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REFLECTIONS ON THE USE OF THE FOREIGNER CONCEPT:

EVOLUTION AND FUNCTION OF THE IMAGE OF THE BARBARIAN IN ATHENS IN THE CLASSICAL ERA

In the following essay we shall try to show how a society uses the notion of "Foreigner," how the image which it creates of something extraneous to it is only secondarily a means of conceiving the world, a would-be scientific approach to big problems, but is essentially an ideology for its own internal use and forms an integral part of a political play which takes place within the society itself. We thought that the example of ancient Greece, and particularly of Athens, might present a particularly interesting field for analysis, since for two centuries it had the problem of the Persian Empire's vicinity—a problem which the Greek thinkers and politicians never stopped studying, each following his own point of view; the variations of which seem to us extremely instructive.

I. The data of the problem.

The Athenian and the Persian, the citizen of the Hellenic community and the Barbarian. The relations between these two

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elements, imposed by the geographic proximity of two dynamic societies, pose a series of questions. We know very little about the Persian point of view.We know much more about the Greek point of view, but these testimonials must be analyzed considering the chronology very carefully, first, because the point of view evolves; secondly because many Greek writings do not so much describe precisely the events they recount as the ideological construction grafted onto them; in addition, the research of modern historians could not avoid the deformation implied by the nature of their sources represented essentially by an Athenian discourse on the city's glorious past; however, these studies were considerably enriched during the last years diversifying their points of view: in a certain measure the history of the Mediterranean world at the time of Athen's greatest splendour has ceased to be a history of Greece told by Greeks.

The Athenians' way of creating the image of the Persian, or rather their way of creating a series of images, supplies the historian's raw material whose very richness is dangerous since it overwhelms all other sources. However, we would try not only to revaluate that evidence—a work already done by some historians—but also to show that these numerous Greek texts do not constitute the totality of Greek thought. To be more precise, let's say that in our opinion the designation "Greek thought" seems to be an inadequate indication of the Greek way of considering what was extraneous to them as well as their own internal relationship. The documents at our disposal in fact bear witness only to the ideology of the ruling groups of certain city states, among which Athens plays first and overwhelming role. In our opinion one cannot equalize the development of Greek philosophy with that of their concept of pan-Hellenism and of their relations with the Persians. As to the former, one can really speak of Greek philosophical thought because there were no philosophers other than the ones considered. In the latter case, on the other hand, the idea of the Foreigner, the Barbarian, in Herodotus as well as in Isocrates, does not seem to originate basically in a philosophical or historical thought non-existent outside the scope of a few specialists; on the contrary, its essential definition seems to belong to politics and therefore appears, in relationship to the former, to be deprived of real autonomy. It

is a particularly clear example of how an idea, in this case the concept of the *Other* and especially of the Persian, depends directly on the need of the time: its evolution follows the evolution of policy made in Athens.

II. Persian Wars and Athenian Imperialism.

1) *Interpretation of the Greek and Persian Worlds.*

The Greek's feeling of belonging to a community founded on common language, traditions and religion is very ancient. The idea in opposition to this is that of *barbaros* and this contrast represents above all a cultural diversity: "Barbarian" is whoever doesn't speak Greek and whoever, more generally, doesn't belong to the Greek civilization. The result is the acknowledgment of a difference which by no means precludes a direct contact. One could even say that the Greek's consciousness of his own originality is superficial: instead of putting first the fundamental difference existing between the political, economic and social organization of the Greek world and that of its neighbours beginning with the immense East, he is satisfied with secondary criteria, with the superficial feeling of belonging to one civilization, without trying to analyze the reasons for these cultural differences.

Practical politics furnish a perfect proof of the fact that consciousness of the difference doesn't cause any rupture. The Persians are partners integrated into the political game of the Greek cities; their strongest characteristic is above all their military and financial power. Since the Ionian revolt, when the Greeks of Asia turn for help and support to their European blood-brothers, they meet with an almost general lack of interest, very understandable if one realizes that the matter is a political problem of the *pros* and the *cons* and not of a fight against a mortal external enemy.[1]

[1] F. Will's analysis represents an interesting reaction to the tendency to reduce the military events of the end of the sixth and the beginning of the fifth century to a confrontation between Greece and Asia; beside *Le mond grec et l'Orient, le V siècle*, coll. "Peuples et Civilisation," Paris, 1972; see also "Notes et discussions: Deux livres sur les guerres médiques et leur temps." in *Revue*

The Persian wars do not mark any break. They are only a logical result of the embroilment of Greeks and Persians in the same political game and never constitute a battle between Greece and Asia. When the Persian general Datis extends his victorious Aegean expedition against Athens it is because he is pushed by Hippias: the ex-tyrant insists on obtaining a rapid submission of the town in which he still has some supporters. At Marathon, Miltiades commands citizens who decided to fight against the Persians in the same manner that they decided to oppose the Pisistratides of the Alkmenoides; the resistence party he succeeded in forming is not a patriotic party built up against the Barbarian who threatens the Greek freedom and civilization—it is a party composed of citizens decided on opposing the Persian campaign only as far as it concerns their own position in the internal political game in Athens.

The Plateans had been at Athens's side at Marathon, as they will be during the wars against Xerxes, salvaging the "honour" of Beotia—but only because the Athenian alliance gave their town a precious counterbalance to the Thebes' ambitions of hegemony in the Beotian confederacy. In all the events which we can judge with even minimal clarity, the fear of the Barbarian plays no role whatsoever: the Greek city-states ally themselves with or oppose the Persians as they ally themselves with or

de Philologie, 90, 1964, pp. 70-88. On the other hand we cannot follow V. Martin's "La politique des Achéménides: L'exploration prélude de la conquête" in *Museum Helveticum, 22,* 1965, pp. 38-48; it describes a great plan of universal conquest founded on Ahura Mazda's promise to give the Persian King "all the kingdoms of the earth." This vision gives the events of the period from 513 B.C. (at which might be dated Darius's great campaign against the Scythians) to 479 B.C. a coherence which confirms the Greek idea formed *a posteriori* (see for example Herodotus, VII, p. 8 or 137), but which is just as artificial. It is impossible to take literally the formulas of universal domination which flourish in the Achaemenide inscriptions, but which are only a repetition of formulas traditional in the Middle East. We can absolve Ahura Mazda of all suspicion of imperialism: he admonished the Achaemenide ruler just like the god Assur admonished the Assyrian kings. We cannot ascribe to this traditional ideology the motivation of the Achaemenide expansion; therefore we cannot attribute *a priori* to this expansion a systematic form due to its theocratic source. It would be better to investigate the role of war booty in those societies as well as the fact that the increase of the revenues, beginning with the royal ones, depends essentially on the increase of the subject population. These realities which might explain the interest of the Achaemenide sovereigns for Greece, still did not make them systematic conquerors decided on absorbing the Greek world at all times.

oppose each other. Ever since the war of 480-479 whose origin Herodotus himself identifies emphatically in one more appeal made by some Greeks to the Persians (VII, p. 6 and 138) Sparta and Athens opposed Xerxes, but the majority of the Greek world keeps prudently out of the military encounters or allies itself with the Persians.

2) *The Reconstruction of the Past: the Eternal Conflict Between Greece and Asia.*

These battles, of secondary importance for the Persian empire but vital for the great Greek city-states, will form the subject of our ideological reconstruction accompanied by a new definition of the difference between the Greeks and the Barbarians. This redefinition is above all the work of Athens, *i.e.* of Athenian intellectuals or of intellectuals frequenting the city which in the 5th century became the rally center of Greek thinkers. The Persian wars were only then transformed into a conflict between Greece and Asia. The themes developed by the great speakers of the time are revealing. They celebrate the glory of Athens by exalting the victories over the Persians, explaining their meaning by reference to well known myths; the comparison of these battles to those fought by Theseus against the Amazons, the prototypes of Asian invaders, transforms them into a continuation of the eternal fight against Asia.[2] This simplified but seductive image imposed mainly by the Athenian propaganda is still followed by many contemporary historical studies; the enticing power of this version is witnessed by the preference given the glorious theme of the great barbaric offensive against the Greek world surrounded by enemies, broken in 480 when the Carthaginians were defeated in Sicily at Himera and the Persians at Salamina. It is a highly symbolic simultaneousness but its meaning is only maintained by Ephorus and, contradicted by the silence

[2] See W. Kierdorf; *Erlebnis und Darstellung der Perserkriege*, Göttingen, 1966. There is a clear analogy with certain scenes represented on Athenian vases of the same period; they show not only a multiplication of pictures of Persians; but above all in these images the mythical elements (details of dress and weapons, attitudes) belonging to the traditional lore used to represent the Amazons are substituted for the real characteristics. (see A. Bovon, "La répresentation des guerriers perses et la notion de Barbare dans la première moitié du V siècle" in the *BCH, 87*, 1963, pp. 579-602).

or outright denial of other writers, it renders the present success of this theme all the more revealing.[3]

3) *The New Image of the Barbarian.*

a) *The political break.* We are here concerned with the manner in which this reconstruction of the recent past fundamentally changed the relations between Greece and the external world. As a result, the variation is enriched and to the cultural opposition is added the opposition based on political ideals. As a matter of fact, the Persian wars are exploited to establish more firmly the theme of Greek unity against the Barbarians, *i.e.* essentially against Persia. These two terms (Greek and Barbarian) are linked indissolubly and nourish each other. The increasing consciousness of the elements unifying the Greek world needs the idea of the Barbarian, and the latter becomes defined only by contrast to the world of which it forms the surroundings: the exterior. The deepening feeling of a break results from a political analysis particularly well discernible in the works of Herodotus. During the 5th century we see the forming of the idea of a conflict between Europe and Asia based particularly on the contrast between the world of cities on one hand—an environment in which human abilities could develop in freedom—and on the other hand the East dominated by a theocratic monarchy which generates a general servitude.[4]

[3] This theme appeared in H. Bengtson's *Griechen und Perser*, Munich, 1965; or in A.R. Burn's *Persia and the Greeks. The Defence of the West, c. 546-478 B.C.*, London, 1962. For a development of this problem see Ph. Gauthier's "Le parallèle Himère-Salamine au Ve et au IVe siècle av. J.C." in the *REA, 68*, 1966, pp. 5-32.

[4] While waiting for the publication of H. Hartog's thesis we might refer to S. Mazzarino *Il pensiero storico classico*, Bari, 1965; as well as the *Convegno sul tema: La Persia e il mondo greco-romano, Roma, 11-14 Aprile 1965*, Acc. Naz. dei Lincei, 1966, quaderno 76 (see particularly G. Pugliese Carratelli "Le guerre mediche e il sorgere della solidarietà ellenica" p. 147 ff.; C. Mossé, "Les rapports entre la Grèce et la Perse au IVe s. av. J.C." p. 177 ff. and R. Cantarella "La Persia nella letteratura greca" p. 489 ff.). Concerning the growing importance of political causality in Herodotus' works to the detriment of the themes of divine intervention or human vengeance, see J. de Romilly "La vengeance comme explication historique dans l'oeuvre d'Hérodote" in *REG*, 84, 1971, pp. 314-337. Among the many passages of Greek writers concerning the feeling of a political break between the Greeks and the Persians see *e.g.* Herodotus VII, 8; Æschylus *The Persians*, v. 56 or v. 242; Euripides *Helen*, v. 276. This association is repeated by later writers: e.g. see Plato, *Symposium*, 182 and Aristotle *Politics* I, 1252 b.

Herodotus' tale of the deliberations preceding the battle of Salamina demonstrates this concept: on one side the surging assembly of Greeks, and on the other the meeting of the council around Xerxes, a meeting majestic but sterile, since everyone cares only to please the Great King, anticipating his wishes. This superiority of the Greek debate to the Asiatic submission finds its logical proof during the battle in which the motivation of the Greeks overcomes the discipline of the Persian troops.

In his treatise *De aere, aquis et locis* Hippocrates gives us a particularly interesting analysis of this problem. It contains a study on the effects of the natural elements causing the difference between the European and the Asiatic nations whose characters are explained by the nature of the sun and of the water system and above all by the course of the seasons. It is evidently a theory of the originality of the two continents. However these physical explanations are completed by a political one considered by the physician to be of an even greater importance: he attributes a fundamental role to the monarchy which dominates Asia, corrupting the spirit and softening the hearts. And so we find in Hippocrates, expressed with a self-proclaimed scientific forcefulness, the two basic themes which gain acceptance in the 5th century: the recognition of the specificity of the two worlds, the Greek and the Persian, and the decisive importance of the political criteria in their differentiation.

b) *Asia as the warmonger*. This analysis leads to the presentation of the Persian wars as a deliberate aggression by the Achaemenide ruler.[5] Monarchy is in fact the rule of the *hybris,* of excess. The royal power is above all rules, or rather it transgresses them by its very nature; and one of the major transgressions perpetrated by the Asiatic sovereigns, Darius and Xerxes, is their desire to conquer Europe; the building of bridges over the sea is related to sexual deviations also characteristic of the despot too fond of violating all prohibitions. As a matter of fact the Persians, heirs to the Near East military arts, conduct a "modern" war

[5] This theme, which appears clear in *The Persians*, or in Herodotus, soon becomes a slogan, for example as quoted by Plato: (*Laws*, III, 698 b) "All the time of the Persian attack on Greece as well as on more or less all the nations inhabiting Europe..." or Isocrates (*Or.* IV, 68 ff.; XII, 48 ff., 196, etc.).

in which the importance of the troops is completed by the recourse to extensive engineering works and to machines.[6] Herodotus gives a purely political analysis of this technical reality foreshadowing the wars of the Hellenistic period, two centuries later: these practices, beyond the Greek cities' capabilities, constitute *hybris*. The Achaemenide rulers suffer from war folly and the bridges built over the sea constitute a double sin: they deny the sea element: they abolish the separation of Europe from Asia. Those are two complementary aspects of the same fundamental crime: the violation of nature. Thus the royal folly nourishes the war; but Herodotus' analysis goes further: the war is not only an enormous business (a question of presumption, of pride) but also a necessity for the royal power. The historian (III, 134) puts into the mouth of Darius' wife the reasoning according to which war helps to prevent secret plots and to enforce respect for the sovereign.

c) *The dividing line*. This theme of the link between monarchy and war will be respected by Plato and Aristotle in the form of a cause and effect relationship between tyranny and war.[7] Indeed, since Herodotus, the political split between Greek and Barbarian follows a very instructive pattern. It passes definitely between the world of city-states and that of the Persian monarchy, but it very explicitly places the tyranny regime and the Spartan monarchy at the side of the latter.[8] This dividing line ought not to surprise us since this new ideology was born and worked out in

[6] Beside the famous pontoons (boat bridges over the sea) the canal dug at the basis of the Acte peninsula or the stratagem concerning the construction of a dam between Attica and the island of Salamina (see G. Roux "Eschyle, Hérodote, Diodore, Plutarque raconte la bataille de Salamina" in BCH, 102, 1978, pp. 87-96) we can mention the results of excavations of Paphos on Cyprus which revealed a concrete example of the level achieved by the Persian poliorcetics * (see F.G. Maier, *Archäologie und Geschichte, Ausgrabungen in Alt-Paphos*, Constanz, 1973). The theme of these huge enterprises becomes a *leitmotiv* in the Greek literature; see Isocrates, *Or.*, IV, 89.

[7] Plato, *The Republic*, VIII, 566 ff.; Aristotle, *Politics*, V, 1313 b, 10.

[8] For an example of the Sparta-Asia association in Herodotus see VII, 3. The subject is continued in the 4th cent.: see for example Isocrates, *Or.* XII, 177 ff. in which the author places Sparta outside of the Greek world, associates its name with slavery and repeats the accusation brought first by Plato against its tyranny, *i.e.* that Sparta uses the war in order to get rid of potential rebels' opposition (180). As to culture, the Laceademonians are placed even below the Barbarians (208).

* From the Greek: the art of the seige.

Athens, but we should reach the resulting conclusions concerning its function and the circumstances of its creation.

4) *The New Ideology and Athenian Politics.*

a) *Athens, the see of democracy.* Athen's name had been indissolubly linked with the idea of democracy from the second half of the 5th century B.C. on, but the origins of this fact are much older. The city, remodeled by Clisthenes' reforms at the end of the 6th century B.C., becomes an object of internal struggles during the first decades of the 5th, out of which progressively develops the regime that will distinguish it. An episode of the second Persian war shows the point reached by the political thought of its ruling class in this period. On the very eve of the battle of Salamina, in order to put pressure on the allies who intended to abandon Attica to itself and to go over to the Peloponnesus, Themistocles threatens to leave for Italy with all the citizen of Athens. This anecdote reveals a rational and at the same time democratic concept of the city-state as equivalent to the total body of its citizens, a concept proving the rise of the urban *demos* out of which came the oarsmen who won the battle of Salamina. This identification of the city with its citizens appeared as a result of the laicization phenomenon started mostly by Clisthenes.[9] The roots planted in a territory full of myths become secondary; the essential divinities are now the polyadic gods who will follow the citizens wherever they go. This democratic city idea finds an exact echo in a passage of Aeschylos' *Persians,* removed by a few years only: while Athens is burning, the messenger answers the Queen who asks him whether the city is not yet in ruins, that "a city whose men remain alive still has a secure rampart." It is a development of the Pythic theme of abandoning the city walls for walls of wood.[10]

[9] See P. Lévêque and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Clisthène l'Athénien*, Paris, 1973.

[10] Æschylos: *The Persians,* v. 350. It might be compared with the tactics adopted by Athens in the Peloponnesian war; while in 480 B.C. the citizens fled from the city and took refuge in the "ramparts of wood," in the latter war they abandoned their land and took refuge behind the mighty walls of the city. In both cases the city is identified with its citizens and this identification allows for varying tactics. In Themistocles' time they leave the entire territory, including the urban centre and even consider the necessity of exile. In Pericles' time it is

As we see, the evolution of the conception of Greek vs. Persian took place in a city characterized by a democratic regime. Therefore it should not astonish us that this concept is by now founded essentially on opposing political ideas including bunches of notions that correspond even while they contrast with each other; the theme of Oriental riches, of a world of slavery and effeminacy is contrasted by the triad of poverty, liberty and virtue, characteristic of the Greek cities.[11] In this way Athens remodels the history of the Persian wars and uses it to build up a new image of the Barbarian. What is more, Athens, the democratic city, makes this history its own and utilizes it in tracing an ideological border which places Athens definitely at the very heart of the authentic Greek world, a city world which excludes tyrants and Spartan monarchs, rejected as associated with the countries of Oriental despotism.

b) *The Athenian empire.* The potential advantage to which Athens can put such a vision of the world is very clear. This analysis is confirmed by another reality characteristic of the city in the 5th century: while a democratic city, Athens is also an imperialistic one, and both traits are linked indissolubly since the empire is furnishing the means for the democratic policy whose benefits are reserved for citizens only. Now, we think that the image of the Barbarian imposed by the prevailing ideology is directly bound to the Athenian empire's very nature. It is enough to read Aeschylus' *The Persians* or Herodotus' writings to realize that the increasing separation from the Barbarian is not linked with contempt. After the divergence separating the two worlds has been well established, there still remains a certain curiosity for the universe whose specificity is acknowledged. Such a characteristic split between Greek and Barbarian has a

enough to flee the country-side and to exile themselves in the urban centre cut off from the exterior by its walls; the fleet and the empire allow the population to survive; what is more, by freeing it from the contingencies of the traditional city-states, they help it to realize and consolidate this superior form of the city, at one with the body of its citizens.

[11] See Herodotus, VII, 102 or IX, 122 and above all IX, 80 ff.; the description of the Persian camp after Plateae: the contrast of the sumptuous Persian meal compared to the mean Laconian one; but see also Democritus, fgt. 251: "poverty in a democratic state is preferable to what the sovereigns erroneously call happiness, just as freedom is preferable to slavery."

double meaning: on one hand it implicates the necessity of defence from a different world, potentially all the more threatening because it is a domain ruled by a monarch megalomaniac by definition, but on the other hand it contains the acknowledgment of Asia as a world apart whose organization, crazy though it be by the Greek cities' criteria, is quite natural and normal within its own limits.

Hippocrates' analysis of the physical laws which impose a discrimination between the population of Europe and Asia reiterates Herodotus' many passages showing the oriental nations submitting to a king. The free choice of monarchy as a regime is an act which does not make any sense to an Athenian of the classical era: it proves that the difference between the two continents is not due only to circumstances.[12] In our opinion this conception must be considered as very closely related to the nature of Athenian imperialism. The empire, as experienced by the Athenian democracy, is in fact the extent of territory in which the town exercises its hegemony only over other Greeks; centred in the Aegean, it includes the shores colonized long ago and therefore constitutes a threat to the kingdom founded by Cyrus, only as far as it reintegrates the cities of the western coast fringe of Asia Minor into the Greek political domain. From that point, at an ideological level, the image of an irrational Barbarian against whom Athens represents a secure rampart, but to whom they concede the possession of Asia's interior, recognized as specifically non-European, is quite sufficient. There exists a perfect correspondence between the imperialistic needs of Athens and the geographic collocation of the ideological rift separating the civilization of the cities from everything foreign and external to it.

In the same way pan-Hellenism is developed by Athens in this period for the internal use of the Greek world; its essential aim is to organize that world with the ruling city as its centre.

[12] See Herodotus, I, 96 ff. (The Medes and other oriental nations free themselves from the Assyrians and then choose a king to rule them. "within the the meaning of continent, all were independent; and then (by their own will) they again acquired a master"). It is the same with the Egyptians: II, 147 ("When they got their freedom back after the reign of the priest of Hephaistos, the Egyptians—being forever unable to live without a king—created twelve kings and divided all Egypt into twelve parts for them to rule.")

Its claims threaten the autonomy of the Greeks, not of the Persians, be it the matter of restoration of the temples destroyed during the Persian wars, or the foundation of a common colony in Italy and placing it under Athena's protection; or an invitation to the Greek cities to offer the first fruits of their harvest to Eleusis, the Athens-controlled sanctuary. It is not by chance that Themistocles, the democrat, advocates resistence against the Persians; just as it is certainly not by chance that, after his victory, he refuses to pursue the Persians into Asia proper. This attitude foreshadows the double function of the ideology worked out later: to stand security for the Athenian empire and to justify its geographic location.

III. The 4th Century. The Mutations of Pan-Hellenism.

1) *Congress Pan-Hellenism: the Reinsertion of the Persians in the Game of Politics.*

In the 4th century B.C. Athens, depressed because of its defeat in the Peloponnesian war, tries out, one after the other, different policies which apparently are the direct cause of the future development of the pan-Hellenic idea and therefore also the concept of the Barbarian. The Persian wars gave the first impulse to the pan-Hellenic idea but all hope of its concrete realization had been promptly ruined by the way Athenians used it for their exclusive profit and by the bipolarism created respectively around this city and that of Sparta. The latter, in order to gain alliance with the King of kings did not hesitate to acknowledge him as the possessor and sovereign of all Asia Minor; the needs of Sparta, with very few exceptions, concern the East much less than the ambitions of Athens. After the profound rift of the Peloponnesian war there is renewal of the pan-Hellenic movement. Only in a historical context can we fully understand the succeeding developments characterizing this phenomenon.[13] The

[13] The bibliography concerning these problems is very rich; we recommend particularly G. Dobesch, *Der panhellenische Gedanke in 4 Jh. v. Chr. und der "Philippos" des Isokcrates*, Vienna, 1968; and S. Payrau, "Considérations sur l'echec de quelques tentatives panhelléniques au IVe s. av. J.C.," in REA, 73, 1971, pp. 24-79.

rebirth of the pan-Hellenic idea is in fact linked with two other realities which at first seem to contradict it absolutely: the unceasing struggle between the cities and the return of the Persians in full force into Greek politics. We shall not describe the events in detail; we will simply state that the ideological rift between Greek and Barbarian created in the 5th century seemed to be empty of every practical effect since the change of the political set-up. After the period of Athens' greatness when she dared, very imprudently, to carry war into Persian Egypt, and after the shortlived hegemony of Sparta which forced this city into an exceptional break-off of its Persian alliance and into launching expeditions into Asia Minor, there is a swift return to a more traditional situation in which the Persians are again considered partners in the political game and systematically integrated in the ever-changing alliances. The career of Conon, the Athenian general defeated during the Peloponnesian war, becoming an admiral of the King of kings, then coming back to serve Athens again, can serve—from that point of view—as an example of many other similar careers.

Since 393 B.C., *i.e.* the first conference of Sardis, Sparta tries to conclude an alliance with Persia, and the delegates of other Greek cities hurry to follow her. This conference inaugurates a long period in which the Achaemenide ruler is raised to the role of arbiter. The "King's peace," signed at Sardis in 386 B.C. and renewed several times, installs peace among the Greeks, confirms the principle of the cities' autonomy and acknowledges the Persian sovereign as owner and ruler of all Asia, including the Greek city-states in Asia Minor. The Great King is even authorized to overthrow and conquer by military force those who rebel against the treaty. This spectacular reinstalment of the Persians in the political game was effected by way of the expedient of a renewed alliance with Sparta, founded on the sacrifice of Asia to the Achaemenidae and on the clause of the cities' autonomy, which aims above all at preventing Athens from rebuilding an empire. However, the policy of the latter, some reticences notwithstanding, did not differ fundamentally from that of her adversaries; even as she tries to reconstruct her empire, she takes care to give it a reassuring form and her principal aim in the Persian peace is to conquer a position equal to that of Sparta;

and she obtains it soon enough. Her diplomatic activity, culminating in the common peace of 362-361 B.C. which leaves Sparta out, is not directed against the Persian empire: the firmataries of the peace refuse to lend support to the satraps rebelling against Artaxerxes II.

Clearly what seems essential during the first half of the 4th century is a Greek world characterized by constant internal struggles, and parallel to that, by multiple efforts to organize a general peace. This great movement called congress pan-Hellenism admits the Persians as partners, even as privileged ones, because of their power; Athens no more has the strength needed to force the Greeks of Asia to join an empire from which the Persians are excluded; Sparta has never had any precise and continuous aims in the East. The rift created in the 5th century B.C. disappeared with the fall of the Athenian empire.

2) *The Pan-Hellenism of the Orators. The Abandonment of the Theme of the Specificity of Asia and of Europe.*

Meanwhile, beside the politician's pan-Hellenism there developed, in this first half of the 4th century B.C., a pan-Hellenism of orators characterized by its aggressiveness towards the Persians. During the Olympic games of 392 B.C., Gorgias, a Sicilian sophist, had made or published a speech in which, for the very first time, the theme of the conquest of Asia appears. From then on this idea is being constantly reiterated; since 388 B.C. by Lysias, in another Olympic speech, then in the 380's by Xenophon; Plato will do the same[14] and of course it will constitute one of the dominant ideas of Isocrates' works. It is evidently an important turning point in the predominant ideology of the preceding century which maintained the specificity of Europe and of Asia; now they return to what was considered a basic gift of nature and they revive, reversing them for their own advantage, the Great King's conquest plans. This fact requires a discord between

[14] Xenophon, *Anabasis*, I, 7, 4 ff.; III, 2, p. 23 ff. and particularly p. 26 ("We shall prove to the Hellenes that, if they are poor, it is because they want to be, for they have every freedom, bringing here to Asia those who now there lead miserable lives, to see them in opulence.") Plato, *Laws*, 736a and 740e (colonization as a means of regulation of the Greek cities) *The Republic* V, p. 471 b.

some thinkers' ideology and the rulers' practical policy. The new circumstances will help the readjustment.

3) *The Turning Point in the Middle of the 4th Century B.C.*

This aggressive form of pan-Hellenism remained without influence on practical politics until the middle of the 4th century. At this time it reached a turning point: in 355-354 B.C. the Athenians saw the last confederation they put together rise victoriously against them with Persian support, and had to accept a renewal of the "King's peace." It is truly the end of the Athenian empire. It produces a political change in the city: the moderates, Eubules, Diophantos, and then Aeschines, come to power and their essential policy, characterized by renouncing every vain trial of the empire's reconstruction, bears the mark of the thought of Xenophon and Isocrates.

a) *Athens' policy: the conjunction of the two pan-Hellenisms.* These have in fact worked out a common idea concerning the profound crisis then existing in Greece. Aware of the deterioration of social relations in the cities, provoked by the erosion of the middle classes which left only the rich facing the poor, they fought for a conclusive peace in Greece; and for Athens this meant in fact giving up definitively its whole policy of sea hegemony. This renunciation of the empire is the corner stone of their reasoning. For Xenophon and Isocrates the empire creates an external danger: it is the cause of war between Athens and her allies or other Greeks; and so plays into the hands of the Persians. In *Agesilas,* dated just about 355 B.C., Xenophon denounces the Persian see-saw policy which feeds the internecine wars and leaves Greece defenceless. The empire means another internal danger: war is costly, its profit uncertain, and the financial load weighing down the rich of the city jeopardizes the prosperity of the whole population. What is more, the systematic hiring of mercenaries, necessary in longlasting and far away wars, threatens the democratic institutions. Not only are their functions altered because the citizens can no more control the development of their operations, but even their very existence is threatened by subversion; in fact in the 4th century B.C. there is a recrudescence of tyranny as a direct result of this situation, the majority of the

new tyrants being past war chiefs.[15] The policy of the moderates in power corresponds perfectly with their ideology: one cannot miss the parallel between Xenophon's "Those who came back" and the policy of Attica's revaluation or of the transformation of Pireus from the centre of the empire to a great commercial harbour. For the coupled democracy-imperialism, whose essential support is the urban *demos,* they substitute the practice of peace and of moderate policy, leaning on the countryside and on the rich.

b) *Internal deadlock and external aggressivity.* However, these political choices end up in a blind alley: pacifism and efforts to reorganize a real citizen's army does not solve the problem of mercenaries. Their disappearance and the dangers they represent presupposes the solution, on the level of all Greece, of the social crisis which has contributed to their birth and allowed them to develop. Now there were no lands available for the settlement of tens of thousands of adventurers, except at the high cost of subjecting Greece to fresh social revolutions. Such a solution is of course excluded by pan-Hellenism's most important thinkers just as well as by the powers that be. In this background there appears a new variation in pan-Hellenism, or rather a growing importance given to the themes which, created at the beginning of the century, will modify the philosophy of relations with Asia. Beside the congress pan-Hellenism that consists in uniting the Greeks while coexisting with the Persians, to whom they concede Asia and a role in the Aegean world's politics, more and more consensus is won by an aggressive pan-Hellenism. The idea of the conquest of Asia acquires a growing importance. It is exalted by the professional speakers, but relegated to a secondary role by the chief politicians and even apparently denied by the new moderate government of Athens. But as a matter of fact the latter's policy, conservative and hostile to the traditional imperialism, puts into evidence the necessity of finding a solution for the social crisis by exporting it abroad and so it, too, helps the conquest idea to mature. Pan-Hellenism's new face reflects an ideological

[15] Aeneas the Tactician's *Poliorketika* constitutes a precious document about the military problems and their context in the period in question. Concerning the mercenaries see particularly XII, (5 on the tyranny installed at Heraclea in Pontus by a chief of mercenaries) and XIII.

preparation for an Asian war. The causes of this decision are to be found not only in the economic, social and political crises which upset Greece in the 4th century B.C. but also, and above all, in the blockage of every solution in the country itself. The result was a new image of the barbarians. A feeling of strangeness mixed with curiosity was sufficient for the great Athenian Empire built at the cost of Greeks, but the political aims of the ruling class in the middle of the 4th century required another image of the Persian. There developed then the vision of an Asian world not only separate from the world of city-states but, above all, populated by inferior human beings. After the mixture of curiosity and calculated distrust came the period of contempt, a justification of future plans.[16]

4) *Pan-Hellenism's Last Mutation: the Abandonment of Political Ideals.*

This manipulating of the image seems to be very evidently dependent on the political needs of the Greek ruling classes, and mainly the Athenian ones. In our opinion the development of Isocrates serves as a proof that politics furnish the determinant element of pan-Hellenic thought. The historian has soon understood how to use the Eastern war as a means to strengthen further the union of Greece, to free the Greeks of Asia and to secure riches for a society in crisis; but he still has to solve the problem of a commander-in-chief who will guide this great expedition.

During all the first half of the 4th century B.C. Isocrates stays within pan-Hellenism's original cadres, *i.e.* those of the city-states whose values have been raised to a higher unitary level, without being changed in any way. Thus in the *Panegyrics*, a speech given in 380 B.C., he talks about Athens, whose glorious past

[16] While Plutarch called Herodotus a "philobarbaros" Euripides, in one of his last tragedies (*Iphigenia in Aulis*, v. 1400-1401: "The Greek has to command the Barbarian, never... the Barbarian the Greek! He is fit only for slavery, the Greek for freedom!") and Xenophon (since *Anabasis*) adopt another attitude (see I, 7, 3 ff.: the traditional subject of Greek liberty as opposed to the servitude of the Barbarian becomes here downright scornful; the speech being put into the mouth of Cyrus the Younger lends it even more force); see also Isocrates, *Or.* V, 90-91, 101, 124, 137, 139; VII. 75, 150.

seems to guarantee a future better than the difficult present. The failures of the Athenian policy, constantly giving in to the temptation of a restricted imperialism oppressing other Greeks, the renewed deceptions inflicted on them by Spartan policy force the Athenians to leave in suspense the decisive problem: where to find a power whose hegemony would not be exercised at the very heart of the Greek world but which on the contrary would have the broader views needed to impose its might on the East for the greatest benefit of all the Greeks. The events themselves will solve this problem; within less than twenty years Philip II of Macedonia will raise his hand against Greece. During this struggle Demosthenes incarnates the traditional pan-Hellenism which aims to unite autonomous city-states, but the last hope of this programmed realization is extinguished at Chaeronea, in 338 B.C., when the Greek cities gather their armies for the last time to defend a common policy of which they are still the masters. In view of this traditional position, Isocrates' evolution is revealing: he rallies completely to the side of Philip II whom he sees now as the only chief needed by Greece. In his *Philip* speech given immediately after the provisory peace of 346 B.C. he asks Philip to lead Greece against Persia. Right after the battle of Chaeronea and shortly before his own death he congratulates the king on his victory. One may respect Isocrates' realism emphasizing, by contrast, Demosthenes' vain hopes, but one must also realize what is the meaning of this adherence to the Macedonian monarchy. Philip is a king, and above all a king who has already displayed violence inherent in this type of institution; he is a destroyer of cities (the Greeks cannot possibly have forgotten his razing Olynthes to the ground and reducing its inhabitants to slavery) and a violent warrior. His behaviour towards the bodies of his adversaries fallen at Chaeronea proves his barbarian character: he acts exactly like the Persians who at Thermopylae maimed the body of Leonidas, while Pausanias, the victor of Plateae, refused to revenge himself on cadavers.[17] Therefore Philip is a character absolutely foreign to the world of city-states, a character stained by *hybris*, by megalomania, like the worst of tyrants or Oriental

[17] See Herodotus, IX, 78-79: to the Aeginian who advises him to have Mardonios' body impaled in revenge for the beheading of Leonidas, Pausanias answers "...such behaviour is fit for Barbarians but not for Greeks..."

despots. Isocrates' support of such a monarch therefore acquires a particular meaning: pan-Hellenism goes through its last mutation, renouncing its political ideals which constituted an essential part of its definition ever since the 5th century B.C. The violence of this mutation reveals the hidden essence of pan-Hellenism and of its inherent concept of the Foreigner: they are but an ideological structure in direct dependence on political necessities. In the middle of the 4th century the problem consists in finding a way out of the Greek crisis without endangering the power of the ruling classes; the Macedonian barbarian serves as a means to maintain order and to export the internal contradictions of the cities as far as possible to the East. Therefore it is quite understandable that pan-Hellenism reinstates royalty after having been founded in opposition to it.[18]

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During almost a century and a half pan-Hellenism has developed, but it remained essentially coherent—whether it was the Athenian pan-Hellenism of the 5th century or congress pan-Hellenism or the aggressive pan-Hellenism of the Athenian orators of the 4th century. All those forms might be considered but different facets of a unique thought rooted deeply in the values characteristic of the city-states. The conception of the Greek and Barbarian worlds, worked out in the 5th century, constitutes a solid body of thought whose sole aspect—the concession of Asia to the Persians—becomes a problem during the first half of the 4th century, but only among certain intellectuals. In return the last mutation produces an expanded pan-Hellenism which denies its original definition, re-establishing that which was foreign to it by definition: the monarchy and, with it, the *hybris*. The fundamental cause of this process is the incapacity of the cities to resolve the crisis which strikes them and which nourishes a constant danger of social revolution. The Greek ruling classes,

[18] This process was rendered possible by the internal needs of Macedonia which exactly reflected those of Greece; see J.R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*, London, 1976. The author shows that the Macedonian king's plans against Asia constitute the basis of his foreign policy and can be understood only in the light of internal reasons: since the army constitutes the only unified corps on which the monarchy can rely, this fact directly conditions royal policy.

with the Athenian moderates in the foremost row, can neither accept the crisis threatening them nor solve it in Greece itself; Isocrates' way reflects the only possible solution.

As we see, the pan-Hellenic movement and the concept of the Barbarian endorsed by it do not seem independent (at the cross roads of history, philosophy, geography and political reflexion), but a simple piece of political propaganda. This fact explains why its evolution leads to a denial. In this context images of the Other, the Foreigner, the Barbarian, have been forged successively, at this epoch representing particularly the Persian; images which reveal only remotely a scientific curiosity for the outside world. In this way the mighty Persia with an acknowledged specificity and dominion is succeeded by an inferior Persia, unworthy to own the lands it is ruling. Of course this development is neither linear nor monolithic, but its outline is clear all the same; and it seems unsatisfactory to discard it, presenting instead a combination of fascination for a mysterious world and of fear of constant danger. In fact we ought not to seek the logic and the dynamics of this evolution in the very heart of this ideology but outside of it, in the succession of two different forms of imperialism.

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