling class.” Our sympathies are with the graduate student going forth to conduct field research with such a weak analytical framework.

In the case of Chile, perhaps because of a lack of rigorous definitions, we are never given a clear picture of what precise groups, elites, or classes have become dependent. The most comprehensive discussion is provided by Petras (1969) prior to his full conversion to dependency theory. Nowhere in dependency materials does one find a systematic outline of the various groups, elites, or classes operating in Chile. This is further confused by indiscriminate references to upper class, bourgeoisie, middle class, strata or sector, industrial class, working class, lumpenproletariat, peasant, *ad infinitum*. By far the most comprehensive discussion of class is that provided by the Chileans themselves, especially the one by MAPU—Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (Johnson, 1973: 207–38). MAPU defines class in the Marxist sense of groups distinguished by their various relationships to the means of production. It then establishes two broad classes in Chile, the bourgeoisie (or capitalist) and the proletariat, with several subdivisions within each class. MAPU points out that certain social strata, such as bureaucrats, the armed forces, students, domestic servants, and the lumpenproletariat, cannot be classified as classes. In addition, two other groups cannot be designated as classes—

the peasants and the middle class. The middle class is a "hollow phrase" since it includes classes and strata so disparate that they cannot be defined simply as one. Apparently what is lacking is any sense of class consciousness or class identification.

It seems to us that dependency analysis is heavily reliant on specifying what precise classes and groups are dependent on outside capitalists. We are not quite sure to what groups (elites, classes) the dependentistas are referring in the case of Chile. A glaring omission is the failure to discuss systematically certain key actors in Chilean politics. For example, there has been little analysis of the military, with the exception of a brief mention by Richard Feinberg and Robinson Rojas, although every dependentista seemed well aware of the fact that the armed forces could step in at any moment to overthrow the Allende government (Rojas, 1973; Feinberg, 1974). One would expect to find some detailed analysis of the Chilean military, but the search is in vain. The same is largely true for both students and the church. Two factors probably explain this lack: First, the failure to develop clear conceptual models or schemes for analyzing the groups in Chile could blind one to the potential role of certain groups; second, and more important, the convenient scapegoat becomes the bourgeoisie, a nameless and unanalyzed "they," which really does not require specific data.

Perhaps the fundamental difficulty is best illustrated by Bodenheim:

Without getting into an extensive discussion of what is meant by "social class," it should nevertheless be understood that the concept of "class" does not refer simply to one-dimensional income, occupation, "status," or "interest" groups. Membership in a particular class implies, in addition to a certain level of income, etc., a "mode of life" and a structural position in relation to other classes in the society, giving rise to a class consciousness, to class interests, and to sharp struggles with other classes (1971:337).

What is required then, is some degree of class consciousness. The dependentistas must introduce this concept in Marxist terms to show the inherent conflict generated by the class struggle. The bourgeoisie is dependent because it recognizes that it is the best means of retaining a superior position within the political system as well as keeping other classes in their inferior and subjugated roles. To the naive non-Marxist (a position to which we readily relegate ourselves), class consciousness should be something that can be clearly defined and established through the use of modern social science techniques. How well, then, have the dependentistas dispelled some of the doubts and uncertainties about class consciousness in Chile?

To be perfectly honest, they have totally confused us. This is

especially true in the analysis presented for peasants, workers, and industrialists. At one point Petras informs us that Unidad Popular measures have radicalized the peasantry and capitalism appears to be on the road to extinction in the Chilean countryside (1973:24). In another work, however, we are told that the process of land seizure in one Chilean case study resulted in the bourgeoisieification of the peasants (Petras and Zemelman, 1972). In the latter case, the repressive nature of capitalism eventually led to the alienation of the peasants and they became increasingly radicalized during the 1960s. Collective self-expression then became evident in the slogan, "the land for those who work it." At the start of the seizure of land from their capitalist landowners, the peasants displayed a class consciousness truly worthy of the rural proletariat. Unfortunately, the peasants then began to lapse back into a capitalism, as they became primarily interested in the personal profit to be realized from the land as individuals. Petras and Zemelman appear to have misinterpreted, as do other Marxists, the relationship of the peasant to the land. Perhaps "the land for those who work it" always meant that the peasant expected to reap the rewards of working the land for himself. It appears to us that there may have been a misunderstanding of the basic desires of the Chilean peasant, primarily because of the preconceived concept of class consciousness. Incidentally, one should not preclude the ultimate success of agrarian reform in Chile, or elsewhere, solely on the basis that the peasantry failed to develop a truly proletarian class consciousness.

In a more recent work, Petras claims that the tradition of class struggle has turned the industrial workers into a cohesive organization based on class solidarity: "The idea that the working class could combine and act as a class in favor of a socialist society against capitalistic exploitation and inequality seems to have eluded scores of U.S. investigators who claim to study the lower classes in Latin America" (1973:12). The industrial working class in Chile has been truly radicalized by the failure of Chilean and U.S. capitalism (1973:17). Later we are told that the copper miners have developed "little in the way of a radical political consciousness," and that the "real question facing the Left is its ability to transform the 'economist' consciousness of its supporters into 'socialist' consciousness" (1973:31–32). He then goes on to note that the "working class is not a homogeneous entity with the same level of class consciousness," and that there are even significant differences of consciousness among workers in the same industry. Petras analyzes several different groups in Chile including the copper miners, supervisors in the mines, workers, executives and trade union leaders in the textile industry, agrarian workers, and urban land squatters. Although he notes evidence of militance in all of these groups, he does seem somewhat pessimistic about the general level

of socialist consciousness emerging among them. Most of them, including the workers, seem to be far more interested in making money than in taking any collective socialistic action on a class basis. The single exception is urban land squatters, among whom he finds the emergence of the "new socialist man" concept enunciated by Che Guevara. We are led to wonder whether or not the working class has actually developed a class consciousness, a class solidarity, to overthrow their dependent status. From the confusing analysis presented by Petras we must count ourselves among the "score of U.S. investigators" who cannot find a class consciousness in the Chilean worker. The example of the working class would appear to be an analysis in which ideological predilections have interfered with conceptual clarity.<sup>12</sup>

In the analysis of industrialists, the dependentistas seem to go much farther towards proving their fundamental hypothesis. Dos Santos's investigation of the Brazilian industrial class directly links their position to foreign investment (Dos Santos, 1968a:431–53). In one of the more rigorous methodological efforts, Petras and Thomas Cook have demonstrated that Argentine industrialists are likely to support foreign participation in the Argentine economy (1973:143–92). Although several questions remain with respect to the conclusions reached, at least the sample appears large enough to verify the responses.

Similarly, the NACLA group does have considerable evidence (much of it based on Chilean writers) of the dependent status of certain industrialists, especially the Edwards and Yarur families, on outside capitalists (NACLA, 1973b:79–81). Nonetheless, we are still somewhat confused about these industrialists, particularly by an article by Dale Johnson (1972c). Johnson established that the Chilean industrialists were not opposed to foreign investment, nor were they especially linked with any developmental ideology. The conclusion he reached, well within the boundaries of dependency theory, is that industrialists are neither nationalist nor progressive in their basic orientations. Then he adds that the industrialists lack a sense of group identification, that they are fragmented, with a sense of community limited primarily to the family. They do not support their trade associations and the demands they make on the political system are normally made through personal contact rather than institutional channels. He further notes, "these conclusions on the political influence of Chilean industrialists are valid whether one assumes a pluralist or elitist model of power structure in the country" (1972c:206). In a subsequent article he stresses that there is an absence of any significant level of political activity by industrial interests (1973[ed.]:38).

This analysis raises several questions, not the least being the introduction of extraordinarily complex (and largely confined to the U.S.



system) frameworks, such as the pluralist and elitist models, in such an offhand fashion with no follow-up. Dependency analysis seems to absolutely require a demonstration that the dependent classes in the less developed world recognize their superior positions within their own society and act in a unified and cohesive manner to protect themselves. But, apparently, Chilean industrialists do not use the political system in any organized fashion to defend their status and privileged position, and seem to have very little perception of class interests.

If this is the case there would appear to be a serious breach in dependency analysis, since the dependentistas would have to prove that the upper class acts to suppress other class interests in the society. Two observations seem in order. First, the rather mechanistic employment of the Marxist concept of class may underrate the role played by individualism and *personalismo* in Latin American political culture. Second, and far more important from the dependency perspective, the very dependence of these privileged classes may prevent them from perceiving their dependent status. In other words, dependency itself may be responsible for their basically antinational and anticlass attitudes and perhaps dependentistas should explore how external factors lead to these misperceptions. Efforts to establish class consciousness among different groups have, instead, shown no readily perceived class consciousness; thus it might be explained why no class consciousness has developed.

It would seem evident, therefore, that the dependency writers have not been sufficiently rigorous in their analysis of class and society in Latin America, especially regarding Chile. We are never quite sure what classes exist, nor of their relationship to each other and to the political system. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence concerning the dependence of the various groups on outside capitalists. Devotion of greater time and effort to a more systematic methodological approach within the confines of dependentista predilections would be helpful.

The dependentistas have been far more successful in accumulating data in support of the contention that United States foreign policy supports capitalism and the dependency status of Latin American states. Ample evidence exists that foreign policy is aimed at perpetuating the dependency of the less developed countries; again, our analysis will concentrate primarily on Chile because more data has been gathered on the abortive Chilean revolution than for any other country. The dependentistas have illustrated that United States foreign policy towards the Allende government revolved principally around the problem of compensation for nationalized industry (especially the copper mines of three U.S.-owned firms—Anaconda, Kennecott, and Cerro), as well as ideological opposition from other structures such as the CIA and ITT. It

should be stressed that the dependency writers were the first to point out these activities and subsequent disclosures have supported their contentions more often than not. There is ample evidence to demonstrate that the Nixon administration used official government agencies, international banks, and other pressures to erect a *bloqueo invisible* around Chile. This presented the Allende government with formidable economic problems that made it extremely difficult to carry out revolutionary changes. Our concern is less with the economic manipulations and intelligence shenanigans than it is with the analysis of the dependentistas concerning the monolithic nature of United States foreign policy.<sup>13</sup>

As Lowenthal points out, the major goal of the radicals (dependentistas) is to demonstrate that the United States foreign policies serve the expansive interests of North American capitalism (1973:9–11). Furthermore, dependency writers conceive of inter-American relations as a conflict (from their Marxist assumptions) between the United States attempting to dominate Latin America and the Latin Americans trying to assert their national sovereignty. Lowenthal notes that both the traditional liberals and the radicals utilize the “rational policy model,” assuming that foreign policy is the result of calculated, unitary, and rational actors. He suggests that this approach is an unrealistic view of decision-making and that a “bureaucratic politics model” would offer a far better analysis. In essence, the bureaucratic politics model simply means that the researcher must focus on different agencies and individuals in the decision-making process to determine what roles they played in the ultimate policy. He notes that a good many divergent interests and views are likely to come into play in the making of United States foreign policy, and any accurate assessment of that policy requires a description of these different actors. The dependency writers have given more than an adequate description of the actors involved in United States–Chilean relations; we intend to review their analysis employing the two models developed by Lowenthal.

In a generally excellent article, Petras and LaPorte state that U.S. policy towards Latin America is considered on the basis of cost-benefit analysis within the framework of the Cold War, and that decisions are not the result of “irrational, misinformed, or misunderstood individuals” (1973: 196). This statement seemingly sets the stage for a rational policy approach. The Chilean decision to nationalize the copper interests presented U.S. business interests with “the most significant challenge to U.S. policy since the Cuban Revolution” (1973:198). The entire “aim of U.S. policy makers is to pressure the Chilean government to meet U.S. corporate compensation demands” (1973:201). They then proceed to

analyze the various governmental and nongovernmental agencies involved in the U.S. policy-making process.

Basically the argument presented is that Secretary of Treasury John Connally dominated the policy process and forged a unified, cohesive policy among all the governmental agencies concerned. Given the dominant role played by Connally in this period of the Nixon administration, such an assertion appears basically correct. The State Department represented the "position of moderation" in the initial period of the Allende government, but it was soon forced to acquiesce as Latin American policy was shifted to the Treasury. (It is wise to keep in mind that Kissinger had centralized decision making in the National Security Council and the State Department often lost out in that forum.) The State Department had many officials who continued to view Chile in terms of the Cold War, but, more important, it had very little input into U.S. policy. The Treasury Department, according to the authors, can be regarded as little more than the spokesman of U.S. corporate interests, with the major goal being to put as much pressure as possible for compensation on the Allende government through the international banks. The Treasury generally controls these banks and it was most forceful in articulating the need for the invisible blockade until compensation was forthcoming.

They are quite correct in pointing out that the international banks often serve the interests of U.S. foreign policy. A recent study released by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations fully supports the contentions of the dependentistas (U.S. Senate, 1973). The Export-Import Bank, for example, is an official organ of the U.S. government and directly under the secretary of the Treasury. U.S. interests in the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank are also paramount. Petras and LaPorte conclude, "it is clear from the record, then, that the 'international' lending agencies are mere appendages of the U.S. government" (1973: 219). In this context we would not dispute the conclusion.

The Congress was a different story, since "neither House nor Senate leadership enunciated a specific policy toward Chile" (Petras and LaPorte, 1973:209). The dependentistas are particularly vitriolic with respect to certain "liberal" representatives, such as Senator Jacob Javits, who presented the view "that American capital should not be infringed upon even when foreign political leadership has a democratically based consensus to limit exploitation of national resources by these corporations" (1973:210). They note that it is clear from the debates in Congress over Chilean policy that liberal and conservative opinion was united in support of U.S. business interests. It is added, however, that left-wing liberals, such as Frank Church and Edward Kennedy, expressed opinions quite different from the unanimous view of Congress. In the House, opinion

was fully in support of Treasury, although at the end of one debate Petras and LaPorte concluded, "along with a growing mood of hostility and frustration over the failure to hold back nationalism, some U.S. Congressmen have turned against the very corporations they are so angrily defending" (1973:216).

Business is regarded as a coherent and unified group that acts through its chief lobbyist, the Council of the Americas. These industrialists consult regularly with government officials (and often serve themselves as decision-makers) to closely supervise U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. Another nongovernmental agency involved is the Council on Foreign Relations, which actively supported the Nixon administration position on Chile. Finally, Henry Kissinger was groomed for his current job through his membership on the Council on Foreign Relations and his intimate ties with the Rockefeller family; of course, everyone is familiar with the Rockefeller holdings in Latin America.

In general we support the contentions of the dependentistas, especially those relating to the activities of the international banks and the Department of the Treasury in creating the invisible blockade around the Allende government. Nevertheless, we do have some reservations. A basic difficulty is that the view of the policy-making process is too simplified and ideologically convenient. Johnson carries this simplistic approach much further than Petras and LaPorte when he contends that a most fruitful approach to policy analysis would be to focus on "official conspiracies" (Johnson, 1973:51), the "natural phenomena" that can fully explain foreign policy. We regard suspiciously any social scientist viewing a complex process such as foreign policy making as simple conspiracy. Does the conspiracy as a natural phenomena only occur in capitalist states? Evidence of internal disagreements in socialist states over foreign policy (e.g., Che Guevara's differences with Fidel Castro over Cuban support for revolutionary movements in Latin America) is readily available, and we wonder if they too would be classified as conspiracies. If not, then there may well be something wrong with the analytical tool. It appears to us, rather, as a convenient device for excluding contradictory evidence, or to make the data fit preconceived assumptions. Let us repeat that this does not mean that there was not a unified, rational policy in support of U.S. corporate interests; rather it means that a large amount of data must be presented to prove the hypothesis.

We do not find that mass of data. Moreover, there is considerable evidence given by the dependentistas that could be used to support the bureaucratic politics model instead of the rational policy model they employ. Obviously, there were considerable differences of opinion between State and Treasury, and one suspects that those differences may

have been evident in the actual conduct of diplomatic relations in Chile itself, since the State Department could be expected to dominate in-country. Treasury could block transactions in the international market (recent disclosures by customs agents, for example, indicate they were told to hold up all contact with Chile), but is it not feasible that State could differ in terms of internal relations in Chile? In an interview, President Allende, when asked if the U.S. government had applied any pressure on him, replied: "No, none" (NACLA, 1973b:18). The interview took place in January 1971, prior to the effects of the invisible blockade, but is it possible that he perceived no active opposition to his administration from the U.S. because he was primarily dealing with State Department officials? We would also like to see some mention of the roles of other governmental agencies. For instance, what was the position of the Department of Defense and how was it carried out? One gets a little tired of the simplistic argument that since the Chilean officers were trained in the U.S. and carried U.S. weapons, they may be regarded as instruments of U.S. foreign policy (Feinberg, 1974:20). Where is the evidence for such a conclusion?<sup>14</sup>

The evidence submitted concerning the Congress appears to support greatly the bureaucratic politics approach. It is apparent that opinion was divided, but the conclusion that Congress was unified in its support of multinational interests becoming dominant in Chilean policy seems to fly in the face of the data presented. Opposition to administration policy voiced by key senators and congressmen does not indicate a unified policy. We are informed, however, that Congress is of little importance in the policy process "except where the position of Congress coincides with that of the executive branch and the business community" (Petras and LaPorte, 1973:228). We think both the Nixon and Ford administrations would be surprised to discover that Congress plays no role in the foreign policy-making process. Secretary of State Kissinger will be reassured to know that Congress will play no role in the renegotiation of the Panama Canal Treaty!

The bureaucratic politics model requires an analysis of the individual attitudinal patterns of those who participate in the policy-making process. Petras and LaPorte note: "The overlap in policy is largely a result of the career patterns and prior socialization of many of the leading policy makers; individuals who have come from corporate related careers and/or who may be headed for such a career, but who in any case share many of the key beliefs associated with business enterprise" (1973:229). Considerable suggestive evidence is offered (although direct links are not specifically stated) concerning the individuals involved in the key decisions over Chilean policy. John Connally, for example, is the legal representative of

such firms as Brown and Root, which have important interests in Latin America, although nothing is specifically mentioned of their projects in Chile. Peter G. Peterson, former president of Bell and Howell and chief advisor to the president for international economic policy, was the author of a report calling for an activist role by the U.S. government in protecting business interests abroad. (Recent disclosures point out that Mr. Peterson's secretary was on loan from the CIA, and that *is* a direct link.) The majority of those involved in the Chilean decisions were, indeed, closely tied to corporate industry. A basic problem, not fully pursued in dependency analysis, is to demonstrate that as decision makers, individuals acted in the interests of multinational corporations; but we believe the dependentistas have acquired considerable evidence to illustrate that these business interests were certainly present in the decision-making process. We are not quite sure, however, that any alternatives are available. Is it possible to find decision makers not socialized into the key beliefs of U.S. business enterprise? Socialization into these beliefs is so deeply ingrained in the U.S. system that it would appear impossible to obtain decision makers who would not consider them, especially in a Republican administration.

In some cases there may be inaccurate assessments of individual behavior. For instance, the replacement of Ambassador Edward Korry by Nathaniel Davis was generally regarded as a move to replace the hard-line Korry with a more malleable and soft-line diplomat, especially on the issue of compensation (Gil, 1973:35). Even NACLA regarded Korry as a representative of the position taken by the Treasury Department (1973b: 47). Yet Johnson feels that since Davis was ambassador to Guatemala in 1954, the move really represented a strengthening of the counterrevolutionary forces (1973:45). Thus we see a rare phenomenon, a difference of opinion among dependency analysts concerning the change in ambassadors.

The case against Henry Kissinger is even more dubious. To link Kissinger to Rockefeller interests in Latin America because of his membership in the Council on Foreign Relations seems to be vastly oversimplistic. The dependentistas believe Kissinger's policy towards Latin America is based on support of Rockefeller interests. A more realistic appraisal of Kissinger's Latin American policy, at least prior to his appointment as secretary of state, was that he simply did not regard Latin America as very important in his balance-of-power scheme. The rapprochement with China and the detente with the Soviet Union, Europe, Vietnam, and the Middle East were all far more important than Latin America. Recent policy changes, such as settlement of the compensation issue over IPC with Peru, the renegotiation of the Panama Canal Treaty,

new contacts with Cuba, and the much-heralded (if low-cost) New Dialogue, all indicate that Kissinger can break the mold of recent U.S. policy towards Latin America when he is interested. (We should also mention one unfortunate problem with dependency analysis. Abraham Lowenthal currently works with the Council on Foreign Relations. We can see that it would be easy to discount his bureaucratic politics approach by simply noting his membership in the Council. We would only ask that the dependentistas exert themselves to directly connect Lowenthal's analysis with his membership.)

Another major difficulty with dependency analysis, in terms of the rational policy model, is the view of U.S. business as a cohesive and coordinated group. There is considerable evidence that the policies of the corporations involved in Chile were divided and fragmented and not conscious, rational, or unified. In the nefarious schemes of ITT exposed by Jack Anderson, for example, there is little evidence that other corporate interests supported ITT. More important, T. H. Moran has demonstrated that there was a basic difference in policy between the two copper mining giants, Kennecott and Anaconda (1973). Kennecott had recognized the threat of nationalization and prepared a long-range strategy to minimize losses. Anaconda, on the other hand, did not, and was at the mercy of the Chilean demands. Kennecott was able to exert tremendous pressure on Chile through European and Japanese banks and governments. Since 70 to 80 percent of Chilean copper went to Europe or Japan, this also brings into question the direct ties between the copper companies and the U.S. government. Incidentally, the Kennecott example suggests that efforts by nation-states to regulate multinational or transnational companies may be doomed to failure without intergovernmental cooperation (Moore, 1973). The president of Cerro Corporation, another of the copper companies, admitted that they were having no trouble at all in Chile (Gil, 1973:44). There is also very little discussion or explanation by the dependentistas of why some MNCs were not nationalized by the Allende government. Perhaps a different type of analysis should have been employed.<sup>15</sup> What all this suggests is that there is scanty evidence of a "conspiracy" among U.S. corporations, and that perhaps more attention should have been paid to existing policy differences within the business community.

One final remark: In his analysis of three fallacies of the dependency model, David Ray notes that dependentistas attribute dependency only to capitalism and fail to consider other forms of dependency, such as that of the Eastern European bloc on the Soviet Union (1973:8–10). Johnson refuses to accept the dependency status of Cuba, as do most other scholars (Johnson, 1973 [ed. ]:3; Bray and Harding, 1974). In the analysis

of Chile, the dependency writers totally ignore this type of dependency. Yet aid from the socialist bloc grew rapidly in two short years to over \$400 million with the Soviet Union contributing \$259 million (NACLA, 1973a: 21). Most of the funds were long-term loans to be used to import capital or transport equipment. One would expect to find somewhere in dependency writings at least a mention of the possibility that this aid could lead to another form of dependency; but there is none.

It does not seem to us that the dependentistas have proved that U.S. policy towards Chile was monolithic in nature and in full support of the multinational companies' interests. We do believe there was an invisible blockade that certainly benefited multinational interests, and we accept the fact that certain governmental agencies actively worked for the overthrow of the Allende government. The difficulty is that the rational policy model does not appear to fit the data. Further analysis, we think, will demonstrate that the bureaucratic politics model is a far better instrument to employ in the assessment of U.S. policy towards Latin America.

#### IV. SOME CRITICISMS, SOME SUGGESTIONS

One of the more disconcerting foibles of dependency writers is their frequent acceptance and promulgation of a particular line of analysis without dealing properly with a respectable, well conceived, contrary view. An excellent case in point is Raúl Prebisch's thesis of a long-term decline in the terms of trade of raw commodity producing or periphery countries. As early as the mid-1950s, P. T. Ellsworth observed: "There are few harder perennials among discussions of international economic relations than the problem of the terms of trade between primary-producing and industrial countries" (1956:47). The same could be said today; dependency analysts typically cite the thesis of a secular decline in the terms of trade of developing nations with little or no critical comment.

This is hardly the proper vehicle in which to attempt a resolution of the argument, but a few elements in the controversy might serve as an indication that there is indeed a legitimate dispute. Prebisch's original analysis rested heavily on two statistical series, one running from 1876 to 1938 and a later series from 1950 to 1961. As interpreted by Prebisch, the commodity terms of trade (the price index of exports divided by the price index of imports) of periphery countries fell during both periods. Both of these statistical series have been roundly criticized. The early series (1876–1938) relied solely on Great Britain's imports from Latin America. Since Great Britain's import prices were *c.i.f.*, however, a fall in the cost of transportation could have accounted for most or all of the improvement



of Great Britain's terms of trade and account for the inferred deterioration in the position of Latin America. From 1870 to 1913, freight rates are estimated to have fallen by about 50 percent (Baldwin, 1955:269). Furthermore, the early statistical series ended during a period of world-wide depression when one would expect prices for raw commodities to be abnormally low due to depressed demand. Also, Charles P. Kindleberger (1956), challenging the use of Great Britain as a proxy for all industrialized countries, found no reliable trend when he constructed rough trade indices for other industrialized European countries covering the same period. The same danger is encountered by using Latin America as a proxy for all periphery countries. Similar objections can be levied at the later statistical series. They begin at the height of a boom period during the Korean war, when raw commodity prices improved substantially, and end in a period marked by recession in the United States. Also, petroleum was inexplicably not included in these statistics.

More generalized reservations abound. The trade statistics do not reflect changes in quality of goods that would presumably occur most dramatically in nonprimary products (Viner, 1952:143). Similarly, the statistics do not satisfactorily measure enhanced utility from the introduction of new products. Trade in services or "intangibles" is not included in the commodity terms of trade. Also, what if stages of declining commodity terms of trade can be explained by conditions peculiar to each period without relying on Prebisch's more global explanation? Indeed, Ellsworth (1956) gives a convincing exposition of such explanations. The picture is further complicated in view of much primary commodity exports by developed countries and growing industrial exports by developing nations. Moreover, *some* raw commodities, silver for instance, tend to be income elastic rather than the reverse.

Then there are more fundamental attacks. Haberler (1961) points out that the commodity terms of trade is not an unambiguous measure of economic welfare. Under some conditions the income terms of trade or single factorial terms of trade may be a better indication, and it is possible that these can move in the opposite direction from the commodity terms of trade. And what about periods not covered by Prebisch's data? P. T. Bauer calculates that the terms of trade of the less developed world improved from an index number of 80 in 1938, to 95 in 1948, and to 100 by 1963. There was a slight improvement from 1963 to 1969 (1972:241).

All of this ignores the question of where to put the blame. A rapid population growth probably adversely affects the terms of trade (Viner, 1952:143). Gerald Meier, in a sophisticated analysis too lengthy to review here, gives us reason to believe that virtually any innovation leading to an increase in productivity in developing nations will deteriorate the terms

of trade (1968). Finally, we should note that all of these arguments were marshalled *before* the monumental increases in the prices of raw commodities since 1970. The long-term decline in terms of trade for less developed countries is then very much in doubt. These issues are for the most part ignored by the dependency school. The “hardy perennial” thrives, but at what cost in terms of misguided policies penalizing raw commodity production, pursuing high cost industrialization, restricting trade, etc.?

Unfortunately, the terms of trade issue is not the only one to receive cavalier treatment. The normal handling of foreign investment by dependency writers is, similarly, all too primitive. Virtually all dependentistas are concerned with (1) amortization and repatriated profits and interest on existing debt exceeding the value of new inflows of investment into Latin America, (2) the increasing tendency for reinvested profits to account for a greater proportion of investment (new investment flows are “drying up”), (3) foreign investment increasingly financed by funds obtained locally, and (4) purchases of existing firms previously owned by Latin American entrepreneurs (the “denationalization” of Latin American enterprise). The concern with each of these trends is perfectly legitimate, but the common tendency (Wionczek is a notable exception) is to mention these trends in passing, along with occasional supportive data, and leave the impression that each constitutes an unmitigated evil. Frankly, our own instincts lead us to be somewhat sympathetic with this position; but it remains unproved, as almost any undergraduate text on international trade will substantiate.<sup>16</sup>

In evaluating the contribution to economic welfare from foreign investment, one does not look merely to the net balance-of-payments effect of past and current investment, but the net investment. Even the more narrow balance-of-payments effect is not unambiguous. How does one know, for instance, that much foreign investment has not resulted in substantial savings in foreign exchange through producing goods that substitute for those previously imported? What is the fundamental difference between reinvested profits and an additional inflow of investment; cannot each reinvestment, from a theoretical standpoint, be considered as money repatriated and then recycled to the original country? When funds are obtained locally by foreigners, does this represent a net increase in the total amount of resources allocated to investment? When a purchase of a domestic firm takes place, are not these funds available for reinvestment by the recipients? All of these questions, in addition to a host of others, must be answered concerning foreign investment’s impact on learning and acquisition of human skills, changes in demand patterns, increased use of fallow resources, changes in patterns of income distribu-

tion, alterations of bargaining power between host and foreign affiliate, absolute amounts and relative amounts of taxes paid, introduction of new technology, and so forth. With the exception of Wionczek this much needed work is either ignored altogether or included in a fragmented form.

If we may zero-in on one dependency writer in particular, Raúl Prebisch has exhibited several irritating tendencies that are apropos of the foregoing remarks: (1) Seldom does he answer or even acknowledge the existence of critics; (2) in each new publication the tacit assumption is made that the reader is familiar with all of his previous works and that the salient arguments in these works are now firmly accepted; and (3) often articles are published under the auspices of an agency that he heads, with the clear stamp of the Prebisch style and viewpoint, but without his name as author. We all lose by such cloistered behavior and we can only hope that the new-found academic respectability of dependency theory will lead to a fruitful interaction between dependentistas and their critics.

Turning to another important matter, we have been unable to discover anything resembling a population policy for Latin America in the dependency literature. André Gunder Frank and Arturo Bonilla, in fact, refer to the theory of the population explosion and the implications for economic backwardness as a doubtful thesis (1972:315). This will not do. In view of the widespread belief that a slowing down of the rate of population growth in developing countries would contribute substantially to increased per capita incomes, we are at least deserving of an explanation or refutation. Perhaps the most dramatic claims have been made by Stephen Enke, whose original analysis implied that a dollar spent on slowing the population growth could increase per capita income one hundred times more than spending on orthodox investment in plant and equipment. Although subsequent criticism has shown this estimate to be on the optimistic side, if Enke is anywhere in or close to "the ballpark," population policy cannot be ignored.<sup>17</sup>

Aside from the supposed impact on incomes, high rates of population growth exacerbate the already staggering problem of absorbing redundant labor productively and concomitantly contribute to the social, economic, and political marginalization of large segments of the population. Since these are problems often touched upon by dependency writers, at least these aspects of population policy beg to be either integrated or explained away. Moreover, since the difference in fertility rates among income groups is not believed to be pronounced and desirable positions at the top of the occupational ladder are hard to come by, there is a constant downward drift of displaced or excess members of the elite filtering into occupations usually available to the middle rung of society. Anyone

achieving upward social mobility must not only contend with the ordinary institutional rigidities, but also must swim upstream against the upper-crust fallout. The devastating toll on latent achievement motivation is obvious.<sup>18</sup>

Another objection to the dependency claims regards the degree to which internal Latin American decisions can lead to greater independence. Is Latin American policy as circumscribed as the radicals would have us believe? Following Ray (1973) and the conservative dependency writers, we have reason to doubt such an extreme position. There appear to be a variety of viable policy options open to Latin American countries that can ameliorate the intensity of dependence, a move toward the independent end of the spectrum that the either-or, do-or-die, totally dependent-totally independent mentality does not consider.

Latin American policy regarding science and technology affords a good case in point. Few would question the following harsh realities: (1) Most new technology is generated in mature industrial countries, (2) much new technology, evolving as it does in high wage countries, usually represents a poor fit to labor surplus periphery countries, and (3) periphery countries usually acquire technology, especially proprietary technology, under disadvantageous market conditions. Yet Latin America has reacted to these conditions and perhaps could take additional steps that would enhance her degree of independence from external forces as they now exist.

Already Argentina, Brazil, the Andean Pact countries, and Mexico have passed laws regulating the acquisition of technology.<sup>19</sup> Among these laws, all established between December 1970 and January 1973, those of the Andean Pact countries and Mexico are especially rigorous. The Mexican law applies not only to contracts involving patents and licenses, but can be applied to blueprints, engineering specifications, etc. In addition, there is growing evidence that Latin American nations could undertake a number of measures to improve their internal research and development capabilities, the pay-off from which can be substantial.<sup>20</sup> We might also point out that recent empirical research implies that Latin American entrepreneurs may not be handicapped in their efforts to acquire new technology vis-à-vis their foreign counterparts. Loretta Fairchild, after extensive interviews with indigenous and foreign entrepreneurs in Monterrey, Mexico, found that Mexican entrepreneurs *felt* that they were unable to acquire technology on an equal footing with foreign firms, but in actual fact, they were at no severe disadvantage. While no one claims Monterrey is typical of Latin America as a whole, the Fairchild study does at least indicate that under favorable conditions, such as long traditions of entrepreneurs relatively independent of government au-

thority and rapid industrial growth, the more extreme dependency syndrome does not apply.<sup>21</sup>

Turning to a different point, the enormous proliferation of literature dealing with MNCs inclines us to feel that we can offer greater contributions on less illuminated areas. One comment, however, proves beyond our ability to resist. MNCs have moved to a central position of the dependence theories of Furtado, Sunkel, and Dos Santos while playing a major role in the analytical framework of the radical group. One is tempted to suggest that rather than analyzing the MNCs as a vehicle emanating from the center that dominates the periphery, perhaps the real "pay dirt" will come from centering on the conflict of interest between the MNCs and *nationalism* without regard for the degree of development. After all, Canada and France have been among the most militant countries against foreign investment; a representative from Texas has championed a bill limiting foreign control of businesses in the United States; and the Burke-Hartke bill, if passed, would represent a blow against investment leaving the United States.<sup>22</sup>

The moderates (especially) and radicals leave themselves open to further criticism by being rather vague on policy issues. If we look for detailed, step-by-step descriptions of how a "strong state capitalism," "popular democracy," or "social revolution" is going to come about, we search in vain. Is it their purpose only to issue the clarion call? Or are there inexorable forces at work so that one merely stands back and watches it happen? Or are precise strategies not revealed for fear of giving undue advantages to opposing forces? We are not really told. We can press this argument further. Given a social revolution, what is the optimal model for Latin America? What are the elements from other socialist experiences that may fit well into the Latin American scene? We do certainly get some glimpses of how agriculture should be reorganized, or income distributed on a different pattern, etc., and admittedly we get strong inferences of what should be eliminated, but the complete design envisioned for the future is never displayed.

If we may depart from the foregoing format for a moment, there are two positive aspects to dependency theory that should be mentioned. Standing in opposition to the dependency thesis is the research performed by "gradualists" or "incrementalists" (e.g., Albert Hirschman), defined here as those who believe if enough small decisions and projects are pulled off in the correct manner, Latin America can indeed move in the right direction. The dependentistas are attempting to bypass this opposition through an end run, and quite legitimately so! If they can demonstrate that apparent successes at the micro-level have the benefits leeches off through unjustified channeling of income within the country

or leaked outside in excessive profits, much of the gradualists' thunder is taken away. The dependentistas can claim the reverse of the old punch line: Each individual project yields a benefit but the gains are lost through volume. In our opinion, the dependentistas have placed an additional burden of proof on gradualist studies to trace through the *ultimate* social benefits of individual decisions or projects as well as the immediate cost-benefit gains.

Similarly, dependency writers have a right to demand an answer on another score, that of income distribution. One can argue the question of efficiency and growth achieved by socialism vis-à-vis capitalism, but in terms of achieving a more egalitarian distribution of income, socialist policy is undeniably the winner. There is ample nondependentista, as well as conservative dependentista, literature that makes a strong case for a more equitable distribution of income for technical reasons, such as the effect on the size of the market and composition of demand, and for normative reasons, such as fairness for humanitarian considerations. In our opinion, the socialist element of dependentista writings has put some of the burden of proof on the more orthodox approaches to formulate concrete strategies of political economy that seem feasible in a Latin American setting, by which income can be shared more fully by lower income groups.<sup>23</sup>

And now some thoughts on optional directions for dependentista effort: In terms of content, or if you will, the marginal productivity per research hour and per printed page, some major shifts in emphasis within the dependency field seem to be warranted. Anyone who is going to be convinced at all now knows that (1) the United States very often influences internal affairs in Latin America; (2) servicing interest, dividends, and amortization of past foreign investment is now contributing to balance-of-payments problems; and (3) MNCs are big, powerful, and important. There was probably some justification for harping on these issues in the past. Sheer volume of output was needed in order to get our attention. At this point, however, we get the feeling that the dependentistas continue to exert a good deal of effort to "con" us into accepting tenets even though we capitulated long ago. A reallocation of effort into more creative explorations can now be considered.

Along these lines it may well be time for Raúl Prebisch to bring his enormous prestige, moral suasion, and insights to bear more heavily on internal Latin American problems. This is not because international problems are not as important to Latin America; but with the appearance of *Change and Development*, the impression was left that Prebisch has, except for incidental tidying up, completed his theoretical framework and policy recommendations for the external sector. Prebisch and his disciples

should, we feel, redistribute their energies in favor of formulating viable policy avenues for increasing employment, reorienting the structure of the agrarian sector, reforming tax collection systems, developing more appropriate technologies, and bringing market prices for factors of production closer to their real social opportunity cost. After all, anyone who was instrumental in successfully promoting economic integration in Latin America is a political economist with the credentials to substantiate the claim. The whole generation of Latin American technicians inspired by Prebisch should be able to affect the center of gravity of policy. If successful, the irony may be that Prebisch, so roundly criticized by nondependentistas, may ultimately present the strongest case in opposition to the radical position that appreciable progress can come only after exorcising influences from the dominant metropole.

One area of success justifies further exploitation: The radical writers on dependency are engaged in much productive and inventive historical research, especially on micro-historical topics.<sup>24</sup> There are numerous areas in need of just such investigation; we mention two for illustrative purposes. When claiming that the degree of economic backwardness in Latin America is associated with the length and intensity of contact with capitalist institutions, the radicals usually cite cases involving mining or plantation activity. Is it possible that these economic undertakings have special characteristics that would eventually lead to underdevelopment regardless of the economic system? As a second possibility, it may take historical research to reconcile dependency theory with important cases in which scholars from the center had from the outset criticized policies that dependentistas also found objectionable. While not universal, the brunt of commentary and advice from metropole economists has been adamant against the policy of achieving industrialization through supply-push (protection, subsidies, etc.) import-substitution policy. Is this an instance of the bad guys being correct by sheer randomness? Or were they correct but for the wrong reasons? Or are academic and government economists of the center far enough removed from capitalism to be excluded from the plot? Perhaps some explanation is due.

Our primary purpose in this review of dependency theory has been to make suggestions to improve the analysis. We offer the following for those who may wish to do so:

Unfortunately, our first suggestion is that it might be better to change the name from "dependency theory" to "linkage politics." Linkage politics is an approach that encompasses the basic components of dependency theory, but without the ideological predilections of the latter.<sup>25</sup> Linkage politics posits four different levels of analysis: the character of the international system, the external groups and their relationship to the

polity, the internal linkage groups and their relationship to the polity as well as to external groups, and the character of the polity itself. As Robert Ayres (1972:45) has noted, such an approach permits one to differentiate between lack of self-sufficiency and dependency, as well as to more clearly delineate those aspects of dependency stemming from the international system and those resulting from internal structure. He goes on to add that such an approach would permit a far better analysis of the state of dependency than anything offered thus far by the dependentistas.

It is also interesting to note that Bodenhimer (1971:344–47), in her description of the applicability of international relations theory to the dependent state of Latin America, makes no reference whatsoever to linkage politics. Yet it might be asked if, given nonideological similarities to dependency theory, linkage politics might merit exploration. We do recognize, to be sure, that in terms of the need for studies of the political economy, linkage politics requires further elaboration and formulation from the field of economics to make it a better tool of analysis.

Second, in light of the discussion of dependency analysis of internal groups in Chile, one obvious recommendation would be a strengthening of the concept of class as a tool of analysis. There is no reason why class, elite, and group analysis should not be combined, but the dependentistas should be careful to establish some clear guidelines at the outset. We would make two recommendations in this regard. First, they may want to consider a concept of class related to *power* even if that will, in turn, force them to deal with such an elusive concept as power (Bill and Hardgrave, 1973). A further suggestion would be that they attempt to define class in terms of Latin America, rather than accepting a priori the use of the term from a different context. Certain unique features of Latin America would have to be considered, such as personalismo and the fact that class identification within Latin America may be based on different criteria than in Western Europe or the United States.

Third, we suggest that the radical dependentistas may want to explore the use of research techniques other than unstructured interviews. Perhaps sample survey research or sophisticated treatment of census data could have been employed in the case of Chile. They may also desire to establish the direct links between alleged attitudes and the actual behavior of decision makers through other types of research techniques.

Fourth, to avoid the confusion with respect to the class consciousness of different groups in Latin America, it might prove useful to present the data first, before reaching any conclusions concerning the degree of class consciousness encountered or absent. The problem here appears to be an ideological bias, and perhaps the radical dependentistas should consider themselves first as social scientists and secondarily as social



engineers. We would also strongly recommend that the dependentistas reverse their approach to class consciousness. They have demonstrated that there does not seem to be much class solidarity in the industrial or bourgeois class in Latin America, although such an attitude is crucial to their entire thesis. Maybe they should look at why that class has *not* developed any sense of common identity or purpose. It could be argued that the isolation, fragmentation, and lack of class consciousness is the result of factors directly attributable to their dependent status. Could it not be a goal of the external capitalist to keep them from developing a sense of common interest in order to better exploit them?

Fifth, in terms of the relationship between the developed countries and the developing areas, if one is going to analyze policy, perhaps it would prove beneficial to adopt the bureaucratic politics approach. The dependentistas have used such an approach in the analysis of U.S. policy towards Chile, but given their fundamental assumption of a conspiratorial, rational policy they may be blinded to an accurate assessment of the data. Let us stress once more that we are not saying there is no rational, unified policy, only that further consideration should be given the data before reaching the conclusion. What is obviously required is an extensive analysis of the different positions taken by various governmental and nongovernmental agencies.

Sixth, we wish that not only the dependentistas, but also all Latin Americans would take an honest look at the phenomenon of uncontrolled population increase. If they actually desire economic growth, then Latin Americans must give serious consideration to the subject. Thus far, dependency writers have tended to ignore the problem or to ascribe any measures of population control to some sort of capitalist plot.

Seventh, another piece of advice intended for nondependentistas also, we may all do well to follow the example of Miguel Wionczek with respect to shedding light on the full effect of foreign investment and transfers of technology. He has (1) emphasized the necessity for avoiding the use of overly simplified first approximations (1969–70:9), (2) made specific suggestions for concrete case studies (1971d), and (3) stimulated the research of others as well as performing useful research on his own (1973).

Eighth, there exist abiding realities of the international economic system that dependency analysis must eventually confront (Ray, 1973). Countries must sell certain goods to others and, in return, buy goods. It is totally unrealistic to assume that some ideal state exists outside this need for trade. The dependentistas should admit that the necessities of trade can result in dependency other than the one with which they are totally absorbed. Similarly, they might note that social problems are not elimi-

nated by the adoption of one form of economic control over another. We might interject here a bias of our own. The dependentistas feel that the role of the multinational companies can be controlled through the actions of the nation-state. They are certainly not alone in this assumption, but we believe that global economic institutions cannot be controlled by an outmoded form of nationalism. What is needed is cooperation among governments to control these companies, not the individual action of the nation-state.

Finally, we feel emphatically that dependency theory would benefit from an approach integrating both political science and economics. No one is more aware than we of the time and energy involved in attempting to do so. This effort has fallen considerably short of our original aspirations in this respect. We can only issue an exhortation meant for ourselves as well as the writers on dependency: "Try harder." At the barest minimum, a combination of the two disciplines helps avoid some of the more egregious errors.

#### NOTES

1. Throughout this paper we intermingle such terms as "theory," "analysis," "model," "approach," "framework," "method," etc. We fully recognize that these terms require more rigorous definitions, but we are simply reflecting the terminology of dependency writings that do not have definitions. See Broadbeck (1968) for a discussion of this problem.
2. Nonetheless, the isolation of the dependency writers can still be encountered. In a recent book published by Latin American scholars Harold Eugene Davis, Larman C. Wilson et al., *Latin American Foreign Policies: An Analysis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), not one reference can be found to any writer regarded as part of the dependency school. On the other hand, in the recent Chilcote and Edelstein book there are few citations used by Wilson. It seems incredible to us that two groups of Latin American scholars could write on countries in Latin America and use two entirely different sets of references, none of which are cross-indexed.
3. Raúl Prebisch has consistently maintained that "spontaneous industrialization" will not yield the desired results for Latin America. Also, he laments "the traditional propensity to introduce from abroad nostrums that are largely alien to the real requirements of Latin America's situation" (1963:14). In a similar vein James Petras, one of the more prolific radical U.S. dependentistas, criticizes an "ideology which transfers a given type of development from one period to another totally different, and which imposes the criteria of the first onto the latter" (1968b:158). See similar statements by Furtado (1973b:122) and James D. Cockcroft et al. (1972:xi).
4. It was available only in Spanish in mimeograph form. The United Nations published it in 1950 and it was reprinted in full in *Economic Bulletin for Latin America* 7, no. 1 (February 1962):1–22.
5. For the best discussion of the evolution of Prebisch's writings through 1963, see Hodgson (1966).
6. "Las decisiones básicas respecto al desarrollo deben ser tomadas por las países en desarrollo mismos" (1972:347).
7. See especially his policy recommendations in his 1971f and 1972.
8. See especially Sunkel (1972b) and Furtado (1970b:especially 29–37).

9. Sunkel came to see import substitution policies as a new form of dependency after he and Paz had written their *El subdesarrollo latinoamericano y la teoría del desarrollo* (conversation with Sunkel, February 1975, Austin, Texas).
10. According to Furtado, in an uncharacteristically caustic article, internal Brazilian elites are also consciously gearing policy to redistribute income from the masses to the more privileged (1973a).
11. Excluded from this analysis is the dependency writing on Chile prior to 1970. For excellent analysis of Chilean history from the dependency view, see Frank (1967a) and Petras (1969).
12. Serious reservations should be raised concerning Petras's methodology. In his study of class, forty unstructured interviews were used as the total sample for the many groups involved. In the Petras and Zemelman book, only twelve peasants were subjected to semistructured interviews and six months of participatory observation. Further, "the interview was developed from an ideal typology of peasant consciousness" (Petras and Zemelman, 1972:xiii). Such a typology may very well force the data into erroneous conclusions. In both these cases it would appear to be dubious methodology to broaden conclusions about such a complex concept as class consciousness from such an extremely small sample. Perhaps the confusion over attitudes of peasants and workers is the result of sample size.
13. This analysis was written prior to the disclosures of the Senate committee investigating U.S. intelligence activities in Chile. The recent information (November 1975) would seem to support the dependency authors even more fully, especially with respect to the role of Henry Kissinger.
14. As Einaudi has pointed out in the case of Peru, it is problematical that U.S. training turns military officers into staunch U.S. supporters (1970).
15. In an excellent article, Martins (1974) discusses the different types of political tactics being utilized by the MNCs.
16. See, for instance, Charles P. Kindleberger, *Economics*, 5th ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin and Co., 1973), chaps. 15 and 16.
17. Johnson mentions this phenomenon, but fails to follow up on the implications (1972c:173).
18. Stephen Enke, "The Economic Aspects of Slowing Population Growth," *Economic Journal* 76(March 1966):44–56. For a critique and reply see T. L. Simon, "The Value of Avoiding Births to Underdeveloped Countries," *Population Studies* 23, no. 1 (March 1969):61–68, and Enke's "Reply to Simon," 24, no. 3 (November 1970):455–56.
19. Legislación argentina sobre transferencia de tecnología," *Comercio Exterior* (Octubre 1972), p. 953; "El grupo andino y la inversión extranjera," *Comercio Exterior*, two parts (Febrero y Marzo 1973); and "Iniciativa de ley sobre transferencia de tecnología," *Comercio Exterior* (Noviembre 1972), pp. 1009–11.
20. See Dilmus James, "The Economic Case for More Indigenous Scientific and Technological Research and Development in Less Developed Countries" (Paper presented to the Asociación Mexicana Sociología—UNESCO, Oaxtepec, México, October 1972); Richard R. Nelson, "Less Developed Countries—Technology Transfer and Adaptation: The Role of the Indigenous Science Community," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 23, no. 1 (October 1974):61–78; and Jorge Sabato, "The Influence of Indigenous Research and Development Efforts on the Industrialization of Developing Countries," in *Industrialization and Development*, eds. H. E. Hoelscher and M. C. Hawk (San Francisco: San Francisco Press, Inc., 1969), pp. 178–83.
21. Loretta Fairchild, "A Comparison of Foreign and Domestic Firms in Monterrey: Performance and Source of Technology" (Paper presented to the Southwestern Economics Association—North American Economic Studies Association, San Antonio, Texas, March 1975). The research was conducted under the auspices of the Program on Policy for Science and Technology in Developing Nations, Cornell University. We understand that similar surveys are being undertaken in Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil. (Forthcoming, *Journal of Development Studies*.)
22. This suggestion is partly inspired by Hymer (1972).

23. Ironically, one of the best articles on this topic has been coauthored by Aníbal Pinto, himself a dependentista. See Pinto and Filippo (1974).
24. An excellent example is Cockcroft (1972c).
25. Linkage politics as an approach to the study of the inter-American system is discussed by Chalmers (1972).
26. The same conclusion is reached by Moore (1973).

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