

DISCOVERY IN RUSSIAN AND SIBERIAN WATERS. By *L. H. Neatby*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1973. vii, 226 pp. \$8.50.

This modest book surveys four centuries of multinational exploration and discovery in the Arctic waters of the Eastern Hemisphere. The story of the opening of the North American sector of the Arctic Ocean has overshadowed that of the Eurasian sector, thanks in part to three previous books by Neatby himself (an historian by avocation) but also to Russian secretiveness, the traditional remoteness and strangeness of things Russian, and the uncoordinated character of pre-Soviet efforts to probe the Russian High Arctic. This book will help to right the imbalance.

The absorbing narrative is perhaps predictable—heroic courage, incredible endurance, horrible suffering, and small reward in the face of pack ice, bitter cold, snow blindness, scurvy, uncharted shoals, unsuitable vessels, and sometimes unhelpful natives (but always hospitable Russians). The explorers were motivated by the desire to open trade with Russia, to find a shorter route to China, to satisfy scientific curiosity, and to reach the North Pole, with means ranging from kayak to dirigible.

These attempts by Britons, Italians, Norwegians, Russians, and others are knowledgeably and respectfully treated by Neatby in sprightly (if at times hyperbolic and folksy) prose. Geographically the coverage is well balanced, but topically it is not; two of the sixteen chapters, for example, concern the voyage of the *Jcannette* (1879–81), which was perhaps the most disastrous—but certainly not very fruitful. There is also somewhat too much detail and admiration for foreign efforts and not enough for Russian ones, particularly those of the numerous but unsung *morekhody* and *zemleprokhodtsy* as against the large-scale and official expeditions. This unevenness stems from the author's overreliance on non-Russian sources (the page-and-a-half bibliography lists only two Russian-language items). The weakest section is his support of Golder's contention that Dezhnev crossed rather than rounded the Chukchi Peninsula; he overlooks the recent thorough examination of this question by Fisher, who has concluded that Dezhnev did indeed sail through Bering Strait, so that the renaming of Captain Cook's East Cape as Cape Dezhnev by the Russians hardly qualifies as "horrible gaucherie." There are few typos, but the maps are pedestrian and the index is spare (personal and geographical names only).

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RUSSLAND, FRANKREICH UND DAS REICH, 1801–1803: ZUR VORGESCHICHTE DER 3. KOALITION. By *Uta Krüger-Löwenstein*. Frankfurter Historische Abhandlungen, vol. 2. Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1972. xii, 159 pp. DM 24, paper.

Making good use of German and Austrian archives, and an impressive array of published sources, Uta Krüger-Löwenstein seeks to elucidate Russia's role in the indemnification of the German princes whose left-bank territories had been annexed by France. The author proves convincingly that Alexander sought to solve the problem in conjunction with Austria and Prussia; but the inability of the three powers to act in concert enabled Napoleon to seize the initiative and redistribute power in southwestern Germany in order to strengthen his own position in the German Reich, leaving Alexander the dubious privilege of approving the arrange-

ments. Alexander's initial foray into foreign policy, the author concludes, was a miserable failure, tempered only by one useful lesson: France and Britain would heed Russia's claims only when they could be backed by force.

The narrative is presented with great clarity, thanks in part to the exclusion of other aspects of Russian foreign policy. The reader is left somewhat confused by the generous space devoted to Rostopchin, Panin, Kochubey, Vorontsov, Maria Fedorovna, and the Unofficial Committee, for the author fails to delineate their respective contributions, if any, to Alexander's policies. But can foreign policy in an autocratic state be described successfully without coming to grips with the question of its formulation? The monograph's significance is further reduced by the author's admission that among Alexander's priorities the German constitution was secondary to the Mediterranean, and that the negotiations themselves were nothing more than a passing episode, soon eclipsed by renewed Anglo-French rivalry, which finally permitted the tsar to pursue his interest in the Mediterranean (here the author would have done well to consult Norman E. Saul's study, *Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807*). Given its limited scope, the thesis could probably have been presented more conveniently in article form.

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NAPOLEON BONAPART. By *A. Z. Manfred*. Moscow: "Mysl'," 1972. 724 pp. 2.40 rubles.

Albert Manfred, author of *Ocherki po istorii Frantsii* (1961), has set out to write a biography of Napoleon using sources "insufficiently or not at all studied by specialists," all seen "without preconceptions through the eyes of a Marxist historian of the end of the twentieth century" (p. 5). It is hard to find where he has added new matter of any significance. We hardly need the seven pages—seven lines would suffice—on why Dumouriez was not received by Paul I. It is also difficult to find Marx used in any but the most perfunctory way. Manfred shows throughout his book the decisive role of the personal factor, whether in battles or diplomacy, the abandonment of revolutionary tactics, the reading of Alexander I's character at Austerlitz, the restoration of aristocracy and church, or the pursuit of an endlessly predatory policy against Napoleon's own interests. Never is Napoleon called, as one would have expected, the tool of the bourgeoisie. Manfred has truly abandoned preconceptions, and his book represents a significant advance for Soviet historians seeking to understand an absolute ruler's impact on history. He has moved well beyond the Tolstoyan (and Marxist) caricature of Bonaparte as a mere figurehead for historical forces.

The book is not an advance in Western terms. It is an old-fashioned political biography—pre-Jung, pre-Freud, and pre-Lytton Strachey. But let us be grateful that a Soviet historian has not only noted Josephine but also observed that her infidelity was an important factor in Napoleon's growing disillusion. Manfred is concerned to defend his hero from the historiography which has portrayed him as from the start cynical, cold, calculating, and power-hungry. The author shows that he indeed became so, but only gradually and understandably.

To portray a tragic fall, one must portray what the character once was, and Manfred's best chapters are those on Napoleon's youth, his Rousseauism and idealism when he was a Corsican Don Quixote, his adulation of and disillusion