

# CORPORATISM AND DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT: A HONDURAN CASE STUDY\*

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## INTRODUCTION

Within the past few years, the study of Latin American politics has been increasingly influenced by a theoretical perspective that the outcome of World War II temporarily relegated to the "dustbin of history." This perspective is the corporate one, long associated with the political perversions of Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy, and a handful of post-war continental regimes such as Spain and Portugal which were considered by most observers to be political backwaters.

However, recent developments in a number of Latin American countries have induced scholars such as Howard Wiarda, Philippe Schmitter, James Malloy, Ronald Newton, and Frederick Pike to take a second look at corporate organizing principles and ideology as a means of coming to grips with certain political phenomena that amalgamate traditional political processes with newer corporate institutional forms.<sup>1</sup> The corporate model has been applied to explain latent and emerging structural features of Latin American politics that do not seem amenable to interpretation within the pluralist framework. Thus, the apparent sectoral/functional organization of the Mexican polity seems more directly intelligible when explained in corporate terms than when interpreted as a pluralist/democratic process. As for Brazil and Peru, some analysts have noted that the "military" nature of both regimes tends to obscure the more fundamental reality of their corporate substructures, with military control of secondary importance to the modernizing incorporative processes operating within both societies.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the "new corporatism" observed in Latin America is that it appears to exist as an organizing form among numerous regimes independent of where they may lie

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on the political spectrum. We tend to associate Brazil with the right and Peru with the left, and yet incorporative tendencies seem equally marked in both countries. Similarly, as Howard Wiarda observes, one can note *the numerous incorporative aspects of Allende's Chile* and, at the same time, view the post-Allende military regime in a somewhat similar light.<sup>3</sup>

In the early neocorporate literature dealing with Latin America, explanatory power for current manifestations of corporatism was derived primarily from historical and cultural antecedents. More specifically, current incorporative tendencies in various Latin American countries were viewed as the elaboration and extension of an Iberic-Latin heritage that derived from principles of Roman jurisprudence and a paternalistic Catholic *weltanschauung*.<sup>4</sup> Recently, this interpretation has been subjected to a good deal of scrutiny in light of certain problems that it presents. For one thing, Iberic-Catholic tradition does not help to explain why modern-day corporate structures seem to be appearing around the world in a number of disparate geographical and cultural settings.<sup>5</sup> Nor does this perspective explain why corporate phenomena, even in the alleged "homelands" of corporate tradition (i.e., Iberia and Latin America), have been rather sporadic in their temporal manifestations.<sup>6</sup>

As an alternative, or perhaps supplement to such historical-cultural explanations, a number of more recent interpretations have been put forward by scholars such as Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter. O'Donnell's primary contribution to the current debate takes the form of criticism of the inclination to associate rising levels of modernization with increasingly democratic and pluralistic political structures. His analysis of Latin America reverses this economic-political equation, suggesting that corporate structure and process emerge in certain Latin American countries as a response to modernizing pressures.<sup>7</sup>

A further perspective concerning neocorporate phenomena is offered by Schmitter. Although space does not permit a full elaboration of his position, we can suggest that his main contribution lies along two lines. First, he defines the concept of corporatism in a manner that allows for its operationalization with respect to particular polities.

Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.<sup>8</sup>

As for Schmitter's definition of pluralism, it is simply the obverse of all of those specific traits that he associated with corporatism.<sup>9</sup>

Schmitter's second major contribution has been to "dis-aggregate" corporate phenomena to include two major subtypes. One reflects corporate tendencies in advanced industrial or postindustrial countries such as the United States, Sweden, and West Germany where emerging corporate political structures and processes seem to be associated with "the slow, almost imperceptible decay of advanced pluralism."<sup>10</sup> In Schmitter's words:

The decay of pluralism and its gradual displacement by societal corporatism can be traced primarily to the imperative necessity for a stable, bourgeois-dominant regime, due to processes of concentration of ownership, competition between national economies, expansion of the role of public policy and rationalization of decision-making within the state to associate or incorporate subordinate classes and status groups more closely within the political process.<sup>11</sup>

The outgrowth then, of the interplay between these factors in advanced techno-societies is an evolutionary shift in the loci of political power and major shifts in the relationship between interest groups and the bureaucratic mechanisms of the state. This results in the amalgam of state organizational control with interest group representation that Schmitter refers to as "societal corporatism."

With respect to our own analysis, the most important aspect of Schmitter's contribution is his delineation of a second major corporate subtype (state corporatism or "corporatism from above"), which he views as being most frequently associated with rapidly modernizing polities. Whereas incorporative processes in developed nations seem to take the form of a "reaching down" by state bureaucracies to sectoral interest groups and a concomitant "reaching up" by these same interest groups, the process in developing nations is less evolutionary in nature and appears to involve a much larger and more emphatic role for the organs of the state.

Schmitter further argues that this second corporate subtype seems to be most closely associated with the phenomenon of "delayed-dependent development." Drawing on the seminal work of Mihail Manoilescu, he contends that the roots of these modern *state* incorporative tendencies in Latin America might best be understood as "an institutional-political response to a particular process of transformation that the world political economy and its attendant system of international stratification is presently undergoing."<sup>12</sup> From this perspective, the key to understanding internal political dynamics is not so much the relationship between classes in a particular country but rather the relationship between nations at unequal levels of development. As economically dependent

nations increasingly become aware of the realities of their dependence, there is a spontaneous movement toward the building of state institutional structures that can cope with the realities of the dependent relationship, and eventually lead to a new international division of labor.<sup>13</sup>

Schmitter's thesis concerning manifestations of state corporatism in Latin America should not be interpreted as rigid or exclusivist. He recognizes the reinforcing impact that tradition and culture may have. Nevertheless, the primary thrust of his argument is that it is the radical nationalist demand for the restructuring of economic relations between rich and poor countries that is behind the observed movement toward state corporate political solutions in countries such as Peru, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile. To sum up his position:

In the present absence of comparative case studies, it is not easy to evaluate the merits of Manoilescu's prototheory of the emergence of state corporatism, or to elaborate further upon it. In a very general way, there seems to be a correspondence between the context of peripheral, delayed-dependent capitalism; awareness of relative under-development; resentment against inferior international status; desire for enhanced national economic and political autarky; extension of state control through regulatory policies, sectoral planning and public enterprise; emergence of a more professionalized and achievement-oriented *situs* of civil servants; and the forced corporatization of interest representation from above.<sup>14</sup>

Following Schmitter's suggestion with regard to case studies, we would submit that Honduras offers a fertile field for the application of such a perspective because it is a country in which dependent development is a fairly obvious fact of life. Furthermore, as will be detailed later, the current sociopolitical process in Honduras is one of intense ferment and "telescoped" change. Thus, the concurrent existence of both rapid change and dependency would seem to offer conditions of study conducive to the intuitive "testing" of the Manoilescu/Schmitter prototheory.

#### I. "DELAYED-DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT" IN HONDURAS

By most currently applied standards, Honduran economic development can be said to lag significantly behind growth not only in the advanced countries of the world, but also elsewhere in Latin America. In 1973, the per capita gross national product of Honduras was \$320, with only Bolivia and Haiti ranking lower.<sup>15</sup> Other indicators of Honduran development reflect a similar lag. Honduras consistently places among the lowest three or four nations in Latin America as measured by standards such as national literacy levels, level of urbanization, life expectancy, or by industrial standards such as electric power production and percent of the population engaged in manufacturing.<sup>16</sup>

However, Manoilescu and Schmitter's use of the concept of "de-

layed-dependent development" aims at conveying the impression, *not only* that there is an economic lag in those countries which incline toward incorporative political solutions, but that this lag is the specific result of that country's economic relationship to the outside world.<sup>17</sup> For development to be delayed implies that there is a "delayer," which consciously or unconsciously impedes the "normal" processes of societal growth and national economic consolidation. In the words of one North American *dependentista* theoretician: "The distinguishing feature of dependent (as contrasted with interdependent) development is that growth in the dependent nations occurs as a reflex of the expansion of the dominant nations, and is geared toward the needs of the dominant economies—i.e., foreign rather than national needs. In the dependent countries, imported factors of production . . . have become the central determinants of economic development and sociopolitical life."<sup>18</sup> Or, in the words of a well-known Brazilian economist:

By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependency between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate development.<sup>19</sup>

"Delayed dependence" is thus reflective of a skewed economic relationship between two countries, a relationship in which the dominant partner induces, whether purposely or through the objective structure of the relationship, reflexive political, social, and economic activities from its dependent counterpart. Furthermore, this relationship is seen as contributing to the delay of normal developmental processes in the dependent country rather than supplying a balanced symbiosis. Within this structure of dependence, the primary linkages between "metropole" and "satellite" are believed to take the form of foreign trade, foreign investment, and foreign assistance.

With regard to Honduras, it is easy to construct a *prima facie* case for the historical existence of a dependency relationship, both to the United States government and to the large North American banana companies. Honduran history of the early twentieth century is largely written in terms of the fluctuating relationship between domestic political factions attempting to gain or retain control over the state and U.S. Marines or business interests concerned with promoting either their national or private well-being. By 1925, the United States had intervened in Honduran politics with troops on six separate occasions, and U.S.

companies had a total of \$40,000,000 invested in Honduras, primarily in the production of bananas.<sup>20</sup>

North American influence was so pervasive during the 1920s and 1930s that the stabilization of Honduran politics under General Tiburcio Carias Andino (1932–48) seems directly attributable both to U.S. governmental policy and to the consolidation of the North American banana empire in Honduras. The failure of the Liberal party to regain control of the presidency until 1957 was intimately linked to the purchase in 1929 by the United Fruit Company of 300,000 shares of Cuyamel Fruit Company stock. Since Cuyamel had traditionally been the main source of Liberal party funding (in return for economic concessions once the party was in power), the elimination of the company resulted in the temporary collapse of the party.<sup>21</sup>

In recent years, the structure of this dependency relationship has changed somewhat. While 85 percent of total foreign investments come from the United States (\$230 million as of 1975), these investments are gradually shifting from banana production into other areas.<sup>22</sup> However, the dependency of the Honduran economy on the production of the two major banana companies (Standard Fruit and United Brands) is still extremely heavy, especially with regard to foreign exchange earnings. Honduras is primarily an agrarian society with approximately two-thirds of the population engaged in agriculture. Of her exports, about 80 percent are of agricultural origin with bananas typically representing about two-thirds of the total.<sup>23</sup>

The traditional dependence of the Honduran economy on the banana companies has thus been largely based upon the concentration of U.S. investments in enclaves on the North Coast of Honduras which are critical with respect to annual Honduran export earnings. The banana companies have in recent years been able to use the threat of moving banana production to more accommodating countries in order to enhance or consolidate their financial relationship vis-à-vis the Honduran government.<sup>24</sup> For example, after the Honduran government imposed an export tax in March 1974 of one dollar per forty-pound crate of bananas, Standard Fruit announced that it was taking half of its 22,000 acres out of production and United Fruit indicated similar possible moves. The projected loss of jobs in the Honduran economy may have had something to do with the fact that the banana tax was quickly reduced to fifty cents and finally stabilized at thirty cents, saving the banana companies an estimated \$7.5 million a year.

Perhaps an even better example of the traditional relationship between the banana companies and the Honduran government comes in the form of evidence that United Brands paid a bribe of \$1.25 million

to certain high government officials in September 1974 as additional insurance that the newly created export tax would be reduced.<sup>25</sup> This initial payment was to be followed by second payment of the same amount to be deposited, as was the first, in a numbered Swiss bank account. The bribe was apparently approved by the chairman of United Brands, Eli M. Black, who committed suicide on 3 February 1975.<sup>26</sup>

As for the role of the United States government in this dependent relationship, there are numerous indications of the power that it exercised in Honduran politics. The disequibrated nature of this relationship is reflected most directly in a rough capsule comparison of the two countries (see table 1). Supplemental to this general imbalance in developmental levels and to levels of U.S. investment in the critical primary sector of the Honduran economy, we find that an additional source of U.S. governmental influence lies in the extent to which Honduras is dependent on U.S. markets to absorb its major exports. In 1971, the United States consumed 75 percent of all Honduran bananas and 49 percent of all coffee. Total U.S. consumption was 63 percent of all Honduran exports during the year.<sup>27</sup>

TABLE 1 Comparison of U.S. and Honduran Levels of Development

	United States	Honduras
GNP per capita (1973) (\$)	6,200	320
Energy consumption per capita (1973) (kilograms coal equiv.)	11,897	234
International reserves (1975) (\$ mil.)	15,887	81
Public education expenditure per capita (1972) (\$)	314	10

Source: Roger D. Hansen and the Staff of the Overseas Development Council, *The U.S. and World Development: Agenda for Action, 1976*, (New York: Praeger, pp. 134 and 141.

The structural dependence in Honduras leads to a situation in which the U.S. embassy in Tegucigalpa becomes one of the major participants in the domestic political process. For example, when it was speculated that the National party might attempt to use coercion and unethical tactics in the municipal elections of March 1968, there was considerable concern in the embassy that a recurrence of politics "estilo Hondureño" would give both the Honduran government and the embassy a political black eye. On 25 March 1968, a delegation from the National party visited Ambassador Joseph A. Jova at the U.S. embassy to explain that the campaign was being conducted democratically and that the party had no connection with the so-called "Mancha Brava"—

groups of men who used various strong-arm methods to influence voting results. Later, a delegation from the Liberal party also visited Ambassador Jova.<sup>28</sup>

Even more common in terms of application of political pressure is the situation in which the embassy finds solutions for problems facing the banana companies. For example, Standard and United Brands were greatly disturbed in 1962 by what they considered to be the discriminatory and quasi-legal nature of the new Honduran Agrarian Reform Bill. Considerable pressure was applied through the embassy (i.e., threats to apply the Hickenlooper Amendment) and the "discriminatory aspects" of the legislation were removed before the new law was promulgated.<sup>29</sup>

In sum then, various statistical measures of Honduran dependency seem to find confirmation in more impressionistic evidence. However, while it is relatively easy to document Honduran dependency, it is much more difficult to prove that such dependency has constrained Honduran development.<sup>30</sup> Given the extremely hypothetical and tenuous nature of the *delayed*-dependency arguments, and the fact that Schmitter's hypothesis concerning corporatism seems to rely more heavily on the dependency relationship for explanatory power than on the precise economic impact of this relationship, we will stress the latter aspect of Schmitter's concept in the following analysis.

## II. MANIFESTATIONS OF CORPORATISM IN HONDURAN POLITICS

### *Schmitter's Definition Applied*

State corporatism is, in its most fundamental manifestation, the effort by political representatives of the state to create and maintain singular, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered, sectorally compartmentalized interest associations as vehicles for the prosecution of a wide range of national or international goals.<sup>31</sup> The existence or nonexistence of a corporate structure is independent of the goals which that structure has been established to pursue, and thus we can look rather descriptively at Honduran politics and social structure without initially inferring purpose or causality.<sup>32</sup> To what extent is Honduras a "corporate state"? Perhaps the best way to approach this question is through a detailed application of Schmitter's definition of corporatism to contemporary Honduran political reality.<sup>33</sup>

1. *Existence of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive units* | We assume here that Schmitter is referring to the various economic functional sectors such as subsistence agriculture, industrial-manufacturing, commercial, agribusiness, *empleados* (private and public), and professional groupings.



The corporate definition holds that interests emanating from these sectors are represented via specific organizations, and that the particular organizations face little or no competition within their respective sectors. Moreover, the organizations operate only within their own spheres of functional specialization and maintain/recruit their rank and file through rules and regulations that require membership in order to hold a job or participate in benefits. Under these conditions, the number of organizations should closely parallel the number of viable economic/functional sectors in the society. Thus, the constituent units should be "limited in number." Schmitter's addition of the qualifiers "singular" and "non-competitive" leads us to believe that each principal sector should be represented by only *one* interest group organization.

Taking only a cursory look at sectoral differentiation within Honduras, we can conclude that interest groups are not limited in number in accordance with the postulated definition. Within the major sectors of the Honduran society and economy, there are numerous competing organizations that are *not* compulsory in membership, that have *not* been restricted to functionally different categories, and that are *not* hierarchically ordered within their respective sectors. This is not to ignore those instances where certain organizations approach the corporatist definition. But, on the whole, the array of interest groups in Honduras appears to be multiple rather than limited in number. In fact, several of the organizations overlap functional categories in their formal structure.<sup>34</sup>

With regard to the *agrarian peasant sector*, there are several interest-groups, ranging from peasant organizations and cooperatives to the so-called agricultural and lumber *sindicatos* affiliated with the central labor confederation.<sup>35</sup> Landless peasants and small landowners are represented in three organizations: the Asociación Nacional de Campesinos de Honduras (ANACH), the Unión Nacional de Campesinos (UNC), and the Federación de Cooperativas de la Reforma Agraria de Honduras (FECORAH).

ANACH, which includes some sixty thousand peasants in regional and local associations, was launched concurrently with the Agrarian Reform Law of 1962 and proceeded to expand its membership rapidly until the conservative elites and traditional political forces slowed its growth by modifying the law and discouraging membership. ANACH has the continued support of the major labor confederation in Honduras, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Honduras (CTH), and was formally affiliated with the CTH in 1967 via one of the confederation's major components, the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Nacionales de Honduras (FESITRANH).

While ANACH has the largest membership, UNC has, since 1964, become a powerful rival in competition for peasant loyalties. It includes approximately eighteen thousand landless laborers and small farmers in its sixty-odd *ligas*, which are independent of each other although coordinated via administrative divisions. The UNC itself is part of the Central General de Trabajadores (CGT), the rival labor confederation and counterpart to the CTH. Thus not only are the ANACH and the UNC separated organizationally, but they compete for the same clientele and differ in their philosophical conception of the peasant movement.

The peasant movement is further fragmented by another small but efficient confederation of peasant cooperatives, FECORAH. This group emerged from the aftermath of efforts made by the National Agrarian Institute (INA) to create its own set of peasant groups through which to channel its agrarian reform program. But FECORAH disengaged itself from INA in 1968 and has maintained an independent stance under dynamic leadership. The so-called "brigadas rurales" sponsored by the University Student Federation is one other organizational aspect of the peasant movement, but one with little national significance.<sup>36</sup>

As for the *industrial-agribusiness labor sector*, labor unions in Honduras won the right to organize only in 1954 after a lengthy strike of banana workers on the North Coast. Emerging from this period of sociopolitical discontinuity were organizations that were to become the strongest labor federations in Honduras. FESITRANH, organized in 1957, encompasses the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Tela Railroad Co. (SITRATERCO) and the Sindicato Unificado de Trabajadores de la Standard Fruit Co. (SUTRAFSCO), along with a host of other unions within the industrial sector.

This "industrialized" segment of the agrarian work force occupies a somewhat ambiguous position within the sectoral structure of Honduran interest groups. On the one hand, its organizing principles are similar to those of the industrial sector with reliance on industrial-type *sindicatos*. From this perspective, the banana worker's unions are appropriately included within the industrial labor movement rather than within the *campesino* sector.<sup>37</sup> However, the psychological and cultural attributes of the agrarian labor force remain largely rural in spite of this structural/organizational overlay. This duality prohibits full integration of the agrarian work force into either the peasant or industrial sector.

As Honduras expanded its industrial capacity and the state assumed more service and regulatory functions, organizational efforts led to the development of another labor federation—the Federación Central

de Sindicatos de Trabajadores Libres de Honduras (FECESITLIH), located in Tegucigalpa. By 1964, FESITRANH and FECESITLIH were combined into the CTH, which is influenced by the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) and has cooperated closely with most governmental regimes.

Clearly, the CTH is the strongest labor confederation in Honduras and more effectively entrenched than its rival, the CGT, which was formed in 1970 by combining the prominent UNC with two fledgling labor federations, the federación Auténtica Sindical de Honduras (FASH), and somewhat later, the Federación de Sindicatos de Sur (FESISUR). The CGT, and its strongest component (UNC), gains its inspiration from the Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores (CLAT), which embodies a Social-Christian theme.<sup>38</sup> This is in clear contrast to the ORIT-sponsored CTH. The CGT does not have the political clout of its opposite number due to its smaller membership, lack of financial resources, and the fact that it has yet to gain legal recognition from the state; nevertheless, it continues to expound its vision of a nationally controlled economy as opposed to the domination of outside capital.

It is perhaps in the management side of the industrial-agribusiness sector where the Honduran interest-group system comes closest to the "limited number" of Schmitter's definition. The business, manufacturing, and large agribusiness concerns are formally organized under a "peak" organization formed in 1964. The Consejo Hondureño de la Empresa Privada (COHEP) includes the various chambers of commerce, the stockraisers association, the banking group, the construction industry, and most manufacturers. In effect, the management side of the industrialized economic sector is organized under a single structure. Furthermore, the various associations parallel functionally differentiated categories within the industrial-agribusiness sector.<sup>39</sup> Even so, with the apparent exception of the chambers of commerce, membership is not compulsory and COHEP is not hierarchically superior *de facto* to its constituent elements.<sup>40</sup> While subsidiary groups are not directly competitive in functional terms, political and philosophical factionalism occurs between the Cámara de Comercio e Industrias de Cortés (CCIC) and the Cámara de Comercio e Industrias de Tegucigalpa (CCIT), with the other principal groups splitting down the line.<sup>41</sup>

Finally, there is the *service or professional sector* of Honduran society, which is primarily concentrated within the urban portion of the country. Professionals are organized into *colegios* along occupational lines such as the Colegio de Profesionales de Ciencias Agrícolas or the Honduran Bar Association. Although each profession is organized along functional lines, there exists no overarching professional federation or its equivalent

as a “representative” of the white-collar working classes. In fact, among teacher groups, there are several associations distributed among the various levels of the educational system which are, in some cases, in competition with each other. As with the professional groups, there is no national confederation of teacher groups to suggest any type of corporate relationship to the state. Furthermore, the teachers have no affiliation with either of the labor confederations in Honduras.

Throughout Honduran society, there are numerous social service and civic groups organized independently of the state. These groups operate mostly on a nonpolitical level and are by no means combined through external hierarchies or confederations. The various Rotary and Lions Clubs, as well as the Federación de Asociaciones Femeninas de Honduras, are nationally organized into chapters, are in some instances federated, and are approved by the Minister of Government. However, they are not organized as a sector nor are their internal affairs controlled by the state.

2. *Recognition or licensing by the state* / The corporate tendencies or imperatives assumed to be present in Latin American political systems are perhaps more apparent in Honduras in the requirements of legal recognition or *personería jurídica* imposed by the Honduran state. The several interest groups and associations involved in the various economic and professional sectors operate under codes, organic laws, and regulations. Newly organized labor groups seeking state recognition apply to the Labor Ministry; the same is true of peasant organizations. Most other groups solicit recognition from the Ministry of Government. The formal procedure may include an evaluation of the by-laws of a group and determination as to whether the group meets specifications that might be contained in an organic law or code. Also, the determination of whether a particular group gains recognition depends to a considerable extent upon its political acceptability.

By way of illustration, the UNC has unsuccessfully lobbied for its legal recognition as a national peasant organization. Meanwhile, its rival—ANACH—has had legal status from its inception. Similarly, the UNC ally—FASH—is continually working on behalf of its component sindicatos in an effort to obtain their recognition from the Labor Ministry. In part, the difficulties of the CGT and its component federations stem from their independent political stance and their continued aloofness from the governing elites of Honduras.<sup>42</sup>

Legal recognition is not necessary for a group to exist or for it to be politically active. A prime example is the UNC whose pressures for land reform have proven successful since 1968. Despite the UNC’s lack of legal recognition, lack of representation on the Consejo Nacional

Agrario, and its alliance with the semiostracized CGT, it has mobilized its membership into a cohesive political force. UNC members also have been able to receive their share of lands under existing Agrarian Reform Laws and they have frequent contacts with officials in the INA.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, legal recognition is extremely helpful to any group as a form of licensing by the state. Subsidies, loans from private and public sources, and contracts entered into with various groups of associations are legal and binding in court *only* if a group has recognition. Of course, recognition also means that direct political access is more easily achieved.

3. *Deliberate representational monopoly within respective categories* / None of the heretofore cited evidence indicates that one group or confederation assumes a monopoly of representation within its sector; the existence of multiple labor federations, confederations, peasant groups, and teacher associations, most of which have achieved legal recognition, is sufficient to make this point. Moreover, given adequate political leverage, there are apparently no barriers to the rise of other labor, business, and professional groups. Probably the greatest limiting factor with respect to the continued proliferation of new interest groups in Honduras is the sectoral base upon which new groups would have to build.

An exception to this low level of state monopoly would appear to be found in the organic laws that govern the creation and membership of certain associations such as the chambers of commerce. Both legally and economically, the Tegucigalpa Chamber of Commerce (CCIT) has dominated the commercial sector and has been its representative before the state since 1918. In 1964, the CCIT was designated the "parent" organization by law. However, since 1960, economic power has shifted to the North Coast. Despite the content of the law, the San Pedro Sula based Chamber of Commerce (CCIC), in alliance with other sectors of the business community, has assumed a nationally prominent political role. Thus, *de facto*, there is little in the way of monopoly in the business/commercial sector.

4. *Controls over leader selection* / With respect to evaluating the extent of state control over the selection of sectoral leaders, an accurate interpretation becomes somewhat dependent upon intuitive judgment. Leadership selection at the national level for practically all interest groups seems to be largely an internal affair. For example, business groups follow procedures outlined in their by-laws and there appears to be rotation in office with very little public fanfare or governmental interference. One dramatic leadership change occurred in 1973 when high officials in COHEP were challenged by dissident members of the executive council. Their concern centered around the political posture of COHEP and the lack of internal consultation regarding the group's

policy stances. Although the leadership changes reflected political differences, the conflict was resolved internally.<sup>44</sup>

Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that the state plays a major role in leadership selection or control in exchange for representational monopolies. Across and within sectors there is considerable variation in patterns of leadership, which primarily seem to be reflective of the specific attributes and historical experiences of the groups involved. For example, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Honduras is still led by several organizers of the 1954 strike, while the rival Central General de Trabajadores has experienced frequent changes in leadership. Thus, although the centralized nature of the Honduran state undoubtedly influences the process of leadership selection and control, this characteristic of the political system seems to be of secondary importance.

*5. Controls over patterns of articulation* / Neither the demands and supports communicated to the government by Honduran interest groups nor their procedural patterning indicate that the state exercises any real control in this area. Traditionally, the most influential factor affecting interest articulation in Honduras was the formal and informal centralization of political power. Authority centered around the executive branch, headed by a president whose powers of appointment, control over local and provincial governments, and political party support combined with personalistic values and hierarchically structured loyalties. The result was a pattern of high-level policymaking in which the chief executive became the overriding focus for sectoral demands.

Present patterns of articulation can be broadly classified as either private or public. The private category includes those contacts with governmental officials through cables, letters, or personal visits. For the most part, these contacts are for routine business and constitute a continuous lobbying effort to maintain points of access and informational levels. Most issues raised through these private channels are solved by *arreglos directos* and are not subject to extensive news coverage.

More important matters are often made public by *planteamientos* that relay the issues dealt with in private meetings to a broader public forum. In addition, opinions on specific policy areas are relayed to the government as well as to the public through *pronunciamientos* which are freely available to the press. A more complex style of public lobbying is conducted via publicity campaigns or blitzes. One example was the campaign conducted through the public media in an effort to counter the agrarian reform policy of the López regime (1972–75). This particular campaign was conducted by conservative business and landowner elements, and included well publicized visits to high-level officials and the president.<sup>45</sup>

Public means of interest articulation also frequently involve the threat or actual use of force (*a la fuerza*). Either the failure of the traditional political figures to acknowledge the newer demands for social and economic reform, or the inability of the political system to respond to or accommodate the emerging sectors, has led to occasional violence and to counterrepression. For example, the campesino movement—including both the ANACH and the UNC—was convinced after 1968 that land occupations or invasions were necessary to jolt the National Agrarian Institute and the government into some kind of response on land reform. Additionally, the labor movement owes its initial establishment and long-term success to the 1954 banana strike. Thus, the threat of mass demonstrations or general strikes must be considered by any government. Student demonstrations, labor rallies, and campesino “hunger marches” are all designed to influence policy by threatening decision-makers through potential or actual displays of violence.

The government has reacted to such techniques with both covert and overt violence of its own. The infamous Mancha Brava, or goon squads organized by the political parties, has been a mainstay of Honduran politics in the past.<sup>46</sup> Similarly, the Cuerpo Especial de Seguridad (CES) and the military have been used to evict campesinos who have occupied either public or private lands.

Violence or the threat of violence will remain part of the Honduran pattern of interest articulation as long as the political system is unable to respond adequately to the rapid expansion of social and economic pressures. Perhaps the ultimate in forcible interest group techniques has been the use by the armed forces of the *golpe de estado*. Conservative groups have collaborated with the military in 1956, 1963, and 1975. On the other hand, in 1972, it was the popular sectors and progressive business groups operating through various interest group organizations who urged an end to the civilian *Pacto* regime of President Cruz. It was with the support of labor and the campesinos that General López Arellano brought the military back into the center of the political stage.

In sum, the pattern and style of interest group articulation has evolved toward open lobbying and public mobilization and away from traditional personalistic modes of political influence. To be sure, personalism and elite interrelationships remain basic to Honduran politics but, as political participation levels increase with the proliferation of interest groups, the older forms have tended to decline in importance.

*Some Additional Perspectives on Corporate Tendencies*

We have established the fact that the *current* Honduran political process seems only marginally reflective of corporatism, as defined by Schmitter, with respect to the array of interest groups and their style of articulation. However, we have yet to examine a number of other more general features of the Honduran political system as they relate to possible corporate tendencies. These features include (1) the historical evolution of the Honduran state in relation to major power contenders and (2) recent shifts in the policy orientations of the state.

*Historical evolution of the Honduran state* | Before the arrival of foreign investment and immigrants from the Levantine, the Honduran state was merely a shadow of its neglected colonial past and of abortive attempts at Central American union. *Caudillos* and political factions wrangled with each other in chaotic internecine warfare until the early 1900s when the banana companies began to construct their economic and political enclave on the North Coast. The original establishment of the Tegucigalpa Chamber of Commerce in 1918 was a direct response to these new investments as the companies needed some kind of structure to facilitate their business operations.

It was these foreign intrusions during the early years of the twentieth century that served as the major catalyst for political centralization in Honduras. Governments of the era took advantage of the new revenues produced to consolidate their power, and some semblance of national unity had come to Honduras by the early 1920s. After two previous attempts, Tiburcio Carías Andino gained the presidency in the 1932 elections. Carías consolidated his personalistic following and instituted the practice of *continuismo* in a regime that lasted until 1948. He expanded his National party organization to the provinces, maintaining control through spoils and coercion. The power of the state was totally concentrated in the office of the presidency and within the National party organization controlled by Carías. Economic and political stability was achieved in Honduras but at the price of economic stagnation and social backwardness for most of the rural population. Politics was the privilege of the urban elites in conjunction with the foreign economic enterprises, and sectoral development in terms of interest groups was practically nonexistent.

Juan Manuel Gálvez succeeded Carías as president and presided over initial efforts to modernize the Honduran economic and political structure. In response to a World Bank recommendation, the Banco Central de Honduras was established. Similarly, the Banco Nacional de Fomento was set up to provide credit to agriculture and industry. Gál-



vez's policies, although authoritarian and well within the confines of the traditional National party political machine, were more liberal than those of Carias. His administration in effect marked the beginning of a transition period from the backwardness of the Carias era to the period of economic and political development of the 1960s and 1970s.

This post-Carias adjustment period saw the emergence of new power contenders who gradually began to challenge the political leadership of the National party. It was during the early 1950s that the Honduran armed forces began to achieve a certain primitive level of institutionalization under the prodding of U.S. military aid missions.<sup>47</sup> Also, it was a period during which the working and middle classes began to emerge as power contenders, particularly in the wake of the massive banana workers' strike of 1954.

These new sectors and interest groups gradually began to move into the political vacuum that had been left by the fall of Carias and the inability of the political parties to agree as to future leadership. Finally, after a series of false starts during which the armed forces became actively involved in the political process for the first time, Ramón Villeda Morales was elected to the presidency in 1957 under the banner of the Liberal party. The Villeda regime had the support of the emergent middle classes and of the nascent labor movement which had successfully won the right to organize after the banana strike. Acting upon nationalist-reformist principles, the Liberal government passed into law a new Labor Code, a workable Social Security Law, and the first real Agrarian Reform Law in Honduran history. Debates in the Congress were perhaps at their zenith since the Liberals now had at least a semblance of power with which to argue against Nationalist policies.<sup>48</sup>

As Villeda Morales increasingly attempted more far-reaching reforms, the effort to maintain middle-class support prevented major structural changes in the nature of the Honduran economy and state. The Liberals, faced with resistance from landholders and the banana companies, were forced to make certain concessions in the Agrarian Reform Law of 1962 that all but emasculated it. Villeda Morales had also created a Guardia Civil which was intended to offset the growing political significance of the armed forces. The perceived "radical" nature of Villeda's reforms, increased popular levels of political expression in the wake of Fidel Castro's victory in Cuba, and the potential threat from the Guardia Civil led Colonel Oswaldo López Arellano to direct a coup in 1963 that would "abolish the politically oriented Civil Guard and establish an apolitical force to fight Communist infiltration in government which was threatening (Honduran democracy and religious heritage)".<sup>49</sup>

By 1963, the Honduran state had been consolidated into a much

more centralized and bureaucratized structure with the president continuing to occupy the pinnacle of authority. The Congress, when it existed, was a perfunctory organ and served merely to carry out the National and Liberal party dictates as determined by the head of state and his coterie of political followers. Interest groups had yet to become seriously involved in policymaking or even adept at publicizing their own causes. Ironically, it was a series of military regimes or administrations closely allied to the military that facilitated the emergence of sectoral politics.

General Oswaldo López Arellano, working initially within the National party structure, established himself as the dominant force in Honduran politics for the next ten years. However, during this period, a subtle shift began to take place in relation to the bases of institutional and public support on which the general relied for power. Gradually, he began to rely less and less on the National party and more on the increasingly institutionalized armed forces. This shift was greatly facilitated by the so-called "Soccer War" of 1969, which sparked a dormant nationalism that in turn led to greater public support and encouragement for the armed forces.<sup>50</sup>

As stated previously, this period of transition from the praetorian rule of Carías also saw the formation and increasingly active participation of popular sectors in Honduran politics. Labor had become well organized during the 1950s, and business groups had proliferated as a small industrial sector expanded from a combination of banana company diversification, Alliance for Progress investments, and formation of the Central American Common Market. These various forces that revitalized the Honduran economy and polity also had an impact on the rural sector, and campesino groups proliferated after passage in 1962 of the Agrarian Reform Law.

Interest groups from the business, labor, and rural sectors essentially came into their own after the 1969 war with El Salvador. In November of that year, a "meeting of the minds" resulted when representatives from these sectors met in San Pedro Sula to discuss the economic plight of Honduras, to urge the adoption of some reforms of the governmental bureaucracy, and to demand that the sectors be consulted in the making of national policy.<sup>51</sup> Not all elements of the business or labor community took part in this movement of the *fuerzas vivas*, for these fuerzas were essentially a reflection of cracks in the old system of political elitism and economic conservatism.

The zenith of interest group politics was reached during the period of the Plan Político de Unidad Nacional (1971–72).<sup>52</sup> As the 1971 elections approached, some private sector and labor interest groups

gained momentum, demanding free elections and urging President López to push for the reforms initially advocated during the 1969 *fuerzas vivas* conference. The political parties were being seriously challenged now, not only by the armed forces but also by the interest groups. The increased tempo of campesino land invasions, old guard reactions, and economic stagnation prompted the more progressive sectors to suggest to President López that some new political formula be found that would prevent electoral violence and insure future political stability.

The outcome of these discussions was the creation of a political accord (the Plan Político de Unidad Nacional or Pacto) under which the Nationals and Liberals agreed to both share political power and to dedicate the next presidential term to a multiple-point program of social and political reform. The interest groups and the armed forces were to act as "guarantors" for the Plan Político. However, they eventually withdrew their support from the Pacto administration of President Cruz, which had proved politically inept. By December 1972, the armed forces had again assumed power. The Pacto proposal and its demise had, to a certain extent, brought part of the labor movement and certain elements of the business sector under the tutelage of the armed forces. The 1972 coup was supported by labor and campesino groups who now felt that the old party system was beyond repair. Similarly, the armed forces, whose fortunes had been intertwined with the parties (particularly with the Nationals), now moved away from these alliances.

The Pacto administration, in our judgment, represented the last gasp of those sociopolitical forces that had traditionally operated through the vehicle of the National and Liberal parties. Since 1972, the new interest groups have communicated their demands directly to the military governments and bureaucracies pertinent to their specific interests. The faction-ridden parties have fallen into disarray since losing their access to government funds.

With respect to the military, certain internal developments have resulted in a number of long-term changes. For one thing, the armed forces have consolidated their central position within the Honduran political structure, particularly in the wake of López Arellano's exit from office. Prior to the coup of April 1975, the armed forces had *de facto* occupied a central position, but lip service was generally paid during the 1960s to the *ideal* of civilian supremacy.<sup>53</sup> After the 1975 coup, the military leadership indicated that their stay in politics would be indefinite and that, even in the unlikely event that politics was turned over to the civilians, the parties would cease to play a role.

This shift from a *de facto* central role to one in which the military unequivocally occupied center stage was accompanied by a shift in the

rationale for military participation in politics. As indicated above, shifts took place in the structure of the dominant institutional/sectoral alliance patterns that, over time, tended to place the armed forces in the “developmental” camp. This process, which began under López Arellano, continued and perhaps even accelerated after April 1975 with the ascendance of the so-called *Movimiento de Oficiales Jóvenes* (MOJ—comprised of junior lieutenant colonels who received their training in the new military schools under U.S. aegis, both in Honduras and in the Panama Canal Zone).<sup>54</sup>

A third and perhaps equally important shift within the Honduran armed forces has been the movement toward collective leadership. During the late 1950s and early 1960s Honduran military institutionalization and development took place under the leadership of López Arellano. However, López was replaced by a group of lieutenant colonels (the MOJ) who seemed to comprise a military junta. This new junta governed under collegial principles utilizing the structure of the *Consejo Superior de las Fuerzas Armadas* (CONSUF), which consisted of twenty-five senior officers.<sup>55</sup> That the new leadership may in fact be truly collective and intent on preventing the emergence of a new military *caudillo* is indicated by the fact that the positions of commander-in-chief of the armed forces and head of state (both of which were previously held by General López) have been separated.

*Changes in the policy orientation of the state* / The second aspect of Honduran politics that we can examine for corporate tendencies is the nature of the policies promulgated by recent administrations. Although there is no necessary connection between corporate structure and any particular set of substantive policy orientations, the Schmitter/Manoilescu analysis suggests that state corporatism seems to have a “developmental” rationale.

After the 1972 coup, General López Arellano was obligated to the campesino movement to do something concerning agrarian problems in Honduras. He therefore issued Decree No. 8, which was designed to alleviate the demand for land in rural areas. In part, it provided for the forced rental or transfer of idle or “inadequately utilized” private lands for a period of up to two years. During this two-year period, the military government was to draw up and implement a national agrarian reform plan that would provide for a more permanent solution to the land problem. The major stockraisers association (FENAGH) objected vociferously to the arbitrary methods and procedures contained in the new agrarian policy and, after a summit meeting with President López, revisions were made through a bipartite commission.<sup>56</sup>

The labor movement and their campesino affiliates were not

completely satisfied with Decree No. 8, nor were they encouraged by the subsequent revisions made under pressure from the landowners and stock raisers. But the popular sectors were not about to threaten their newly won political status by turning against the military regime. Moreover, the campesinos in the UNC were still hopeful of getting legal recognition.

A second decree-law, issued by López in January 1973, authorized labor unions to collect union dues from nonunion workers in situations where collective contracts provided them with the same direct benefits as union members. The conservative sectors of the business community argued that this meant forced unionization, which was unconstitutional, and that the funds generated by this law would only serve to enrich labor leaders. The height of the conservative reaction to agrarian and labor policies was reached in 1973 when the spectre of a Honduran Worker's party was raised. This new political force would supposedly replace the Liberal and National parties, and it was half hinted that President López would announce the establishment of a one-party, socialist state during May Day celebrations. In fact, speaking before the Labor Day rally of workers and campesinos, López declared that the armed forces were not tied or committed to any particular interest or group. Rather, the duty of the armed forces was to the country, and he called upon all sectors to join in the development of Honduras.<sup>57</sup>

The military regime has continued to pursue its policies of reform and has given its support to the campesino movement with the issuance of a new Agrarian Reform Law in January 1975.<sup>58</sup> The National Agrarian Institute is to implement the provisions of the new agrarian law, and the National Agrarian Council will act as an advisory body to the head of state concerning these matters. Members of the Agrarian Council are to be selected by the head of state from nominations submitted by the various stock raiser associations and campesino groups. Thus, it is clear that the president, in conjunction with the armed forces (acting through CONSUFA), will be the prime initiator of agrarian policy for the foreseeable future.<sup>59</sup>

*Corporate tendencies?* / From our analysis of historical patterns of state structural growth and the evolution of policies pursued by the state, what conclusions can we draw with regard to the existence or nonexistence of corporatism in Honduras? First, the historical record seems to indicate that, despite numerous changes in regime and perhaps even in regime type, the period from 1950 until 1976 demonstrates a consistently noncorporate pattern of interest group articulation and interaction. While patterns of interest group articulation changed in that they became somewhat more open and involved a series of new groups, the

general drift within this process was, if anything, toward more fluid patterns of interaction.

What seems to have taken place over the past twenty-five years is a major *shift* away from control of the state by the traditional political parties, with power gravitating toward the armed forces in conjunction with the popular sectors. However, granted recognition of this new tacit alliance, we still cannot perceive any major corporate tendencies. There are no formal lines of interest articulation established by the military regimes, nor have any of the latest policies created specifically corporate structures. Groups still compete within and across sectoral lines for resources and political influence in a freewheeling pattern of alliances and competitive trade-offs.

In broader terms, a case for corporate tendencies might be made with regard to the formal structure and legal requirements of the state. It is true that the government exerts certain controls over the formation, activities, and goals of interest groups in Honduras. To a certain extent, the interest groups are tied to the formal policy processes by: (a) the realities of political power and the structure of centralized authority; (b) the factor of *personería jurídica*; (c) the inclusion by law of interest groups on various governmental commissions; and (d) the occasional use of coercion by the state. However, these factors do not appear to have a clear impact upon the *number* of groups within socioeconomic sectors, nor do they bear any definite relationship to the *internal policy-making process* of interest groups.

The case for control or influence over articulation patterns is perhaps somewhat stronger. The focus of power and access to government around the head of state is easily demonstrated. Part of the chief executive's influence lies in his power to grant legal recognition. Such recognition can bolster a particular group's status and influence and solidify its ties with governmental agencies or ministries.

Additionally, corporate tendencies might be construed from the fact that interest groups are often involved formally in the policymaking process through their inclusion as members of the several commissions within the Honduran government. These commissions function as boards of autonomous agencies such as the Economic Council, the National Agrarian Institute, and the Social Security Institute.<sup>60</sup> However, the question arises as to whether these commissions play a meaningful role in policymaking. The so-called direct representation of the interest groups may be more fiction than fact in light of the frequency of meetings held by the various commissions. For example, the Consejo Superior de Planificación Económica met only three times from mid-1971 until mid-1973. One might also ask whether these mixed commis-

sions actually function as intended. Rather than advising the National Agrarian Institute or directing its affairs, it appears that, under the provisions of the new Agrarian Reform Law of 1975, the Consejo Nacional Agrario will be a creature of the head of state and of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.

Finally, the state can and does use coercion, or in Schmitter's terms "the organized monopoly of legitimate violence," to effect control over interest groups. Labor federations are regulated by the Labor Code and their ultimate tactical weapon, the strike, can be declared illegal by the government. Coercion was directed at the labor movement in 1954, and more successfully in 1968. Peasant groups have been continually frustrated by a government that seldom heeds their demands, and it was almost inevitable that land invasions became a tactic to stimulate governmental actions. The articulation of peasant demands has frequently been met by force, in some cases resulting in deaths as military and police clashed with campesinos.

However, despite these "corporate tendencies" and political realities, articulation patterns do not appear to have been formalized by the state. Groups continue to use extraofficial means to influence policy despite the risk of violence and, for the most part, the "corporate" ties to the governmental bureaucracy are ignored. The freewheeling atmosphere of public pronouncements, publicity campaigns, lobbying efforts, coalitions, and sectoral splits seems to indicate that the patterns of representation are undefined and often highly fluid.

### III. DEPENDENCY AND CORPORATISM IN HONDURAS: SOME CONCLUSIONS

We have attempted to document the concurrent existence in Honduras of a state of dependent development and political processes that cannot be described as corporate according to Schmitter's definition. Whatever term is used to describe this situation—and some have been suggested—the current Honduran political situation is one that appears to be highly fluid with a certain veneer of corporatism but little of the reality.<sup>61</sup> Additionally, when we look at the historical evolution of the Honduran political system, we find little suggestion of corporate praxis or tendencies.

Clearly, if Ronald Newton is correct in suggesting that the existence of urbanized middle sectors and labor groups is a structural prerequisite for the emergence of corporate organizational forms, then we should not expect to find such forms in Honduras during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.<sup>62</sup> However, from the early 1950s to the present, a broad spectrum of sectoral interest groups has emerged in Honduras, begin-

ning with the organization of the banana workers. Thus, while the traditional politics of earlier years is to be expected, given the nonurbanized nature of the social substructure, the scarcity of corporate manifestations is more difficult to explain in light of twenty years of favorable preconditions.<sup>63</sup> Even more disturbing from a theoretical perspective is the fact that the high level of fluidity in Honduran politics is to be found in precisely that type of dependent nation that Manoilescu's prototheory would seem to associate with corporatism. How then, in theoretical terms, do we explain the concurrent existence in Honduras of a state of dependency without corporatism?

Perhaps the most important observation we would have with respect to this seeming incongruence is that most, if not all, of the sectoral differentiation which took place within Honduran society during the 1950s and 1960s was in some sense dependency-derived. As Robert White has recently suggested, the development of the internal structure of both the Honduran central political control mechanisms and the structure of Honduran society was *primarily* influenced by the increased penetration during these years of external sources of influence.

At the state level, external influence penetrated Honduras during the 1940s and 1950s in the form of aid from the United States under the Point IV Program, aid from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and suggestions from the newly formed U. N. Economic Commission on Latin America. In order for the Honduran state to respond to the suggestions of these external promoters of development, a whole series of state-controlled bureaucracies and service institutions had to be created.<sup>64</sup> In effect, during the 1940s and 1950s the condition of dependency, through external aid, led to the replacement of personalistic nonbureaucratic state leadership by a *relatively* modern institutionalized bureaucratic structure.

Even more important has been the impact of dependency relations on the social structure of Honduras. During the past forty years, the reality of Honduran dependence has led to the creation of several new sectors. The first of these was, of course, the unionized banana workers who emerged as a political force from the enclave agrarian-industrial economy of the North Coast. Following the banana workers came the growth, particularly during the 1960s, of those North Coast business interests whose success was essentially derivative from the original establishment of the banana producing and marketing complex around San Pedro Sula.

With regard to the general impact of dependency, then, we would argue that the effect of the dependency relationship was to promote a rapid process of structural differentiation in Honduras at the level of



both central state institutions and society. At the state level, not only did dependency lead to the rapid bureaucratization and hence institutional differentiation of central control mechanisms, but also to the creation of new "political sectors" with a viewpoint quite different from that of the traditional political elites. During the 1950s and 1960s, a new group of indigenous political forces gathered around the Central Bank and Development Bank, and gradually developed linkages with other emerging sections of the developmental infrastructure to include the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the National Economic Planning Council, autonomous public service institutions, and private banking groups. These new state-level groups, who expanded their alliance to include many North Coast business leaders, increasingly came into economic and ideological conflict with the more traditional economic and political forces.<sup>65</sup>

At the societal level, dependency relations led not only to the creation of new "sectors" but, perhaps even more importantly, to the creation of such sectors outside of the range of effective state control. Partially, this resulted from the historical accident of the development of the banana industry in a section of the country far removed from the political center at Tegucigalpa. However, more significant than the physical distance separating new emerging groups from political centers of power is the fact that these sectors were often supplied externally with economic organizational resources which allowed them to maintain their independence from traditional vehicles of state control such as the political parties.<sup>66</sup>

Viewed in isolation, each individual dependency-conditioned state and sectoral development that has occurred since 1945 may not appear particularly important. However, the *total* impact of the activity of foreign governments, unions, churches, secular aid societies, international agencies, and private business was to promote the rapid growth of a plethora of relatively independent groups, structures, and organizations within Honduras at both the state and societal level.

With regard to Schmitter's prototheory relating dependent development to the emergence of corporatism, we thus confront a problem in that the impact of dependence on the Honduran political and social structure would seem to mitigate against the emergence of corporatism in a number of respects. First, in fragmenting both the structure of the state institutions and the ideological perspectives of those who control the state, a situation may have been created in which it would have been difficult to agree on a common organizational solution to problems of dependency. Second, the tendency of dependency to create new sectoral groupings and to subsidize their autonomous existence would have

made it additionally difficult for any attempt at incorporative solutions to succeed.<sup>67</sup> A third difficulty with regard to the theory that a positive linkage should exist between dependency and corporatism in Honduras lies in the *rate* of state and sectoral change that dependency has induced in the Honduran case. Thus, while dependency-induced sectoral changes may have proceeded in an evolutionary manner in certain Latin American countries, the effect of dependency in Honduras was to literally produce an explosion of new sectors and institutions. The pace of change may have thus surpassed some sort of critical "threshold" during the 1950s or 1960s which made incorporative solutions difficult either to conceive or implement.<sup>68</sup>

In sum, it would appear that, in Honduras at least, dependent development entails a relationship between dominant and subordinate national entities that has multiple and often *contradictory* effects, some of which are supportive of an incorporative political outcome and some of which are not. In the Honduran case, it seems clear that dependency in some sense supplied certain preconditions for corporatism in that the dependent relationship led to the development of "middle class" and labor sectors. Similarly, the existence of the dependency relationship between the Honduran state and the U.S. government led to the rapid emergence of the Honduran armed forces as an institutional political power, a development that some analysts have seen as a necessary precondition for the emergence of corporatism. On the other hand, the process of rapid interest group and institutional articulation may have made it increasingly difficult to conceive of corporate policy as being capable of encompassing and permanently consolidating this vast range of rapidly evolving social and institutional forces.

The primary difficulty we see then with the Manoilescu/Schmitter prototheory is its unidimensional nature. It would appear to us that part of the current problem in assessing the nature of the relationship between dependency and corporatism may lie in the initial failure to distinguish between the impact of a dependent relationship on indigenous *attitudes* and the impact on *structure*. At the attitudinal level, there can be little argument with the proposition that dependency relationships promote a search for national political solutions that may be incorporative in nature. However, the impact on the sociopolitical and economic structure of a particular nation may be such as to prevent the successful application of the perceived new solutions. Thus, while corporate imperatives and perhaps even widespread attitudes supporting corporate solutions may exist in a country such as Honduras, the dependency-created structural reality may be such that such solutions cannot be feasibly implemented.<sup>69</sup>

A second problem we confront in attempting to apply the Manólesco/Schmitter prototheory to Honduras lies in the fact that the theory is not fully elaborated in a manner that allows for testing. For example, we have to assume that the primary linkage that Schmitter perceives between dependency and corporatism is the creation of new attitudes among increasingly nationalistic elites.<sup>70</sup> The precise nature of the mechanisms, points of transmission, or connections between the activities of external actors and the emergence of indigenous corporate movements is never made adequately clear. Thus, while we find Schmitter's analysis extremely suggestive, we do not believe that it takes us very far down the road toward understanding the multifaceted and extremely complex relationship that apparently exists between dependency and corporatism. Is corporatism, as Schmitter seems to suggest, primarily a *conscious* collective effort to break the bonds of dependency as national consciousness levels rise? Or might we argue that corporatism is a reflexive *structural* response to a crisis of dependency (i.e., to a weakened dependency relationship)?

Schmitter's analysis would seem to indicate that corporatism is a phenomenon that emerges from a pattern of attitudinal change among indigenous elites during a period of heightened economic dependency. However, one might just as effectively argue that corporatism emerges under conditions where existing dependency mechanisms, which support existing political structures, have failed or are beginning to fail.<sup>71</sup> If, for example, one looks at the history of corporatism in Latin America, it seems clear that two distinct phases have occurred—the first during the 1930s and the second during the 1960s. These two waves of corporatism would seem to coincide to a considerable degree with periods during which the “metropole” was, for various reasons, serving less as a central political and economic actor. During the 1930s, the primary reason for this lack of highly dependent political and economic relationships seems to have been the Great Depression. Thirty years later, the decline in economic and political ties came as a result of rapid disenchantment with the Alliance for Progress and the natural gravitation of “metropole” investment capital away from primary extractive activities and toward secondary and tertiary activities in Canada and Western Europe.<sup>72</sup>

Could it be then that the “corporate populism” of the 1930s together with the more recent phase are most accurately interpreted as a reflexive attempt by various Latin American nations to adjust their “control mechanisms” to a new economic reality in which external capital and trade linkages are no longer supportive of internal political or economic equilibrium? Does corporatism in fact emerge not to reduce

increasingly restrictive dependency ties but rather to replace a failing dependency? While answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this paper, we might suggest that such an interpretation would have a number of implications, both with respect to our view of Latin American history and our expectations for the future. For one thing, the view that corporatism is primarily a response to the failure of dependency linkages would make it much easier to explain why corporate manifestations have not been consistent through time as the "Iberian cultural heritage" school would suggest. With shifts in economic conditions, corporate tendencies would be expected to appear in a country such as Brazil in the 1930s, only to disappear a decade or so later with the return to dependent economic linkages. As for the future, acceptance of the perspective that manifestations of corporatism in Latin America primarily relate to macroeconomic cycles within the capitalist system would imply that Ronald Newton's suggestion that the "Age of Corporatism" in Latin America is substantially at an end seems a little premature.<sup>73</sup> From our perspective, corporate forms might be expected to appear and disappear in some form of lagged synchronization with business macro-cycles.<sup>74</sup>

With respect to Honduras, we would suggest that the emergence of corporate structures is perhaps somewhat more likely in the future in spite of the obvious difficulties presented by a dependency-derived system fluidity which may have temporarily delayed movement in this direction. What we seem to have today in Honduras is the convergence of two factors that appear particularly conducive to the future emergence of corporate structure. First, the sectoral preconditions now exist and, second, Honduras appears to be entering an economic phase in which existing dependency linkages are weakening.<sup>75</sup>

How the Honduran state and Honduran society will respond to these new conditions will depend to a considerable extent on the nature and magnitude of future changes in current relationships of dependency. Here we might speculate that the quality of a particular dependency relationship may affect the type of corporatism that develops in the impacted country. It might be reasonable to assume that a high level of a metropole's dependency upon the central governmental bureaucracies could lead in the direction of state corporatism, given the tendency of such a dependency relationship to strengthen the central bureaucracies of the satellite state. On the other hand, a dependency relationship in which large private interests (for example, multinationals) played a major role, might result in rapid movement toward forms of societal corporatism or "corporatism from below."<sup>76</sup>

Generally, Honduras seems to be following the pattern observ-

able throughout Latin America in which interdependencies between metropole and satellite governments are on the decline while, at the same time, the role of private enterprise is remaining somewhat more constant.<sup>77</sup> However, in Honduras as elsewhere, rapid shifts are also taking place with regard to the nature of the business presence. These shifts are moving Honduras generally in the direction of less reliance on a few major companies involved in agricultural/extractive activities and toward the existence of more numerous contacts with multinationals engaged in a wide range of secondary and tertiary economic pursuits.<sup>78</sup>

How this changing structure of dependency will interact with internal structure and attitudinal changes in the future is difficult to determine. One possibility is the eventual emergence of an obrero-campesino political alliance that would amalgamate and consolidate the somewhat similar interests of these two sectors. An alternative would be a trans-class alignment based on these new forces but also including the more progressive business elements. This new alignment might carry the evolution of sectoral relationships beyond the simple collaboration of the Pacto guarantors and even lead to the institutionalization of the *fuerzas vivas* as a new political force.

Whether either of these outcomes can be achieved would seem to depend, in the final analysis, on the position taken by the armed forces. So far, the entente between the military, popular sector interest groups, and the progressive business elements is nothing more than that, and shows few signs at present of moving to a higher level of organization. And yet there is some indication that the Honduran armed forces are drifting, consciously or unconsciously, toward a more central political role with a concomitant extension of military "reach" that may presage the development of fully corporate institutional structures.<sup>79</sup> Under López Arellano, the political role of the armed forces was primarily one of presiding over civilian (political) mechanisms for running the state. However, in late 1974, we find the beginnings of a shift toward more direct military control with the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel Mario Maldonado as head of the National Agrarian Institute. This extension of the military's policymaking role became even more apparent after April 1975. For example, not only did the MOJ officers confirm Maldonado's appointment but an army captain was named minister of the economy.

Thus, it may well be that the military nature of the current Honduran government in fact masks a drift that might be interpreted as moving the political process in corporative directions. As a young institution which has yet to test the outer limits of its organizational capabilities, the Honduran armed forces seem the most likely candidate to consolidate this drift. However, in the long run, the important question

would not seem to be whether the Honduran armed forces or other sectoral-institutional actors will attempt incorporative political solutions but whether they can expect any degree of success in these endeavors. The answer to this latter question would seem to be that it is difficult to conceive of those conditions under which any incorporative solution could work in Honduras. Not only would the emerging "corporatists" confront the problem of encompassing in one institutional framework the plethora of rapidly evolving groups, but they would also face the even more difficult problem of satisfying their various demands over the long run.<sup>80</sup> In this regard, the Bolivian case is instructive of what can happen in a small resource-poor country when an incorporative solution is attempted. During the 1950s, the *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario* (MNR) attempted what James Malloy has termed an "inclusive corporate solution." That is, the MNR attempted to satisfy the demands of every major sector of Bolivian society. According to Malloy, the fact that the military reemerged during the early 1960s as the main anchor of the political system was reflective of the failure of an inclusive corporate solution due to inadequate resources. The military, in the Bolivian case, executed an "exclusive" corporate strategy, that is, one that relied on the support of only certain favored sectors of the body politic.<sup>81</sup>

One can envisage such a future sequence of developments in Honduras. First, an incorporative phase based on the new alliance between the military, labor, and progressive business; and second, a phase during which the armed forces moves toward a less inclusive variety of corporatism under pressure of resource constraints. The question as to which sectors of Honduran society the armed forces would choose to demobilize is a moot one although, simply in terms of numbers, one might suspect that the excluded groups would at some point include the *campesinos*.

In our opinion, it is the tension between inadequate resources, which do not allow for full support of viable corporate solutions, and the developmental imperatives, which demand that incorporative attempts nonetheless be made, that will explain much of the political confusion that will occur in Honduras during coming decades. We have attempted to show the manner in which this tension is apparently linked to the current Honduran state of dependent development. In general, the relationship between corporate manifestations and dependency seems to be an ambiguous and multifaceted one that will require considerable ingenuity to explain fully.

## NOTES

1. Much of the work to date on neocorporate theory can be found in Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds., *The New Corporatism: Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World* (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1974). Also useful are Philippe C. Schmitter, "Paths to Political Development in Latin America" in Douglas A. Chalmers, ed., *Changing Latin America: New Interpretations of its Politics and Society* (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1972); Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973); Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," *World Politics* 25, no. 2 (January 1973):206–35; and Ronald C. Newton, "On Functional Groups, Fragmentation, and Pluralism in Spanish American Political Society," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 50, no. 1 (February 1970):1–29.
2. See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell's discussion of "bureaucratic authoritarianism" in *Modernization*. O'Donnell's analysis is concentrated primarily on Brazil and Argentina, with occasional asides regarding Peru.
3. Howard Wiarda, "Corporatism and Development in the Iberic-Latin World: Persistent Strains and New Variations", in Pike and Stritch, *The New Corporatism*, p. 4.
4. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework," and Wiarda, ed., *Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition* (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1974).
5. Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?," in Pike and Stritch, *The New Corporatism*, p. 90.
6. For example, the Brazilian historical experience reveals significant fluctuations over time with regard to the nature of the political system. At times the system has appeared pluralist, at others populist-pluralist, with more recent manifestations of military authoritarianism. Such fluctuations would seem anomalous if the "cultural heritage" of corporatism indeed exerts the influence claimed for it.
7. O'Donnell, *Modernization*, *passim*.
8. Schmitter, "Still the Century," pp. 93–94. Howard Wiarda offers a definition of corporatism that focuses attention primarily on the nature and degree of state control. According to Wiarda: "In the corporative system, the government controls and directs all associations, holding the power not only to grant or withhold juridical recognition (the *sine qua non* for the group's existence) but also access to official funds and favors without which any sector is unlikely to succeed or survive" ("Toward a Framework"), p. 222.
9. There is perhaps a tendency in some of the corporate literature to discuss politics as if corporatism and pluralism were polar types encompassing the entire range of organizational possibilities. We hope that our own analysis does not suggest such a point of view. Rather, we would tend to regard both corporatism and pluralism as being responses to social and structural differentiation during an industrial age. For definitive treatment of these issues, see Juan Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Mass Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1970).
10. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 107–8. Schmitter recognizes his heavy debt to early corporate theorists (and particularly to Manólesco) with regard to the task of "dis-aggregating" corporatism as a concept. Manólesco recognized quite early the critical distinction between corporate structures created from below, on which the state itself was semidependent, and those corporate mechanisms created and maintained by the state itself, often in its own interest.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
13. Manólesco apparently recognized the importance in explaining state corporatist phenomena of factors such as rapid radicalization of the proletariat, regional or urban-rural tensions, and the failure of emerging middle classes to govern effectively.

- However, in his theory, all of these internal factors were of secondary importance to the structure of relationships *between nations*. State corporate process is viewed as being primarily conditioned by the rise of nationalism and by the effort to discover new political structures that would insure political independence and economic autarky. Mihail Manoilescu, *Le Siecle du Corporatisme* (Paris, 1936), p. 30, as cited in Schmitter, "Still the Century," p. 119.
14. Schmitter, "Still the Century," p. 123.
  15. Roger D. Hansen and the Staff of the Overseas Development Council, *The U.S. and World Development: Agenda for Action, 1976* (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 132–41.
  16. In his article dealing with the timing of economic development in various Latin American countries, David Collier selected the level of .10 kilowatt hours per capita to represent the "threshold of industrial development." Using such a measure, Honduras did not reach this stage until 1968, as compared with 1922 for Chile and 1924 for Argentina. Only Paraguay reached this threshold at a later date. David Collier, "Timing of Economic Growth and Regime Characteristics in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 7, no. 3 (April 1975), p. 341.
  17. Whether Philippe Schmitter would consider himself in any formal sense a dependentista theorist is somewhat unclear. However, with respect to this particular aspect of his analytical thought, we would argue that he seems to accept many major dependentista tenets. For an attempt to sort out the various current dependentista perspectives, see C. Richard Bath and Dilmus James, "Dependency Analysis of Latin America: Some Criticisms, Some Suggestions," *LARR* 11, no. 3 (Fall 1976):3–53.
  18. Susanne Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," *Politics and Society*, no. 1, (May 1971):331–32.
  19. Theotonio dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," in *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment*, Charles K. Wilbur, ed. (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 109.
  20. Henrik Shipstead, "Dollar Diplomacy in Latin America," *Current History and Forum*, no. 26, (September 1927):883–84. See also, in this regard, Vilma Lainez and Víctor Meza, "El enclave bananero en la historia de Honduras," *Estudios Sociales CentroAmericanos*, no. 5 (May/August 1973).
  21. Carlos Contreras, *Entre el Marasmo* (Tegucigalpa, 1970), p. 12.
  22. There are approximately seventy U.S. companies currently operating in Honduras. These include multinationals such as IBM and Xerox, as well as more localized firms such as Rosario Mining and Resources, Inc. (*Wall Street Journal*, 14 April 1975).
  23. Donald E. Baer, "Income and Export Taxation of Agriculture in Costa Rica and Honduras," *The Journal of Developing Areas*, no. 8 (October 1973): 40.
  24. One direct measure of influence is that both United Brands and Standard Fruit are excluded from Honduran income tax laws and pay a special tax on net annual income of 30 percent. The quasi-monopolistic nature of the position that they have created for themselves is indicated by the fact that large Honduran national banana producers have to pay a 40 percent tax on such income, in addition to higher export duties. On the other hand, the Honduran government cannot afford to rely too heavily on the banana companies as a source of annual revenue due to fluctuations in company income:

*Banana Company Income Taxes as a Percentage of Total Honduran Income Taxes*

1958	1.1%	1963	4.1%
1959	26.9	1964	3.6
1960	3.8	1965	25.0
1961	0.0	1966	38.2
1962	7.9	1967	34.7

Ibid., pp. 44–47.



25. At this writing, it is still unclear as to who accepted the bribes. The names most frequently mentioned are former President López Arellano, who was removed from office because of the scandal, and former Minister of the Economy Bennaton Ramos.
26. *Wall Street Journal*, 9, 11, and 14 April 1975; and the *New York Times*, 13 and 24 April 1975. However, another interpretation which might be put on this event is that it was reflective of *declining* company influence. Thus, it is difficult to conceive of United Fruit being forced to pay such an exorbitant bribe during earlier decades.
27. Neale J. Pearson, "Peasant Pressure Groups and Agrarian Reform in Honduras under Civilian and Military Regimes, 1962–1973," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Rocky Mountain Social Sciences Association, 25–27 April 1974, El Paso, Texas, p. 10. We feel that the data presented here sufficiently document our case for a high level of Honduran dependency on the United States. In a recent study, which attempted to operationalize the concept of dependency, the measures selected were levels of trade dependency and capital dependency. Honduras scores as highly dependent according to both of these measures, as do most of the Central American countries (Robert R. Kaufman, Harry I. Chernotsky, and Daniel S. Geller, "A Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency," *Comparative Politics* 7, no. 3 [April 1975], p. 311).
28. James A. Morris, "The Honduran Plan Político de Unidad Nacional, 1971–1972: Its Origins and Demise," *Occasional Paper*, Center for Inter-American Studies, University of Texas at El Paso (February 1975).
29. See for example the correspondence between the president of United Fruit and the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Latin America (Edwin M. Martin), in Marvin D. Bernstein, ed., *Foreign Investment in Latin America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 186–211.
30. With regard to dependency theory, this is perhaps its most debatable point. That is, while few would deny the existence of a structural imbalance in the relationship between the United States and Latin American countries, or the economic and political influence that the former traditionally exercised over the latter, it is more difficult to prove that this relationship has affected Latin America adversely or, as the dependentistas claim, has led to the "development of underdevelopment." While it is claimed that the "metropole" has siphoned off developmental capital from the "satellites" in the form of excessive profits, such profits are central to *any* capitalist developmental mode, whether in developed or underdeveloped countries. The economic aspects of dependency would seem more complex than the simple zero-sum game involving one big winner and a host of small losers that the dependentistas posit. See, in this regard, Shane L. Hunt, "Evaluating Direct Foreign Investment in Latin America," in Luigi Einaudi, ed., *Latin America in the 1970s* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1972), pp. 128–36, and David Ray, "The Dependency Model of Latin American Underdevelopment: Three Basic Fallacies," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 15 (February 1973):4–20.
31. Schmitter, "Still the Century," pp. 93–94.
32. Contemporary research on Honduras was preceded and facilitated by the classic study of William S. Stokes. See his *Honduras: An Area Study in Government* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1950); and also his "The Land Laws of Honduras," *Agricultural History* 21, no. 3 (July 1947):148–54; "Honduras: Dilemma of Development," *Current History* 42, no. 246 (February 1962):83–88; and "Honduras: Problems and Prospects," *Current History* 50, no. 293 (January 1966):22–26.

For other studies previous to 1970, see Arturo Jauregui, "The Young Free Trade Union Movement in Honduras," *Free Labour World*, no. 59 (May 1955): 26–31; Richard N. Adams, *Cultural Survey of Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras* (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Sanitary Bureau, Scientific Publications, No. 33, December 1957); Vincent Checchi, *Honduras: A Problem in Economic Development* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1959); Lucas Paredes, *Drama político de Honduras* (México: Editorial Latinoamericano, 1959); Lucas Paredes, *Liberalismo y*

- nacionalismo (*Transfugismo político*) (Tegucigalpa D.C.: Imprenta Honduras, 1963); Anonymous, "Agrarian Reform Law in Honduras," *International Labour Review* 87, no. 6 (June 1963):573–80; Benjamin Villanueva, "The Role of Institutional Innovations in the Economic Development of Honduras" (Madison, Wisconsin: Land Tenure Center, Reprint No. 34, November 1968); Stanford Research Institute, *Economic Development of Southern Honduras* (Stanford, California: SRI Project No. 1–5878, July 1968); Joseph R. Thompson, "An Economic Analysis of the Public Expenditure in Honduras, 1925–1963" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, Gainesville, 1968); and Rafael Leiva Vivas, *Un país en Honduras* (Tegucigalpa D.C.: Calderon, 1969).
33. The terminology used in this paper to describe social phenomena in Honduras is purposely eclectic and based on the assumption of a high degree of eclecticism of subject matter. While we tend to make extensive use of the term "interest group" in the Honduran context, we are well aware of its implications of rationality and instrumentality and its concomitant deemphasis with regard to affective dimensions of politics. Similarly, we often use the term "sector" in situations where the existing degree of institutionalization and politicization may not fully warrant such usage.
  34. For the most recent research and analysis of Honduras development, structural change, and political dynamics see Howard I. Blutstein et al., *Area Handbook for Honduras* (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, American University, 1971); U.S. Department of State, *Republic of Honduras: Background Notes* (Washington D.C., November 1971); Rolando Cruz Martínez, "La clase obrera y el desarrollo económico de Honduras" (thesis, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, Tegucigalpa D.C., 1971); Luz Laines de Morris, "Alcances sociales y económicos del movimiento laboral en Honduras" (thesis, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, Tegucigalpa D.C., 1971); Martha O. Brown and Olga Elvir Hernández, "Las invasiones campesinas como fenómeno social en la reforma agraria" (thesis, Escuela de Servicio Social de Honduras, Tegucigalpa D.C., 1971); Robert A. White, *The Adult Education Program of Acción Cultural Hondureña: An Evaluation of the Rural Development Potential of the Radio School Movement in Honduras* (Full Report, Parts I and II. Department of Anthropology and Sociology, St. Louis University, October 1972); Axel I. Mundigo, *Elites, Economic Development, and Population in Honduras* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Dissertation Series, No. 34, May 1972); Carlos O'B. Fonck, *Modernity and Public Policies in the Context of the Peasant Sector: Honduras as a Case Study* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Dissertation Series, No. 32, May 1972); Arturo Euceda Gomez, "La estructura interna de la sociedad hondureña y la población", *Extra* (Tegucigalpa D.C.) 7, no. 90 (January 1973); Steve C. Ropp, "The Honduran Army in the Sociopolitical Evolution of the Honduran State," *The Americas* 30, no. 4 (April 1974); James A. Morris, "Interest Groups and Politics in Honduras" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 1974); James A. Morris, "Plan Político"; and Robert A. White, "Structural Factors in Rural Development: The Church and the Peasant in Honduras" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1976).
  35. Most of the data on interest groups and sectors derived from Morris, "Interest Groups," *passim*. Cf. White, "Structural Factors," ch. 4.
  36. Developments in 1975 saw the three most important campesino organizations (ANACH, UNC, and FECORAH) overcome their rivalries to form a Frente de Unidad Campesina (FUC). This unification was essentially a reflexive response to governmental inaction on agrarian reform. However, the campesino movement still remains organizationally divided with FUC representing a tentative step in the direction of sectoral coordination and centralization.
  37. See Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris, "A Typology of Latin American Subcultures," in *The Dynamics of Change in Latin America*, ed. John D. Martz, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 31–35; and Solomon Miller, "Proletarianization of Indian Peasants in Northern Peru," in *Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America*, ed. Dwight B. Heath, 2d ed. (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 135–42.

38. CLAT was formerly the Confederación Latinoamericana de Sindicalistas Cristianos (CLASC) organized in 1954 with its headquarters in Santiago, Chile. In 1971, the name was changed. CLAT is entirely Latin American in its membership, in contrast with ORIT which combines many Latin American labor unions with those of North America.
39. The directorate of COHEP is shared among nine national and regional associations. According to the statutes of COHEP, as revised in 1973, the executive council is composed of representatives from the Cámara de Comercio e Industrias de Tegucigalpa (CCIT), the Cámara de Comercio e Industrias de Cortés (CCIC), the Cámara de Comercio e Industrias de Atlántida (CCIA), the Asociación Nacional de Industrias (ANDI), the Asociación Hondureña de Instituciones Bancarias y Aseguradoras (AHIBA), the Federación Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos de Honduras (FENAGH), and the Cámara Hondureña de la Industria de la Construcción (CHIC), plus two elected members.
40. The stated goals or functions of COHEP include representing the private sector in the policymaking process as well as appointing representatives to those governmental commissions which include a member of the business peak association. Membership in COHEP, however, is not obligatory but is open to any group within the private sector upon proper application and approval by the executive council. See *Estatutos del Consejo Hondureño de la Empresa Privada* (Tegucigalpa D.C., February 1973).
41. About 1970, the tentative division within the business sector widened and eventually became a split. The division had several facets including differences over the role of the private sector in politics and labor-management relations. Political ties to the traditional power centers tend to be closer in Tegucigalpa, while business groups and certain individuals in San Pedro Sula reflect a more independent attitude and stance. Enmity among the progressive-minded San Pedro Sula groups and the conservative elements had roots in the fuerzas vivas conference in late 1969, and later with the establishment of the Plan Político in 1971. It was not until February 1973, when a new set of by-laws was approved and leadership changes were made within the peak association, that the business community patched up its formal structure and procedural affairs. Nevertheless, the private sector still retains its basic division with the North Coast groups (CCIC, CCIA, CHIC) arrayed against the more conservative interests (CCIT, FENAGH, and ANDI).
42. Another example of the political nature of legal recognition was when COHEP, the business sector organization, was floundering through a period of reorganization. The contending factions were, in effect, struggling for control of the organization so as to direct its political impact in preferred directions. The end result was a compromise and changes in the by-laws of COHEP. Although the granting of recognition was hardly in doubt, the government had to approve these changes before COHEP would be able to operate with personería jurídica under its new constitution.
43. The effectiveness of the UNC stems from its coherent organization and grassroots participation. Most recently, the UNC launched a series of simultaneous land "invasions" (despite its prohibition in the new Agrarian Reform Law) in a continued effort to stimulate land distribution by the INA. A representative of ANACH viewed the UNC action with sympathy and suggested that his organization might coordinate with the UNC in such actions. The military regime responded by forming a committee of the Consejo Superior de las Fuerzas Armadas which met with UNC and CGT leaders in order to resolve the confrontation peaceably. See *El Tiempo* (20, 22 May 1975).
44. Morris, "Plan Político."
45. Morris, "Interest Groups," pp. 273–77.
46. See Leiva Vivas, *Un país, passim*.
47. Ropp, "The Honduran Army."
48. Villeda Morales's regime probably represented a half-way house between a mild form of populism and politics as usual. At heart, it was still based on the organiza-

- tional strengths and allegiances of the traditional Liberal party. However, the situation was given a more amorphous populist flavor due to the weakness of the Liberal party at that point (after years of political control by the Nationals). Perhaps in compensation for this fact, Villeda attempted to activate the "available masses" of union members and bureaucrats by passing a series of liberal labor laws. However, our judgment is that traditional institutional mechanisms and leaders played too great a role in this process of mass incorporation to label the process populist.
49. Stokes, "Honduras: Problems and Prospects."
  50. Ropp, "The Honduran Army." For analyses of the broader impact of the "Soccer War" on developments in Honduras and Central America, see Cal Clark and Steve C. Ropp, "Disintegrative Tendencies in the Central American Common Market," *Occasional Papers* (Institute of Government Research, University of Arizona, July 1974); Marco Carias Virgilio and Daniel Slutzky, *La guerra inútil: Análisis socio-económico del conflicto entre Honduras y El Salvador* (San José: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, 1971); Vincent Cable, "The Football War and the Central American Common Market," *International Affairs* (London), 45 (October 1969):658–71; Raymond Prats, "Le conflit Honduras-El Salvador; ses conséquences pour la communauté centro-américaine," *Notes et études documentaires* 21, nos. 3822–3823 (5 October 1971):6–36; and Alain Rouquie, "Honduras-El Salvador. La guerre de cent heures: un cas de désintégration régionale," *Revue française de science politique* 21, no. 6 (December 1971):1290–1316.
  51. See various documents from the III Reunión de las Fuerzas Vivas de Honduras, 21–23 November 1969, San Pedro Sula. Interestingly, Article Four of the Honduran Constitution supports these kinds of sectoral demands. It states in part that: "Integration implies the participation of all social, economic, and political sectors in the public administration, a principle which the authorities must respect, with the goals of strengthening and guaranteeing the Honduran nationality, and make viable the progress of Honduras based upon political stability and national conciliation" (República de Honduras, *Constitución de la República* [Tegucigalpa D.C., 1965]).
  52. Morris, "Plan Político."
  53. An indication of the military's adherence to this ideal was the fact that General López Arellano had himself constitutionally elected to the presidency in 1965, rather than continuing to rule by decree.
  54. One can perhaps question the sincerity of the MOJ officers with regard to their true concern for long-term Honduran development. Clearly, they profited professionally from the institutional changes of March 1975, which retired from active duty all but four of the military's full colonels.
  55. The long-range question is whether the new leadership in fact constitutes a collegial decision-making entity, or whether the "junta phenomenon" masks differences of ideology and perspective that will resurface in the near future.
  56. Morris, "Interest Groups," pp. 195–204.
  57. *El Tiempo* (2 May 1973).
  58. For the text of this Agrarian Reform Law, see *El Tiempo* (3 January 1975).
  59. *El Tiempo* (20 February 1975). Article 320 of the Honduran Constitution in regard to the armed forces, says in part: "They will cooperate with the Executive Power in the tasks of literacy, education, agriculture, conservation of natural resources, roads, communications, health, settlement and emergency actions, as long as these activities do not detract from the military's principal mission."
  60. There are a number of these commissions scattered throughout the Honduran bureaucracy, for example, the Empresa Nacional Portuaria, Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Honduras, and the Comisión Consultativa para el Desarrollo Industrial. Another, the Comisión Nacional de Comercio Exterior de Honduras, is composed of the undersecretaries of economy, foreign relations, finance, and natural resources; the executive secretary of the Economic Planning Council; the presidents of the Central Bank and National Development Bank; and representatives of the CCIT, FENAGH, and

- AHIBA. Before 1975, the Consejo Nacional Agrario, which theoretically oversees the INA, included a delegate from both ANACH and FENAGH. Similarly, the CTH, CCIT, and ANDI are all represented on the Comisión Nacional de Integración Económica. Cf. White, "Structural Factors," ch. 4.
61. For example, Robert White has described the sociopolitical drift in Honduras over the past thirty years as "increased national system fluidity." See his "Structural Factors."
  62. Ronald C. Newton, "Natural Corporatism and the Passing of Populism in Latin America," in Pike and Stritch, *The New Corporatism*, pp. 39–40. It would also seem that corporate organizational forms could not precede the centralization of state power and control that took place under Carias and that was accelerated by developmental pressures during the post-WWII period.
  63. The only political development during this period that might be interpreted as some sort of "corporate manifestation" would be the election of Villeda Morales to the presidency in 1957. To the extent that Villeda Morales's following was polyclass and his style populist, one could argue that we see here an amorphous brand of incipient corporatism that might be expected during the earliest phases of sectoral development.
  64. For example, both the Central Bank and the National Development Bank were established in 1950 with the help of advisors from the International Monetary Fund. The Ministry of Labor was founded with the help of ORIT and the ILO in the wake of the 1954 banana strike. The Ministry of Agriculture was established in 1952 under the supervision of advisers supplied under the Point IV Program. See Robert White for a more detailed historical analysis, "Structural Factors," ch. 4.
  65. *Ibid.*
  66. To cite an example of the manner in which dependency not only led to the creation of new sectoral interests but facilitated the maintenance of sectoral autonomy, USAID officials created a system of national credit unions in Honduras during 1963 that was eventually linked to a series of agricultural cooperatives in 1967. These programs permitted the existence to some extent of "agrarian reform programs" that were independent of the control of the local National party power structure. Similarly, the business sector peak organization (COHEP) originated from the importation of capital and technical skills via the Consejo Interamericana de Comercio y Producción, headquartered in Caracas.
  67. Dependencista analysis, we believe, has been largely correct in its assumption that dependency linkages have had a number of debilitating effects on the power of central state organs. Furthermore, dependencistas have pointed out how external linkages tend to fragment the class structure in such a manner as to mitigate against class-based statist solutions. We see their analysis as paralleling our own with regard to the somewhat negative impact that dependency has on statist solutions, whether of the left or right, whether corporate or class-based. However, we also argue that dependency also impacts to some extent in the opposite direction, as detailed below.
  68. The question of timing sequences in developing nations has received considerable attention during recent years. Unfortunately, as David Collier points out, we have little yet in the way of studies that attempt to test various hypotheses relating levels of development to regime characteristics and other sociopolitical factors (Collier, "Timing of Economic Growth," p. 332).
  69. There is an increasing amount of attitudinal evidence to suggest that large segments of Honduran elites do in fact perceive the nature of the current *immobilisme* and would support incorporative political solutions. For example, see the attitudes cited in the dissertation by Axel Mundigo, *Elites*, pp. 98–103.
  70. This stress on the centrality of attitudinal changes in sparking incorporative solutions seems implicit in Schmitter's analysis: "There seems to be a correspondence between the context of peripheral, delayed-dependent capitalism; *awareness* of relative underdevelopment; *resentment* against inferior international status; *desire* for enhanced na-

- tional economic and political autarky" (emphasis added), Schmitter, "Still the Century," p. 123.
71. Such a possibility is suggested by James Malloy, "Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern," paper delivered at the Conference on Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, University of Pittsburgh, 4–6 April 1974.
  72. The best recent analysis of this trend toward declining metropole-satellite economic ties is Aníbal Pinto's "Economic Relations between Latin America and the United States: Some Implications and Perspectives," in Julio Cotler and Richard Fagen eds., *Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities* (Stanford: The Stanford University Press, 1974). Pinto finds, for example, that Latin America's share of total U.S. imports declined from 24 percent to only 11 percent from 1960 to 1970. Whereas the United States absorbed 40 percent of all Latin American exports in the early 1960s, this figure had dropped to only 30 percent during the latter half of the decade.
  73. Newton, "Natural Corporatism," pp. 44–45.
  74. This corporatism might be expected to appear with different "faces" that would be commensurate with the state of economic development and social differentiation existing in a particular country during the low point of the economic macrocycle. The "corporate populism" of the 1930s and the "bureaucratic corporatism" of the 1960s and 1970s may foreshadow new forms reflective of even higher levels of modernization. For an impressionistic but stimulating treatment of the subject of capitalist macrocycles and their political impact, see James B. Shuman and David Rosenau, *The Kondratieff Wave: The Future of America Until 1984 and Beyond* (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1972).
  75. There have been a number of recent indications that traditional linkages are in the process of breaking down. For example, Standard Fruit gave up banana production on five thousand hectares of land in the Isletas region of Honduras, laying off approximately five hundred workers in the process. While this may have represented a tactical maneuver in the face of higher taxes, it more likely is representative of a long-term movement away from primary production activities of foreign corporations operating in Honduras.
  76. Obviously, this variant of societal corporatism would be quite distinct from what Schmitter sees as coming in postindustrial societies. It would have different imperatives, structural forms, timing, and implications for development of the political system.
  77. One may wonder, however, whether the metropole/satellite relationship is really disappearing or whether new metropolises are simply being substituted for the heretofore dominant United States. In this regard, it is interesting to speculate concerning the activities of the Venezuelans who are subsidizing development in Central America through a system that channels petroleum import expenses above \$6.00 a barrel into area central banks. The Venezuelans intend to lend \$103.4 million to Honduras through the International Development Bank for the construction of a huge pulp and paper mill. While Honduras will retain 51 percent control of the mill, this level of Venezuelan funding should insure a considerable measure of political influence (*International Development Bank News* 3, no. 4 [May 1976], p. 16).
  78. For example, McDonalds is in the process of setting up operations in Tegucigalpa that will rely on imported meat for its hamburgers. As in other Latin American countries, there is also a movement in Honduras toward the establishment of "joint enterprises." Both Standard Fruit and United Brands have recently made overtures to the government in this direction.
  79. In May of 1976, General Juan Melgar Castro formally installed the Advisory Council of the Chief of State, a body composed of thirty-five members drawn from a wide range of political and economic groups including new political parties, labor, campesinos, professional associations, and the armed forces. The council was to draw up a new electoral law that would make provision for the legal recognition of these new

- political forces. Significantly, the traditional political parties and the business peak organization (COHEP) chose not to participate. General Castro indicated that the armed forces intended to restructure the constitutional order by the "authentic participation . . . of all sectors, interests, and modes of thought" (*Latin American Report* 4, no. 10 [May 1976]).
80. Another way of phrasing the question is to ask whether the Honduran political system can successfully accommodate the large number of interest groups and sectoral splinters that will fall back upon the state for support as foreign funding dries up under conditions of general international economic scarcity.
  81. James Malloy, "Authoritarianism and Corporatism: The Case of Bolivia," paper presented at the Conference on Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, University of Pittsburgh, 4–6 April 1974, pp. 37–39.

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